


































































































































































. 



























I 



/ 










©rcat Captain?! 


CESAR 


A HISTORY OF THE ART OF WAR AMONG THE 
ROMANS DOWN TO THE END OF THE ROMAN 
EMPIRE, WITH A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE 
CAMPAIGNS OF CAIUS JULIUS CAESAR 


WITH 258 CHARTS, MAPS, PLANS OP BATTLES AND 
TACTICAL MANOEUVRES, CUTS OP ARMOR, 
WEAPONS AND ENGINES 


BY 


THEODORE AYRAULT DODGE 


// 


BREVET LIEUTENANT COLONEL UNITED STATES ARMY, RETIRED LIST; AUTHOR OF “ THE 
CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE,” “ A BIRD’s-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR,” 

“ PATROCLUS AND PENELOPE.. A CHAT IN THE SADDLE,” “GREAT 
CAPTAINS,” “ALEXANDER,” “HANNIBAL,” ETC., ETC. 



BOSTON AND NEW YORK 
HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY 
Cfje Etoctst&e Press, CamkiUge 
1892 



















(o \ 

a t 


Copyright, 1892, 

By THEODORE AYRAULT DODGE. 

All rights reserved. 



The Riverside Press, Cambridge, Mass., U. S. A. 
Electrotyped and Printed by H. O. Houghton & Co. 


THE AMERICAN SOLDIER 


WHO, NOT BRED TO ARMS, BUT NURTURED BY INDEPENDENCE, HAS ACHIEVED 
THE PROUDEST RANK AMONG THE VETERANS OF HISTORY 


ARE DEDICATED 




“ Faites la guerre offensive comme Alexandre, Annibal, Cesar , 
Gustave Adolphe, Turenne, le prince Eugene et Frederic; lisez, reli- 
lisez I’kistoire de leur quatre-vingt-kuit campagnes; modelez-vous sur 
eux, — c’est le seul moyen de devenir grand capitaine et de surprendre 
le secret de Vart; votre genie, ainsi Eel air E, vous fera rejeterdes max- 
imes opposees d celles de ces grands homines — Napoleon. 

“ La tactique, les Evolutions, la science de Voffcier de genie, de 
Vofferer d'artillerie peuvent s’apprendre dans les traites;—mais la 
connaissance de la grande tactique ne s’acquiert que par Vexperience 
etparl'Etude de Vhistoire des campagnes de tous les grands capitaines 
— Napoleon. 


PREFACE. 


♦ 


The present volume has been delayed nearly a year to 
enable the author to visit the theatre of Caesar’s campaigns 
and his many battlefields. To do this is almost a prerequi¬ 
site to writing intelligently on the subject. Familiarity with 
the topography gives a quite different understanding of the 
narrative of the ancient historians. Though Caesar’s Com¬ 
mentaries are among the most exact and picturesque of his¬ 
torical writings, it is by patient study alone that they can 
be understood otherwise than superficially; without suitable 
maps they cannot be understood at all. From the days of 
ingenious but far-fetched Guischard and Turpin de Crisse, 
topographical descriptions and charts have habitually been 
copied by one author from another, to the lot of neither of 
whom it has fallen to personally inspect the terrain; and 
many errors have been thus propagated. The author hopes 
that this volume is reasonably free from such. 

We owe a great debt to Napoleon III. for patronizing and 
defraying the expense of the systematic excavations and to¬ 
pographical and military studies which have culminated in 
his own and Colonel S toff el’s works on Caesar. To Colonel 
Stoffel we are peculiarly indebted for one of the most splen¬ 
did military histories which exists. The present author has 
made free use of both these works; and though he has per¬ 
sonally passed over all the ground covered by Caesar’s cam¬ 
paigns, it would savor of impertinence to seek to better the 



Vlll 


PREFACE. 


results of Colonel Stoffel’s long and accurate research or of 
the archaeological work of Napoleon. In all cases, however, 
the author has not been able to agree with these distinguished 
men; nor is the plan of this volume the one on which the 
other histories are based. The charts, while lacking the ex¬ 
treme accuracy of detail of the plates of Napoleon and Stoffel, 
will be found to answer every requirement, at a mere frac¬ 
tion of the cost of those works; and their insertion in the 
text will aid the average reader as large maps in a separate 
volume will not. 

This history of Caesar follows the narrative of the Com¬ 
mentaries, and whenever practicable quotes from them, so as . 
to retain the quaintness of their flavor, as far as is consist¬ 
ent with the space allowed. Quotations not ascribed to 
other sources are uniformly from the Commentaries. As 
classical names must at times be used, the author has not 
clung exclusively to the modern equivalents, but has inter¬ 
changeably used both. 

This volume pretends to be only a military history of 
Cassar. For clear and brilliant disquisitions on his state¬ 
craft or his personal career, or for the history of his era, the 
reader must go to other sources. But some of the best of 
the histories of Home are full of military errors. Even the 
great Mommsen is by no means free from them. In all the 
histories which pretend to cover the complicated political 
and absorbing social conditions of that century, the descrip¬ 
tion of military events is short and superficial. The author 
seeks to fill the gap. 

Many pages will be found too technical to interest the 
general reader; but they are essential to the tracing out of 
the history of the art of war. The legend at the head of 
each chapter will tell the reader what to skip. 

The very great array of facts which we possess with re- 


PREFACE . 


IX 


garcl to the military career of Caesar makes it hard to com¬ 
press all that should be said within the limits of even a large 
volume. But it is believed that no noteworthy fact has been 
omitted. The history of the art of war during the Empire 
has been cut down to very meagre limits; but though there 
were abundant wars, there was much lack of method in war 
during this period; and it may be said that to omit bodily 
the fourteen centuries from Caesar to the invention of gun¬ 
powder would not materially alter the general scope proposed 
for these biographies of the great captains. 

Some of the comment indulged in may seem to savor of 
’ hypercriticism. But though the author may not meet the 
views of all in what he says, the reader will at least give him 
credit for qualifying himself as well as may be by careful 
study of all the ancient authorities, of the best recognized 
modern critics, and by personal inspection of the ground. 
With the sole exception of Colonel S toff el, the author be¬ 
lieves that he is the only writer on this subject who has 
followed Caesar entirely around the Mediterranean basin. 

The principal sources of our knowledge of Caesar as a cap¬ 
tain are the Commentaries, Cicero’s speeches and other writ¬ 
ings, Dion Cassius, Plutarch, Suetonius, and Velleius Pater¬ 
culus; the best commentators are Guischard, Turpin de 
Crisse, Napoleon I., Lossau, Goler, Rustow, Napoleon III., 
and above all Colonel Stoffel, of whose lifework one cannot 

_ say too much. 


0 


TABLE OF CONTENTS 


CHAPTER PAGE 

I. Marius and the Army Changes. 110-86 b. c. . 1 

II. Sulla, Pompey. 90-60 b. c.21 

III. Caesar’s Youth, Education and Early Services. 

100-58 b. c.37 

IV. Caesar’s New Province. The Helvetii. 60-58 b. c. 50 

Y. The Battles of the Arar and Bibracte. June, 58 

b. c .68 

VI. Campaign against Ariovistus. August and Septem¬ 


ber, 58 b. c.. 

VII. The BelGjE. Spring of 57 b. c. .... 
VIII, Battle of the Sabis. July to September, 57 b. c. . 
IX. The Work of Caesar’s Lieutenants. 57-56 b. c. . 

X. The Rhine. Spring of 55 b. c. 

XI. Britain. Fall of 55 b. c.. 

XII. Cassivellaunus. Spring and Summer, 54 b. c. . 

XIII. Ambiorix. Winter, 54-53 b. c. .... 

XIV. The Treviri and Eburones. Spring, 53 b. c. . 

XV. Vercingetorix. Winter, 53-52 b. c. 

XVI. Avaricum. Late Winter and Early Spring, 52 b. c. 

XVII. The Siege of Gergovia. Spring, 52 b. c. . 

XVIII. Labienus’ Campaign. Spring, 52 b. c. 

XIX. The Siege of Alesia. Summer and Fall of 52 b. c. 

XX. The Battle of Alesia. Fall of 52 b. c. 

XXI. The Bellovaci. January to April, 51 b. c. 

XXII. UXELLODUNUM. SPRING OF 51 B. C. 

XXIII. Gesar’s Method. 

XXIV. Caesar’s Army. 

XXV. Camps, Sieges and Ballistics. 


82 

100 

113 

128 

150 

164 

177 

190 

210 

227 

238 

252 

270 

283 

300 

310 

324 

338 

352 

381 






Xll 


TABLE OF CONTENTS. 


XXVI. The Opening of the Civil War. December, 50, 

to May, 49 b. c.400 

XXVII. Brundisium and Massilia. February to April, 

49 b. c.422 

XXVIII. Ilerda. April to June, 49 b. c. . . . 438 

XXIX. Good Manceuvring. June, 49 b. c. . . . 454 

XXX. Massilia, Gades, Africa. April to September, 

49 b. c..474 

XXXI. Epirus. November, 49, to February, 48 b. c. . 493 

XXXII. Dyrrachium. March to May, 48 b. c. . . 515 

XXXIII. Caesar’s Defeat. May, 48 b. c. . . . 529 

XXXIV. Retreat from Dyrrachium. May, 48 b. c. . 541 

XXXV. Pharsalus. June 29, 48 b. c.557 

XXXVI. Alexandria. August, 48, to March, 47 b. c. . 577 

XXXVII. Veni, Vidi, Vici. May and June, 47 b. c. . 604 

XXXVIII. Ruspina. October and November, 47 b. c. . 619 

XXXIX. Intrenched Advance. December, 47 b. c. . 640 

XL. Ucita. January, 46 b. c.659 

XLL Thapsus. February, 47 b. c.677 

XLII. Spain. December, 46, to August, 45 b. c. . 695 

XLIII. Munda. March, 45 b. c.712 

XLIV. The Man and Soldier.731 

XLV. Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar .... 755 

XLVI. The Art of War of the Roman Empire . . 768 

Appendix A. Casualties in Some Ancient Battles . 781 

Appendix B. Some Ancient Marches.782 

Index.783 



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 


■ ♦ 

PAGE 

Legion of Second Punic War.3 

Marius’ Legion .......... 8 

Section of short Quinquireme . ..• . 14 

Harbor ..15 

Route of Cimbri and Teutones . ..17 

Battle of Aquae Sextae ......... 19 

Gallic Cuirass ........... 20 

Battle of Chaeronaea ......... 22 

Iberia ............ 28 

The Mediterranean ..31 

Asia Minor . . . . . . . . . . .33 

Ancient Helmet .......... 36 

iEgean ............ 41 

Cape Carvoeiro .......... 45 

Caesar’s Provinces .......... 48 

Gallic Battle-Axe.49 

Gaul 55 

Routes of the Helvetii......... 59 

Caesar’s Wall and Sections of Rhone Bed ..... 61 

Caesar’s Route across the Alps.65 

Theatre of Helvetian Campaign.67 

Camp at Sathonay.69 

Operation near Toulon ......... 73 

Battle of Bibracte.^5 

Caesar, the Citizen. (Vatican).81 

The Rhine and the Germans.84 

March against Ariovistus.66 

Vesontio. ^ 

Q9 

Ariovistus’ Manoeuvre.^ 






















XIV 


LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 


Battle against Ariovistus ........ 96 

Gallic Shield.99 

Vesontio to the Axona ......... 102 

Camp on Axona .......... 105 

Bridgehead on Axona ......... 105 

Profile of Camp .......... 106 

Ditches at Camp-Gates.107 

Battle of the Axona ......... 108 

Axona to Sabis .......... Ill 

Battle of the Sabis .. 115 

Battle of the Sabis. Second Phase.119 

The Sabis to Namur ......... 123 

The Town of the Aduatuci ........ 124 

Winter-Quarters, 57-56 B. c. . . . . . . . . 126 

Caesar, early in Gallic War (Campo Santo, Pisa) . . . 127 

Octodorus Valley .......... 129 

The Venetan Country ......... 132 

Distribution of Legions, 56 b. c. . . . . . . . 134 

A Venetan Town .......... 135 

Bay at Quiberon .......... 137 

Theatre of Sabinus’ Campaign ....... 140 

Camp du Chastillier ......... 141 

Sabinus’ Battle .......... 142 

Theatre of Crassus’ Campaign ....... 143 

Crassus’ Battle .......... 145 

The Morini and Menapii ........ 147 

Light-Armed Soldier ......... 149 

Normandy to the Rhine 152 

Rhine and Meuse.......... 154 

The Rhine ........... 158 

The Rhine Bridge (cross section) ...... 160 

The Rhine Bridge (elevation) ........ 161 

The Rhine Bridge (plan).. 

Gallic Horseman, from a Sarcophagus.163 

Gaul to Britain .......... 166 

Gallic Swords.. 

Britain ........... 181 

Gallic Soldier wounded, from a Sarcophagus.189 




















LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 


xv 


Winter-Quarters, 54-53 b. c.191 

Camp at Aduatuca.195 

Cicero’s Camp.198 

Caesar’s March.201 

Battle against Ambiorix ......... 203 

New Camps ........... 205 

Attack on Labienus’ Camp ........ 206 

Caesar, from a Coin .......... 209 

Campaign against Nervii and other Tribes.211 

The Menapii Campaign ......... 213 

The Treviri Campaign ......... 215 

Pursuit of Ambiorix.218 

The Three Columns ......... 219 

Cicero at Aduatuca . . . . . . . . . 223 

Winter-Quarters, 53-52 b. c. . . . . . . 225 

Gallic Helmet .......... 226 

Central Gaul .......... 229 

The Province ........... 233 

Caesar’s March to his Legions ....... 234 

Agendicum to Avaricum ........ 235 

Gallic Horseman, from a terra-cotta Statuette .... 237 

Avaricum ........... 241 

Terrace at Avaricum (plan) ....... 242 

Terrace at Avaricum (section) . ..243 

Gallic Wall . 245 

Avaricum to Gergovia. 249 

The Elaver. 250 

Gergovia and Vicinity ......... 253 

Larger Camp at Gergovia ........ 255 

Smaller Camp .......... 256 

Profile of double Trench ........ 256 

Profile of Ground from smaller Camp to Gergovia .... 261 

Gergovia from Koche Blanche ....... 262 

Gergovia to Agendicum.* 268 

Labienus’ Campaign.271 

Battle of Lutetia .......... 273 

Agendicum to Alesia ......... 278 

Battle of the Vingeanne ......... 280 


















XVI 


LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS . 


Gallic Swords ........... 282 

Alesia ............ 284 

Alesia, from the Northwest ........ 287 

Alesia, from the South . . . . - . . . 287 

Alesia, from the Southeast ........ 289 

Alesia, from the Northeast ........ 289 

Profile of Work .......... 292 

Face of Work .......... 293 

Lilia and Stimuli .......... 294 

Ciesar, late in Gallic War (British Museum) .... 299 

Battle of Alesia .......... 302 

Winter-Quarters, 52-51 b. c. . . . . . . 307 

Campaign against Bituriges . . . . . . . 311 

Campaign against Bellovaci........ 314 

Fight of Bellovaci.315 

Camp at Mt. St. Pierre ........ 316 

Section of Wall and Ditch . . . . . . . .317 

Theatre of Bellovacian Campaign ...... 320 

Combat with Bellovaci ......... 321 

Caninius’ March .......... 325 

Uxellodunum ........... 326 

Uxellodunum, from the South ....... 328 

Uxellodunum, from the North ....... 328 

Mound and Tower ......... 331 

Winter-Quarters, 51-50 b. c. . . . . . . . . 332 

Gallic Horseman, from a terra-cotta Statuette .... 336 

Tribes of Gaul........... 337 

Physical Features of Gaul ........ 342 

Early Cohorts .......... 354 

Csesar’s Cohort .......... 354 

Maniple of 120 Men ......... 356 

Maniple of 200 Men ......... 357 

Muli Mariani ........... 357 

Legion in one Line ......... 358 

Light-Armed Man .......... 358 

Legionary ready for Battle . . .- . . * . . . 358 

Legion in two Lines ......... 360 

Legion in three Lines ......... 361 

















LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. xvii 

Cesar’s Legion.361 

Seven Legions in three Lines.362 

Turma.364 

Ala in two Lines.364 

Ala in three Lines .......... 364 

Agmen Manipulatim.365 

Agmen Centuriatim ......... 366 

By Lines to the Right ..367 

By Wings to the Front ......... 367 

March forward in Square . 369 

Army on the March . . . .'.371 

Gallic Shield .......... 380 

Caesar’s Camp.382 

Camp Wall (section).383 

Cohort Tents (Hyginus) ......... 385 

Section of Mound ......... 388 

Plan of Approaches to a Town ....... 389 

Musculus, light .......... 391 

Musculus, strong .......... 391 

The Vinea ........... 392 

Pluteus (three styles) ......... 392 

Tower ............ 394 

Ram and Tongs .......... 395 

Telenon ........... 396 

Catapult.397 

Ballista ........... 397 

Scorpio ............ 399 

Crassus’ Routes .......... 402 

Battle of Carrhae.403 

Italy.410 

Corfiniuin ........... 418 

Caesar, early in Civil War (Berlin) ...... 421 

Brundisium ........... 424 

Italy, Spain, Epirus ......... 430 

Pompey’s Spanish Legions ........ 436 

Ilerda and Vicinity ......... 439 

Attack on Ilerda .......... 444 

Ilerda, from the Northeast . . . . % . • • 446 


























XV111 


LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 


Rescue of Convoy.451 

Signum ............ 453 

Artificial Ford .......... 455 

Theatre of Operations near Ilerda ....... 458 

Siege of Massilia .......... 475 

Vicinity of Massilia . ........ 477 

Works at Massilia ......... 479 

Farther Spain ........... 481 

Utica and Vicinity ......... 485 

Epirus and Macedonia ......... 497 

Caesar and Antony join . * . . . . . . . 506 

Caesar’s March to Dyrrachium . . . . . . .511 

Theatre of Dyrrachium ........ 512 

Dyrrachium, Theatre of Operations . . . . . .517 

Combat of Ninth Legion ........ 520 

Caesar before Dyrrachium ........ 523 

Attack ou Sylla .......... 525 

Battle of Dyrrachium. Pompey’s Attack ..... 532 

Battle of Dyrrachium. Caesar’s Attack ..... 535 

Aquilifer ........... 540 

Situation, June 6 ......... 546 

Plain of Thessaly .......... 549 

Pharsalus Plain .......... 555 

Roman Coin with Civic Wreath ....... 556 

Armies at Pharsalus ......... 561 

Battle of Pharsalus ......... 559 

After the Battle of Pharsalus ....... 567 

Ancient Helmet .......... 576 

Alexandria ........... 578 

Egypt ............ 580 

Second Naval Battle ......... 591 

Battle at the Mole .......... 593 

Battle of the Nile (Terrain) ....... 599 

Battle of the Nile .......... 601 

Asia Minor ........... 605 

Battle of Nicopolis .......... 607 

Illyricum ........... 609 

Theatre of Zela . . '.612 






















LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 


xix 


Battle of Zela .......... 614 

Triumphal Car.618 

North Africa .......... 620 

Theatre of African Campaign ....... 624 

Battle of Ruspina (first phase) ....... 631 

Battle of Ruspina (second phase) ....... 632 

Battle of Ruspina (third phase) ....... 634 

Ruspina Camp .......... 638 

Ucita Plain ........... 646 

Fight at Ucita .......... 648 

Lines of Battle at Ucita ........ 650 

Ravine Fight ........... 653 

Ucita Lines ........... 656 

Ancient Helmet ....... ... 658 

Cjesar and Varus .......... 661 

In Line of Battle .......... 663 

Labienus’ Stratagem ......... 666 

March to Agar . . . • • • * • ♦ • 669 

Zeta Raid .....•••••• 670 

Tegea.678 

Thapsus and Vicinity.680 

Battle of Thapsus .......... 684 

Spain .... ....... 696 

Theatre of Spanish Campaign.698 

Corduba. 700 

Corduba to Munda ...•••♦••• 702 

Attegua.^64 

Roman Cuirass . . • • • • • . • • * 711 

Battle of Munda .. 

Csesar as Pontifex Maximus (Vatican).754 

Triumphal Car. 























































. 

































































CiESAR. 


» 

I. 

$ 

MARIUS AND THE ARMY CHANGES. 110-86 B. C. 

Cesar’s legion was more like the Greek phalanx than like the legion of the 
Second Punic War. The latter had intervals between maniples equal to maniple 
front, and the maniples stood checkerwise. Each man occupied a space five 
feet square. The material of the legion was of the highest order — the burgess- 
soldier of the simple republic. But gradually the professional soldier came 
into vogue ; the citizens avoided military duty; and a less reliable material 
filled the ranks. Marius first enlisted men solely for their physical qualifica¬ 
tions ; and foreign mercenaries were added to the army. The general, not the 
republic, claimed the soldier’s fealty. Arms and equipment remained the same, 
but the trustworthiness of the soldier decreased, and the intervals in the line 
of battle were lessened. The cohort was no longer a body of citizens marshaled 
on a basis of property-standing, but a body of from three hundred to six 
hundred of any kind of men, and the legion was marshaled in two or three lines 
of cohorts. The army ceased to be a national militia, but was composed of 
regulars and auxiliaries. Ballistics and fortification were improved. Sieges 
grew to be more expertly managed. The fleets gained in importance. Marius’ 
great work was the change he wrought in the army ; but he was also the means 
of rescuing Rome from the invasion of the Teutones and Cimbri, the former 
of whom he defeated at Aquae Sextiae in Southern Gaul, and the latter at 
Vercellae in Northern Italy. Both victories redound much to his credit. 

The legion with which the Romans vanquished the Gre¬ 
cian phalanx, and which gallantly took the fearful punish¬ 
ment inflicted on it by Hannibal, again and again facing 
destruction with unflinching courage, until the Carthaginians, 
exhausted by attrition, were forced to abandon Italy, was 
a very different body of men from the enthusiastic legion 



2 


CAESAR'S LEGION. 


which Csesar led victorious to the four quarters of the then 
known world. Curiously enough, the formation of Caesar’s 
legion more nearly approached that of the “simple phalanx’ 
of the Greeks than that of the splendid body of burgess- 
soldiers, whose stanch front to disaster makes the Second 
Punic War so memorable a page in the annals of Roman 
courage and intelligence. Caesar’s array in line of battle 
did not differ as greatly from Hannibal’s phalanx in the 
later battles of this war, as it did from the legion of Marcel- 
lus or Nero. At Asculum, Herdonia and Zama, Hannibal’s 
army was set up in two or three lines of legionary phalanxes, 
so to speak. Adopting the quincunx or checkerwise forma¬ 
tion by maniples as the typical idea of the legion of the 
Second Punic War, Caesar’s army, during all his campaigns, 
was set up more like Hannibal’s phalanx, and at times very 
nearly approached it. 

Let us see how the change came about. 

The legion of the Second Punic War was a body composed 
of citizens rendering service according to the classes of Ser- 
vius Tullius. This service was as much a privilege as a duty, 
and was jealously guarded. Only burgesses with a given 
amount of property were allowed to serve. Those who had 
less than twelve thousand five hundred asses were excluded 
from the right. They were proletarii , having some slight 
means, and capite censi , having nothing and reckoned merely 
as so many head of men. 

The material of which the legion was made was thus of the 
very highest order; and originally the armament and place 
in the legion were determined by the class-rating. But later 
these were made to depend on length of service, so that the 
youngest soldiers, from seventeen to twenty-five years of age, 
were velites or light troops; those from twenty-five to thirty, 
liastati or heavy troops of the first line; those from thirty to 


EARLY LEGION. 


3 


forty, principes or heavy troops of the second line; those 
from forty to forty-five, triarii or reserves of the third line. 

The light troops acted as skirmishers. The legionary 
soldier occupied a space about five feet square. The lines 
of hastati and of principes stood in maniples of one hundred 
and twenty men each, twelve front by ten deep, and between 


< -, 10Q FT 


mmmmmmmmnqni 


f HASTATI 




cn m m m m m m m m ml* 


$ PRINCIPES 


c;; □ □ □ □ c 0:::: 0 - D0 c - □—□ ^ OS 


' TRIARII 
i* VEUTCS 


Legion of tlie Second Punic War. 


each two maniples was an interval equal to maniple front. 
The lines were some two hundred and fifty feet apart, and the 
maniples of the principes stood behind the intervals of the 
hastati. The triarii maniples had but sixty men, and stood 
behind the hastati intervals. 

* 

There were ten maniples in each of the three lines, so that 
there were of line troops twelve hundred hastati, twelve hun¬ 
dred principes and six hundred triarii. To these must be 
added twelve hundred (or more) velites, making forty-two 
hundred footmen in the legion, of whom, three thousand 
were heavy. 

There were three hundred cavalry in each legion, whose 
place was on the flanks. The velites often occupied the 
intervals of the triarii. The details of the formation are 
fully given in the volume on Hannibal. 

This body proved to have extraordinary mobility and 
capacity to meet unusual conditions, and with the discipline 


i 




4 


CAIUS MARIUS. 


and esprit de corps natural to the perfect material of which 
it was composed made an unequaled body of troops. The 
wars of the third century b. c. fully proved the qualities of 
the legion so organized. It was at its very best. 

The legion of Caesar’s era was quite a different body. 
Changes had grown up in the state and army which affected 
the matter of service and thus the legion; and a number of 
marked alterations were brought about during the times of 
the civil wars. The legion descended to Caesar in a new 
shape, one that Marcellus and Nero and Scipio would not 
have recognized. 

Caius Marius is a more noteworthy figure in history from 
his rugged, uncouth personality and his startling political 
success and failure than from his merit as a captain. 
Though unquestionably able as a leader, though Rome owed 
to him the victory at Aquse Sextiae, which delivered her from 
the Cimbri and Teutones, his position in military annals was 
more distinguished by the new organization of the Roman 
army than by any other contribution to the art of war. 

When internal disquiet began to monopolize the thought 
and action of the citizens of the Roman republic, the army 
was not long in feeling its influence for the worse. The civil 
wars sadly marred the soldierly sentiments of the Romans, 
but it was Caius Marius who first gave a serious downward 
impetus to the character of the army. Long before his time 
many of the old Servian methods had got changed or dis¬ 
tinctly modified. The minimum property which entitled a 
citizen to the privilege of serving had been reduced to four 
thousand asses. The armament of the legionary had ceased 
to be determined by census-rating; it had, as above stated, 
grown to be fixed by length of service. Wealth and luxury 
had supplanted the ancient habits of simplicity. The bur¬ 
gesses gradually sought to avoid service; the proletariats 


POOR MATERIAL IN LEGION. 


5 


found in it a means of improving their condition. A certain 
number of campaigns were no longer essential to secure 
political preferment. The burgess-cavalry had given up 
serving in the field, and become a sort of guard of honor. 
The avoidance of military duty by the rich made it impossi¬ 
ble to raise large forces with rapidity by the simple means of 
calling out the classes; and yet, as after the battle of Arausio, 
contingencies occurred when large levies must be instantly 
made. The new barbarian territories of Rome had begun to 
furnish cavalry, such as the heavy horse of Thrace and the 
light irregulars from Numidia, as well as light infantry, such 
as the Ligurians and the Balearic slingers; but the heavy 
foot had remained Italian. 

It was Marius who first gave every free-born citizen, how¬ 
ever poor, an equal right to serve. The heavy infantry, has- 
tati, principes, triarii, were all reduced to a level, and it was 
the officers who decided, from the qualifications of the man, 
where and with what arms each soldier should be allowed to 
serve. The armament of all the heavy foot was made the 
same, and gladiators were employed as masters of arms to 
teach the recruits the use of their weapons; while Publius 
Rutilius, Marius’s favorite comrade and fellow legate in the 
African war, compiled a system of tactics for the new legion. 

A son of the people, when in 107 B. C. Marius had attained 
consular rank, he found his advantage in raising his army, 
not from the self-respecting classes, but from men he could 
so handle as to subserve his purpose of gaining the supreme 
control. Later leaders, Sulla, Crassus, Pompey, followed in 
the steps of Marius. Lender such leadership the army soon 
became another body, no longer representative of Roman 
courage, honesty and patriotism. 

The right to serve in the army ceased to be a privilege, — 
the sole road to civic honors. The wealthy citizen would no 


6 


SOLDIER'S OATH. 


longer consent to serve. Bodily exercises were neglected. 
The ranks were filled, not by representatives of every class, 
rich and poor, but by the proletarii; and it was not long be¬ 
fore there crept into the ranks numbers of men from peoples 
tributary to Rome, freedmen, strangers and slaves. Even 
the criminal classes were greedily recruited, and Marius once 
made a body-guard of slaves. Some veterans did service in 
exchange for grants of land, and answered the call for duty 
as evocati , having special privileges. 

The legions were not now divided into simple Roman and 
allied. In the Social War, Roman citizenship was granted 
broadcast to the Italians, and the legions were composed of 
Romans, auxiliaries, provincial troops and mercenaries. The 
test of Marius was simply personal size and strength. Char¬ 
acter went for nothing. Cavalry was raised in a manner 
similar to the infantry, and mostly from foreign elements. 
If the knights still consented to serve, it was only in posts of 
peculiar honor. The ancient rules for raising men were utterly 
disregarded. Any one ready to pay could secure freedom 
from service; any one physically qualified could bear arms. 

The oath of the soldier was no longer an oath to serve the 
republic; he swore personal fealty to the general. The grow¬ 
ing necessity for keeping troops long under arms, which fol¬ 
lowed the extended conquests of Rome, made generals resort 
to every means to prevent their forces from disbanding. 
Gradually the honorable service of the Roman citizen to the 
fatherland got prostituted to the low grade of soldier of 
fortune. Mercenaries and standing armies took the place 
of voluntary service and of armies called out from necessity 
alone. The conquered provinces were placed under procon¬ 
suls, each with a standing army and unlimited power, and 
were farmed out for revenue with the inevitable result. Rome 
was following in the footsteps of Greece. 


INTERVALS. 


7 


This change from the old method of classified personal 
service rendered essential corresponding changes in the mar¬ 
shaling of the legion. The ancient distinction of principes, 
hastati and triarii disappeared, and all troops were either 
heavy or light. The inherited arms and equipment were not 
materially altered. The old numerical force of the legion, 
say four thousand to six thousand heavy infantry and three 
hundred heavy cavalry as the normal strength, was retained; 
but the light troops, now all raised from the conquered prov¬ 
inces, were largely increased, both foot and horse, and were 
no longer an integral part of the legion. The horse grew in 
importance and effectiveness, for the Roman horseman had 
imitated the better models of light cavalry which his many 
wars in every land, from Iberia to the distant Orient, had 
afforded him. This improvement was traceable in the heavy 
cavalry in a lesser degree. From about one tenth of the 
numerical force of the foot, the horse grew to the proportion 
of one seventh or at times more. 

The number of legions in a consular army was no longer 
four, but ran up to any given number, even to ten, not count¬ 
ing the auxiliaries, horse or foot. Elephants and ballistic 
machines came into common use. A legion in the field had 
thirty small catapults and ballistas, each served by ten men. 
Still, as with Alexander, these machines were not employed 
in battle, but in the attack and defense of defiles, in cross¬ 
ing rivers, and in the attack and defense of camps and other 
works. 

Up to the time of Marius, the quincuncial form of the 
legion was retained, and the intervals still remained equal to 
the maniple front. But when the legions grew to be com¬ 
posed of inexpert recruits, not as in the early days of men 
trained to war from their youth, the individuality of the 
legionary could no longer be relied upon. Moreover, the 


8 


MARIUS’ LEGION. 


Romans in their wars with Germanic barbarians and Orien- 

• 

tal masses had found that the always present danger of the 
enemy forcing his way into the intervals grew more serious as 
the troops deteriorated in quality. This difficulty had for¬ 
merly been obviated by moving the principes up into or close 
behind the intervals of the hastati. But Marius introduced 
another organization, the setting up of the legion in three 
lines of cohorts. The thirty legionary maniples, each of two 
centuries, were given up. The word cohort remained, but the 
body consisted no longer of a maniple each of hastati, prin¬ 
cipes and triarii, with velites and a turma of horse; it was 
a body of from four to six maniples of four, five or six hun¬ 
dred legionary soldiers. At first the intervals remained; the 
five feet space of each soldier, the ten deep file and the dis¬ 
tance between lines were not altered; the cohorts had forty, 

• 

l ~~" , 1 . i L.. ' I r~ ‘ I f— ■ 1 f 

2- r--i i ‘— i u ~ :~:z . i 


Marius’ Legion. 

fifty or sixty files. Shortly the intervals between cohorts 
began to diminish with the individual trustworthiness of the 
legionary, and the distances beween lines were increased to 
three hundred feet. These lines were now known as first, 
second and third; and the first had four, the second and third 
each three cohorts. The three cohorts in second line stood 
opposite the diminished intervals of the first, the third line 
cohorts at the flanks and opposite the centre. The legionary 
eagle was still carried by the primipilus of the first cohort of 
the third line, and each cohort had its own special ensign 
( signum ). The legionaries of first and second lines, it is 
thought by some, were the soldiers who were called antesig- 






















MARIUS' MARCHES. 


9 


nani; in the third line cohorts were the bravest and strongest 
soldiers; but they were no longer the triarii. 

Upon this formation were grafted, at times not easily deter¬ 
mined, yet other changes. The ten cohorts stood in two lines, 
five in each; or instead of ten there were fifteen cohorts, each 
of two maniples, and five of these were in each line. The 
files were now and then split and doubled, making a five deep 
cohort of double length of front, which in line would close up 
a full interval. Finally, by a process of steadily decreasing 
intervals, the cohorts came to all but join each other, and the 
legion had again become a phalanx. This formation without 
intervals was not invariable. Caesar generally set up his 
cohorts with intervals more or less wide. But a leg-ion whose 
first line was nearly a solid body was not uncommon. The 
ancient quincunx had disappeared. This was the inevitable 
result of the loss of the old Roman patriotism, discipline and 
stanchness in the legionary soldier, and of his being replaced 
by a far inferior man who needed to be held well in hand to 
force him to his work. Finally, the eagle found its way into 
the front line, but the word antesignani remained, applied to 
a special body, of which more will be told anon. 

The use of the testudo-formation grew into a huge rectan¬ 
gle, much like the modern square against cavalry, for which, 
indeed, in the Romans’ Oriental wars it was frequently used. 
On open ground, marches were sometimes made in squares, 
like that of the phalanx of Brasidas — agmen quadratum. 
Marius especially excelled in his dispositions for the march. 
In the war against Jugurtha, he is said to have moved in a 
column by legions. Sulla with the cavalry and Manlius with 
the slingers, bowmen and Ligurians covered the column on 
right and left. In the van and rear, under command of mili¬ 
tary tribunes, were some cohorts in light marching order, 
and scouts in quantities were on the flanks. 


10 


DISCIPLINE. 


In battle order, the Roman legions stood in the centre, the 
auxiliaries on the flanks, the velites in the spaces between 
bodies, on the flanks, or in front and rear as needed. Cavalry 
began to be more of an arm, and was hurled in masses on the 
enemy or employed to protect the foot. It no longer kept its 
old stand on both flanks. The method of fighting was not 
much altered, but grand tactics grew apace, until they reached 
their highest Roman development under Caesar. 

Other changes of even more importance were made in this 
period. The office of dictator, that is, the supreme control, 
was the aim of the ambitious; it was their means of gaining 
possession of the state. The legates grew to greater impor¬ 
tance and acquired more and more the command of legions 
and armies. They were the general officers. The military 
tribunes became cohort-commanders, and the centuries were 
commanded by centurions. The troops were still drilled and 
exercised in gymnastics, but not so the citizens. Soldiers, to 
keep them from idleness and turbulence, were put upon the 
public works, especially the great military roads. 

The soldier’s pay was doubled by Caesar at the opening of 
the Civil War. The footmen received ten asses a day; cen¬ 
turions twenty, cavalrymen thirty, subject to certain deduc¬ 
tions, as of old, for rations, arms, equipments and horses. 

In this era, discipline and esprit de corps were in a transi¬ 
tion state from the perfect basis of the Second Punic War to 
the utter worthlessness of later days. Courage and good 
behavior were still present, but these were maintained by the 
severity of the laws. Punishments were cruelly unjust at 
times, foolishly inadequate at others. They were inflicted 
no longer in accordance with the code, but to suit the moods 
or character of the general. The splendid victories of the 
Romans prove abundantly that much of the old spirit was 
still there. But it proceeded from a different motive. The 


SOLDIERS NOT CITIZENS . 


11 


ancient love of honor and country had disappeared, and in its 
place stood an avaricious grasping for booty and a greed of 
bloodshed and conquest. These men were no longer Roman 
soldiers. They belonged to the chief who led them, and he 
used every motive which is peculiarly suited to a low class of 
military recruits to bind them to his cause and use them for 
his own purposes. Ubi bene ibi patria was the accepted 
rule; and each general easily persuaded his troops that he 
represented the chief good. The civil uprisings in Rome 
had demonstrated how little the Roman soldier of the first 
century b. c. was like the Roman soldier of the war against 
Hannibal. 

When Caesar’s legions mutinied and demanded their dis¬ 
charge, he addressed them as quirites , a title which every 
Roman soldier in the early days viewed with pride. Just 
because he was a citizen, he was a soldier. But Caesar’s 
legionaries were only soldiers. They were not citizens, nor 
did they care to be. The one word quirites shamed or fright¬ 
ened them into obedience. 

As punishments in the army were no longer made accord¬ 
ing to rule, so were unearned rewards distributed. Favorit¬ 
ism grew apace. The simple crown of leaves or grasses 
gave place to expensive ornaments. The officers, and later 
the soldiers, were freed from the duty of nightly fortification 
and other fatigue work. The greater triumph went to the 
unworthy. Luxury and pomp stepped into the place of sim¬ 
plicity, not only with wealthy citizens, but in the camp. 

But because the soldier had degenerated, it does not follow 
that the ability of the leaders had gone. Rather because of 
the degeneracy of the rank and file, ability in the captain was 
enabled to push its way to the front. 

The period of the Civil War shows great advance in forti¬ 
fication and ballistics. The form of the camp remained the 


12 


SIEGES. 


same, but the walls and defenses were made much more intri¬ 
cate. The wall was higher and thicker; the ditch was wider 
and usually wet; towers were more numerous and bigger, 
and covered ways connected them; entanglements in front of 
the defenses were more common; the camp, especially castra 
stativa , became a fortress. 

Even battlefields were fortified. Sulla erected palisades 
between his lines with ditches on the flanks, against the 
enemy’s chariots at Clneronaea. Marius intrenched himself 
against the Teutones at the mouth of the Isere. The 
Romans kept to their own method, but exceeded the Greeks 
in cleverness at this sort of temporary fortification. 

Sieges likewise gained in skillful management. In assaults 
the telenon of the Greeks was used to swing men up on the 
enemy’s wall. The corona consisted in surrounding a town 
with two lines of foot and one of horse and gradually decreas¬ 
ing the circumference of the lines until the walls could be 
reached under cover of penthouses and tortoises. The mov¬ 
able testudo of shields was commonly employed and with 
good results. 

Lines of contra- and circumvallation were made more 
expertly than of yore. Mounds were used as formerly in 
Greece, but grew to enormous proportions. Sulla’s at Mas- 
sada was two hundred and eighty-six feet high, and upon 
these were other constructions and towers of one hundred 
and fifty-five feet, making four hundred and forty-one feet 
above the level. 

Mines were dexterously used. Sulla’s at Athens showed 
especial ability. Sheds, tortoises, movable towers, rains, all 
came into play. Catapults and ballistas were in constant 
use. The big catapult projected beams a horizontal distance 
of four hundred to eight hundred paces. The small catapult 
( scorpio ) shot heavy lances three hundred to five hundfed 


FLEETS . 


13 


paces. The former was used in sieges, the latter in the field. 
A burning missile ( falerica ) was also hurled. The big 
ballista threw stones four hundred to six hundred paces on a 
curved path like that of a mortar, and was used in sieges. 
The small one (onager) was used in the field. The smallest 
onager and scorpio could be worked by one man. 

In general, the sieges of this day were much like those 
of the Greeks. They had gained distinctly in skill since 
the days of Hannibal, but few besiegers reached the clever 
devices of Alexander; none approached his gallant assaults. 

Foreign conquest obliged the Romans to increase the 
power and effectiveness of their fleet. This was done with 
their usual push and good sense. 

The government owned public forests which were devoted 
to ship-building, and were well managed. War vessels con¬ 
sisted of biremes, triremes, quinquiremes and up to octo- 
remes; the triremes and quinquiremes were the ones mostly 
in commission. There were cruisers for light coast duty and 
spying out the enemy (naves speculatorice); a smaller class 
like gunboats; transports and flat bottoms (pontones) for 
river duty. The war vessels mostly had iron rams (rostra 
ferramenta ), and their sides were protected by beams and 
shields of various kinds to save them from the blows of the 
enemy’s. The larger, often the smaller, vessels had decks, 
and missile-throwers and towers stood upon them. Each 
vessel was provided with grappling-irons, boarding-bridges, 
siege implements and machines for casting fire-pots. The 
use of fireships was well understood. 

The fleets were manned by rowers or sailors, and by sol¬ 
diers or marines. The rowers and sailors were slaves or came 
from the lower classes; the marines were raised like legion¬ 
aries. Their oath of fealty was equally to the admiral and 
not to the state. A quinquireme had four hundred rowers, 


14 


HARBORS. 


the others a corresponding number. The marines were 
armed like the legionaries, but had scythed lances, battle- 
axes and boarding-swords. The rowers were also armed. 



Section of Short Quinquireme. 


Each vessel had a chief of rowers who gave the time of the 
stroke by a hammer-blow on a gong; a sort of boatswain in 
charge of the sails, anchors, etc.; a steersman ( cjubernator ), 
who was also pilot; a captain (navarchus ); and a comman¬ 
dant of marines (prcpfectus navis). A consul or praetor 
might be in command of the fleet, or a special officer ( dux 
propfcctusque classis) might lead it. 

Harbors were natural or artificial. A favorite form of 
the latter was a semicircle from the shore, from which two 
moles ran out seaward, the entrance between which was 
closed by a chain. The inner harbor was in several divisions, 
and well provided with arsenals and wharves. These har¬ 
bors were fortified both towards the sea and on the land side. 

When a fleet was ready to put to sea the rowers first went 
aboard, then the marines. An inspection with religious cer¬ 
emonies followed and the fleet set sail, the light vessels 
ahead, then the triremes and other war-galleys, then the 
transports. On landing, the vessels were drawn up on the 
beach, and were protected by palisades towards the sea and 
fieldworks towards the land. This rule, along the rocky 



































NA VAL BA TTLES. 15 

coast of Italy, must frequently have been broken; but a fleet 
always passed the night ashore, when possible. 

Naval battles generally took place near land, and vessels 
were lightened as much as possible by leaving off sails, lower¬ 
ing masts, and clearing decks. Ebb and flood tides were 
carefully watched and utilized. 

The common order of battle was a parallel one in two lines 
(acies duplex), with the lighter ships in the rear line; a 



concave order (acies lunata ), with the heaviest ships on the 
flanks to outflank the enemy; a convex order, in which the 
heaviest ships were in the centre;" a pincer-like form ( for¬ 
ceps), against a wedge (acies cunecitd ), or vice versa. 

The signal for battle was a red flag at the admiral’s mast¬ 
head, and a trumpet-blast from each ship. Upon this all 
hands gave the battle-cry and intnned the battle-hymn. The 
missile-throwers opened the action and then the lines clashed. 
Each ship endeavored to run down or ram an adversary, cut 
its oars, board and capture it, or set it afire. 






























16 


SOLDIERS AND LEADERS. 


A naval victory was celebrated by songs and music, and 
by decorating the prows of the vessels with laurel. The ad¬ 
miral was allowed a triumphus navalis. 

To sum the matter up, the old and perfect militia-system 
of Rome had disappeared, the soldier had become a profes¬ 
sional, and tiie forces on foot were simple mercenaries. The 
distinctions ^in the legions were exclusively military, having 
nothing to cjo with civil rank or class. And as everything 
now depended on the general, so there grew up about him 
a headquarters-guard ( prcetoricini) which was the germ of a 
regular army. 

The wonderful campaigns and battles of this era were the 
work of the leaders. The condition of the army, for good or 
bad, reflected the spirit and character of the general. It was 
no longer the Roman citizen who won the victories of Rome, 
but the genius of great men who aimed at the control of the 
state. > 

Much of Marius’ success in the Jugurtlian war he owed to 
the skill of Sulla, his then quaestor and later political oppo¬ 
nent. Metellus, Marius’ chief, deserves the credit for the 
conquest of Numidia as far as the confines of the desert; 
Sulla that for the capture of Jugurtha. Marius profited by 
both. The great army-changes are associated with Marius; 
but there is little in his military feats which have other than 
a political significance. 

To Marius is, however, due abundant praise for his con¬ 
duct at Aquae Sextiae and Vercellae. Rome never ran a 
greater danger than from the invasion of the Teutones and 
Cimbri; and it was to Marius she owed her rescue. After 
the defeat of the Romans at Arausio (Orange) in 105 B. c., 
where the consuls Mallius Maximus and Servilius Caepio, 
with eighty thousand Roman soldiers and half as many non- 
combatants, paid with their lives the penalty of mismanage- 


CIMBRI AND TEUTONES. 


17 


ment,— a blow more seriously threatening than even Cannae, 
— Marius was sent to Gaul to repair the disaster. He had 
ample time, for instead of to Italy the barbarians had headed 
their column towards Spain. Here, forced back by the 
brave Iberians and the difficulties of the Pyrenees, they again 
marched towards the north, until they were checked by the 
stubborn Belgse and once more rolled in a vast flood towards 
the Roman province. 



Marius had established himself at the confluence of the 
Rhone and Isere; had reduced the disaffected tribes and con¬ 
firmed the fealty of others in the Province. At this point he 
protected the roads to the only two then available passes, over 
the Little St. Bernard and over the Maritime Alps. The 
barbarians were in two bodies. One of these essayed the 









18 


MARIUS’ CARE . 


Eastern Alps and in due time debouched into Italy. The 
other, the Teutones, aimed to pass down the Rhone and fol¬ 
low the coast to the Maritime Alps. These soon made their 
appearance before the camp of Marius, which the consul had 
fortified with extreme care. Though he was an excellent 
disciplinarian and his men were in good heart, Marius was 
unwilling to encounter the immense hordes of the Teutones 
until his men had become accustomed to the sight of their 
huge stature, their wild demeanor and howling battle-cry. 
The Romans feared these light-haired bulky barbarians as 
the Greeks had dreaded the Persians prior to Marathon. 
Not all the taunts of the enemy could make Marius budge 
from his secure intrenchments. Finally, tired out, the Teu¬ 
tones assaulted the camp for three days in succession, but 
were thrust back with heavy loss. They then marched for 
Italy, filing, say the authorities, six days and nights past the 
Roman camp, with their armed men and families and bag¬ 
gage-trains, and calling with sneers to the legionaries for 
messages to their wives and children in Italy. 

Now came Marius’ chance. Cautiously following up the 
enemy in the style he had learned in the Jugurthan war, daily 
camping near by them on inaccessible heights and behind 
strong works, he finally felt that the temper of his men was 
equal to an attack on the enemy. Near Aquae Sextiae (Aix, 
Department des Bouches du Rhone), even before his camp was 
finished, a fight was begun between the men of both armies 
who were getting water at the little river Arc, which lay 
between them. The Romans drove the barbarians — they 
were Ambrones — across the river and to their wagon-camp. 
Here took place a severe combat in which the wives of the 
Ambrones fought beside their husbands and the barbarians 
lost heavily. But though they had done good work, the day 
ended by the Romans falling back to their side of the river. 


BATTLE OF AQUjE SEX TEE. 


19 


During- the succeeding night, Marius placed Marcellus 
with three thousand men — some authorities say non-comba¬ 
tants — in ambush in some wooded ravines up the river from 
the barbarian camp, with orders, during the battle which he 
proposed to force, to debouch on the enemy’s rear. At day¬ 
break the consul drew up the Roman army on some heights 



lining the river where he had established his camp, and sent 
his cavalry out to lure the Teutones to attack. This was 
cleverly accomplished. The barbarians, under the impres¬ 
sion that the Romans would not fight, forded the stream and 
rushed tumultuously up the slope. They were received so 
stoutly by the legions that they fell into disorder and were 
driven back to the plain. Unused to the midday heat of the 
Mediterranean, the barbarians, after some hours fighting, 
lost their vigor, and at the proper instant the party in am¬ 
bush emerged and fell, sustained by the cavalry, upon their 







20 


BATTLE OF VERCELLjE. 


rear. The Teutones were as demoralized as they had for¬ 
merly been eager. They fled in disorder and were cut down 
in their tracks, with a loss, according to Livy, of ninety 
thousand killed and twenty thousand captured. This was 
in 102 B. c. 

Meanwhile the Cimbri had crossed the Rhsetian Alps, but 
did not at once march on Rome. Marius reached the scene 
in time to join his colleague Catulus. The barbarians, ac¬ 
cording to their odd but ancient custom, asked of Marius to 
appoint a day and place for battle, which to them was but a 
huge duel, governed by the same forms. This Marius did, 
and near Yercellae the hosts met in 101 B. C. The Cimbri 
were beaten and annihilated — no less than one hundred and 
forty thousand being killed and sixty thousand captured, as 
is claimed by the Latin historians. The nation disappeared 
from history. Rome was saved from another burning. 
Marius was more than a hero. He was the people’s demigod. 



Gallic Cuirass. (PNarbonese.) 







II. 


SULLA, POMPEY. 90-60 B. C. 

Sutlla was one of the ablest generals of his era. He learned his trade under 
Marius. He first used earthworks in battle to protect his lines, and at 
Orchcmenus he used fieldworks to hem in his enemy. Sulla was bold and dis¬ 
creet ; he was both lion and fox. Pompey was one of those captains upon 
whom greatness happens to he thrust. Of good but not high ability, excep¬ 
tional fortune enabled him to reap the benefit of the hard work of others. He 
was slow and lacked initiative, but did some of his work well. His early suc¬ 
cesses in Sicily and Africa earned him the title of Great at twenty-four ; but 
when he went to Spain and opposed Sertorius, one of the most noteworthy 
generals of antiquity, he more than met his match. Only the death of Sertorius 
enabled him to win success. The campaign in which Pompey swept the pirates 
from the Mediterranean was a simple piece of work excellently done ; his 
campaign in the East had been already made easy by Lucullus, whose labors 
redounded to Pompey's credit. On the whole, while Pompey should not 
be underrated, it must be acknowledged that he earned his great repute on 
more than usually slender grounds. 

Sulla, as a general, stands higher than any of the men 
immediately preceding Caesar. He got his training in the 
Jugurthan war under Marius, and won his first laurels by the 
able negotiations which mainly contributed to the capture of 
Jugurtha and the ending of that difficult conflict. He again 
served under Marius in the campaign against the Cimbri and 
Teutones. Later on, master and pupil marked an era in the 
history of Rome by their competition for the supremacy of 
the state. 

Sulla’s work in the East in the Mithridatic war was mas¬ 
terly. His siege of Athens, coupled to the earlier siege of 
Numantia by Scipio Africanus Minor, furnished the pattern 


22 


SULLA AT CHJER ON ALA. 


on. which Caesar worked and bettered, though unquestionably 
Caesar had studied the siege operations at Tyre and Rhodes, 
and had drawn his inspiration from them. All Sulla’s cam¬ 
paigns are of marked interest. There was much in the wars 
of the early part of the last century B. c. which was splendid 
in skill and accomplishment, and which is specially note¬ 
worthy as being the school in which young Caesar learned his 
trade. It is hard to select anyone of Sulla’s numerous great 
deeds which shall stand alone as representative of his sol¬ 
dierly work. The battle of Chaeronaea, 86 b. c., on the field 
rendered famous by Philip’s victory and the youthful daring 
of Alexander, is a sample of how to deal with unusual ques¬ 
tions in war. 

Taxiles and Arehelaus, the lieutenants of Mithridates, had 







Phalanx i-1 




. -jI_ 


Chariot 5 


^. 



4 % 


an army of one hundred thousand foot and ten thousand horse 
with ninety scythed chariots. Sulla’s force, including his 
Greek auxiliaries, was less than a third this number, and in 
cavalry he was especially wanting, — on these plains a great 
source of weakness. His Roman troops were but sixteen thou¬ 
sand five hundred strong. But Sulla despised his enemy, 
and was confident of success. He made up for his want of 















































SULLA’S BOLDNESS. 


23 


strength by protecting his flanks with trenches which should 
save him from the charges of the enemy’s horse, and by 
erecting a row of heavy palisades between his first and second 
lines, which should arrest the charge of the scythed chariots. 
Here was an intelligent instance of the use of fieldworks. 

The battle was opened in true Oriental fashion by the 
charge of chariots. Sulla’s first line smartly withdrew be¬ 
hind the palisades, which not only checked the onset of the 
chariots, but these, their horses being terrified by the heavy 
fire of Sulla’s slingers and archers, turned on their own line 
and produced marked confusion in the Macedonian phalanx 
and in a corps of Italian auxiliaries serving in the Mithri- 
datic army. To repair the disaster, Archelaus ordered his 
horse from both flanks to charge the Roman legions. The 
Orientals rode down on the Romans with great elan , and 
their furious charge, despite the trenches, succeeded in break¬ 
ing the Roman formation, showing clearly that without the 
trenches Sulla’s line would have been destroyed. But the 
legionaries did not lose heart. They rapidly formed squares 
and resisted the horsemen with great determination. Sulla, 
meanwhile, perceiving that the enemy’s phalanx did not 
readily recover from the disorder into which the chariots had 
thrown it, and that the moment had arrived when a blow 
driven home at the right spot was needed, gathered his own 
small force of cavalry from the right, and heading it in per¬ 
son charged sharply in on the exposed flank of the enemy. 
As was always the case with Sulla, fortune followed hard 
upon his boldness. The Asiatic foot offered but little resist¬ 
ance, and its flight unsettled the phalanx. The horse which 
was assailing the Roman legions found its task too stubborn, 
and turned to aid in retrieving the disorder of the foot. The 
legions gained breathing spell, and speedily patching up a 
new formation advanced sharply on the wavering foot of 


24 


FIELDWORKS AT ORCHOMENUS. 


Arehelaus. This decided the day. The entire Mithridatic 
army was swept from off the field. 

Arehelaus managed to retire to his camp, and closed the 
gates to save what he had got within. Immense slaughter 
without the walls resulted. When the gates were finally 
forced by the surging mass, the Romans entered with the 
enemy and prolonged the massacre. Arehelaus saved but a 
twelfth part of his army. The Roman loss was trivial. 

At the battle of Orchomenus, in the succeeding year, Sulla, 
by clever calculation in cutting ditches and more clever tac¬ 
tics, succeeded in penning up a new army under Arehelaus 
in such a position as to drive him into some swamps and 
morasses, where he destroyed the entire force. This oper¬ 
ation appears to have been a species of siege, by a system of 
gradually narrowed fieldworks, of an army camped in the 
open instead of protected by the walls of a fortress, and as 
such exhibits decided originality of conception and boldness 
in execution. The accounts of the operation are obscure. 

Sulla was equally able as statesman and soldier. He 
acted, not like Marius, from impulse, but in a well-considered 
though rapid manner. He was tireless and active, brave and 
enterprising, and singularly cool in thought and deed. Carbo 
pronounced Sulla to have the qualities of both the lion and 
the fox. He won the love of his soldiers, and yet was 
a stern disciplinarian. He showed as marked skill in his 
sieges as in tactics. 

The most interesting though least creditable part of the 
military career of Cnaeus Pompey will be dealt with at length 
when we find him measuring swords with Caesar. In the 
earlier part of his life, before he had Caesar to contend with, 
Pompey showed many characteristics of the great man and 
soldier. He must not be underrated. But Pompey was 
perhaps the lightest weight of all the characters who have 


POMPEY’S CHARACTER. 


25 


enacted a giant’s role on the stage of life. No man won the 
title of Great on such slender merit. No man ever wielded 
such vast power with so little to back it up. He compares 
favorably with men of a second rank; but as he stood on the 
same plane of power with Caesar, so must we gauge him by 
the same large measure. It is due to Pompey to sketch his 
early achievements. 

Pompey had many of the virtues of the soldier. He was 
splendid as an athlete. He was bold in that species of war 
which calls not too largely on the intellect or the moral force. 
He could charge at the head of his horse with noble gallantry, 
when he was unable to plan a good campaign or assume a sud¬ 
den strategic or tactical risk. He was as simple, modest and 
reserved in habit as he was fearless in battle. He had those 
qualities which endeared him to the people. Taken up by 
Sulla when a mere youth, he climbed into popular favor as 
Scipio Africanus Major had done, by belief in and assertion 
of his right to commands usually given to those who have 
long served the state. But Pompey had less than the ability 
of Scipio. He was clean in his private life, and his “honest 
countenance ” was proverbial. He was upright in his family 
relations, but none the less divorced his wife at the nod of 
Sulla, while Caesar, against whom much is charged in his 
commerce with women, refused to do so. Pompey was retir¬ 
ing in civil life and lacked the graces of manner much con¬ 
sidered at that day, though he had a fair degree of culture. 
In council he was slow, and to a habit of silence which came 
from a not over quick comprehension, was referred, as it often 
is, a judgment he did not possess. 

Pompey was but an ordinary man of good abilities. He 
had not the first glint of genius. Greatness was thrust upon 
him if it ever was upon any man. He was the very reverse 
of Caesar. Circumstances made Pompey; Caesar made cir- 


26 


POMPEY’S CAUTION. 


cumstances. Pompey was cold, passionless and slow at mak¬ 
ing resolutions. In that era, when every man in power held 
ultra opinions of some sort, Pompey’s very ordinariness sun¬ 
dered him from the ranks of his peers as his assertion and 
honest belief that he was great raised him above them. Had 
his conduct risen to a higher plane, other qualities might have 
been ascribed to him; but he must be judged by the event. 
In him were blended a singular modesty of bearing and ex¬ 
travagance in demands. He was fortunate in his beginnings; 
much was done for him; to what he had, more was given; he 
was never overtaxed, nor did luck run counter to his course. 
By such easy steps rose Cnseus Pompey, the creation not of 
brilliant, but of steady good fortune. 

Pompey possessed obstinacy to the last degree, — a quality 
which is often a saving clause. But it was not an intelligent 
obstinacy. He imagined that he was having his own way 
when more clever men were outwitting him. From unreadi¬ 
ness to assume a heavy responsibility, when thrust upon him, 
grew a set habit of caution which well exhibits the average 
plane of his character. It was not the caution of a Hanni¬ 
bal, who, when called on, could be bold beyond any man; it 
was rather a want of moral incisiveness. While not lacking 
good conduct and qualities he was, says Mommsen, “the 
most starched of artificial great men.” Pompey was perhaps 
the best individual to hold his party together, because he did 
naught to disrupt it. 

Pompey first came into notice in 83 B. c., when he under¬ 
took to raise an army for Sulla in Picenum. Here his per¬ 
sonal bearing and unquestioned gallantry stood him in good 
stead. He raised and equipped a superior force, and when 
three Marian armies faced him, he had the nerve to attack 
them in detail before they could assemble, and the good for¬ 
tune to disperse them. He led an attack on the enemy’s 


SERTORIUS. 


27 




camp — an unusual tiling at that day — which did credit to 
the Roman name. On his joining his chief, Sulla saluted 
the young man of twenty-three as Imperator, a title which 
few men ever won, and those only at the end of many years 
of arduous and brilliant service. In 82 B. c., Pompey was 
sent as propraetor to Sicily. • The island, on his approach with 
six legions and one hundred and twenty galleys, was at once 
evacuated by the enemy and afforded him an easy triumph. 
From Sicily he shipped to Africa, where, though with larger 
forces, he conducted a handsome and successful campaign 
against Domitius Ahenobarbus, the Marian. His assault 
on the enemy’s camp here, too, as well as a speedy and ener¬ 
getic forty days’ campaign, revived the Roman name, which 
had fallen into disrepute. On his return, “half in irony and 
half in recognition,” Sulla saluted him as Magnus, and he was 
allowed, against all precedent, the greater triumph, never 
granted but to those of senatorial rank. 

Q. Sertorius, the Marian, had been for some years holding 
head against the Sullan faction in Spain. It was essential 
that some able soldier should go thither. Pompey as usual 
felt that he had a right to demand the place, and it was given 
him. He was not fortunate in opposing thfe extraordinary 
general, who, had his work been cast on a winning in lieu of 
a losing theatre, might have rivaled any Roman antedating 
Caisar. Sertorius was equally remarkable as a statesman 
and a soldier. He had practically set up an independent 
kingdom in Iberia. Few men have ever held a difficult 
people to its work, or conducted an energetic guerilla war¬ 
fare so well or on so large a scale. Never coming to battle, 
he had wearied the Sullan general Metellus by minor opera¬ 
tions, by cutting off his foragers and water-parties, by at¬ 
tacking him on the march, and by remarkable activity in 
small-war. Metellus had been unable to cope with him. 


28 


POMPEY IN HISPANIA. 


It was in the summer of 77 b. c. that Pompey went to 
Spain as proconsul. On his way he made the new road over 
the Cottian Alps (Mt. Genevre) which Caesar later used, and 
settled some troubles in Gaul. He did not cross the Pyr- 
enees till late in the fall of that year, and wintered in north¬ 



east Spain. Sertorius was on the upper Ebro; of his lieu¬ 
tenants, Hirtuleius was facing Metellus in Farther Spain, 
and Perpenna, sustained by Herennius, held the Ebro against 
Pompey’s columns. Pompey, early in the spring, advanced 
to and forced the Ebro, defeated Herennius at Yalentia, south 
of Saguntum, and captured the place. Sertorius had moved 
on Lauro, a town allied to Pompey, on the Sucro (Xucar), 
south of Yalentia, and was besieging it. Pompey moved 
against him, and sought to shut him in. So confident was he 
of success that he flattered himself that he had got Sertorius 




SERTORIUS DEFEATS POMPEY. 


29 


where he must soon surrender. He did not know his oppo¬ 
nent. In the struggle which Pompey forced on him, Serto- 
rius utterly outmanoeuvred his opponent, penned him up, and 
under his very eyes burned Lauro and transported its inhab¬ 
itants to Lusitania. Pompey was surprised enough at the 
turn affairs had taken. 

Meanwhile Metellus had defeated Hirtuleius near Hispalis 
(Seville). The next year he again defeated him near Segovia 
when the Sertorian sought to prevent Metellus from marching 
to join Pompey. Foreseeing the arrival of his colleague, and 
lest he should be forced to divide his laurels with him, Pom¬ 
pey offered battle to Sertorius on the Sucro, which this gen¬ 
eral was only too glad to accept before the arrival of Metel¬ 
lus. On the left of the Roman line, Afranius beat back the 
enemy and took Sertorius’ camp; on the right, however, 
Pompey was severely wounded and his trooj>s badly defeated 
by Sertorius, who thereupon turned on Afranius and drove 
him back in turn. Pompey’s army was rescued by the arrival 
of Metellus, and Sertorius’ quite unreliable forces hereupon 
began to disperse. The main difficulty this able man had to 
contend with was to keep his irregular levies together and 
ready for work. At times he had very large numbers, even 
as high as one hundred and fifty thousand men, which he had 
with vast labor got together; then, suddenly, on a reverse 
or from some unexpected discouragement, the army would 
dissolve to a mere handful. So now. On the junction of 
Metellus and Pompey, and learning of the defeat of Hirtu¬ 
leius, Sertorius’ army incontinently retired and dispersed to 
the mountains. After a period of recuperation they were 
again collected and Sertorius faced Pompey south of Sa- 
guntum. Meanwhile his galleys interfered with the Roman 
victualling fleets along the coast. 

After some manoeuvring another battle was fought on the 


30 


METELLUS AND POMPEY. 


river Turia (Guadalaviar). It was a long and stanch strug¬ 
gle for mastery. Finally Sertorius defeated Pompey and his 
cavalry, while Metellus broke Perpenna’s array. The result 
was favorable to the Sullans, and Sertorius’ army again dis¬ 
persed. Sertorius betook himself to Clunia, a fortress on the 
upper Durius (Douro), where he was besieged. But the Span¬ 
ish army was once more got together, and Sertorius cleverly 
escaped from Clunia and joined it. The end of the year 75 
B. c. saw him again facing the Sullans, with equal chances. 

On the whole, however, Metellus and Pompey had done 
well. Southern and Central Spain had been recovered, and 
Sertorius had made no gain. This was Metellus’ work rather 
than Pompey’s. The colleagues went into winter-quarters, 
Metellus in Gaul, Pompey between the Durius and Iberus, 
near modern Valladolid. 

In the spring of 74 b. c. Sertorius began a small-war 
against Pompey. The latter was besieging Pallantia (Pal- 
lencia), when Sertorius drove him from it. At Calagurris, 
though joined by Metellus, he was likewise defeated, and 
then driven out of the upper Ebro region. Whenever Pom¬ 
pey met Sertorius, he succumbed. The succeeding year was 
characterized by much the same fortune, though Pompey 
made some headway in getting allies among the Spanish cities. 
The war had been going on eight years. It was a serious 
drain on Italy, and Spain itself by stress of war was lapsing 
into barbarism. Pompey and Metellus had found their master. 
The legions were heartily sick of their ill-rewarded labors. 
Many people in Pome began to fear Sertorius as a second 
Hannibal, though indeed there was no such danger. It was 
Sertorius’ peculiar abilities, so well suited to the people and 
mountains of Spain, which enabled him to do such brilliant 
work. Able as he was, the gigantic conception of a Hanni¬ 
bal was beyond him, — as beyond all others. 


WAR AGAINST THE PIRATES. 


31 


Finally, as a piece of good fortune for Pompey, Sertorius 
was assassinated in 72 B. c. Perpenna, his second in com¬ 
mand, was no such opponent, and him Pompey and Metellus 
speedily put down within the next year. Then regulating 
the affairs of the two Spanish provinces, they returned to 
Rome, and together triumphed. This campaign cannot be 
said to have added to the laurels of Pompey the Great. 

In the war against the pirates, Pompey showed consider¬ 
able skill. Not that the task was one to tax the resources 
of a great soldier. The Mediterranean pirates were to the 



Roman legions and fleets much what a gang of desperadoes 
is to a well-organized police. But the pirates had long been 
a scourge to Roman commerce, and their suppression became 
necessary. In 67 b. c. Pompey was given absolute power in 
the premises. He began in a business-like way. He divided 
the entire field into thirteen districts and placed a lieutenant 
and a sufficient force in each, with instructions to raise and 
equip men and galleys, search the coasts and hunt down the 
pirates. Pompey himself undertook the western Mediterra¬ 
nean, and cleared the coast of Sardinia, Sicily and Africa, so 
as to reestablish the grain traffic with Rome. Part of his 
force did the like on the shores of Gaul and Spain. In forty 
days Pompey had cleared the western half of the Mediterra- 


82 


LUCULLUS IN THE EAST. 


nean, and proceeded to Syria and Cilicia. The resistance 
offered was slight. There was no general organization. But 
Pompey was shrewd. He chose to be indulgent to many and 
moderate to most, rather than to crucify every pirate caught, 
as it had been the rule to do. This conduct of itself helped 
break up an already lost cause. The Cilicians alone offered 
any serious resistance; and these the Roman superior force 
and well-equipped galleys completely overwhelmed. The 
land resorts of the pirates were next broken up. Pardon 
brought many to terms. In three months from the first blow 
the entire war was finished. Some four hundred vessels, 
including ninety war-galleys, were taken; thirteen hundred in 
all were destroyed; ten thousand pirates perished and twenty 
thousand were captured. Many Roman prisoners were res¬ 
cued. 

The pirates had threatened Rome with starvation. Pom- 
pey’s victories brought abundance. Every one had feared 
to go to sea; the Mediterranean was henceforth open to all. 
No wonder Pompey was heralded as the savior of Rome. 
Yet he had done only a good piece of work, scarcely a great 
one. 

The consul Lucullus had been ably conducting war in the 
East against the great Mithridates, who had overrun all Asia 
Minor (74 b. C.). His colleague, Cotta, having been de¬ 
feated in the Propontis (Sea of Marmora), Lucullus hastened 
to his relief and forced the king back with heavy loss. Set¬ 
ting matters to rights at sea, he followed up his advantage 
with a sharp offensive, crossed the Halys, marched across 
Pontus, won a fierce battle at Cabira, and fairly drove the 
great king out of his own kingdom. Capturing many cities 
by siege, Lucullus advanced into Armenia Minor, while Mith¬ 
ridates took refuge with Tigranes, king of Armenia. In 
order to forfeit no present advantages, Lucullus, unauthor- 


EXCELLENT CAMPAIGNING. 


33 


ized by tlie Senate, crossed the Euphrates into Armenia, and 
defeated Tigranes in the great battle of Tigranocerta near the 
Tigris. The kings joined forces, but Lucullus beat them 
again and marched on Artaxata, the capital of Tigranes. A 
mutiny among his legions prevented his reaching his objec¬ 
tive, and forced him to retire across the Tigris into Mesopo¬ 
tamia. While Lucullus was taking Nisibis by storm, Mith- 
ridates returned to Pontus, and defeated the Roman army 
left there, at Zela. Though handicapped by fresh mutinies 
and recalled by the Senate, Lucullus still made a handsome 
retreat to Asia Minor. 



While Lucullus had ended unsuccessfully, he had in eight 
years of hard campaigning done much to weaken the re¬ 
sources of both Mithridates and Tigranes. In CG B. c. 



34 


POMPEY’S AMBUSH. 


Pompey went to Galatia to supplant Lucullus, purposing to 
advance into Pontus, whither his Cilician legions were to fol¬ 
low him. He had nearly fifty thousand men. Mithridates 
opposed him with thirty thousand foot, mostly archers, and 
three thousand horse. He no longer had his ancient ally 
and son-in-law, Tigranes, to rely upon, and would have gladly 
made peace; but he would not unconditionally surrender, as 
Pompey demanded that he should do. Mithridates led Pom¬ 
pey some distance into his territory, harassing him severely 
with his superior horse. Pompey properly ceased to follow, 
and marching to the upper Euphrates crossed and entered 
Mithridates’ eastern provinces. The king followed Pompey 
along the Euphrates and finally arrested his progress at the 
castle of Dasteira, from which secure position he scoured the 
lowlands with his cavalry and light troops. Pompey was 
forced to retire to Armenia Minor until his Cilician legions 
came up. Then he invested Mithridates in his eyrie and 
ravaged the land. After six weeks’ blockade Mithridates put 
his sick and wounded to death to save them from falling into 
the hands of Pompey, and made his escape, marching by a 
circuit towards Armenia, Tigranes’ territory. Pompey fol¬ 
lowed, but again perceiving Mithridates’ intention of luring 
him away from Pontus, he resorted to a clever stratagem. 
In front of Mithridates, on the route he was pursuing south 
of the Lycus, near where Nicopolis was later built, was a 
narrow valley. Pompey, in lieu of following in Mithridates’ 
rear, by a secret forced march got beyond him and occupied 
the heights surrounding the valley. Mithridates, unaware 
of this fact, marched next day as usual, and camped at night¬ 
fall in the very spot which placed his army in the trap ably 
laid for him by Pompey. In the middle of the night Pom¬ 
pey attacked. The army of Mithridates was wrapped in sleep 
and unable to resist. It was cut to pieces where it stood. 


HIS TRIUMPH. 


35 


Mithridates fled. Unable to go to Tigranes, lie made his 
way along the east and north shores of the Euxine (Black 
Sea) to the Cliersonesus (Crimea). Tigranes was at the 
mercy of Pompey. He gave up his recent conquests, and 
paid six thousand talents into the Roman war chest. Pom¬ 
pey had dictated peace. 

In one easy campaign Pompey had thus overcome the two 
great Oriental kings, — of Pontus and Armenia. The terri¬ 
tory of Rome had been indefinitely extended. No wonder 
that his name was in every mouth. 

Pompey for a while pursued Mithridates, which brought 
about a campaign against the tribes of the Caucasus. The 
king he could not overtake; the Caucasians he forced into a 
peace. Mithridates, from his refuge in Panticapaeum in the 
Crimea, harbored extravagant ideas of attacking Rome from 
the north by enlisting the Scythians and Danubian Celts in 
his favor as Hannibal had enlisted the Gauls. But this wild 
plan was ended by his death in 63 b. c. He had waged war 
against Rome for twenty-six years. 

Pompey finished his work by reducing the new provinces, 
Pontus, Syria, Cilicia, to order, by subduing disorders in 
Syria, and settling affairs with the Parthians. He then 
returned to Rome for the reward which was his by right. 

Lucullus had made much headway with the conquest of 
the East, for which his ability and enterprise were well suited. 
Pompey with his large forces, lack of initiative, and extreme 
caution, had completed what Lucullus had begun. Had he 
launched out as boldly as his predecessor he would not have 
accomplished so much. He had on all hands opportunities 
for brilliant strokes. He did nothing that was not safe. He 
kept his superiority of force at all times. His course was the 
very best to reap what Lucullus had sown, but it would never 
have conquered the East without such preparation as Lucullus 


36 


LUCULLUS VERSUS POMPEY. 


had made. The campaigns of the latter compare favorably 
with those of Pompey, who was heralded as the representa¬ 
tive of all that was most splendid in Roman annals, while 
Lucullus was forgotten. We shall be better able to gauge 
Pompey’s real abilities when we try him in the same balance 
with Caesar. 



Ancient Helmet. 




III. 


i 


CESAR’S YOUTH, EDUCATION AND EARLY 
SERVICES. 100-58 B. C. 

Cjesar was born 100 b. c. of an old Roman family. He owed much to the 
care given him by his mother. His education was carefully conducted and 
well bestowed. He was not strong as a lad, but gymnastics and a settled regi¬ 
men improved his physique, which had a tendency to epilepsy. He was some¬ 
what of a dandy, and a leader of the young society of Rome. ^He early 
developed talent as an orator and held many minor offices. His party — the 
Marian — was out of power, and the young man was wise in keeping out of the 
whirlpool of politics. Caesar had less to do with military affairs than most of 
those who rose to distinction in Rome. His work was in the line of statesman¬ 
ship. He saw much of the world and at twenty-three made a reputation in 
his oration against Dolabella. He was well known as an able man, but not as 
a soldier. At thirty-nine he became praetor and received Spain as province. 
He was of middle age and had as yet done nothing but accumulate immense 
debts. In Spain he showed energy and ability, reduced Lusitania, and so 
managed its finances as to discharge all his debts. When he returned to Rome, 
Pompey, Caesar and Crassus became triumvirs; Caesar was made consul and 
allotted Gaul. In 58 b. C., at the age of forty-two, he entered upon that part 
of his career which has made him so great a part of the world’s history. 

Caius Julius CLesar was born in 100 b. c. (some authori¬ 
ties hold 102 B. c.), of an old patrician family which had come 
from Alba under the reign of Tullus Hostilius, and which had 
enjoyed many public trusts. His father had been praetor 
and had died when Caesar was about sixteen years old. His 
mother, Aurelia, was of good stock of plebeian origin, and was 
a woman of exceptionally fine character. Caesar was proud 
of his forbears. In pronouncing the funeral oration of his 
aunt Julia, who had married Marius, Suetonius tells us that 
he thus spoke of his descent: “My aunt Julia, on the mater- 


38 


CAESAR’S APPEARANCE. 


nal side, is of the issue of kings; on the paternal side, she 
descends from the immortal gods; for her mother was a Mar¬ 
cia, and the family Marcius Rex are the descendants of An- 
cus Marcius. The Julia family, to which I belong, descends 
from Venus herself. Thus our house unites to the sacred 
character of kings, who are the most powerful among men, 
the venerated holiness of the gods, who keep kings themselves 
in subjection.” 

Aurelia devoted her life to her son’s education, and by this 
his natural mental and moral nature enabled him to profit as 
few youths can. He grew to manhood with many of the best 
qualitit/of head and heart stamped upon him. As pedagogue 
he had a Gaul, M. Antonius Gnipho, who had received all 
the benefits of an education in Alexandria. His body grew 
strong,—though originally delicate and having a tendency 
to epilepsy, — his carriage was erect, his manner open and 
kindly, and his countenance singularly engaging and expres¬ 
sive, if not handsome. He had black, piercing eyes, pale 
face, straight aquiline nose, small handsome mouth, with 
finely curled lips which bore a look of kindliness; large brow 
showing great intellectual activity and power. In his youth 
his face was well-rounded. He was moderate in his diet and 
temperate; his health, harmed by neither excess of labor or 
of pleasure, was uniformly good, though at Corduba and later 
at Thapsus he had serious nervous attacks. He exposed him¬ 
self to all weathers, was an excellent gymnast, and noted as 
a rider. “From his first youth he was much used to horse¬ 
back, and had even acquired the facility of riding with dropped 
reins and his hands joined behind his back ” (Plutarch). By 
judicious exercise he gradually became able to endure great 
fatigue. His dress was careful, and his person neat and taste¬ 
ful to the extreme. Like the youth of every age he was over 
fond of outward adornment. Suetonius speaks of his key- 


HIS ACQUIREMENTS. 


39 


pattern ornamented toga and loose girdle. Sulla once re¬ 
marked that it would be well to look out for yonder dandy — 
and dandies in every age have notably made among the best 
of soldiers and men. This habit of personal nicety — not to 
say vanity — clung to him through life. “And when,” says 
Cicero, “I look at his hair, so artistically arranged, and when 
I see him scratch his head with one finger,” lest perchance 
he should disarrange it, “I cannot believe that such a man 
could conceive so black a design as to overthrow the Roman 
Republic ” (Plutarch). 

Caesar was fond of art as of books. He spoke Greek and 
Latin with equal ease and fluency, as was common to the cul¬ 
tured classes. He wrote several works which earned him a 
reputation for clear and forcible style, but he was not equally 
happy as a poet. “For Caesar and Brutus have also made 
verses, and have placed them in the public libraries. They 
are poets as feeble as Cicero, but happier in that fewer peo¬ 
ple know of them,” says Tacitus. His life up to manhood 
was that of a city youth of good family and breeding, perhaps 
according to our notions lax, but within the bounds set by the 
age in which he lived; in later years he was a thorough man 
of the world. He was fond of female society, and cultivated 
it throughout his life. He possessed a marked taste for pic¬ 
tures, jewels, statues; and, as we are told by Dio Cassius, 
habitually wore a ring with a very beautiful seal of an armed 
Venus. He joined excellent physical endurance to very ex¬ 
ceptional mental and nervous strength. “He was liberal to 
prodigality, and of a courage above human nature and even 
imagination,” says Velleius Paterculus. Plutarch calls him 
the second orator in Rome. Pliny speaks of his extraordi¬ 
nary memory. Seneca gives him credit for great calmness 
in anger, and Plutarch says he was affable, courteous and 
gracious to a degree which won him the affection of the 


40 


EARLY OFFICES. 


people. “In voice, gesture, a grand and noble personality, 
lie had a certain brilliancy in speaking, without a trace of 
artifice,” testifies Cicero. To the external advantages which 
distinguished him from all other citizens, Caesar joined an 
impetuous and powerful soul, says Velleius. One could 
scarcely add a single qualification to his equipment for the 
profession of arms. Such was Caius Julius Caesar in the 
estimation of his contemporaries. 

At fourteen years of age, Marius procured for him the 
appointment of priest of Jupiter. At sixteen he was be¬ 
trothed to Cossutia, the daughter of a wealthy knight, but 
broke the engagement a year later. At eighteen he mar¬ 
ried Cornelia, daughter of China. He is said to have been 
already well known for his personal and intellectual char¬ 
acteristics; but this was doubtless as the promising young 
scion of a well-known family, rather than from any services 
actually accomplished. 

When Sulla rode into power on the wreck of the Marian 
party, he would have liked to bring over this brilliant young 
man to his cause, but he found Caesar immovable. He or¬ 
dered him to put away Cornelia, whose father had belonged 
to the Marian faction, but this Caesar bluntly refused, though 
he forfeited his priesthood and his wife’s fortune, was declared 
incapable of inheriting in his own family, and ran danger of 
his life. This was at a time when such men as Piso and 
Pompey divorced their wives to suit the politics of the day, 
and scores a high mark to Caesar’s credit. Finally, after a 
period of concealment in the Sabine country, through the 
influence of friends, Caesar was forgiven by Sulla. But 
Sulla prophesied truly, says Suetonius, that there was more 
than one Marius lurking in the personality of Caesar. 

Caesar deemed it wise, under the circumstances, to keep 
away from Pome. He could not remain without being thrust 


ABSENCE FROM ROME. 


41 


actively into the political turmoil, which he could see was hut 
an interlude. Such discretion he manifested all through his 
political career. lie spent some time in Bithynia, where he 
was guest of King Nicomedes. Here, under the praetor M. 
Thermus, he served as contubernalis (aide de camp) against 




# 


Mithridates, and was (81 b. c.) actively employed both in war 
and diplomacy. At the siege of Mitylene he received a civic 
crown for saving the life of a Roman soldier. His reputation 
for morality of demeanor was rudely compromised by his 
conduct at the court of Nicomedes; but such facts do not 
concern the soldier. The morals of each age and clime must 
stand by themselves. Caesar in no wise differed from his 
compeers. He then served at sea under Servilius in the cam- 


42 


AS AN ORATOR. 


paign of 78 B. C., against the Cilician pirates. On Sulla’s 
death he returned to Rome. 

Here his conduct was marked by great moral courage and 
independence coupled with common sense and a liberal pol¬ 
icy; and in some civil proceedings his powers of oratory, 
which he studied with great care, raised him high in the esti¬ 
mation of the people. It was an usual means of introducing 
one’s self to the public to pose as advocate in some great polit¬ 
ical prosecution. Such was Caesar’s part in the prosecution 
of Dolabella. He was twenty-one years old, and his oration, 
“which we still read with admiration,” says Tacitus, in a 
moment made him famous. He later attacked Antonius 
Hybrida, and was engaged in other celebrated causes. These 
attacks were really aimed at Sulla’s party, though still in 
power, rather than at individuals. 

Preferring not to join for the present in the profitless polit¬ 
ical struggles of Rome, Csesar set sail for Rhodes, which at 
that time was a marked centre of learning, intending to devote . 
some time to study. On the way thither he was captured by 
pirates of Pharmacusa (Fermaco), a small island of the Spo- 
rades. The pirates demanded twenty talents ransom, but 
Caesar contemptuously volunteered to pay them fifty, a piece 
of originality which insured him good treatment. While 
waiting some forty days for the receipt of the ransom-money, 
Caesar gained such influence with these men, that he was 
treated rather as a king than as a prisoner. He disarmed all 
their suspicions and entertained them by his eloquence and 
wit. He is said to have told them — which they treated as 
a jest — that he would return, capture and crucify them all. 
He was as good as his word. Collecting vessels and men so 
soon as he was released, he fell unawares upon the pirates, 
recovered his money, took much booty, and punished them as 
he had threatened to do. Suetonius states that from motives 


A TRUE MARIAN. 43 

of pity lie had them all strangled first and only nailed their 
corpses to the cross. 

After a short stay in Rhodes, where he studied under 
Apollonius Molo, the most celebrated of the masters of elo¬ 
quence, he undertook on his own authority and cost a cam¬ 
paign against Mithridates in Cyzicus, in which he was measur¬ 
ably successful. He now learned from Rome that he had 
been nominated pontifex, in place of his uncle, L. Aurelius 
Cotta. He returned, and shortly after was also elected mili¬ 
tary tribune. He declined service in armies under the com¬ 
mand of the Sullan generals, at the time of the campaigns 
against Sertorius in Spain. He would gladly have gone to 
the front to learn his duties in the field, but did not care 
to take a part against one who represented the old Marian 
party. He as usual cleverly avoided useless complications. 
Still he was ambitious of power, and set to work to form a 
party for himself in the state; and by employing fortune, 
friends, energy and ability, he succeeded in doing this. 
Being made quaestor, he accompanied the proconsul Antis- 
tius Yetus to Spain. Returned to Rome, he was in 68 b. c. 
made curator of the Appian Way and aedile curulis, and 
largely increased his popularity by the splendor of the public 
games he gave. 

His next office was that of judex quaestionis, or judge of 
the criminal court, in 64 B. C., and in the succeeding year 
he was made pontifex maximus. After still another year he 
became praetor. During all this time he had been earning the 
hate of the aristocrats and the favor of the people. He was 
assigned the charge of the province of Hispania Ulterior, in 
61 B. c., but could not leave Rome till some one had become 
bondsman for his debts, amounting, it is said, to over four 
thousand talents, or, according to Plutarch, to eight hundred 
and thirty talents, from one to five million dollars, as the 


44 


CAESAR IN SPAIN. 


sum. Caesar’s recklessness in money matters was a charac¬ 
teristic which pursued him through life. 

Crassus was prevailed on to he his security. He relied for 
repayment on Caesar’s future successes. He was not deceived. 
Political preferment in Rome was coupled with opportunities 
of making money indefinitely great. The control of a prov¬ 
ince opened endless avenues of gain. And though no one 
was more careful to observe the forms of law, though no one 
was more law-abiding in the technical sense, Caesar was in 
larger matters as unscrupulous as Napoleon. It was the 
habit of his day. 

Caesar’s province as praetor — Farther Spain, or Boetica, 
— possibly included some adjoining territories. He left 
Rome so soon as his money matters were arranged, without 
waiting for the instructions of the Senate, whose action was 
delayed by some political trials. The lowlanders of his 
province had been long subject to forays by the mountaineers 
of Lusitania, a section of country only half subject to the 
Roman power, if at all. Caesar found two legions, or twenty 
cohorts, under the colors. These he at once increased by a 
third legion, or ten additional cohorts, giving him some ten 
thousand men. The tribes of Mons Herminium (Sierra di 
Estrella) in Lusitania (Portugal) were constantly troubling 
the province. Unable to control them by the command of 
the Roman people, whose authority the hardy uplanders 
laughed to scorn, Caesar promptly undertook a campaign 
against them, and by vigorous measures reduced them to 
submission. Much of the detail of this campaign is not 
known. The other tribes of the mountains, lest they should 
suffer a like harsh fate, migrated beyond the Douro. This 
enabled Caesar to possess himself of the strong places of 
the country in the valley of the Munda (Mondego), basing 
on which, he set out to pursue the fugitives, whom he soon 


CAPE CARVOEIRO. 


45 


reached. The barbarians turned upon him, and to unsettle 
his cohorts by making the legionaries eager for booty, they 
drove their herds before them. But Caesar’s men always felt 
the influence of the strong hand, and these cohorts, though 
new to him, had already learned to obey. An army is the 
mirror of its captain, reflecting his force and character as well 
as his intelligence. So now. Not a soldier left the ranks, 
and the Lusitanians were quickly routed. In this campaign' 
Caesar scoured the country on both banks of the Durius. 

Meanwhile the Mt. Herminianites had again revolted, 
hoping that Caesar would be defeated by the migrating tribes, 
and that they could close the road against his retreat and have 
him at their mercy. Caesar had advanced towards the Durius 



on the eastern slope of one of the minor ranges. Finding 
that the barbarians had closed this way, and not caring to 
encounter a guerilla warfare when he could operate to better 
advantage, he sought an outlet on the slope which descends 
towards the sea; but this, too, the barbarians closed by occu¬ 
pying the country from the foothills of the mountains to the 




46 


CAPE CAR VOEIRO. 


shore. Caesar had to fight his way through; but this his 
legions found no difficulty in doing on the easier terrain near 
the sea. In attacking the enemy, Caesar operated by his left 
and managed to cut them off from the interior so as to drive 
them towards the sea, where he could more readily handle 
them. They took refuge on an island, which some critics 
have identified with the headland of Carvoeiro, now joined to 
'the mainland, some forty-five miles north of Lisbon. The 
strait could be crossed in places at low tide on foot, but with 
difficulty. Having cooped up his enemy, Caesar proposed to 
destroy him. It was impracticable to cross the strait under 
the fire of the barbarians. Caesar built some rafts, and put 
over a portion of his troops. Part of the rest, over eager, 
attempted to ford the strait, but, sharply attacked by the 
barbarians, they were driven back into the rising tide and 
engulfed. The first attack thus failed, the small part for 
which the rafts sufficed being unable to effect a landing. 

But Caesar never gave up what was possible of accomplish¬ 
ment. Camping opposite the island, where he could hold the 
Lusitanians, he dispatched messengers to Gades for ships. 
On the arrival of these, he was able to put a suitable force 
over to the island, which done, he had no difficulty in sub¬ 
duing the enemy’s force. This matter ended, he sailed to 
Brigantium (Corunna), whose inhabitants, terrified at the 
novel sight of such mighty vessels, voluntarily gave up the 
contest. 

This campaign resulted in the submission of all Lusitania, 
and added much territory to the Koman holding in Spain. 
Caesar was saluted Imperator by his soldiers and allowed a 
triumph by the Senate, which also decreed a holiday in honor 
of his success. So little is given us by the historians beyond 
the bare outline of the campaign, that we can say of it only 
that it was Caesar’s first lesson in war. When he attacked 


CAESAR ACCUMULATES WEALTH. 


47 


the Gallic question, he showed that he was familiar with war, 
but not with the management of its greater problems. Gaul 
was his school in the grand operations of war. It is to be 
regretted that we do not know how he had learned what un¬ 
questionably he knew of the art previous to his first campaign 
in Gaul. He had manifestly covered an immense territory, 
but we know naught of his method. 

With the civil administration of his province after this war 
we have no concern. Caesar accumulated great wealth; as 
Suetonius says, by the begging of subsidies; as Napoleon 
III. phrases it, “by contributions of war; a good administra¬ 
tion, and even by the gratitude of those whom he governed.” 
The fact remains, but Caesar did no more than every gov¬ 
ernor of a Roman province felt it his right to do. 

Caesar unquestionably cared for money, but not from mi¬ 
serly motives. Hannibal was accused of avarice; but every 
coin he accumulated went to fan the flame of war against his 
country’s oppressors. Caesar used his gold to create an army, 
to win to himself the love of his legions. Such an amount of 
booty was taken in Spain as not only to reward his soldiers 
with exceptional liberality, but to pay off his own debts. 
His ambition was satisfied in every way. 

That Caesar was ambitious is no reproach. No man lack¬ 
ing ambition ever rose out of mediocrity, ever accomplished 
anything in the world’s economy. At a small village in 
crossing the Alps, Caesar is said to have exclaimed: “I would 
rather be first here than second in Rome!” Every great 
man is ambitious. It is the purpose of his ambition and the 
means he takes to satisfy it which are the test of its being a 
virtue or a vice. Caesar’s ambition was more personal than 
Hannibal’s. It was akin to that of Alexander and Napo¬ 
leon. In the temple of Hercules at Gades, standing before 
the statue of Alexander, Caesar exclaimed that he had yet 


48 


A SECRET COMPACT. 


done nothing, when long before his age Alexander had con¬ 
quered the world. Such was not the ambition of Hannibal 
or Gustavus. 

For his victories in Spain, Caesar was entitled to a triumph, 
but he denied himself this glory in order to run for the con¬ 
sulship. 

The Roman Senate had demonstrated its inability to con¬ 



trol the rival factions which were shaking the foundations of 
the state. Finally a breach between the Senate and Pompey, 
who was the strongest man in Rome, was brought about by 
its refusal to grant an allotment of lands for his Eastern vet¬ 
erans. As a result, Pompey, Csesar and Crassus formed a 
secret compact to act together to divide the power and offices 
of Rome. They and their friends, with the easy methods of 
the day, could readily control both the Senate and the people. 



CuESAR RECEIVES GAUL. 


49 


Cfesar was unanimously elected consul, and with him was 
chosen Calpurnius Bibulus. The latter was to all purposes, 
and easily, shelved as a nonentity. Caesar’s first year was 
passed in law-making. He was able, by Pompey’s aid, to 
procure the passage of a law by which he received for five 
years control of Illyria and Cisalpine Gaul, with four legions. 
This was his first great step upward. The governorship 
would enable him to win renown and to create an army de¬ 
voted to his own person, a stepping-stone to almost any great¬ 
ness. Among his other measures he caused Ariovistus, king 
of the Suevi, one of his later great antagonists, to be declared 
a friend and ally of Rome. 

Before leaving for Gaul he married his daughter Julia to 
Pompey, as a bond during his absence, and himself — his 
wife Julia having died some years before — married Cal- 
purnia, daughter of Piso, the ex-consul. Cicero and Cato, 
Caesar’s rich and powerful opponents, it was agreed should 
be exiled. The foundation was well laid for permanence. 

Caesar had reached the goal of his political ambition by 
years of persistent effort and by means of every kind, not 
always such as were most to his credit. But now began a 
new life. He was forty-two years old, and politics ceded to 
arms. We shall hereafter view him in a new and far more 
worthy role, — a role which has made one of the great chap¬ 
ters in the history of the art of war. 






IV. 


CiESAR’S NEW PROVINCE. THE HELVETII. 

60-58 B. C. 

The Gauls had always been the most dreaded foes of Rome. Whoever put 
an end to the danger would he the national hero. This fact Caesar recognized. 
The Gauls were a fine, hearty people. They had many fortified towns, hut the 
population lived mostly in open villages. There was good agricultural devel¬ 
opment, much pastoral and some mining industry. The men were warlike 
and brave, hut fickle in temper. Their cavalry was excellent; the foot unre¬ 
liable, though gallant. The common people were downtrodden by the knights 
and Druids; the powerful princes and cantons had the weaker population and 
tribes as clients, exacting service and affording protection. Just before Caesar's 
arrival the Helvetii had prepared a descent from their Alpine home to the 
lowlands. Caesar saw that this migration would complicate his problem, and 
refused them the passage they requested across the Roman Province, fortify¬ 
ing the Rhone below Geneva against them. The Helvetii made their way down 
the north bank of the Rhone. The Gallic tribes, some of whom were under 
Roman protection, appealed to Caesar for help. The Helvetii were three hun¬ 
dred and sixty-eight thousand strong, and had begun to ravage the Gallic lands 
as they marched towards the Saone. 

Many months before Caesar left for Gaul, reports reached 
Rome that the Gallic allies on the Arar (Saone) had been 
defeated by the Germans, and that the Helvetii were in arms. 

• The news created great consternation. All feared a fresli 
invasion of barbarians such as had been barely averted by 
Marius. A general levy was ordered. Caesar had asked as 
his province only for Cisalpine Gaul and Illyria. Under 
the pressure of danger the Senate added Transalpine Gaul to 
his charge. 

The Gauls had a memorable record in Roman annals, but 
the greater part of their warlike feats lie buried in obscurity. 


I 


TURMOILS OF GAUL. 51 

We know that late in the seventh century b. c., an expedi¬ 
tion of Celtic Gauls moved through southern Germany to 
Illyria, while another crossed the Alps and seized on the val¬ 
ley of the Po. It was the descendants of these latter Gauls 
who burned Rome. In the fourth century, other tribes moved 
down the Danube to Thrace and ravaged northern Greece. 
Some of them pursued their way to Byzantium and passed 
into Asia, where they overran and held a large territory — 
Gallo-Grecia or Galatia. Rome was constantly fighting the 
Gauls during the third and fourth centuries, but her know¬ 
ledge of them was confined to such as lived south of the Alps 
or in Mediterranean Gaul. She had spilled much blood and 
spent much treasure to bring the Padane Gauls to terms, but 
these tribes were no sooner subdued than they again rose 
when Hannibal crossed the Alps. They were not finally re¬ 
duced for a generation after the Second Punic war. 

The foothold of the Romans in Gaul had been acquired in 
the usual way, by taking the old Greek colony of Massilia 
under its protection and subduing the neighboring tribes for 
its benefit, about the middle of the second century B. C. Next 
Aquae Sextiae was settled as an outpost to Massilia. Be¬ 
tween the Rhone and the mountains lay the Yocontii as far 
as the Isere; from this river to the Rhone lay the Allobroges 
with Vienna as their capital; from the Rhone to the Saone 
and Jura mountains the Sequani, with Vesontio; between the 
Saone and Loire the JEdui, with Bibracte; on both sides of 
the Allier the Arverni. The iEdui and Arverni had long 
disputed for the hegemony of Gaul; the Allobroges favored 
the latter. Rome stepped in and helped the JEdui. In 
121 B. c., Domitius Ahenobarbus and Fabius Maximus put 
down the Allobroges in two great battles. Thus was founded 
the Roman Province in Gaul. To it was later added Narbo. 
The irruption of the Teutones and Cimbri about the date of 


52 THE PROVINCE. 

the birth of Caesar threatened to destroy the structure so 
carefully reared. The barbarians successively beat five Ro¬ 
man armies. But the victory of Marius at Aquae Sextiae 
forestalled the danger and reestablished the Roman influence. 

The boundaries of the Province had been established from 
Tolosa and Narbo, south and east of the Cebenna mountains, 
up to Vienna, thence along the Rhone to the Alps, and thence 
southerly to the ocean. They were such when Caesar took it 
in charge. 

There was constant friction among the Gallic tribes in and 
adjoining the Province, and many of their representatives 
visited Rome. Among these were Ariovistus the German 
and Divitiacus the Gaul. Prom these men, both able and 
well-informed, Caesar learned much about the conditions gov¬ 
erning the land as well as its geography and topography. It 
was, except in the remote regions, by no means terra incog¬ 
nita which Caesar was to take in charge. He found a good 
base for his operations in the Province when Gaul was as¬ 
signed to him as his share of the triumvirate spoils. 

Gaul was in a turbulent state. War had never ceased 
within its borders. There were ceaseless insurrections; and 
a Roman army passing through southern Gaul to Spain was 
sure to have to fight its way. Despite the constant turmoil, 
the Province was, however, a favorite resort. Its endless 
wealth of trade with the interior, already begun by the early 
Greek settlers, was attractive, and its climate was balmy and 
agreeable. The land still bore traces of Hellenism, but it had 
gained the practical Roman imprint. Much money was made 
in trade. Still a residence in the Province had its drawbacks, 
and was always subject to danger. r 

“Until the time of Caesar,” says Cicero, “our generals 
were satisfied with repelling the Gauls, thinking more of 
putting a period to their aggressions than of carrying war 


TRANSALPINE GAUL. 


53 


among them. Marius himself did not penetrate to their 
towns and homes, hut confined himself to opposing a har¬ 
rier to these torrents of peoples which were overflowing 
Italy. . . . Caesar alone determined to subject Gaul to our 
dominion.” The Romans looked to conquer other peoples, 
but only to protect themselves from the Gauls. To resist a 
Gallic invasion there was always a levy en masse , and there 
was a special treasure in the Capitol to furnish means for 
only this occasion. 

This never-ending terror of the Gauls — equaled only by 
that of Hannibal, which lasted but eighteen years — explains 
why the Roman people, after the conquest of these enemies, 
felt so beholden to Csesar. The meed due all other conquer¬ 
ors was small compared to his. Other victories had meant 
aggrandizement; that over the Gauls meant safety. It was 
a knowledge of all this, of the reputation and power he could 
thus win, which inspired Cagsar in his task. 

Cisalpine Gaul we already know from the campaigns of 
Hannibal. Transalpine Gaul was bounded by the Rhine, 
the Alps, the Mediterranean, the Pyrenees and the ocean. 
It comprised France, the Low Countries, the Rhenish prov¬ 
inces and Switzerland. This huge country had an irregular 
mountain-backbone running through its centre from north to 
south, — a watershed on the east of which the streams flowed 
into the Rhone and the Rhine, and on the west into the 
Garonne, the Loire and the Seine, or into their affluents. 
All these rivers flowed in basins well-defined, and furnished 
excellent means of communication throughout the country. 

A o-lance at the course of the rivers shows how excellent the 

© 

lines of advance or retreat of an army might be. The cen¬ 
tral mountain chain was readily crossed in many places. 

In climate there were the same distinctions in Gaul as 
to-day. The Province was mild; the north, still covered by 


54 TRIBES OF GAUL. 

dense forests, was colder than to-day. The forest of Ardu- 
enna (Ardennes) extended over an area of two hundred miles 
wide, from the Rhine to the Scheldt and the frontier of the 
Remi. The country had a wooded character, and deep forests 
covered territory which to-day is under close cultivation. It 
is difficult to gauge the population; but to take a reasonable 
percentage of arms-bearing men, the troops raised on various 
occasions would argue something over seven million souls. 
Gaul was divided into numerous tribes, which Tacitus states 
as sixty-four, but which others place at three or four hundred. 
This latter number may be accurate, if it be held to comprise 
the many' client-tribes, or small tribes relying upon some 
powerful neighbor for protection, and bound to send its con¬ 
tingent to its patron’s wars. This sort of feudalism existed 
throughout the country. Powerful individuals had large 
forces of clients; powerful cantons had numbers of client- 
cantons. In central Gaul the Arverni and the ACdui strove 
for the hegemony. Such competition for control created a 
very loose national tie, and made Gaul all the more ripe for 
conquest. 

To the north of the Sequana (Seine) and Matrona (Marne) 
and west of the Rhine lived the Belgians, to whom Caesar 
accords the palm as the bravest of the barbarians. They 
remembered with pride that they had defended their borders 
against the Cimbri and Teutones. Being farthest removed 
from the Province, and least accessible to merchants, these 
people had nothing to render them effeminate; while a con¬ 
stant war with the Germans across the Rhine, though they 
claimed kindred with them, tended to make them bold and 
hardy. In the southwest of Gaul, back of the Garumna 
(Garonne) lived the Aquitani. Between these and the Bel¬ 
gians, the land was occupied by various tribes of Celts or 
Gauls. The Province was in every sense a part of Gaul. Its 


THE BEL GTE. 


55 


peoples had the same origin; they had merely felt the influ¬ 
ence of the Greek colony at Massilia, as they now did that 
of Rome. The Belgae comprised several notable tribes. The 



Gaul. 


Bellovaci, who abutted on the sea, could put one hundred 
thousand men into line. The Nervii placed Caesar in the 
most desperate strait he ever faced. The Treviri and the 
Remi were bold and hardy. Central Gaul, or Celtica, 
counted the Arverni, the iEdui, the Sequani and the Hel- 





56 


THE PEOPLE. 


vetii as principal nations. The latter stood proudly aloof 
in their mountain homes; the three former warred much for 
the supremacy of Gaul, ^quitania, in the era of Caesar, 
had less importance to the Romans. 

These large cantons were divided into tribes, and further 
into clans. They had many towns or oppidci — Caesar men¬ 
tions twenty-one — which were mostly well placed and forti¬ 
fied. The bulk of the people lived in open villages. Roads 
practicable for wheels existed in every section, and there 
were bridges over many rivers. Navigation on the rivers 
and sailing vessels at sea were common. 

The Gauls were tall in stature, and of light complexion. 
They dyed their hair; the commoners wore beards, the nobles 
only a moustache. They were dressed in trowsers and a 
sleeved shirt, with a mantle among the rich, a skin among 
the poor. Gold was plentiful among them, and bred the 
habit of wearing collars, earrings, bracelets and rings. They 
were fairly expert in agriculture, though some tribes preferred 
pastoral pursuits, and manufactured linen cloths and felts. 
Much grain, and cattle and horses, were raised. Their 
houses were built of wood and wicker-work. Copper was 
mined and worked. Some tribes wrought in iron and plated 
it with tin and silver. They ate beef, pork, and other domes¬ 
tic meats, drank milk and brewed ale and mead, in which 
they frequently over-indulged. Italian wine was highly con¬ 
sidered; ajar of it was deemed at times worth a slave. They 
were pleasant and kindly, but vain and quick-tempered, fickle 
and restless. Brave in battle, they wilted under defeat. 
They spoke in precise hyperbole and wrote with Greek let¬ 
ters. The women were strong and beautiful, and often as 
brave and hardy as the men. The husband had the right of 
life or death over his wife or child. A free man might not 
legally be put to the torture; a free woman was not exempt. 


THEIR HABITS. 


57 


In Caesar’s clay, as in Hannibal’s, the Gauls wielded the long 
two-edged cutting sword. Some tribes preferred long pikes 
with wavy blades; all cast darts, and bore both bows and 
slings. Their metal helmets were ornamented with the horns 
of animals or with a bird or beast, and were surmounted with 
a high tuft of feathers. They carried big shields and wore 
a breast-plate or coat of mail, which they manufactured them¬ 
selves. The Gallic cavalry was superior to the foot, as it 
contained the nobles. This arm was their delight. They 
took pride in their horses and sought noble breeds. Tilting 
was a frequent sport, and at banquets duels to the death were 
not unknown. 

The Gauls imitated well what they saw of value among 
others. Their armies were followed by a long array of 
wagons, and at night they fortified their camps with a circle 
of them. They challenged to single combat any champion of 
the enemy before battle, killed their prisoners, and preserved 
their heads as trophies.' Levies en masse were common, at 
which the last arrival forfeited his life. This put every man 
on the alert. They transmitted news with great rapidity by 
signals and relays of men, and by peculiar shouts from place 
to place. The Gauls were superstitious, and part of their 
religious observances consisted of human sacrifices. The 
Druids, who originated in Britain, kept them well under 
control. Their gods approximated to those of all antiquity, 
there being deities with the attributes of Jupiter, Mars, 
Apollo and Neptune. 

The two classes of distinction were the knights and the 
Druids. The commonalty was ground between these as be¬ 
tween the upper and nether millstone. Each knight or noble 
had a following of clients, who were devoted to him to the 
death. The government of each nation lay in a king or an 
assembly. 


1 . 

I 

j 58 THE HELVETII. 

l 

Among the Gallic cantons, some one or other was always 
\ in the ascendant, and exercised for a time the control of all 
/ the i land. At the period of Csesar’s receiving Gaul as a 
province, the Sequani had the upper hand, and had severely 
oppressed the iEdui, ancient allies of the Romans. 

The Helvetii, in modern Switzerland, were then, as history 
has always shown them to be, a stout-hearted, big-fisted, self- 
reliant people. They waged a never-ceasing warfare with 
the Germans, whose tribes constantly invaded their borders 
or were invaded by them. Orgetorix was a bold, ambitious 
and wealthy chief of the Helvetii. He had persuaded his 
people, three years before the beginning of Caesar’s governor¬ 
ship, that their valor would easily conquer for them the more 
fertile plains of Gaul, and thus enable them to extend their 
empire beyond the narrow limits of their unproductive hills, 
all too confined for their numbers, their pride, and their re¬ 
pute in war. Wrought up by the promises of gain and fame 
which Orgetorix thus held out to them, the Helvetii proceeded 
to gather together as many beasts of burden and wagons as 
possible, proposing to move with all their possessions and an 
abundance of corn, to serve for sowing as well as victual. 
Orgetorix was appointed to make arrangements with neigh¬ 
boring potentates for passage over their territories. But 
Orgetorix proved faithless to the trust reposed in him, and 
instead of serving his fellow-citizens, laid plans for obtain¬ 
ing sovereignty over the Helvetii for himself and his descend¬ 
ants. Being brought to trial, his adherents rose in arms, 
but Orgetorix died, — it was supposed by suicide, — and this 
put an end to the matter. 

The Helvetian mind, however, excited by the allurements 
of the fertile plains towards the great sea, still clung to the 
plan of emigration. In the third year, 60-59 b. c., having 
made all their preparations, and each one carrying three 


59 


THE PAS DE L’ECLUSE. 

months’ supply of meal, they fired their twelve towns, four 
hundred villages and numberless farms, burned all the corn 
which they were unable to carry with them, and in order to 
leave no inclination to return, destroyed every vestige of their 
homes and habitations. Several neighboring tribes — the 
Rauraei, the Tulingi, the Latobriges, and some of the Boii 
— cast in their fortunes with the Helvetii. 

The Helvetii had to choose between two routes. They 
could find an exit from their valleys into Gaul through the 
land of the Sequani, across the pass between the Rhone and 
the Jura mountains, now the Pas de l’Ecluse, just below 



Geneva. This was a rugged road, difficult to march over, 
“by which scarcely one wagon at a time could be led,” and 
which could be easily held and their progress intercepted by 
a mere handful of enemies skillfully disposed. Or they could 
cross to the south side of the Rhone and pass through the 
land of the Allobroges, where the river — the boundary be¬ 
tween themselves and this people — was then, it is said, though 





60 


CJZSAR'S MOTIVES. 


it is not now, fordable in many places. The river has some¬ 
what altered its width and course. Genava (Geneva), then 
built only on the left bank of the Rhone, was the town of 
the Allobroges nearest to the Helvetii, and here was also a 
bridge. This latter route was easy. The Helvetii felt con¬ 
fident of their ability to persuade or compel the Allobroges 
to allow them to pass, for this people had been recently con¬ 
quered by the Romans and were bitter accordingly. They 
made a rendezvous upon the banks of the Rhone for their 
whole people, three hundred and sixty-eight thousand souls, 
for the spring equinox of 58 B. c. 

All these facts must have come to the ears of Caesar long 
before the time of which we are to write, for the Helvetii had 
been openly preparing their expedition for two years, and 
one of^Caesar’s strong points was his ability to gather news. 
Caesar had not got ready to leave Rome, where political com¬ 
plications and the advocacy of new laws retained him. But 
he was carefully watching events. War was what he antici¬ 
pated. In the division of spoils by the triumvirate, Caesar 
had advisedly chosen Gaul for his consular province. His 
purpose was to subdue the country, not only to save Rome 
from future incursions, but, equally important to him person¬ 
ally, to create for himself an army, in those troublous times 
an essential for the great, the possession of which was to be 
his kevto abiding success. Caesar’s motives must not be im- 
pugned; neither must they be overrated. He was neither a 
Gustavus nor a Washington. He worked for Rome; but 
Rome was Caesar. L'empire, c'est moi! was his motive if 
not his motto. 

In March, 58 b. c., the time was rife; events would no 
longer wait his leisure. Caesar hastened from Rome to Ge¬ 
neva, which journey he accomplished, says Plutarch, in eight 
days. There was at the time in Transalpine Gaul but a 


Caesar's Wall and Sections of Rhone Bed. 
















62 


CAESAR A TALLEYRAND. 


single legion, the Tenth. This he at once headed for Ge¬ 
neva, and ordering the Province to raise and equip with utmost 
speed as many more men as could be done, he took the only 
possible step momentarily to arrest the advance of the bar¬ 
barians by causing the bridge at that city to be broken down. 

So soon as the Helvetii heard of Caesar’s arrival, they sent 
an embassy to him composed of their most illustrious men, 
requesting the privilege of crossing the Province peacefully, 
there being no other available route, and promising good 
behavior on the march. But remembering that L. Cassius, 
when consul with Marius in 107 B. C., had been defeated and 
slain and his army passed under the yoke by the Helvetii, and 
far from believing in their pacific intention, Caesar decided 
to decline the request. Moreover, he recognized that it was 
impossible for a body of nearly four hundred thousand souls 
to pass through the Province without devastating it like a 
plague of grasshoppers. And once in Gaul, the Helvetii 
would but add one more tribe to conquer, while their terri¬ 
tory would almost certainly be speedily filled by the Ger¬ 
mans whom the Helvetii now held in check. Still, desiring 
to gain time to raise troops and complete his preparations, 
Caesar listened courteously to the ambassadors and declared 
his willingness to consider the matter; inviting them to return 
two weeks later, on the ides of April, when he would have 
his answer ready to give them. It is evident that the Helvetii 
believed that Caesar was sincere. He had conveyed to them 
the impression that he would grant their request. The pro¬ 
ceeding is a fair sample of Caesar’s political management. 
He was a very Talleyrand in statecraft. 

Meanwhile, with wonderful expedition and skill, he built 
intrenclnnents at intervals along the left bank of the Rhone 
from the lake of Geneva to the Jura range at the Pas de 
l’Eeluse. This has been supposed to be continuous fortifica- 


CAESAR’S WALL. 


63 


tion; but it can scarcely have been such; many critics, how¬ 
ever, think that the several redoubts may have been joined by 
a simple line of works. A continuous defense was unneces¬ 
sary. Caesar had not men enough to man such a line. The 
Rhone itself is an enormous ditch with scarp and counterscarp, 
which takes the place of intrenchments. Caesar had the 
Tenth legion, say five thousand men, and perhaps an equal 
number of new levies, and could have well built in the period 
mentioned a wall sixteen feet high and eighteen miles long, 
as given in the Commentaries. Colonel Stoffel estimates 
that the work assumed to have been actually done could be 
performed by three thousand men in three days. Dion Cas¬ 
sius says that Csesar fortified the most important points, and 
much of the course of the Rhone here is so well fortified by 
nature that there is no need of art. Csesar had too much to 
do to undertake what was not necessary. The assumption 
that murus fossaque was a continuous line is untenable. 

Only opposite the modern villages of Aire, Cartigny, 
Avully, Chaney, Cologny, were fortifications needed, because 
at these places the slope of the left bank was gradual. It 
was here that b Csesar cut the trenches sixteen feet deep. 
With the natural scarp of the river bank the line was com¬ 
plete and continuous. The words cannot be held to mean a 
built wall for the entire distance, and the topography clearly 
tells the story. The whole line was fortified with well- 
manned redoubts at suitable intervals, as at all possible fords 
or crossing places, and the fortifications were held with a 
strong garrison. Csesar unquestionably distributed his forces 
at the five named points. From there they could easily con¬ 
centrate on any threatened point in a few hours; and we may 
presume that he posted observation parties at the several 
places where the Helvetii could best be seen. 

It is strange that the Helvetii, who must have clearly per- 


64 


THE HELVETII MOVE. 


ceived wliat Caesar was intending to do by thus fortifying the 
valley against them, should have kept quiet two weeks while 
waiting for his answer, instead of either attacking his half- 
finished works, or of moving by the other route. Probably 
the glib tongue of Caesar had been employed to such good 
purpose in his intercourse with them that they gave credit to 
the words which his acts belied. 

When the ambassadors returned on the ides of April to 
receive their answer, Caesar, being now well prepared, bluntly 
informed them that the Roman customs would not allow him 
to comply with their wishes. He intimated at the same time 
that he should be compelled to use force if they attempted 
to pass, and as they could see, was justified in considering 
himself master of the situation. Some slight efforts were 
made by the disgusted Helvetii to try the strength of Caesar’s 
works or to steal a march by night across the fords, but 
these proved signal failures, and they found that they must 
turn to the other route, having lost two weeks and been com¬ 
pletely outwitted by the Roman. 

For this purpose, they endeavored to procure from the 
Sequani, who occupied substantially the territory covered by 
the Jura and its foothills, the necessary permission to pass 
over their land, and, as they could not themselves prevail in 
this request, they enlisted the services of Dumnorix, the 
-ZEduan, who had married the daughter of Orgetorix and who 
stood in high consideration among the Sequani, to inter¬ 
cede for them. This Dumnorix did, and shortly obtained 
the desired right. Hostages were given by each party, the 
Sequani to allow the passage, the Helvetii to refrain from 
pillaging on the way. 

The rumor of this action reaching Caesar, and hearing, 
moreover, that the Helvetii were heading for the land of the 
Santones, on the coast, northwest from the Tolosates, about 


CuESAR'S PREPARATIONS. 


65 


modern Toulouse, he determined to prevent this movement 
also; tor a wandering tribe of warlike barbarians could not 
fail to be a danger to the Roman supremacy, and the Tolo- 
sates had become Roman clients. What was more, the Hel- 
vetii would probably take possession of the best corn-bearing 
region of the Province, which he himself might need, and 
would keep within no distinct boundaries. 

Caesar estimated correctly that the Helvetii would need 
some weeks in completing their preparations for the march; 



Caesar’s Route across the Alps. 


and leaving Titus Labienus, his most trusted legate, in com¬ 
mand of his works, he himself hastened to Cisalpine Gaul, 
raised two new legions (the Eleventh and Twelfth), called in 
three old ones (the Seventh, Eighth and Ninth) which were 
wintering at Aquileia, and with these five crossed the Alps 
by forced marches into Gaul. His route lay through Ocelum 
over Mont Genevre, and by Grenoble to Lyon, the road 
opened by Pompey when he was in command of Spain. He 
experienced some difficulty on the road from the opposition 
of the mountain tribes, who, despite the reduction of Cisal- 





66 


ADVANCE OF HEL VETII. 


pine Gaul, were still their own masters; but, though they 
held the commanding points of the passes, he defeated these 
barbarians in several smart encounters, safely reached the 
land of the Allobroges with his five legions, and crossed the 
Rhone near modern Lyon, to the territory of the Segusiani. 
All this he had accomplished in an incredibly short time. 
From Ocelum to the land of the Vocontii, about modern 
Grenoble, he took but seven days, thus making about sixteen 
miles a day over a rough mountain mule-road. It had taken 
two months from the refusal of the demand of the Helvetii 
to raise and place his troops upon the Rhone. 

The Helvetii had, indeed, consumed much time in negotia¬ 
tions to secure their passage over the Pas de l’Ecluse, and 
in their actual march, loaded as they were, still more. But 
once across this natural obstacle they had made better speed, 
and, passing through the land of the Sequani, had reached 
that of the JEdui, which they were ravaging in the most cruel 
manner in revenge for Caesar’s evident perfidy to them. 
These people and the Ambarri, their kinsmen, both tribes 
located north of the Rhone, appealed to Caesar for help, alleg¬ 
ing their ancient friendship for Rome and present distress. 
The Allobroges also appealed, assuring Caesar that they had 
nothing remaining. All were clients of Rome. The Hel¬ 
vetii, to judge by the lay of the land, must have followed the 
Rhone to modern Culoz and then struck across country to 
the river Arar, which they reached near modern Trevoux. 
Their slowness is natural when we consider that some three 
hundred and sixty-eight thousand men, women and children, 
followed by a train of ten thousand wagons (for it would take 
at least so many to carry three months’ victual for this num¬ 
ber), had to pass through a single defile. Caesar had relied 
on this essential slowness to get his troops from Italy. He 
lost no time in deciding to attack and punish the Helvetii, 


GALLIC HORSE. 


67 


and told the supplicants that they might rely on his protec¬ 
tion. He required from them, however, a number of troops, 
especially a body of cavalry, of which arm he had none. 

It is rather strange that Csesar, throughout his campaigns 
in Gaul, relied all but exclusively on native horse; and stran¬ 



ger still, that he left the command of this horse to native 
leaders. His reasons for the last were probably mainly polit¬ 
ical ; but the plan was not always followed by good results, 
and was constantly attended by danger. The Gallic horse, 
however, proved for his purposes much better than the Ro¬ 
man. They were an exceptional body of men. 


V. 


THE BATTLES OF THE ARAR AND BIBRACTE. 

JUNE, 58 B. C. 

v 

Caesar had six legions. He came up with the Helvetii on the Saone above 
Lyon. Three quarters of the enemy’s force had crossed the river. Csesar by 
skillful dispositions surprised and destroyed the quarter remaining on the left 
hank. He then crossed and cautiously followed the rest, who, somewhat abashed, 
retreated. The Helvetii still had seventy thousand warriors, and were heading 
down the Loire. At one place Csesar sought to attack them, but his well-con¬ 
ceived tactical combinations failed to work. Finding that his rations were grow¬ 
ing short, Caesar then ceased from pursuit and moved towards Bibracte, where 
was much corn. The enemy turned upon him, deeming him to have acted « 
from fear, and offered battle. Caesar drew up his legions expertly, and awaited 
their attack. The battle was hotly contested. At one period, having advanced 
too far, Caesar was attacked in rear and forced to form two fronts. But Roman 
discipline finally prevailed; the victory was complete and overwhelming. A 
bare third of the Helvetians remained. These Caesar compelled to return to 
their ancient homes. He had exhibited intelligent decision, coupled to a 
marked caution, in this first campaign. 

After crossing the Rhone, Caesar had established a camp, 
not unlikely on the heights of Sathonay, south of where the 
Helvetii were lying while they effected a passage of the Arar. 
It was here that Labienus probably joined him, from the 
Geneva works, which it was now useless to hold. This gave 
Caesar six legions, — thirty thousand men; and the 2Edui and 
the Province raised for him some four thousand horse. He 
was now ready to act with vigor. 

Caesar’s reconnoitring parties, of which he had already 
learned to keep a more than usual number out, soon brought 
him word that the Helvetii were leisurely crossing the Arar 


CAESAR’S FIRST FIGHT. 


69 


by means of boats and rafts. The Saone flowed then as now 
so slowly in places that one could scarcely distinguish the 
direction of its current. At one of these places, north of Tre- 
voux, the Helvetii were ferrying over in boats, for they were 
not sufficiently clever to bridge the stream. Caesar at once 
set out for that vicinity. He 
dispatched spies to ascertain § 
the enemy’s movements, and 8 
shortly learned that three 
quarters of their force — i 
three cantons — had been got | 
over, leaving one canton on ; 
the left bank where he him- 
self still was. Here was his 
opportunity. Breaking up at 
midnight with the Seventh, 

Eighth and Ninth legions, he 
marched between that hour 
and six A. M. about twelve 
miles, up the left bank to the 
place where the enemy was 
crossing, and sharply pushing 
in upon the unsuspecting Hel- Camp at Sathonay. 

vetii, he surprised them, cut a large number to pieces, and 
dispersed the rest, who fled in terror into the neighboring 
fo. aesttF* t was early in June. As a curious fortune would 
hav ’y .As happened to be the particular canton — the Tigo- 
rini, whose home was near modern Zurich — that had de¬ 
feated and slain Cassius, in which disaster had perished Piso, 
of the family into which Caesar had lately married. This 
defeat crippled the forces of the Helvetii, but left something 
like two hundred and eighty thousand people still to be dealt 
with, of whom seventy thousand were warriors; and they had 




70 


THE HELVETII DESIRE PEACE. 


plenty of rations. The locality of the battle is well proven 
by excavations which have revealed immense numbers of 
skeletons of men, women and children, some cremated, but 
all hastily interred, and of broken arms and ornaments. 

Caesar at once bridged the Arar near the battlefield, and 
crossed. It seems surprising that the Helvetii, under whose 
very nose this operation took place, should have made no 
effort to interfere with it, but nothing is said in the Commen¬ 
taries of an attack. All they did was to observe him closely. 
Caesar no doubt had vessels on the river which were transport¬ 
ing rations in his wake, and these aided in the passage. The 
other three legions soon rejoined him from camp at Sathonay. 
Astonished to see Caesar do in one day what they had taken 
twenty to accomplish, the Helvetii again sent ambassadors to 
him, to represent that they were desirous of peace and would 
go and settle wherever Caesar would allow; but that, if 
opposed, Caesar must remember that the Helvetii were brave 
and numerous and feared no one, as the Romans well knew 
from experience. Caesar replied that if they would give him 
hostages to do as they agreed, he would treat with them; but 
the ambassadors haughtily answered that they were in the 
habit of receiving, not giving hostages, and left in high dud¬ 
geon. 

Still the Helvetii were anxious not to fight. They preferred 
to carry out their original project, though they must have 
keenly felt Caesar’s blow in the destruction of a full Qn~rter 
of their number. They marched away on the succeeding day, 
intending still to head fof the land of the Santones. To do 
this they could not advance directly west, on account of the 
intervening mountainous region, which placed two distinct 
ranges between them and their objective. They headed north¬ 
west, so as to strike the lowest part of the watershed between 
the Saone and Loire, which they could cross and thence move 
west. 


CAESAR PURSUES. 


71 


Caesar was not placed so as readily to bring them to battle, 
as their column and his own were more or less confined in the 
narrow space between the Arar and the mountains. A slow, 
dogged pursuit was his only immediate resource, but he threw 
out his Gallic cavalry under command of Dumnorix the 
JEduan, to reconnoitre their movements. A day or two after¬ 
wards a body of five hundred Helvetian horse attacked this 
force, and under unequal conditions inflicted on it a defeat 
and some considerable loss, though Dumnorix outnumbered 
them eight to one. Emboldened by this easy success, the 
Helvetii began to indulge in constant rearguard fighting. 
Caesar was cautious. War on so large a scale was still a 
novelty to him. The teaching of the art in that day did not 
embrace what we now call the grand operations of war. 
What he knew of them he had assimilated, as no one else had 
possessed the intelligence to do, from the history of his pre¬ 
decessors, from the splendid deeds of Alexander and Hanni¬ 
bal. But this was theory merely. Caesar still felt a lack 
of confidence in his own ability; he knew that his grasp was 
not yet as large as his problem, and wisely kept without the 
limits of a general engagement. But he did his best to pre¬ 
vent the Helvetii from plundering and foraging; and thus, at 
a distance of about five miles, he followed them closely for 
fifteen days. 

Caesar was being led from the vicinity of the Arar, and the 
question of supplies was becoming grave. The corn brought 
up the river to him proved bad, and the crops were not yet 
ripe. The supply of forage at this season was limited, and 
was consumed by the immense column of the enemy. The 
iEdui had agreed to furnish Caesar with corn, but it was not 
forthcoming, though he had made a number of demands for 
it. It seems that the iEduan population, seduced by the 
representations of Dumnorix, who was, as before stated, 


72 


CJESAR TRIES RUSE. 


serving in Caesar’s army, were neglecting to furnish it, lest 
Caesar, having by their help overcome the Helvetii, should in 
turn deprive them of their liberties. Dumnorix was anxious 
to see Caesar thwarted, for the Romans interfered with his 
own plans of aggrandizement. He had, in fact, played the 
traitor in the late cavalry conflict with the Helvetii, and had 
been the cause of the loss of the field by retiring at the first 
attack. Caesar suspected that all was not right. He called 
some of the leading JEduans together, and discovered where 
the difficulty lay. He was much tempted to make an ex¬ 
ample of Dumnorix; but, probably from motives of policy, 
lest the latter’s fellow-citizens should feel aggrieved and turn 
definitely from his alliance, he feigned to forgive him at the 
intercession of Divitiacus, his brother, who was a great friend 
of Caesar’s and a faithful ally of the Romans. Caesar, how¬ 
ever, caused Dumnorix to be watched, determined not to 
allow him to push matters too far. 

The Helvetii, at modern St. Vallier, had borne to the west 
to advance towards the valley of the Liger (Loire), down 
which they proposed to march, and to cross at Decize. 
Caesar’s scouts reported that on their march they had en¬ 
camped at the foot of a hill some seven miles distant (not 
far from modern Toulon), and he saw at last his opportunity 
of attacking them to advantage. He reconnoitred the ap¬ 
proaches to the hill with care, and sent Labienus after mid¬ 
night, with two legions and guides, to ascend to the summit 
by a circuit and get into the Helvetian rear, while he himself, 
with the other four legions, preceded by cavalry, broke camp 
long before daylight to approach closer to the enemy’s front. 
The plan, well conceived and ordered, all but succeeded. 
Labienus actually reached his goal unknown to the Helvetii. 
The victory of Caesar, who advanced to within fifteen hun¬ 
dred paces of the enemy, seemed secure. But Considius, an 


FAILURE . 


73 


excellent officer and experienced, one of Sulla’s old staff, 
whom Caesar sent out with the vanguard scouts, in some way 
lost his head and gave his chief quite erroneous information 






, .r:i3 c::3 htj j 




/ ! 

cpcpcpcb- 


vW’iyi 



Operation near Toulon. 



to the effect that the Helvetii and not the Romans had occu¬ 
pied the summit. He imagined that he had recognized their 
weapons and standards. This report led Caesar to believe 
that Labienus had not reached his post, and he was unwilling 
to attack without the aid of the ambush. Thus lieutenant 
and captain failed to work in unison, and the chance of an 
immediate success was lost. Caesar withdrew to an adjoining 
height, where he went into line, to invite an attack by the 
enemy. Labienus, whose orders on reaching the summit 
were to wait for Caesar’s attack, refrained from an advance. 
It was not till the close of the day that Caesar learned the 
actual facts. The enemy had meanwhile moved away. 

Caesar was not in the habit of doing his own reconnoitring, 
even in important cases, if we may judge from a number of 
such instances as this. He was constant and careful and in¬ 
telligent in procuring information; but of all the great cap¬ 
tains he seems to have relied most upon the eyes of others. 
In this case, and in others to be narrated, his own observation 
would have been more fruitful. The Helvetii, having thus 




74 


CjESAR turns aside. 


escaped from the ambuscade, were much elated that Caesar 
had not attacked, — as they deemed from fear; but they had 
no idea of assaulting Caesar’s strong position. 

From passing the Arar, the Helvetii had marched two 
weeks at the rate of about seven miles a day. It was the end 
of June. Finding that he was running short of corn, and 
that the JEdui were still slow in furnishing it, Caesar decided 
next day to make a push past the Helvetii for Bibracte (Mt. 
Beuvray, near Autun). 

Bibracte is apt to be located at Autun, but that it was Mt. 
Beuvray is much more probable. The Gauls were wont to 
place their towns on hills, like Gergovia or Alesia; or if on a 
plain, it was surrounded by a stream or marsh, as Avaricum. 
They would scarcely have located their capital and largest 
city, Bibracte, at the foot of the mountains where lies Autun. 
Several ancient roads centre on Mt. Beuvray, and the hilltop 
is full of the ruins of a town. There is every indication that 
this was the Bibracte of the jFdui. 

From where Caesar lay the place was about eighteen miles, 
and here he was sure to find food in plenty. The time for 
issuing rations, which was usually done every fifteen days, 
when each man received twenty-five pounds of wheat, was 
two days hence, and the soldiers were near the end of their 
supply. 

The Helvetii were told of Caesar’s movements by a deserter 
from the Gallic cavalry, and construed his manoeuvre as a 
retreat. Their assumption that Caesar was afraid to attack 
them was strengthened by his thus giving up pursuit, and 
instead of keeping on towards the Loire valley, they turned 
back to attack Caesar and cut him off from retreat. They 
began to harass the rear of the Homans by more daring 
though isolated attacks. 

Their action accorded well with Caesar’s mood. He deter- 


LOCALITY OF BATTLE. 75 

mined to afford them an opportunity for battle. He occupied 
the first available eminence which he reached in his march 
on Bibracte. The battlefield appears to have been identified 
by Colonel Stoffel as near Toulon. Here he drew up his 
forces, sending the cavalry forward to arrest the too speedy 



approach of the enemy, who had some seventy thousand war¬ 
riors, while himself had from thirty thousand to thirty-six 
thousand legionaries, perhaps twenty thousand auxiliaries 
(Appian says Gallic mountaineers), and four thousand horse. 











76 


THE ROMAN FORMATION. 


He drew up liis four old legions (Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and 
Tenth), in three lines halfway up the slope, the two legions 
(Eleventh and Twelfth) recently raised in Cisalpine Gaul and 
all the auxiliaries on the plateau in the rear, with the baggage 
parked and intrenched and committed to their care. Here, 
as on other occasions, Caesar declined to use his new legions 
in the fighting lines, but kept them in the background. The 
baggage referred to is sardnce , that which the soldiers them¬ 
selves carried. The legions thus went into action in light 
order. The location of the train baggage ( impedimenta ) is 
not given. 

These three lines must not be confounded with the old 
three line formation of the Punic wars, of liastati, principes 
and triarii. The cohort was now formed in one line, as has 
been already explained. The two or three lines which Caesar 
used were separate and distinct, each legion being drawn up 
in three lines of cohorts. The Helvetii parked their wagons 
in an irregular circle on some low ground opposite Caesar’s 
position, and having repulsed the Roman allied cavalry, drew 
up in phalangial order, — a formation in which all barbarians 
are wont to fight pitched battles, — and advanced on the 
Roman army with closed ranks. They joined their shields 
together in testudinal fashion, in front, on the flanks and 
aloft, so as to ward off the first shower of pila, and came on 
with an impetus which promised hot work. 

Csesar had prepared his men by the usual allocutio, or 
battle-speech, and in order once for all to encourage his men 
to feel that he proposed to share their danger, whatever it 
might be, he dismounted from his own horse and obliged the 
other mounted officers to do the like. He may have been 
distrustful of the stanchness of some of his new officers. 
He did not yet know them. This act with the legionaries 
meant: “I will stay here and fight with you, for I have given 


BATTLE OF BIBRACTE. 


77 


up my means of flight.” It was an act the direct reverse of 
officers dismounting in action, as is sometimes done in these 
modern days of musketry. The Roman first line, awaiting 
the Helvetian onset and hurling their javelins from the 
height on which they stood, succeeded after a while in break¬ 
ing gaps in the Helvetian phalanx, and immediately charged 
down upon the barbarians with the sword. A most obstinate 
combat ensued. Many of the Helvetian shields had been 
pierced by the Roman pila, whose iron points being turned, 
the spear could not readily be plucked out, thus making the 
shields so cumbersome that the barbarians threw them away. 
The pilum of this era was a little short of two metres, half of 
which consisted of a long flexible blade with a barbed point, 
or some equivalent. They could be hurled from sixty to 
eighty feet; and when cast at a testudo, would often pin two 
shields together and render them useless. Despite this initial 
check the barbarians exposed their persons recklessly, as the 
hardy mountaineers of Helvetia have always done. But 
robbed of their bucklers, the Romans were enabled to do the 
greater execution, and after long-sustained effort forced the 
enemy slowly but surely from the field. In no wise broken 
or demoralized, the Helvetii retired in good order to an emi¬ 
nence three quarters of a mile away. Here they halted and 
once again made a stand. 

The two new legions and auxiliaries still remained with the 
wagons. As the old legionaries followed up the retiring foe, 
they advanced beyond where the Helvetian rearguard, con¬ 
sisting of some fifteen thousand allied Boii and Tulingi, had 
filed into position which enabled them to protect the Gallic 
wagon-park. These troops, now on the Roman rear, charged 
down upon the legions with the utmost fury, perceiving which 
diversion the Helvetian main line again advanced, giving vent 
to exultant shouts, and resumed the battle with yet greater 


78 


A DOUBLE ATTACK. 


vigor. Caesar states that they fell upon his exposed flank. 
This does not appear from the topography, and the phrase 
“exposed flank” may perhaps be the equivalent of the phrase 
“masked batteries” of 1861. It will be remembered that 
the right side with the ancients was always weak, as the 
shield was carried on the left arm, and the right flank of a 
body of troops was shieldless. It is constantly referred to 
as latus apertum , and the legions were always nervous about 
this flank. A convenient way of explaining a defeat or sug¬ 
gesting a tactical danger would be to speak of an attack on 
the exposed flank. Caesar thus refers to the triarii long after 
their disappearance from the legions. 

Csesar was thus compelled to form two fronts to receive 
this double attack. He faced the standards of the third line 
to the rear to meet the Boii and Tulingi, holding back the 
new onslaught of the Helvetii with his first two. The danger 
was grave, but there was still a reserve of two legions, and 
Caesar pushed the fighting home. For a long while the com¬ 
bat wavered; the Helvetii would not give up the contest, how¬ 
ever unequal, but after a long and obstinate combat the le¬ 
gions drove the enemy back to the hill they had first retired 
to, and forced the rearguard party of allies to the wagons. 
The Helvetii had fought like heroes. During the entire 
action, from noon to eventide, not a man had shown his back. 
Bitter fighting was now resumed for the possession of the 
wagon-park and continued till late at night. The enemy 
threw their weapons from the wagons and intrenched them¬ 
selves between the wheels, whence they used their long pikes. 
The women and children took part in the battle. It was only 
after supreme efforts that the wagon-park was finally cap¬ 
tured. The victory was complete. The Helvetii fled after 
sustaining losses which reduced their number to one hundred 
and thirty thousand souls. Caesar did not pursue. His cav- 


THE HELVETII FLEE. 


79 


airy could not effect much in this hilly country, says Napo¬ 
leon. But the indisposition to pursue came of the caution of 
inexperience rather than because Caesar judged it to be use¬ 
less. 

Caesar’s dispositions for the battle and the vigor of the 
fighting had been in the highest degree commendable, but he 
may perhaps be criticised for advancing so far from his re¬ 
serves as to be liable to be taken in flank and rear. Less 
than the two legions and the auxiliaries could have guarded 
the intrenched baggage-park, and the presence of one of them 
in a supplemental line as at Pharsalus would have rendered 
victory more speedy and less costly. The loss of the Helvetii 
was very heavy; but a large part of the entire people escaped 
from the massacre. These, marching four days and nights 
without a halt, reached the territory of the Lingones (near 
Tonnerre), where they hoped to find corn as well as safety. 
This tribe, however, under Caesar’s declaration sent by cou¬ 
riers that he would treat them in the same manner as the 
Helvetii if they harbored or traded with these enemies of 
the Roman people, refused to have any communication with 
the footsore and famished barbarians. The Helvetii, in the 
severest distress, at once sent messengers soliciting peace. 

Caesar had remained three days at Bibracte, or near the 
battlefield, to bury the dead and care for the severely wounded. 
His loss is not given, but it must have been very large. On 
the fourth day he followed up the Helvetii, and having gone 
into camp near by, he received their embassy, which we can 
imagine couched in less arrogant language than the last. To 
the Helvetian petition he assented upon their delivering up 
hostages, their arms, and a number of slaves who had deserted 
to them from the Roman camp. Having complied with Cie- 
sar’s demands, they were treated with liberality, and fur¬ 
nished with food; but they were obliged to march back to 


80 


FORCED TO RETURN HOME. 


their own country and to rebuild their towns and villages, 
and until they were able to accomplish this, the Allobroges 
were instructed to supply them with corn. Caesar “drove 
this people back into their country as it were a shepherd driv¬ 
ing his flock back into the fold,” says Floras. A party of 
six thousand of the Helvetii (Verbigeni) attempted to escape 
towards Germany; but they were at Caesar’s order stopped 
on the way by the tribes through whose territory they tried 
to pass, brought back and “treated like enemies,” which no 
doubt means that they were sold as slaves or massacred, — 
one of those eases of unnecessary cruelty which blot the pages 
of Caesar’s glorious campaigns. 

The location .of the battle has by some been placed at Cussy 
la Colonne, but that place does not suit the topography of 
the Commentaries. Napoleon III. places it nearer Bibracte, 
but Stoffel’s researches are the latest and most reliable. 

Lists were found in the Helvetian camp, written in the 
Greek character, showing that three hundred and sixty-eight 
thousand in all, men, women and children, Helvetii and allies, 
had left their homes, to wit: Helvetii, two hundred and sixty- 
three thousand; Tulingi, thirty-six thousand, Latobrigi, four¬ 
teen thousand; Rauraci, twenty-three thousand; Boii, thirty- 
two thousand. Of these, ninety-two thousand were fighting 
men. There returned home, according to Caesar’s census, but 
one hundred and ten thousand; the rest had perished in the 
migration, the battles or the massacres, or had dispersed. Of 
the latter it is probable that very many eventually returned 
to Helvetia. The gallant Boii were allowed to settle among 
the HDdui, who desired to receive them. 

This first campaign of Caesar’s in command of a large army 
is characterized by great dash and ability coupled to a certain 
caution apparently bred of self-distrust. He was greatly 
aided by the want of unity and prompt action among the 


CAESAR RESTS. 


81 


Helvetii, who, had they been more alive to their advantages, 
might have greatly hampered Caesar’s movements. For a 
first campaign the conduct and results were certainly bril¬ 
liant. 

Caesar intrenched his camp near Tonnerre, and here he 
remained until midsummer. 



Csesar, the Citizen. 
(Vatican Museum.) 






VI. 


CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARIOVISTUS. AUGUST AND 

SEPTEMBER, 58 B. C. 

The /Edui, Sequani and Arverni now invoked Ciesar’s aid against the 
German Ariovistus, who had crossed the Rhine and taken land and hostages 
from them. Ciesar saw the danger of permitting German invasions. He sent 
word to Ariovistus that he must restore the hostages and return across the Rhine. 
The German retorted, haughtily and with thith, that he was doing no more 
than Caesar was and with equal right. Caesar determined to march against 
him, and moved to Vesontio. Here arose a dissension among the legions, hav¬ 
ing its origin in a dread of the Germans and of the unknown lands they were 
about to invade. Caesar suppressed it by his persuasiveness, and the army 
marched against Ariovistus. A conference with him led to no results. The 
German then cleverly marched around Caesar’s flank and cut him from his base 
— a remarkable manoeuvre for a barbarian ; but by an equally skillful march 
Caesar recovered his communications. Then, learning that Ariovistus was, 
under advice of his soothsayers, waiting for the new moon before coming to an 
engagement, he forced battle upon him and signally defeated him. In the two 
campaigns of this first year, Caesar had shown much caution, bred probably of 
inexperience, but he had also shown boldness and skill in abundant measure. 
The numbers against him had not greatly exceeded his own ; and he had not 
been called on to show the decision of Alexander in Thrace or Hannibal in 
Iberia. 

After the brilliant Helvetian campaign, the Ganls with 
Caesar’s consent convoked a general assembly of tribes, and 
the whole of the country sent ambassadors to sue for the vic¬ 
tor’s good-will. They saw that they now had a Roman con¬ 
sul of a different stamp in their midst. Among the suppli¬ 
cants came embassies from the iEdui, Sequani and Arverni 
led by the iEduan Divitiacus, who particularly begged Cae¬ 
sar’s assistance against Ariovistus, a king of the Germans 


THE SUEVI. 


83 


(the people dwelling beyond the Rhine), “a savage, passion¬ 
ate and reckless man.” This chief, it seemed, having been 
called in to aid the Sequani and Arverni against their domes¬ 
tic enemies, the -ZEdui, had as a reward for this help forcibly 
taken one third of all their land, and was now driving them 
from another third to accommodate fresh arrivals of his own 
subjects, of whom one hundred and twenty thousand had 
already come across the Rhine to settle on the more fertile 
Gallic lands. Nor was this their only grievance, for Ariovis- 
tus had taken all the children of their nobles as hostages, 
and had treated these tribes with consummate cruelty. Par¬ 
ticularly the JEdui had l^een oppressed and compelled to 
swear that they would not even complain of their torments, or 
invite aid from Rome, or ask back their hostages. 

The Suevi were the largest of the German nations and the 
most powerful. They were divided into one hundred cantons, 
each of which furnished yearly one thousand men for war, 
and one thousand for tillage, and these alternated, the tillers 
being bound to maintain the warriors. They were big-framed 
and hardy in the extreme, strong and savage, and disdained 
all other peoples. Their land was said to be surrounded by 
desert wastes, they having devastated the lands of all their 
neighbors. Two immense forests, the Hercynian and that 
called Bacenis, began at the Rhine and ran eastward. The 
former covered the territory between the Danube and the 
Main, the other was substantially the Thiiringerwald of to¬ 
day. South of this latter dwelt the Suevi. 

Caesar was of course alive to the danger of allowing tribes 
of Germans to migrate at will in large bodies across the 
Rhine, for, emboldened by success, they might soon spread 
over Gaul, reach the Province, and from thence move to 
Italy, like the Cimbri and Teutones. The Rhone alone sep¬ 
arated the Province from the Sequani, on whose land they 


INVASION OF GERMANS. 


84 

were already trenching. Moreover, the 2Edui had long been 
“kinsmen” of Rome and deserved protection. Caesar had 
proposed to himself to conquer Gaul. A less conception of 
his problem is unlikely. As a preliminary, the ejection 
of the Germans from the land was essential. His method of 
thought stopped at no halfway measures. He had not come 
into Gaul merely to protect Roman territory or interests in 



the old way. He came for conquest, which as a soldier he 
saw was the only true way to cut the knot of the Gallic dif¬ 
ficulty, and which as a statesman he saw might be a stepping- 
stone to future greatness. Caesar was equipped in author¬ 
ity? men and purpose for war, and it was war he desired. 
The sooner it came, the sooner he would be able to subdue 
Gaul. One reason was as good as another to serve as a 
casus belli. To examine such questions as these is scarcely 
within our present purpose. Let us keep as closely as may 
be to the current of military events. 


ARIOVISTUS. 


85 


Caesar sent messengers to Ariovistus, who was probably on 
the Rhine somewhere about modern Strasburg, collecting an 
army among the Tribocci, proposing an interview. Ariovistus 
returned word that when he desired to see Caesar, he would 
come to him; if Caesar wished to see Ariovistus, he might 
himself come; that he saw no reason why Caesar had any 
business in that part of Gaul which he, Ariovistus, had con- 
quered, as he should not venture into those parts which Caesar 
held. This was bold language, but it has the ring of honest 
bravery in it. Caesar, who looked at the reply from the stand¬ 
point of true Roman arrogance, answered that he was sur¬ 
prised that Ariovistus, a njan who had been styled “king and 
friend ” by the Roman Senate, should refuse his proposal for 
a conference; he required this chief to bring no more men 
from across the Rhine into Gaul, nor seize upon land; at once 
to cause to be restored the hostages of the iEdui, and to cease 
from war in Gaul. Should he do so, Caesar and the Senate 
and people of Rome would still regard him as a friend; if 
not, Caesar, under his instructions to protect the iEdui and 
other allies of the Roman Republic, would take the case in 
hand without delay. To this ultimatum, Ariovistus made 
answer, that he had conquered the iEdui in battle, and had 
rightfully made them pay tribute in exactly the same fashion 
as the Romans did by those whom they had subdued; that 
he should not restore the iEduan hostages; that if the iEdui 
did not pay tribute, he would compel them to do so, and that 
their title of “kinsmen” of Rome would avail them naught. 
He ended his message with a challenge, averring that none 
had ever entered the lists against him but to be exterminated. 
Caesar had certainly met his match in aggressiveness. 

It is not quite clear how broad was the authority Caesar 
possessed by law. The governors of Roman provinces were 
usually prohibited from leaving their limits without the ex- 


86 


C/ESAR’S ROUTE. 


press permission of the Senate. But the governor of Gaul 
had been given, or had assumed, a wider authority, and was 
expected to protect the allies of the Roman people. As a 
matter of fact, there was no control whatever over Caesar, 
except that exerted by his colleagues in the triumvirate. 
And this related only to affairs in Rome. 

Learning at the same time that the Germans were ravaging 
the AMuan lands, and that other large bands of Suevi were 
on the right bank of the Rhine opposite the Treviran district, 
making preparations to cross the river, Caesar determined to 
strike Ariovistus before any reinforcements could come over 
to his assistance. Accordingly, after rationing his men and 
accumulating a supply of corn, he set out early in August 
from the neighborhood of Tonnerre, and by forced marches 
moved towards the upper Arar, where lay Ariovistus. There 



was subsequently a Roman road which led from Tonnerre 
to Langres, so that we may fairly assume that there was a 
previous Gallic path or road, and it was this Caesar took. 
Being informed on the way, perhaps near modern Langres, 
that Ariovistus was on the march to seize Vesontio (Besanc^on) 




HE SEIZES VESONTIO. 


87 

on the Dubas (Doubs), capital city of the Sequani, a depot 
containing large supplies and an admirable position for 
strength, of very considerable importance to whomsoever 
held it, and fearing that Ariovistus might be nearer to the 
place than he actually was, Caesar turned from his straight 
road to the Rhine, which ran by way of Vesoul and Belfort, 
and forcing his marching day and night, made such speed 



that he reached Yesontio and threw a garrison into it before 
Ariovistus could arrive. The Commentaries describe Yeson¬ 
tio so clearly that there can be no mistake in its location. 
“It was so well fortified by nature that it offered every facil¬ 
ity for sustaining war. The Dubas, forming a circle, sur¬ 
rounds it almost entirely, and the space of sixteen hundred 
feet which is not bathed by the water is occupied by a high 
mountain, the base of which reaches on each side to the edge 
of the river.” No military narrative exceeds the Commen¬ 
taries in lucidity; few equal it in its keen descriptions and 
clear-cut style. 

It is evident that Caesar was active in the pursuit of in¬ 
formation, though the Romans as a rule were lax in this 
particular. Like Alexander and Hannibal — like all great 
commanders — he had antennae out in front of the army 





88 ROMAN DEMORALIZATION. 

which felt its way. He was at all times abundantly supplied 
with knowledge about the countries and peoples he was to 
invade and contend with. This he procured by spies, de¬ 
serters and reconnoissances, the latter conducted mostly by 
native cavalry. The Roman horse could by no means vie 
with the Gallic in doing such work, and Caesar had a way of 
insuring the almost uniform fidelity of the latter. 

Ariovistus, learning that Caesar was moving towards him, 
arrested his advance on Vesontio, deeming it wiser to remain 
near the reinforcements which he could draw from across the 
Rhine. Moreover, the proximity of the Rhine, near modern 
upper Alsace, afforded a terrain which was better suited to 
the operations of his cavalry. 

At Vesontio Caesar remained some days. A grave danger 
here beset him, — one which well shows how deep was the 
decay of the morale of the Roman army. There were in the 
army a number of tribunes and praefects, one might call them 
volunteer line officers, men who had accompanied Caesar for 
friendship or excitement or profit, having been given their 
commissions for political or personal motives, but who were 
inexperienced soldiers and lacking in that stanchness which 
few men in an army possess unless they have taken up arms 
as a business. Many of these holiday-soldiers, frightened by 
the tales they heard of the stature and fierceness of the Ger¬ 
mans and of the dangerous route before them, — which tales 
were well borne out by the daring courage of the Helvetii, 
who themselves feared these Teutons, — besought Caesar to 
allow them to return to Italy, each one alleging some peculiar 
personal pretext. Even those who were willing to remain 
strike one as little enough like what we are apt to dub 
Romans. “These could neither compose their countenance 
nor even sometimes check their tears; but hidden in their 
tents, either bewailed their fate, or deplored with their com- 


CHECKED BY CAESAR. 


89 


rades the general danger. Wills were sealed universally 
throughout the whole camp. By the expressions and coward¬ 
ice of these men, even those who possessed great experience 
in the camp, both soldiers and centurions, and those (the 
decurions) who were in command of the cavalry, were grad¬ 
ually disconcerted. Such of them as wished to be considered 
less alarmed, said that they did not dread the enemy, but 
feared the narrowness of the roads and the vastness of the 
forests which lay between them and Ariovistus, or else that 
the supplies could not be brought up readily enough. Some 
even declared to Caesar that when he gave orders for the camp 
to be moved and the troops to advance, the soldiers would 
not be obedient to the command, nor advance in consequence 
of their fear.'’ This disaffection was spreading to the ranks 
and threatening the most serious results. Caesar grasped the 
grave nature of the matter, and his strong will at once rose 
to the occasion. He called a council of war to which all the 
centurions were invited, and with his customary skill and rea¬ 
sonableness, but without weakening his powers as commander 
to compel, he presented to them the matter of roads, rations, 
the skill and courage of the enemy and their own, alleging in 
conclusion that he should march on the enemy immediately, 
and if the other legions would not follow, he would march 
himself, with his favorite Tenth legion, alone. But he did 
not believe, said he, that the rest were afraid to go, having 
Marius as an example, who, with their ancestors, had defeated 
these same Germans. His self-reliant persuasiveness — and 
we know from abundant sources how persuasive Caesar could 
b e — at once changed the tide of feeling. Dismay gave place 
to cheerfulness, good heart resumed its sway. The legions 
expressed their devotion and obedience, the Tenth particularly 
and instantly, and loudly proclaimed their willingness to fol¬ 
low Caesar to the end of the world, alleging that they had 


90 


A CIRCUIT . 


never thought of usurping the right of the chief to decide on 
the movements of the army. 

This and other similar facts not only show that Roman 
human nature was pretty much the same as human nature has 
been all over the world and in all ages, but they show that 
the most essential quality of an army is discipline. These 
troops, not yet hardened to service, were acting as militia or 
unseasoned volunteers will sometimes act. It is probable 
that Caesar, himself yet inexperienced in the duties of com¬ 
manding officer, had not kept his troops sufficiently occupied 
with drill and camp-duties to prevent their wasting their idle 
time in foolish gossip. How much the disaffection is over¬ 
drawn in the Commentaries, to show Caesar’s eloquence and 
moral power, cannot be said, but the bald facts must be as 
stated. Caesar’s management was wise in not having re¬ 
course to rigorous measures. 

From Yesontio towards the Rhine, if he would go the 
straight road, Caesar must cross the northern part of the Jura 
foothills. That part of the route which lay along the valley 
of the Dubas was extremely rough, in parts a continuous 
defile, and much more wooded and difficult then than now. 
But Divitiacus pointed out to him that by a northerly circuit, 
of which the Dubas would be the chord, he could move in a 
comparatively open country and reach the undulating plains 
of the Rhine valley without danger of ambush. Divitiacus, 
always intelligent and useful, had been reconnoitring the 
region in front of the army, and found that the circuit would 
not exceed fifty miles. Proceeding, towards the end of the 
third week in August, along this route in the direction of the 
enemy, in seven days Caesar reached the vicinity of Ariovis- 
tus, who was reported some twenty-four miles off. Unless 
Caesar’s marches were far below the usual rate, and he would 
not loiter under the circumstances, he must in seven days 


A CONFERENCE. 91 

have marched at least eighty-five or ninety miles. This 
would carry him beyond Belfort, usually chosen as the scene 
of the battle against Ariovistus, to near Cernay. This is 
Goler’s opinion. Riistow is in error in selecting the upper 
Saar as the theatre of the approaching campaign. 

Not anticipating Caesar’s speedy coming, Ariovistus himself 
requested a conference, in a way which made Caesar believe 
that the German had grown more reasonable, and it was 
agreed that the two generals should meet on a naked emi¬ 
nence in a large plain between both camps, with an escort 
only of horse. No large plain exists near Belfort, another 
reason for placing the scene farther to the east. Caesar, 
scarcely trusting his Gallic cavalry under such exceptional 
circumstances, had “taken away all their horses,” and had 
mounted his trusted Tenth legionaries, so that they might 
accompany him. They seemed to be ready and expert horse¬ 
men. Reaching the place of conference, they were drawn up 
in line two hundred paces from the mound, the cavalry of 
Ariovistus taking a similar station on the other side. Each 
commander was accompanied to the meeting by ten mounted 
men. 

So far from the conference accomplishing any good end, 
Ariovistus, according to what Caesar wishes us to infer from 
the Commentaries, behaved in a most haughty and provoking 
manner. But even the Commentaries show Ariovistus to 
have talked in a reasonable way. He claimed only the same 
right to conquer a province in Gaul that the Romans had 
exerted, and to collect tribute in the same way; he denied 
his intention of invading Gaul further, and agreed to a 
“hands-off” policy, if Caesar would accept it. But the Com¬ 
mentaries allege that Ariovistus’ cavalry showed the bad faith 
of the transaction by commencing an attack on Caesar’s escort, 
“hurling stones and weapons at them.” Caesar, forbidding . 


92 


CAESAR'S FLANK TURNED. 


his men to retaliate, lest the blame should be cast upon him, 
withdrew from the conference. The eagerness of the legions 
to engage was greatly increased by Ariovistus’ treachery. 
Two days after, Ariovistus again requested a meeting or an 
embassy, and on Caesar’s sending to him two of his officers, 
he seized these and cast them into chains, though one was a 
Gaul and the other bound to him by the sacred ties of hos¬ 
pitality. 

At the same time Ariovistus moved to within six miles of 



the Romans, and encamped at the foot of the Vosegus (Vosges) 
mountains j and next day, by a bold and skillful manoeuvre, 
he marched around Caesar’s flank and within his immediate 




HE OFFERS BATTLE. 


93 


reach, and camped two miles off, west of modern Reinigen, in 
a position which actually cut the Romans off from their base 
and the convoys of corn furnished by the Sequani and JEdui. 
But it fortunately left open the communications with the 
Leuci and Lingones farther north, on whom in part Caesar 
depended, though theirs was a scant province from which to 
draw his supplies for so large a force. 

From the slight description of this manoeuvre of Ariovistus 
in the Commentaries, it would at first blush seem that Caesar 
had lost an excellent opportunity of striking his enemy on the 
flank while thus marching near to and around the Roman 
camp, and this criticism has been frequently made. During 
such a manoeuvre r any column, especially with baggage, is 
wont to be more or less out of order, and there can be no 
better time to attack. The march of Ariovistus was, in this 
case, protected by the forest, of which a portion still remains 
at the present time; and Caesar had not yet learned that 
power of summary action for which he later grew so noted, 
and did not attempt to interfere with the march of the 
enemy. In fact, it is probable that Caesar did not at the 
moment know of the manoeuvre. Nor was it usual with the 
ancients to take advantage for attack of a flank march by the 
enemy. 

Caesar, however, did the next best thing. For five succes¬ 
sive days he emerged from his camp and drew up in battle 
array, inviting action; but Ariovistus, satisfied with his posi¬ 
tion, the effect of which he perfectly comprehended, kept to 
his camp, merely throwing out his cavalry, which was six 
thousand strong, to skirmish with the Roman allied horse. 
The German horseman at this period was accompanied by a 
foot soldier, who was practised to run alongside, holding to 
the horse’s mane, and to fight in connection with the cavalry. 
By these peculiar tactics the Germans puzzled the Gallic 


94 


A NEW CAMP. 


squadrons, though it was really nothing new, but an ancient 
device to be found among many peoples. 

Caesar was unable to provoke Ariovistus to battle. The 
real reason for this was that the female soothsayers of the 
Germans had decided by divination that their army could not 
conquer if it fought before the new moon. This Caesar did 
not at the moment know. Fearing to be definitely cut off 
from his base, which Ariovistus might attempt to accomplish 
by a further advance, he himself resorted to a similar ma¬ 
noeuvre. He was not above taking a lesson from this skill¬ 
ful barbarian. Forming his army in three lines, he marched 
out as if ready to give battle, and moving by the right, placed 
his line on the west of the German camp in such a manner 
as to regain the road along which lay his communications. 
Halting at a distance of not more than two thirds of a mile 
from Ariovistus’ camp and two miles and a half from his 
own, Caesar held the first two lines in readiness to resist the 
enemy’s attack if made, and set the third to intrench a new 
camp and, as usual, surround it with a rampart. Ariovistus 
sent some sixteen thousand light troops and all his cavalry 
to interfere with the Romans in this operation, but this body 
was driven off. In the new camp, when completed, Caesar 
left two legions and some auxiliaries. With the other four 
legions he marched back and reoccupied the old camp. 
Though divided, Caesar was now in better position. He had 
reestablished himself upon his own communications, and 
had placed Ariovistus where he could not undertake the 
offensive to advantage. In attacking either Roman camp, the 
troops from the other would be able to fall upon his flank. 

Next day Caesar marshaled his forces from both camps for 
battle, taking up a position in advance of the larger one, but 
as Ariovistus did not accept the gage, the Romans retired to 
their intrenchments about noon. Then Ariovistus sent part 


CAESAR FORCES BATTLE. 


95 


of his forces to attack the lesser camp, and a vigorous combat 
with some loss ensued, which lasted till night, when Ariovis- 
tus retired. From some prisoners captured on this occasion 
Caesar finally ascertained why it was Ariovistus was unwilling 
to fight: “that it was not the will of heaven that the Ger¬ 
mans should conquer if they engaged in battle before the new 
moon,” and deemed it wiser to force a general engagement at 
once, so as to let the moral effect of fighting against fate do 
its demoralizing work among the German troops. 

On the following day, probably September 10, Caesar 
secretly drew the two legions from the omall camp and joined 
them to the four of the larger camp. He drew up all his 
auxiliaries before the lesser camp to impose on the enemy by 
the number of their array, and to simulate the continued 
presence of the two legions. This must have been cleverly 
done to have escaped detection. With all his legionaries, in 
three lines, Caesar advanced on Ariovistus’ camp. A suffi¬ 
cient force had been left in each of the camps to defend the 
ramparts. At last Ariovistus saw from Caesar’s pronounced 
action that it was imperative to fight. He had no intrenched 
camp, and could probably not resist a determined assault 
should Caesar make one. He accordingly drew up his forces 
by tribes with an interval between each two, — Harudes, 
Marcomanni, Tribocci, Yangiones, Nemetes, Sedusii, Suevi, 
— and surrounded the whole rear and flanks with his wag¬ 
ons so “that no hope might be left in flight.” The women 
remained in the wagon-train as witnesses of the battle, and 
conjured with frantic cries and gestures their husbands, 
fathers and sons to fight so as not to deliver them to the 
sword or to slavery, as had been the fate of the women of the 
Cimbri and Teutones at Aix. 

It is probable that Ariovistus much exceeded Caesar in 
force, but by how much it is impossible to say. Caesar’s 


96 


A SEVERE ENGAGEMENT. 


total, after liis losses at Bibracte, cannot have been much 
more than fifty thousand men, allowing a full complement to 
each legion. 

The Romans faced east, Ariovistus west. Caesar placed 
his quaestor in command of one of the legions and a legate 
over each of the others, with instructions to force the fight¬ 
ing. He himself opened the action with the Roman right 
wing as was his wont, and “because he had observed that 
part of the enemy (opposite to him) to be the least strong.” 
The Germans were drawn up in a species of plialangial order. 

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Battle against Ariovistus. 


The Roman soldiers attacked the foe with their usual visfor- 

© 

ous onslaught, but the Germans met them by a rush given 
with such impetuosity that the legionaries did not have time 
to shift ranks so as to cast all their javelins; they were almost 
immediately constrained to resort to their swords. They 


AN ABLE LIEUTENANT . 


97 


were for the moment put on the defensive. But they quickly 
resumed their ancient habit of offense, and to resist their 
onset the Germans grouped themselves in bodies of three or 
four hundred, who made a tortoise, covering themselves with 
their interlocked shields. The Roman soldiers held to the 
attack with consummate courage, advancing boldly into the 
intervals and ranks of the enemy, and tearing away their 
shields by main force. Some leaped upon the roof of shields 
so interlocked, forced them apart, and hewed at the Germans 
from above. The left wing of the barbarians was thus routed, 
but the enemy still held firmly upon the right, where he was 
by far stronger. The Roman line was unable to make the 
least impression, and finally wavered. Perceiving this danger, 
young P. Crassus, who commanded the cavalry, not being at 
the moment engaged, but placed where he could see what was 
going on, took command of the third line which had lain in 
reserve, ployed it into column, and led it quickly to the sup¬ 
port of the Roman left. The shock of these fresh troops 
broke the enemy’s resistance. No doubt the divination of 
their soothsayers had produced its due effect, and they saw in 
the Roman success the hand of fate. They turned from the 
Roman line, ceased resistance, and soon melted into utter rout 
and flight, nor stopped till they reached the Rhine, a matter 
of fifty miles distant. Their flight was presumably down the 
valley of the Ill, up which they had advanced. Some, it is 
said, swam across the Rhine, near Rheinau. Some others, 
among them Ariovistus, managed to find boats in which to 
cross, and thus escaped. The rest were cut down by Caesar’s 
Gallic cavalry. The two Roman ambassadors who had been 
cast into chains were recovered. 

The Suevi, who had come down to the right bank of the 
Rhine with intention to cross, hearing of the terrible defeat 
of Ariovistus, at once decamped. But their enemies, the 


98 


C/ESAR’S SUCCESS. 


Ubii, from lower down the river, hung upon their rear and 
inflicted severe loss upon them. This victory ended, for the 
time being, any fear of the Germans. 

Caesar, having thus conducted two successful campaigns in 
one season, early put his army into winter-quarters in the land 
of the Sequani, likely enough near Vesontio, under command 
of Labienus. He himself returned to Cisalpine Gaul to hold 
the assizes, as well as to be nearer the political turmoils of 
Rome and to watch for his own interests. 

In this initial year of his command of an army, Caesar 
showed plainly those qualities of rapid decision and action, 
courage and intelligent grasp of the situation, which always 
yielded such vast results. But he was at times more markedly 
cautious than later in his military life, as if he had not yet 
learned to trust to his good fortune, nor acquired wide expe¬ 
rience in arms. One can notice mistakes and a certain in¬ 
decision in these campaigns, to which Caesar was not later so 
much subject; though the same quality crops up all through 
his military career. He has been criticised because he did 
not attack Ariovistus on his dangerous flank march past his 
camp, but this has already received comment. It has also 
been observed that the sixteen thousand men sent by Ario¬ 
vistus against the working-party on the new camp might have 
been destroyed instead of merely driven back by his protect¬ 
ing lines of legionaries, who much outnumbered them. But 
Caesar accomplished his purpose and completed his second 
camp, which was all he needed to do. Chief criticism of all, 
Caesar should apparently have been in command of his left 
wing opposed to the stronger part of the German line, in¬ 
stead of on the right, where the enemy was weaker. It was 
the common habit for the commander to open the attack with 
his right in person; but in this instance it was distinctly 
unwise, as the bulk of the work had to be done on the left. 


ROMAN VERSUS GAUL. 


99 


If young Crassus had not acted with unusual intelligence 
and promptness, Caesar might have forfeited the victory, for 
his success on the right in no wise demoralized the en¬ 
emy’s other flank. His presence on the right was a tactical 
lapse. 

Though indeed the fact does not detract from Caesar’s 
merit, it cannot he said that the balance of numbers of the 
untrained barbarians opposed to his army during this year 
was so excessive as to make his triumph over them a remark¬ 
able thing for Roman legionaries. His army had been trained 
to war in the best manner then known. He himself was able 
to command it and manoeuvre it by a perfect method. His 
enemy, while somewhat larger, had no such preponderance as 
to make the victory of the Romans an extraordinary achieve¬ 
ment. One rather admires the Helvetii and Germans, with 
their comparatively poor discipline, art and equipment, for 
their noble courage in defense of what they undoubtedly be¬ 
lieved to be their rights. In this campaign the odds of the 
barbarians against Caesar was in no sense as great as that 
against Alexander in his Eastern campaigns; while the op¬ 
position to Hannibal was many-fold as great. But no gen¬ 
eral, ancient or modern, ever encountered such overwhelming 
odds and stood his enemies off so successfully as the great 
Carthaginian; no general ever attacked with the fury of 
Alexander. 



Gallic Buckler found in Normandy. 


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VII. 


THE BELG7E. .SPRING OF 57 B. C. 

The redoubtable Belgae had raised a coalition against Caesar during the win¬ 
ter, and so soon as forage grew he set out with sixty thousand men — legions 
and allies — against them. Arriving opportunely among the Remi, he antici¬ 
pated their defection, and by politic treatment transformed them into allies 
who thereafter remained constant. The Belgae and allies had nearly three 
hundred thousand men, but as all were not yet assembled, Caesar was able to 
attack them in detail. He sent a detachment to invade the land of the Bello- 
vaci, one of the most powerful of the coalition, crossed the Aisne, and camped 
beyond the then existing bridge in the land of the Remi. He went cautiously 
to work, showing none of Alexander’s self-confident dash, and sought to induce 
the enemy to assault his intrenched camp. This they declined, and made a 
clever diversion around Caesar’s left flank, hoping to capture the bridge in his 
rear and cut him off. But Caesar caught them while crossing the fords, and 
in a partial engagement routed them with his light troops alone. Easily dis¬ 
heartened, the coalition dissolved, and the Belgian tribes left, each for its own 
territory. Caesar then attacked Novioduuum, but being repulsed, resorted to 
a siege with success. Having done this, he could deal with the tribes sepa¬ 
rately. 

During the succeeding winter of 58-57 b. c., Caesar, in 
Cisalpine Gaul, received news from Labienus that the Belgae 
were threatening trouble, and had roused their neighbors to 
resistance in the fear that Roman success should also over¬ 
whelm them, so soon as Gaul south of them was subdued. 
They made a coalition and exchanged hostages to insure 
mutual action. * Thus far, the result of Caesar’s work had 
been to save Rome from a possible danger; but it had roused 
the Belgae, perhaps a more redoubtable enemy than the Hel- 
vetii or the Germans. This rising was not altogether regret¬ 
ted by Caesar. He saw in it the opportunity and excuse for 


CAESAR’S FORCES. 


101 


pushing his conquests beyond their present limits. The 
boundary of conquered Gaul must be the Rhine on the north 
and east, or there could be no permanent rest. He had his 
six old legions, the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh 
and Twelfth. Raising two new ones in Italy, the Thirteenth 
and Fourteenth, he sent them under his nephew and lieuten¬ 
ant, Q. Pedius, into Transalpine Gaul, probably by the 
Great St. Bernard, to the land of the Sequani. This made 
eight legions, each probably with not much less than its full 
complement. If we assume five thousand men to each, he 
had forty thousand heavy foot. To these we may add Gallic 
auxiliaries, Cretan archers, slingers and Numidians which, 
from certain allusions in the Commentaries, we may place at 
thirteen thousand, or a total of fifty-three thousand foot. 
Add again five thousand cavalry and some iEduan foot under 
Divitiacus, and we have an army of over sixty thousand 
men. The non-combatants (servants and camp-followers) 
were numerous. His lieutenants were M. Crassus, quaestor, 
and T. Labienus, C. Fabius, Q. Cicero, L. Roscius, L. 
Munatius Plancus, C. Trebonius, Q. Titurius Sabinus, and 
L. Arunculeius Cotta, legates, all good men and tried. We 
later find some others placed in responsible command. 
Caesar had authority from the Senate to appoint ten lieuten¬ 
ants of propraetorian rank. But his legates are not, as a 
rule, mentioned as such. 

When the season had advanced so that there was an abun¬ 
dance of forage, Caesar joined the army, probably at Yeson- 
tio. Learning by scouts and by spies of the Senones and 
other tribes, neighbors to the Belgae, whom he sent out as 
less suspicious than other Gauls, that the Belgae had raised 
an army, and that it was encamped in a certain region north 
of the Axona (Aisne), but apparently not ready to move, 
Caesar, after properly providing for rations, broke up and 


102 


MARCH ON BELGJE. 


headed towards their boundaries, some fifteen days distant. 
It was late in May. From Vesontio he marched back over 
the route he had taken when he moved against Ariovistus, to 



Langres, and thence by Bar-sur-Aube, to Vitry le Francois, 
— one hundred and forty-five miles in fifteen days. This 
route is laid down on the assumption that there was an 
ancient Gallic road between these points. 

This march on the enemy’s army as objective was in ac¬ 
cordance with Caesar’s energetic mood, as well as in strict 
conformity with the best rules of warfare. A summary 
attack on the enemy before his plans are completely devel¬ 
oped into action is uniformly the surest means of disconcert¬ 
ing him, and of providing for his discomfiture. It was 





FORCES OF THE BELGJE. 


103 


always Napoleon’s plan, and whenever energetically em¬ 
ployed is apt to succeed even beyond expectation. Having 
determined on this course, Caesar’s speed in carrying out his 
purpose was characteristic of the man, and a first step towards 
victory. 

The result justified Caesar’s anticipations. The nearest 
tribe of Belgae, the Remi, at once submitted, awed by the 
unexpected arrival of Caesar in their very midst. They had 
not yet committed themselves to the coalition, but, familiar 
with its details, their submission put Caesar into possession of 
all the facts. They were not unwilling to play in northern 
Gaul the role which was assumed by the ^Edui in the centre 
of the country. It was the safest, and they proved constant 
to their pledges. 

The Belgae were of German origin. Their distant ances¬ 
tors had come from beyond the Rhine, and they were equally 
haughty and warlike. They, alone and unsupported, had 
thrown back the wave of the Cimbri and Teutones which had 
come so near to wrecking Rome. The Commentaries open 
with the statement that the Belgae were the bravest of the 
barbarians. They were very numerous. It seemed that the 
Bellovaci had promised to the common cause one hundred 
thousand fighting men, of whom sixty thousand picked troops 
should go into the field; the Suessiones and Nervii, fifty 
thousand each; and twelve other tribes a total of one hun¬ 
dred and thirty-six thousand more. The actual forces under 
the colors were as follows: — 


Bellovaci, around modern Beauvais . . . 60,000 men. 


Suessiones, 

u 

u 

Soissons 

. 50,000 

u 

Nervii, 

u 

M 

Hainault . 

50,000 

(( 

Atrebates, 

u 

u 

St. Quentin. 

. 15,000 

u 

Ambiani, 

« 

u 

Amiens . 

10,000 

u 

Morini, 

M 

« 

Artois. 

. 25,000 

u 




104 


ADVANCE TO THE AISNE. 


Menapii, around modern j- 

Caletes, “ “ Havre 

Yiliocasses, “ “ lower Seine 

Veromandui, “ “ Arras 

Aduatuci, “ “ Namur 

Four German Tribes 



FI a n rl firs | 


7,000 men. 


. 10,000 “ 


}■ 


10,000 “ 


. 19,000 “ 
40,000 “ 


296,000 “ 


As the Germans of the left hank of the Rhine had joined 
the coalition, it was not improbable that additional help 
would likewise come from across the river. Galba, king of 
the Suessiones, which tribe Divitiacus had once ruled, was to 
be commander-in-chief. 

This coalition covered the whole of what is now northern 
France and Belgium. Caesar plainly saw that he must not 
allow this gigantic force to assemble, but must speedily attack 
it in detail if he would not be overwhelmed by it as a whole. 
He therefore, as a diversion, sent Divitiacus with the con¬ 
tingents of the HCdui, Remi and Senones into the territory 
of the Bellovaci on a ravaging expedition. This was an 
excellent thrust, even if Divitiacus should prove unable to 
accomplish much, for his presence alone was apt to produce 
present dissension in the ranks of the Belgian cantons. Di¬ 
vitiacus, though allied by friendship to the Bellovaci, did his 
work in a handsome manner. Caesar himself, learning that 
the enemy was near at hand, advanced across the Matrona 
(Marne) through Durocortorum (Reims), and to the Axona 
at modern Berry au Bac. Here was a bridge. Caesar took 
possession of it, crossed the river and went into camp. 

His army was in good spirits and able. His legions were 
vastly superior to the barbarians ; his Gallic allies probably 
as good, and Caesar could of course handle them to better 
advantage than the enemy his own troops. In his camp there 
was but one head, one purpose. 



CAMP AND BRIDGEHEAD. 


105 


The river Axona protected a large part of the territory of 

his new allies, the Remi, and formed 
an excellent defensive line. His 
camp lay north of the Axona, on 
the hill between the river and a 
low, marshy brook now called the 
Miette. There are substantial re¬ 
mains of the camp extant. The hill 
was eighty feet above the Axona, 
and the slopes were such as to al¬ 
low a convenient deployment of the 
legions. The bridge, if he contin¬ 
ued to hold it, made certain that 
his rations could be securely de¬ 
livered to him by the contributory 
tribes in the rear. This bridge he 
at once fortified on the north side 
by a bridgehead, with a rampart 
and palisades twelve feet high and 
t a trench eighteen feet wide; and he 

i 

I placed Q. Titurius Sabinus in com- 
„ on5t o 'W 00 mand of the south bank with six co- 

:svj pP ° 3 _f__ 

] horts, or about three thousand men. 
Camp on Axona. Caesar was, to be sure, astride the 

river, but the bulk of his force was 
on the offensive bank, he had good 
communications with the Province, 
and his camp formed an excellent 
intermediate base for action against 
the Relgae. 

The enemy was near at hand. 

They had invaded that part of the 

territory of the Remi which lay Bridgehead on Axona. 





















106 


CAESAR CAUTIOUS. 


north of the Axona. They had laid siege to Bibrax (Vieux 
Laon), some eight miles north of Caesar’s camp. Their 
method of siege was to drive the defenders from the ram¬ 
parts by showers of 
stones and arrows, 
and then to advance 
against the wall a 
testudo (or tortoise 
made by the soldiers 
holding their shields 
Profile of Camp Defenses. close together over 

their heads) to cover workmen who should undermine it. 
At the close of the first day the besieged managed to smug¬ 
gle some messengers through the lines, never carefully held 
at night, and sent word to Caesar that they must be aided 
or speedily surrender. Caesar at once sent them a force of 
his best Numidian and Cretan archers and Balacrean sling- 
ers. This reinforcement probably penetrated the town by 
the south, where impregnable escarpments made the besieg¬ 
ers lax in their watch. They were active only on the other 
three sides. 

The easily discouraged Belgae drew off from the siege, and 
giving up hope of taking the place, devastated the region. 
They then advanced and took up a position within two miles 
of the Romans. Their camp appeared from the fires to have 
a front some eight miles long. 

Caesar was cautious about engaging this enormous army 
until he had made essay of their valor and discipline as well 
as of that of his ^Eduan horse, and he made daily cavalry 
reconnoissances by which the Romans could gauge the value 
of the enemy in action. They soon ascertained that the allied 
horse was quite equal to the Belgian; and the Roman soldier 
was by far his superior. The legionary’s ambition rose 







THE BATTLE-GROUND. 


107 


PRALTORlAN CATE 


accordingly. This caution on Caesar’s part was as much an 
outcome of his own inexperience as it was the desire of teach¬ 
ing his troops that they were safe in despising numbers. He 
could not afford to have one bad check now, as its effect might 
be so far-reaching as to prejudice the results of his whole 
plan of action in Gaul. But having satisfied himself and his 
soldiers of their superiority, he concluded to bring on a bat¬ 
tle. We admire the method and skill of Caesar, but we look 
in vain for that vlan which characterized even the first cam¬ 
paigns of Alexander — that mettle which made no tale of 
the enemy. Cajsar’s caution was advisable, but it does not 
appeal to us like the Macedonian’s brilliant gallantry. 

The ground on the north slope in 
front of the bridgehead was not only 
available for ranging the Roman 
battle-lines, but its left was protected 
by the Miette and Aisne; the right 
could lean on the camp. But be¬ 
tween the camp and both the Axona 
and the brook were gaps through 
which the barbarians with their vast 
numbers might penetrate, and take 
the legions in reverse. These gaps 
Csesar fortified with a wall and 
trench four hundred paces long, at 
right angles to the front of the camp, 
and built a redoubt at each outer 
end, where he placed some of his 
military engines to support his right 



OECUtlAN 



C AT £ 


& 


A 



35 FT 



15 FT 


1 


flank in case the enemy should over- Ditches at Camp-Gates, 
lap him. He left the two new legions in camp as a reserve. 
The other six he drew up in line on the north slope of the 
hill. The enemy did the same in front of their own camp. 

































108 


THE ARMIES IN LINE . 


Between the two armies was the marshy hit of land made by 
the brook. Neither army appeared willing to cross this 
strip, lest the disorder into which it might fall during the 
crossing should enable the other to take it at a disadvantage. 

The action was opened by some cavalry exchanges between 
the two armies, in which the Roman allies again proved their 



Battle of the Axona. 


superiority after a hot contest. Caesar, not caring himself to 
attack, but wishing to lure the Belgians on to begin the en¬ 
gagement, after some hours thus spent in line, led back his 
forces to camp. The barbarians, who were really anxious 
to fight, for their victual was not overabundant, but unwilling 
to assault Caesar’s intrenchments, now tried another scheme. 
They marched round the Roman left to the river, where they 
had discovered a passable and strangely enough to Caesar 
unknown ford below the camp; and here they began to make 
their way across in small parties, purposing to cut off the 
bridge or the command of Titurius; or failing this, to devas- 




FIGHT AT THE FORD. 


109 


tate the region of the Remi on which the Romans relied for 
much of their corn. It is probable that the country was heav¬ 
ily wooded. Caesar at all events did not discover the turning: 
manoeuvre until informed of it by Titurius. Leaving his le¬ 
gions still in camp, Caesar himself, with his cavalry and light 
troops, moved rapidly to the rear, crossed by the bridge and 
advanced to meet this serious threat. His force consisted of 
his Gallic cavalry, and of Numidian and Cretan archers and 
Balacrean slingers, the best of their kind, and of great value 
and utility. He arrived at the ford not a moment too soon, 
for the barbarians were already swarming across the river in 
considerable numbers. The light troops attacked them with 
vigor. As they were in disorder from the difficulties of the 
ford, which they were crossing without any preparation or 
support, Caesar had them at his mercy, and inflicted enor¬ 
mous losses upon them. The cavalry cut those who had 
reached the south bank to pieces, and drove back the other 
warriors who were gallantly seeking to force their way over 
the river on the bodies of the slain, which all but filled up 
the ford. The victory was won with small effort. The fact 
that the legions were not brought on to the field is a fair 
gauge to the battle of the Axona. 

The barbarians, disappointed at not taking Bibrax, nor 
drawing Caesar into battle on their own ground, nor being 
able to cut him off by crossing the river, lost heart and de¬ 
termined to retire. To this they were especially constrained, 
when on hearing that the .ZEdui had invaded the land of the 
Bellovaci, this latter tribe at once decamped to protect its 
own territory. It was agreed, however, among all the tribes 
before dispersing, that they should again assemble to resist 
the Roman army whenever it might invade the country, on 
the territory of whatever tribe was first attacked. 

They accordingly broke camp that night about ten p. M., 


110 


AN ASSAULT REPULSED. 


and began tlieir rearward movement. As the column of each 
tribe naturally strove to be first in order of march, the army 
as a whole set out on their retreat in much confusion. This 
was increased by the darkness. Perceiving the disorder, but 
fearing an ambush, Caesar, with Fabian caution, remained in 
camp till daybreak. Having then satisfied himself that there 
was no such danger, he sent his cavalry under Pedius and 
Cotta, and three legions under Labienus, to harass the rear of 
the retreating enemy. This was effectually done, and with¬ 
out loss. The Roman troops cut down many thousands of 
the barbarians, who had no further idea of resistance, and 
allowed themselves to be slaughtered like so many brute 
beasts. The pursuit was checked at night, and the party 
returned to camp. Judging from the account in the Com¬ 
mentaries, the pursuit was not over vigorous. The remorse¬ 
less energy with which Alexander followed up his broken 
and flying enemy was entirely lacking here. 

Next day, Caesar made a forced march of twenty-eight 
miles down the Axona to a city of the Suessiones which had 
joined the Belgse. It was called Noviodunum (Soissons). 
He hoped to take the place by storm, as it had but a scanty 
garrison, the tribe being absent in the general expedition. 
The wall and ditch were, however, so high and wide that the 
town could not be captured out of hand. The Commentaries 
simply state that Caesar attempted the assault. It appears 
probable that he did so without proper precautions, and being 
driven back with loss, made no second assault. Hannibal, it 
seems, was not the only general who was balked by walls and 
ditches; and the towns he assaulted were fortified by Roman 
skill and garrisoned by Roman soldiers. The Commentaries 
are our only source of information for the details of this war, 
and as these were written with a purpose, and are as emi¬ 
nently plausible as they are remarkable as a narrative of 


NOVIODUNUM. 


Ill 


events, it is often difficult to read between the lines so as to 
guess at the exact truth. But in this case it is evident that 
Caesar was beaten back by the garrison of Noviodunum. 
Finding that the assault was a failure, Caesar camped near 



by and sent back for the vineae and other engines of siege. 
Yineae, it will be remembered, were portable, strongly con¬ 
structed huts, open at both ends, which could be placed 
together so as to make galleries to approach the walls of 
towns for undermining. They served the same purpose as 
parallels in modern war. 

The army of the Suessiones meanwhile returned, and a 
reinforcement to the garrison was thrown into the place dur¬ 
ing the following night. The Commentaries lead one to infer 
that the entire body of Suessiones filed in. It would seem as 
if this should have been prevented by Caesar. The tribe 
could be more easily fought outside than insidet the place, and 
if he had enough men to besiege it in the presence of the 






112 


BRA TUSPANTIUM. 


relieving army, he certainly had enough to prevent their en¬ 
tering the town. It is probable that the barbarians outwit¬ 
ted Caesar in this matter also. But Caesar started to make a 
terrace; and when the siege apparatus arrived, the barbari¬ 
ans, astonished at the enormous preparations made by the 
Roman engineers, and their speed in the work of the siege, 
concluded that they had better sue for peace. By interces¬ 
sion of the Remi, whose allies they had always been, their 
suit was granted, the people were disarmed, and the usual 
hostages taken. In the town was found a large supply of 
arms. 

Caesar then marched across the Axona against the Bello- 
vaci, — the most dangerous of the allies, — who retired into 
their capital town called Bratuspantium (Breteuil, or possibly 
Beauvais). But when the Roman army came near the place, 
a deputation of old men was met who sued for peace; and so 
soon as Caesar had arrived within sight of its walls, the 
women and boys made supplication from the ramparts. 
Divitiacus, who had returned after disbanding his ACduan 
army, also pleaded for this people, which had been misled by 
its chiefs, and out of respect to him and to the .ZEduans, 
Caesar took the Bellovaci under his protection, requiring, 
however, six hundred hostages from them as well as the 
surrender of their arms. Such hostages were, as a rule, the 
children of the king, if any, and of important citizens, or 
else were illustrious men, needful to the state and influential 
in its councils. The Bellovaci declared that the promoters 
of the Belgic war had fled to Britain, with which country 
there was considerable intercourse. 

The neighboring people, the Ambiani, on being approached, 
also brought in their submission, and now Caesar concluded 
to turn northeasterly towards the land of the Nervii. 


VIII. 


BATTLE OF THE SABIS. JULY-SEPTEMBER, 57 B. C. 

Many of the Belgian tribes had sued for peace. Not so the Nervii and 
their allies. Caesar marched against them. At the river Sabis he was surprised 
by the barbarians, owing purely to insufficient scouting. While the legions 
were preparing to camp, the enemy fell violently upon them. They were 
caught unprepared, and came close to being overwhelmed. Caesar was never, 
except at Munda, in so grave a danger. Finally, by superhuman exertions on 
his own part, and by cheerful gallantry on the part of his men, the tide of bat¬ 
tle turned, and the barbarians were defeated with terrible slaughter. Out of 
sixty thousand Nervii, but five hundred remained fit for duty ; of six hundred 
senators, but three returned from the battle. Caesar then marched down the 
Sabis to a city of the Aduatuci (Namur), which after some trouble he took. 
The campaign had been successful and glorious. Caesar had made serious but 
natural mistakes, of which happily the Gauls were not able enough to take 
advantage. 

The Nervii were the most warlike of the Belgians, and 
they not only absolutely refused to make terms, but reproached 
the other Belgians for submission. This people kept them¬ 
selves entirely aloof from commerce or intercourse with other 
nations, and in this manner had preserved their native 
strength and hardihood. The Nervii had got the Atrebates 
and Veromandui to pool issues with them, and the Aduatuci 
were on the way to join the coalition. The women and chil¬ 
dren had been sent to a spot defended by a marsh, perhaps 
Mons, whose hill is now surrounded by low meadows once 
marshes. In three days’ march Caesar reached a point near 
modern Bavay, not far from the Sabis (Sambre), on which 
river, ten miles away, he learned from some prisoners that 
the Nervii and the adjoining allied tribes were awaiting the 


114 


THE NERVI AN AMBUSH. 


Roman army, at a place near modern Maubeuge. Caesar 
kept up his advance and struck the Sabis on the left or north 
bank. The Nervii were on the right or south bank. He 
sent forward his light troops to reconnoitre, and the usual 
number of centurions to choose a place for camp. The com¬ 
mon formation for the march of the Roman army (i. e. each 
legion being followed by its own baggage) had been carefully 
noted by the neighboring tribes, and its manner reported to 
the Nervii; some native deserters had also joined them with 
similar information from the Roman camp; and the Nervian 
chiefs were advised to promptly attack the leading legion as 
it approached its new camping ground encumbered with its 
impedimenta, because, hampered by the baggage-train follow¬ 
ing it, they would probably be able to destroy it before the 
other legions could arrive to its support. This would in the 
opinion of the Gallic advisers quite demoralize the rest of 
the army and result in Caesar’s complete overthrow. Orders 
were accordingly issued by the Nervian chiefs to attack as 
soon as the baggage-train came in view. Such action was 
all the more promising as the locality was rough and wooded, 
and suitable for the Nervii to fight in, they having little 
horse but most excellent infantry. 

It was towards the end of July. Caesar’s officers had chosen 
for camping a place where an uncovered hill sloped gently 
down to the left bank of the Sabis, at Neuf-Mesnil. On the 
other side of the river was a like hill (Haumont), the upper 
slope of which, beginning some two hundred paces away from 
the river, was heavily wooded. In these woods the Nervii 
hid their camp. Having no cavalry, they resorted to a clever 
means to stop the enemy’s. They bent down saplings and 
interlaced their branches with brambles and brushwork, thus 
making the stiffest kind of hedge. The people of this section 
still do the same thing to-day to fence m fields. By this 


V 


\ 



SKILLFUL DISPOSITIONS. 115 

means the Nervii intercepted the advance of the Roman allied 
horse which was reconnoitring, and effectually prevented the 
discovery of their position. Every warrior was kept out of 



sight, excepting only a few videttes near the flats along the 
river, which was here but about three /feet deep; and these 
served to attract the Romans’ attention and prevent their 
scouting beyond the river. Their skillful dispositions ex¬ 
ceeded Caesar’s. 

Knowing that he was approaching the enemy, Caesar, in¬ 
stead of the usual column, adopted an order of march proper 
to the occasion. First came the cavalry; then the six old 
legions; then the baggage all in one train; last the rear and 






116 


CARELESS CAMPING. \ 

baggage guard, consisting of the two new legions. But Cae¬ 
sar was far from imagining that the whole force outlie enemy 
was close at hand. His scouting was not effective. 

On approaching the camping-ground, the cavalry sent a 
detachment across the river with slingers and archers to drive 
away the Nervian videttes, while the six leading legions set 
about fortifying the camp. The Nervian horsemen skir¬ 
mished well, holding the edge of the wood in such a way that 
the Romans did not discover the Gallic line of battle. 

The Ninth and Tenth legions, meanwhile, began work on 
the left front of the proposed camp; the Eighth and Eleventh 
on the front facing the river, the Seventh and Twelfth on the 
right front. The legionaries, unsuspicious of danger, dis¬ 
persed to collect palisades and other stuff, with but the slender 
cordon of horse out as pickets. While all this was passing, 
and so soon as the wagon-train had come in sight, this being 
the preconcerted signal, the Nervii and their allies, the Atre- 
bates and Veromandui, rushed impetuously from their am¬ 
bush, brushed away the Roman skirmish-line of horse like a 
cobweb, forded the river and fell, as it were an avalanche, 
upon the Romans, who were entirely unconscious of their 
presence and unprepared for an assault. It was evident that 
Caesar had not yet grown expert in reconnoitring his ground 
in the presence of the enemy, nor careful in his method of 
camping. Here was an unwarranted breach of the usual Ro¬ 
man method, which always put out a line of battle to protect 
a camping party. The surprise was complete. It was all 
but certain that Caesar’s army would be wiped from exist¬ 
ence. In the onslaught the Atrebates were so placed on 
the enemy’s right as to attack the Ninth and Tenth legions; 
the Veromandui in the centre, the Eighth and Eleventh; the 
Nervii on their left, the Seventh and Twelfth. The Nervii 
were opposite the rugged left bank of the Sabis at Boussieres. 


A COMPLETE SURPRISE. 


117 


But for the discipline of the legions, which was in every 
sense commendable, the Roman army would have been de¬ 
stroyed. Many of the soldiers were at a distance seeking 
material for the rampart; the rest were busy at work with 
what they had already brought. Lucky it was that the men 
had become hardened in their past year’s campaigns. Better 
still, they had gained confidence in their leader. There was 

A 

not a sign of demoralization. The stanch qualities which 
later enabled Caesar with them to complete the overthrow 
of all his enemies had already taken root. So soon as the 
enemy was seen to emerge from the woods, every legionary 
caught the alarm. The trumpet was quickly sounded, and 
the standards displayed; the officers were happily all at 
hand, it being one of Caesar’s explicit orders that none such 
should, under any pretense, leave his legion till the camp 
was fully fortified; and the Roman soldiers had already 
learned how to fall quickly into the ranks. 

The attack of the barbarians had been so well-timed and 
sudden that the officers, many of them, had not even time to 
put on their badges, such as were usual to distinguish the 
several ranks, or the men to take off the leather covers with 
which, during the march, they were wont to protect their 
often beautifully ornamented shields. Nor could they by any 
means seek each man his own cohort. They fell in under 
whatever standard was nearest, while Caesar and his lieuten¬ 
ants rushed to and fro, encouraging the patchwork lines and 
striving to call order from confusion. 

The line was barely formed in this irregular manner, when 
the enemy reached the ground. They had crossed an open 
stretch of nearly three quarters of a mile and forded a river, 
which may have occupied twenty minutes. The surface was 
considerably cut up by the artificial hedges before referred 
to, which might be described as a sort of abatis. This cir- 


118 


THE LINES CONFUSED. 


cum stance operated to prevent all manoeuvring. The line 
thus thrown together was an irregular convex formation, 
standing in so confused a manner that the legionaries had no 
notion whatsoever of what was going on around them. Each 
small body fought where it stood, as it were, for its own sole 
safety. There was no possibility of mutually assisting each 
other. Aid could not be sent from one to another part of 
the line. There was, for the nonce, no head, no purpose. 
A worse surprise can scarcely be imagined. Still there was 
no manifestation of fear; the legionaries set their teeth and 
proposed to fight it out as best they might. 

The Ninth and Tenth legions were, as stated, on the left. 
These men behaved with all the gallantry for which Caesar so 
loved the Tenth, cast the pilum, fell to with the gladius, and 
after a hearty tussle drove back the Atrebates in their front; 
for these barbarians had become tired and out of breath with 
their sharp rush across the river and their hurried attack. 
They were pushed, with great loss, across the ford, followed 
up and cut down by thousands. The Atrebates rallied for a 
moment, but were again broken and hustled back until the 
Ninth and Tenth finally reached the Gallic camp. 

The Eleventh and Eighth legions in the centre likewise 
behaved with praiseworthy fortitude. After a wavering com¬ 
bat, in which both sides lost heavily, the success of the Ninth 
and Tenth on their left so emboldened these two bodies that, 
with a shout of triumph, they made a common charge on the 
foe and pushed the Veromandui in their front sharply down 
to the river, on whose bank they kept up the combat. 

But this very success was the cause of the gravest danger. 
The advance of the four legions of the left and centre abso¬ 
lutely exposed the front and left of the camp works just 
begun, and left naked the flank and rear of the Seventh and 
Twelfth legions on the right. While all this was going on, a 


THREATENING DISASTER . 119 

heavy force of sixty thousand Nervii, under Boduognatus, the 
chief in command, had been fording the Sabis and climb¬ 
ing the heights of Boussieres. Perceiving the opening, this 
entire force fell on the two legions, which numbered some 
ten thousand men, striking them on the right flank (ciperto 
latere) with a fierceness which the Bomans had never yet 



encountered. The cavalry and light troops, who, after being 
driven in, had just rallied and placed themselves in reserve, 
were again utterly disorganized by this overwhelming onset; 
while the host of non-combatants, — drivers, servants and 
sutlers, — penned up in the camp, seeing a column of the 
barbarians penetrating into its very midst, made a hasty exit 
from the half finished rear-gate in the wildest confusion, and 
made for the woods. So apparently fatal was the disaster 




120 


CAESAR’S PERSONAL GALLANTRY. 


and rout, that some auxiliary cavalry, reputed to be the best 
in Gaul, took to its heels, and conveyed to the tribes along the 
route by which Caesar had advanced, and at home, the news 
that the Romans had been surprised and utterly destroyed. 

Caesar, at the earliest onset of the enemy, had rushed to 
the left, where the line was first threatened, and encouraged 
the Ninth and Tenth legions, who under his cheerful words 
and bearing had gone to work with a will which accomplished 
wonders. Thence he galloj^ed to the centre, where his pres¬ 
ence exerted a like happy effect. On his reaching the right, 
he found matters in the worst possible condition. On this 
front had fallen the attack of the Nervii themselves, the 
bravest of the brave. The standards of the Twelfth legion 
had been planted so closely together that the troops were 
huddled in masses, and unable to fight to any advantage. 
The files were pressed too close to use the sword. There had 
beeu a terrible loss of officers, the missiles falling on the close 
ranks with awful fatality. In some cohorts every centurion 
was killed or wounded. If Caesar had not yet been hard 
pressed by the Gauls, he had his fill of fighting now. The 
efforts of the troops were apparently slackening. The en¬ 
emy, in vast numbers, was pushing in front and overlapping 
the flanks, and more and more were coming. There was no 
reserve. The other legions had not yet worked out their 
problem. The matter was at its climax. Defeat stared 
Caesar in the face,—massacre was its result. Snatching a 
buckler from a soldier in the rear, with the inspiration of dire 
necessity, —as he later did at Munda, where, as he said, he 
fought for his life, — Caesar rushed on foot to the front to 
reestablish order. Seeing their chief performing the part of 
the common soldier, the courage of the men near by at once 
revived, and the good feeling spread. They opened ranks so 
as to wield the gladius. Their battle-cry resumed its normal 


VICTORY HARD WON. 


121 


resonance, and the resistance to the enemy became more 
resolute. Rushing thence to the Seventh legion, Csesar re¬ 
animated that body in like manner, and brought it sharply 
up to the support of the Twelfth, and, as some critics read 
the Commentaries, got the two legions back to back, so as to 
prevent being surrounded. The benefit of Caesar’s gallantry 
was immediate. It struck the same key-note as Napoleon’s 
heading the grenadiers at the bridge of Lodi. Such is the 
effect of a great man’s divine fury upon other men. It was 
the burning genius of the heart within, which could thus in 
a moment transform disaster into victory, could revive the 
ardor of courage fast ebbing away. Such, too, was the 
throbbing heart which turned the tide at Winchester, such 
the dauntless presence which saved the wreck of Chicka- 
mauga. It began to look as if the Seventh and Twelfth 
could hold their own. 

Meanwhile the two legions of the rearguard, having notice 
of the battle, hastened up, and being seen approaching by 
the enemy spread a disheartening effect among their ranks. 
Labienus, who with the Tenth legion had gained possession 
of the enemy’s camp beyond the ford, also perceived from the 
hill opposite the distress of the Twelfth and Seventh, and 
speedily sent the Tenth to their succor. This admirable body 
of men came up at a pas de charge, and took the Nervii in the 
rear with a shock which instantly reestablished the fighting 
on the right; and, seeing the change of tide, the camp-fol¬ 
lowers and cavalry regained their courage, and turning upon 
the foe drove the flanking column of the barbarians from the 
camp. 

The tide had turned; the battle was won, but so tenacious 
of their ground were the Nervii that the survivors stood and 
fought on the bodies of the slain, and even piled them up 
as breastworks. It was by brute pressure alone that these 


122 


NERVI AN LOSSES. 


obstinately gallant barbarians could be forced to cease from 
fighting. The little remainder Caesar drove into flight. They 
had fought with a doggedness exhibited by no foes Caesar 
ever encountered. The Roman army was exhausted as it 
had rarely been, and its losses had been heavy. Camp was at 
once fortified; the men buried the dead, and took their rest. 

The old men from the Nervian retreat shortly sent and 
sued for peace. They stated that of six hundred senators but 
three had returned from the battle; that of the sixty thou¬ 
sand men who had been engaged, a bare five hundred could 
now bear arms. Such had been the splendid valor of the 
vanquished. Caesar accepted their plea, arrested further 
butchery, and commanded the neighboring tribes not to assail 
them in their utter present weakness. 

The Aduatuci had been on the march to the assistance of 
the Nervii, but frightened at the reports of the battle of the 
Sabis, they turned back, deserted their other towns, and con¬ 
veyed all their people and goods into one, peculiarly adapted 
for defense. This town, whose name is not given, was situ¬ 
ated upon a precipitous hill wellnigh inaccessible on every 
side but one, where a gentle slope not over two hundred feet 
in width descended to the plain. This slope they had forti¬ 
fied with a very high double wall. These people were descend¬ 
ants of some six thousand of the Cimbri and Teutones, who 
had been left behind in charge of the baggage, while the bulk 
of the tribes had marched south and been destroyed by 
Marius two generations before. This site was doubtless in 
the angle made by the Sabis and Mosa (Meuse) opposite Na¬ 
mur. Mt. Falhize is suggested as the location,-but it does 
not as well correspond with the text or with the distances 
marched as the other. 

Against this town of the Aduatuci, Csesar, with seven of 
the legions — one was detached under Crassus — at once 


BIG GAULS VERSUS LITTLE ROMANS. 123 

directed his march down the Sabis. Reaching the place, he 
found its location impregnable, and, seeing that he could not 
otherwise capture it, he began a siege by the construction of 



a rampart or line of contravallation. This work was twelve 
feet high and fifteen thousand feet long, with redoubts at 
intervals. The length of the works is often given as fifteen 
miles, but this is a manifest error, as the topography plainly 
shows. After the quindecim millia of the text, the word 
passuum must be understood. The barbarians endeavored 
to interrupt this work by repeated petty attacks, but to no 
effect. When they saw the construction of a tower and vineae 
at a distance, they taunted the Romans for their small stature, 
which, indeed, then as now, was in marked contrast to the 
bulky bodies of the Germans, and of the Gauls who were of 
German lineage, and asked who would bring the tower to 
their walls. But when this same tower began to move to¬ 
wards them, and actually did approach their walls, they at 
once sent ambassadors to treat for peace, alleging their belief 
that the Romans were aided by the gods. They begged that 
they might retain their arms as a defense against their local 
enemies. Caesar demanded unconditional surrender and dis¬ 
armament, but told them that he would command their neigh¬ 
bors to abstain from attack. The Aduatuci were fain to 
submit. Their manner of surrendering their arms was to 






124 


TREACHEROUS SURRENDER. 


throw them from the town rampart into the trench, and the 
su Pply was so great that it filled the trench and made a pile 
nearly up to the height of the rampart for a considerable dis¬ 
tance along its circuit. Despite their surrender, the chiefs 
had acted treacherously, and had yet concealed a third part 
of their arms. After this apparent disarmament the gates 
were opened, and the Roman legions marched in and took 
possession. 

When night came on, the Romans were all ordered from 
the town to their camps. Caesar feared the violence and 



rapacity of his legionaries, and the ill results which might 
flow therefrom. Still this was a lesser danger than to retire 
from a town just captured. The Aduatuci naturally believed 
that the Romans would be less careful now that they had re¬ 
ceived the surrender of the town, and planned an attack that 
very night upon what appeared to be the least strong part of 











SACK AND MASSACRE. 125 

Caesar s contravallation wall. They had the arms not sur¬ 
rendered, and they made new bucklers of bark and wicker¬ 
work. They delivered the assault shortly after midnight and 
with considerable vigor. Caesar, suspecting possible treach¬ 
ery, had provided for just such an occurrence. The usual 
signal-fire was lighted at the point of attack, and the legion¬ 
aries at once rushed from all points to the defense of their 
threatened rampart. The Aduatuci fought like brave men, 
but, with a loss of some four thousand killed, they were 
driven back into the town and penned in. Caesar retaliated 
for this treachery by marketing the whole spoil of the town. 
There were fifty-three thousand people sold as slaves. This 
was early in September. 

During this time, Crassus, who had been detached with 
the Seventh legion against the maritime tribes living on the 
northwest coast of Belgium, had done his work well, and 
reported that these peoples had all been brought under the 
Roman sway. His method of operation is not known. 

So great had the fame of Caesar’s conquests become that 
many of the nations from beyond the Rhine, the Ubii in par¬ 
ticular, sent ambassadors to tender their submission to the 
Romans. But desirous of returning to Italy, and as the cold 
season was now approaching, Caesar put his troops into win¬ 
ter-quarters along the river Liger (Loire), among the Car- 
nutes, Andes and Turones, echeloned between Orleans and 
Angers; and, inviting these ambassadors to return early the 
next summer, himself set out for the south. Reaching Rome, 
a thanksgiving ( supplicatio ) of fifteen days was decreed, — a 
longer period than had ever before been granted a Roman 
general. 

The best praise of this splendid campaign is its own suc¬ 
cess. The energy, rapidity, clear-sightedness and skill with 
which Caesar divided, attacked and overcame the Belgian 


CAESAR'S ERRORS. 


126 

tribes is a model for study. The fact that he had next to no 
fighting to do is all the more to the credit of his strategy. 
But in this his second campaign, he still committed errors. 



Winter-Quarters, b. c. 57-56. 


Many of these are more or less frankly acknowledged in the 
Commentaries. His miscalculation in his unprepared and 
therefore unsuccessful assault on Noviodunum was a natural 
enough mistake, one to which all, even the greatest, comman¬ 
ders are liable. His being surprised, as he was at the river 
Sabis, by the Nervii was due to a piece of carelessness which 
came near being, and but for the stanchness of the Roman 
character would have proved, fatal. He should have placed 

a garrison at once in the town of the Aduatuci, to forestall 

• 

the night attack which he suspected might occur, and but for 
good luck would have proved much more disastrous to him. 



THE COMMENTARIES. 


127 


He should not have allowed his political desire to visit Home 
to prevent his receiving the embassies tendering submission 
by the German tribes. The surprise at the Sabis is the most 
grave of these errors. Caesar appears to have had, contrary 
to all Roman precedent, no troops out to protect the camp¬ 
ing-parties, except a small cavalry detachment, which plainly 
had been checked by the enemy close to the river and was 
unable to penetrate the woods. This fact should at once have 
excited Caesar’s curiosity and have led to greater caution. 
That he was not absolutely destroyed on this occasion he 
owed to the excellence of his troops, and by no means to his 
own skill or care. The Commentaries on this subject show 
an uphill effort to palliate his error. But it was too glaring 
to cover. The truth can be easily read between the lines. 



Caesar, early in Gallic War. 
(Campo Santo, Pisa.) 


7 












IX. 


THE WORK OF CAESAR’S LIEUTENANTS. 57-56 B. C. 

Caesar usually spent his winters in Cisalpine Gaul, to be near events in Italy. 
During this winter, he sent Galba, one of his legates, to open the road from 
Italy over the Simplon and down the modern Rhone. At Martigny, Galba had 
a serious battle with the natives, but defeated them. Crassus, another legate, 
wintered among the Veneti on the coast, and sent ambassadors to gather corn. 
These officers were seized by the Veneti and held so as to compel the return of 
their hostages. On learning of this, Caesar at once made preparations to avenge 
the act. He must protect his envoys ; and to subdue the Veneti would more¬ 
over give him easier access to Britain. In order to cover more ground, Caesar 
decided to divide his forces. Labienus went to the Rhine region; Crassus to 
Aquitania, Sabinus to the coast of modern Normandy. Brutus was put in com¬ 
mand of the fleet. After a tedious campaign against the Veneti, they were 
utterly overthrown by Brutus in a naval battle. Meanwhile Sabinus conducted 
a successful campaign against the Unelli, and Crassus a brilliant one in Aqui¬ 
tania. The year was finished by a partial campaign against the Morini on the 
Channel, by Caesar. The work of the year had mostly been done by Caesar’s 
lieutenants. 

On leaving for Italy for the winter of b. C. 57-56, Caesar 
had sent Servius Galba, with the Twelfth legion and some 
horse, against the tribes south of the lake of Geneva, the 
Nantuates, Yeragri and Seduni, to open one of the most 
available roads over the Alps between Cis- and Transalpine 
Gaul, which ran from Milan via the Simplon or the Great 
St. Bernard to the Rhone valley. The merchants and set¬ 
tlers, in passing through this valley, had generally experienced 
a good deal of trouble from the native tribes, who subjected 
them to heavy imposts, if they did not rob them outright. It 
was essential for military security that this road should be 
made free to passage. Galba was given permission to winter 


AN ALPINE CAMPAIGN. 


129 


in the Alps, if he deemed it essential. This Galba did, and 
having defeated the barbarians in several combats, he re¬ 
ceived their submission and hostages, and camped in the 
Rhone valley, where lay the town called Octodorus (Mar- 
tigny), detailing two cohorts to occupy the land of the Nan- 
tuates farther down the river. 

The valley is cut in two by the Rhone. The Roman camp 
lay on one side, the Gallic on the other. The Gauls formed 



the plan of cutting off this solitary legion, which by reason 
of its small number they thought could easily be done. They 
were indignant at the holding of so many of their children 
as hostages by the Romans, and they feared annexation to 
Rome, — the fate of all the tribes of Gaul. 

These local clans had accordingly occupied all the sur¬ 
rounding heights and passes, so as to cut Galba off from 
victual and assistance. This action, taking Galba entirely 
by surprise, placed him in a most difficult situation. Call¬ 
ing a council of war, it was determined to hold the camp and 
abide the attack which the barbarians were sure to make. 
This was the only present resource, though, for some unac¬ 
countable reason, the fortifications of the winter-quarters’ 



130 


GALLANT DEFENSE. 


camp had not yet been completed. Even Roman orders and 
regulations were not invariably obeyed. 

The assault of the Gauls came in due time and was sudden 
and severe. The defense was obstinate and the legionaries 
moved from place to place to resist the constantly repeated 
attacks on the wall. But the number of the defenders was 
small, and the enemy, whose force was considerable, were 
able constantly to bring fresh troops to supplant the weary. 
So vigorously was the fighting pushed that even the Roman 
wounded could not retire from the trenches. For six long 
hours the barbarians continued to press on in continual waves, 
until the Romans had discharged all their darts, and Galba 
saw that their only hope lay in cutting their way out with 
the sword. The sortie was suggested by primipilus P. Sex- 
tius Baculus, who had distinguished himself at the Sabis, and 
C. Yolusenus, a military tribune. To carry out the idea, 
Galba gave orders to collect as many weapons as could be got 
from those which had fallen into the camp, and then to make 
a sally from all the gates at once. This desperate venture 
resulted in unexpected success. Surprised beyond measure 
at the sudden appearance of the Romans and their vigorous 
onslaught — for they were momentarily expecting a surren¬ 
der — the barbarians, disconcerted, turned and fled. This 
is a fair sample of the inconstancy of the Gaul of that 
day. Brave to a noteworthy degree, when surprised or once 
defeated, he could not rally. The bulk of the fighting done 
by the legions was far from taxing their stanchness. 

The legionaries pursued and slaughtered above a third of 
the enemy, who could not have fallen much short of thirty 
thousand men. After this victory, having devastated the 
valley as a punishment for the treachery, and being unwill¬ 
ing to trust to the bad roads and worse population for his 
supply of corn, Galba passed through the Nantuates, picked 


VENETAN REVOLT. 


131 


up his two cohorts and returned to the Province to winter, 
pitching his quarters among the Allobroges. His conduct 
had been brave and sensible. 

Caesar, while in Hither Gaul, believed that he was safe in 
setting out to Illyricum, as the Belgse had been subdued, the 
Germans expelled, the tribes along the most important road 
over the Alps defeated, and Gaul appeared to be quiet. But 
peace was not of long duration. Crassus, with one of the 
legions, had taken up winter-quarters among the Andes, a 
tribe near the Atlantic on the north shore of the Bay of Bis¬ 
cay. Of the neighboring tribes the Yeneti were the strongest. 
They owned all important harbors on the coast, drove a thriv¬ 
ing commerce with Britain and Spain, and possessed great 
numbers of vessels and considerable wealth. Crassus, run¬ 
ning short of victuals during the winter, had sent out some 
prefects and tribunes among the tribes to negotiate for a sup¬ 
ply of corn. T. Terrasidius had gone to the Unelli, M. Tre- 
bius to the Curiosolitse, and Q. Velanius and T. Silius to the 
Yeneti. These tribes, led by the Yeneti, having determined 
among themselves on protecting their territories and made a 
compact to act together, seized these officers, hoping thereby 
to be able to compel the return of their own hostages. They 
sent, in fact, to demand such surrender as the price of the 
return of Crassus’ ambassadors. 

Caesar, being informed of these things by Crassus, but 
unable to take action during the winter, sent back orders to 
build a fleet in the Liger, provided rowers, sailors and pilots 
from the Mediterranean coast of the Province, and com¬ 
manded everything to be prepared for a marine expedition. 
So soon as the season of b. c. 56 opened, he hurried to Gaul. 
The revolted tribes, knowing that they had, by seizing ambas¬ 
sadors, committed the most inexpiable of all offenses, pre¬ 
pared for the worst. They fortified their towns, collected in 


132 


CAESAR'S MOTIVES. 


them all the breadstuffs which they could bring together, and 
brought their fleet to Venetia, their principal seaport, situ¬ 
ated probably in the estuary of the Auray River, which dis¬ 
charges into the Bay of Quiberon. They knew that ignorance 
of their tides and inlets and harbors would place the Romans 



The Venetan Country. 


at a great disadvantage. Allies, according to Caesar, were 
even sent for to Britain. All the cantons on the coast from 
the Loire to the Scheldt gave aid, material or moral. 

There was not a moment’s hesitation in Caesar’s mind as 
to the necessity of subduing this insurrection. The term in¬ 
surrection is used, inasmuch as these tribes had once handed 
in their submission to Crassus, and now again rose in de¬ 
fense of their liberties. But it seems a harsh word to apply 
to these gallant peoples resisting the encroachments of an 
invader with no right but that of might to back him. The 
difficulties Caesar by no means underrated, but they were as 
nothing compared to the necessity of punishing the Veneti. 
If any tribe could, after giving hostages in token of submis¬ 
sion, be allowed to transgress, without speedy retribution, 


DIVISION OF FORCES. 


13B 


the most universally accepted of the laws of nations, observed 
even among distant barbarians, then all his conquests in Gaul 
were but a house of cards. This is the motive Caesar would 
have us believe he acted on. It is a valid one as far as it 
goes. 

But there was another reason for Caesar’s determination to 
subdue the Yeneti. This people practically owned all the 
commerce with Britain. They were loath to have Caesar seize 
it, as they feared he would do. Strabo tells us that Caesar 
had already planned to invade Britain, and to reduce the 
Yeneti was a necessary first step, for they controlled the sea, 
and while he might push his way between their fleets, they 
could seriously threaten his rear during his absence. 

It must be acknowledged in Caesar’s behalf that the neces¬ 
sity existed of subduing the whole of Gaul, if Rome was to 
extend her dominion in this direction, if indeed Italy was 
to be safe; and if Alexander was justified in avenging the 
attacks of Persia on Greece, so was Caesar justified in aveng¬ 
ing those of the Gauls on Rome. It is hard to criticise the 
universally claimed right of simple conquest among the an¬ 
cients; and once we accept so much, nothing remains to 
blame except unnecessary harshness in the exercise of con¬ 
quest. Caesar was justified from his standpoint. 

As to the method to be pursued in this campaign, Caesar 
decided that it was essential to divide his forces, to occupy 
the country in a military sense, in order to impose on other 
tribes who might be tempted to imitate the example of the 
Yeneti. He therefore sent Labienus with part of the cav¬ 
alry to the Treviri near the Rhine, with orders to sustain the 
Remi and keep quiet among the Belgae, and to resist possi¬ 
ble inroads of the Germans from across the river; for they 
had been invited to make another incursion by the Belgae. 
Crassus, with twelve legionary cohorts and a stout body of 


184 


WINTER- QUAR TERS. 


cavalry, he sent to Aquitania, to preserve quiet, and prevent 
Aquitanian support to the Venetan insurrection. Triturius 
Sabinus he stationed among the Unelli, and other tribes 



Distribution of Legions, B. c. 56. 


along the coast of modern Normandy, for a similar purpose. 
Decimus Brutus was given command of the fleet. He had 
brought some galleys from the Mediterranean, and vessels 
were borrowed from the Pictones, Santones and others. 

Caesar’s eight legions at the opening of the campaign were 
thus distributed: north of the Liger, three legions; in Aqui- 
tania one legion and two cohorts; a legion on the fleet; two 
legions and eight cohorts with Caesar. Galba had no doubt 
rejoined from his winter among the Allobroges. Caesar prob¬ 
ably rendezvoused in the vicinity of Nantes, not far from the 
mouth of the Loire, and thence crossed the Vilaine. 



VENETAN OPPIDA. 


135 


The towns of the Veneti were exceptionally difficult of 
access. Generally on points of land, they were at high tide 
inaccessible except by boats; and the retiring tide, while it 
gave access to land forces, was apt to leave the boats stranded 
and defenseless. Again, whenever, after great exertions, 
any town had been cut off from the sea or been put into a 
desperate strait, the barbarians would simply embark their 
goods on their own boats, of which they had a vast number, 
and escape through the creeks and bays, with which the 



A Venetan Town. 


Romans were not familiar. This shifting from place to place 
they carried on all through the summer of 56 b. c. Their 
ships were flat-bottomed so as to be the more readily used in 
inland navigation, but with high bows and stern to resist the 
waves and the shock of rams. The wood was seasoned oak, 
the parts of which were held together by heavy iron spikes an 
inch thick, and their anchors had iron chains. Their bows, 
made much higher and stronger than those of the Roman 





METHOD OF CAPTURE. 


136 

galleys, rendered them all the more difficult to attack or to 
grapple to. Their sails were of soft and thin but tough 
skins. These boats were in all respects seaworthy, and far 
better adapted to shoal water warfare than those which the 
Romans had built on their usual pattern. Only in speed, 
and this by rowing, did the Roman galley excel that of the 
Yeneti; the latter was impelled by sails alone. 

The Roman method of taking the Yenetan towns was to 
build out from the main land two parallel dikes, sometimes 
as high as the town walls, which when completed excluded 
tides and gave an excellent approach for engines and men — 
a place of arms, in fact. It was a vast labor and the opera¬ 
tion was rendered nugatory in most cases by the escape of 
the barbarians as above explained. 

The bulk of the season thus passed without success. Caesar 
saw that he could accomplish nothing without a fleet, and 
this was not yet assembled, though it had been ordered many 
months before and rendezvous given at the mouth of the 
Liger. The tides, an unknown element to the Romans, the 
lack of harbors, the inexperience of Roman sailors in these 
waters, and many other causes had operated to delay the 
preparations. But there is still something which the Com¬ 
mentaries do not explain. Roman galleys were very speed¬ 
ily constructed. Scipio Africanus, e. g., built and launched 
twenty quinquiremes and ten quadriremes in forty-five days; 
Caesar had been at work nine months, and his fleet was not 
yet equipped. The delay was not a reasonable one. We 
know but half the truth. 

After taking a number of the Yenetan towns, it was 
plainly brought home to Caesar that he was making no prac¬ 
tical headway. He accordingly determined to risk the 
event on the result of a naval battle. He camped on the 
heights of St. Gildas, on the east of the Bay of Quiberon, 


VENETAN AND ROMAN SHIPS. 137 

and waited for his fleet. This was shortly after assembled. 
So soon as matters were made ready, the Roman fleet moved 
against the Veneti into the bay. When it hove in sight, 
about two hundred and twenty of the vessels of the Veneti 



sailed out and confidently made ready for battle. The Ro¬ 
man line formed near modern Point St. Jaques, with its 
right not far from shore. 

The Roman ships were lower; even their turrets were not 
as high as the stern of the barbarian ships, so that the 
marines could not effectively cast their darts, while fully ex¬ 
posed to those of the enemy. It was a question what tactics 
could be advantageously employed. The Romans were supe¬ 
rior only in courage and discipline, and their vessels in speed, 
but this was offset by their being unused to and apprehensive 
of the ocean, to which they ascribed qualities different from 



138 


NAVAL BATTLE. 


their native Mediterranean. But they luckily had on board 
a great number of grappling hooks ( falces ), not unlike those 
used in sieges to pull stones from the tops of walls, or, as 
some construe it, had provided sickles tied to the end of long 
poles. These Brutus, by a stroke of genius, divined how he 
could put to use. A falx was slung to the mast; the Ro¬ 
mans rowed alongside the enemy and grappled on to the 
main cable which held up the yard and sail of a Venetan 
ship; after doing which the oarsmen would pull vigorously 
away, thus cutting the cable and letting fall the yard and 
sail. The vessels thus disabled, — for they had no oars, — 
were then at the mercy of the waves and ready to be 
boarded by the much superior Roman soldiers. Each one 
boarded succumbed. 

This naval fight, the first of which we have any record on 
the Atlantic ocean, was witnessed from the hills by Caesar 
and the entire Roman army, — a vast encouragement to 
deeds of valor. It must have been a splendid spectacle. 
Though the ships of the enemy outnumbered the Romans two 
or more to one, after many of them had been disabled and 
boarded, Roman valor prevailed, and the uncaptured ones soon 
attempted to take refuge in flight. But a dead calm suddenly 
arose so that they could not move, — Cesar’s fortune always 
came to his aid at opportune moments. The wind in this bay 
to-day blows at this season east or northeast till midday, then 
almost invariably a calm sets in. The attempt at flight was 
unfortunate. It dispersed the Venetan ships so that when the 
calm came, the Roman galleys could attack them one by one, 
without their being able to assist each other. From about 
ten o’clock till sundown the contest raged, and so effectual 
were the tactics and discipline of the Romans that very few 
of the Venetan galleys got to land, —and these under cover 
of night. 


CjESAR’S cruelty. 


139 


All the valor, youth and strength of the Yeneti had been 
assembled in this one fleet. After its utter destruction there 
remained to them no means of defense. They had neither 
men nor vessels. They were fain, therefore, to throw them¬ 
selves on Csesar’s mercy. But, deeming, as he says in the 
Commentaries, that he could not forgive their infringement 
of the sacred rights of ambassadors, Caesar determined to 
make an example of this tribe. He put all the senate to 
death and sold the rest of the people into slavery. It would 
be hard to decide whether this act was more unpardonable 
for its mistaken policy or for its ruthless cruelty. Caesar 
never considered this latter point. He did not often err in the 
former; but one or two of his acts of extermination appear 
to be grave mistakes. While one hardly palliates a similar 
policy on the part of Alexander, the cruelties of Caesar appear 
more monstrous on account of the intervening centuries of 
growth in civilization and international law. Not only was 
the military necessity which often constrained Alexander to 
his acts absent in Caesar’s case, but the latter’s destruction 
of human life far exceeds anything of which Alexander was 
ever guilty. Almost all critics — including Napoleon — are 
particularly severe upon Caesar’s unnecessary cruelty to the 
Yeneti. Caesar had less excuse than precedent for his action. 
It is strange that Alexander and Hannibal have been so con¬ 
stantly upbraided for what is termed their cruelty, while this 
quality is rarely imputed to Caesar. 

During the early part of this campaign against the Yeneti, 
Titurius Sabinus had been engaged with the affairs of the 
Unelli, a canton south of modern Cherbourg, in Normandy, 
whose king was Yiridovix. This chief had collected a large 
army from all the adjoining tribes, principally the Lexovii 
and Aulerci-Eburovices, added to which were numbers of 
robbers and soldiers of fortune from all parts of Gaul. 


140 


SABINUS ’ RUSE. 


Sabinus started from the vicinity of Angers on the Loire, 
marched north, and camped among the Unelli. The remains 
of a camp some four miles east of modern Avranches, known 
as Camp du Chastellier, indicate his probable location; and 



though the remains may be those of a later camp, it was not 
uncommon to pitch new camps on the old locations of pre¬ 
decessors. This camp shows an interesting variation from 
the usual shape, dictated by the ground. 

Sabinus was a cautious officer, with a bent to stratagem. 
He kept to his camp, which he had established so that his 
breadstuffs could not be cut off. Viridovix camped over 
against him some two miles away on the other side of the 
little river now called the See, daily drawing up in battle 
array, and taunting the Romans for cowardice in not accept¬ 
ing the gage. Even his own men grew dissatisfied and 
ashamed; but Sabinus had his purpose in thus acting. He 
wished to bring about a habit of carelessness on the enemy’s 
part by inducing him to underrate his opponents. Having 





THE BATTLEFIELD. 


141 


succeeded in so doing, he selected a crafty Gaul, and by 
promises of valuable gifts, persuaded him to pretend desertion 
to the enemy, where suitable representations to Yiridovix 
might convince that chief that the Romans were actually 
cowed by the situation. This spy was directed to state to the 
chief that the Romans were compelled during the following 
night to decamp and march towards Csesar, whose campaign 
against the Yeneti was rumored to be going wrong; and he 
was to seek to persuade him that the Roman army could be 
easily attacked and destroyed before its retreat. The spy 



proved to be a clever one. Yiridovix, in effect, lent a will¬ 
ing ear to his story, and determined on assaulting the Roman 
camp without loss of time. 

This camp was situated on a hill, rocky and steep on the 
west, less so on the other sides. Towards the north it sloped 
gradually down a mile or so to the river See. In pursuance 
of their project the Gauls not only armed themselves fully, 
but carried large quantities of fagots and brushwood to fill 
up the Roman trench. They were over-eager to reach the 








142 


THE BATTLE. 


camp before the Roman army should get away; and, loaded 
down as the warriors were, in toiling up the ascent, they 
arrived in its front wearied and out of breath. Sabinus had 



Sabinus’ Battle. 


been watching for just this chance. The signal was given, 
and the Romans, fresh and ready for the combat, rushed out 
upon the Unelli from the two corner gates at once. Sur¬ 
prised and overwhelmed, the barbarians offered no resistance 
worthy the name; but, turning, sought safety in flight. The 
legionaries and horse followed hard at their heels, and 
slaughtered the greater part of them. This victory and the 
shortly arriving news of Caesar’s triumph over the Yeneti — 
for Caesar and Sabinus each heard of the victory of the other 
about the same time — so entirely broke up the coalition of 
these peoples that tribe now vied with tribe in their anxiety 
to bring in their submission and be assured of its acceptance. 




CRASS US. 


143 

This battle is another fair index to the hasty and impetu¬ 
ous, but frail character of the Gauls. Generous, courageous, 
patriotic, they were dangerous opponents at the inception of 
a campaign. But they became easily discouraged, and were 
never long of one mind. Their treaties for mutual support 
were wont to be short-lived. They were unable to bear dis¬ 
aster. Polybius and Caesar gauge the Gauls alike. 

P. Crassus, meanwhile, had a large task set him in Aqui- 
tania, the territory which is comprised between the Loire 



and the Pyrenees, where the Romans, a few years before, 
under Valerius and Manlius, had suffered two galling de¬ 
feats. Moving south and collecting corn in plenty, summon¬ 
ing to his aid the best men of Tolosa, Carcaso and Narbo, in 
the southwest Province, and enlisting auxiliaries, both foot 
and horse, among the best material to be had in the cantons 
under Roman sway, Crassus crossed the Garumna (Garonne) 
and marched into the land of the Sotiates on the left bank. 

These barbarians, having brought together a large force 
and much cavalry, attempted to attack the Romans on the 
march. They opened the action by a diversion with the 
horse, meanwhile placing their infantry in ambush. "The 


144 


INTELLIGENT GAULS. 


horse was speedily routed, and the Roman infantry, some¬ 
what in disorder with the fray, was resuming its march and 
passing a defile, when it was suddenly assaulted by this force, 
which debouched from hiding, with exceptional vigor. The 
combat at once waxed hot. The barbarians were fighting for 
their soil; the legionaries to show what they could do without 
their general-in-chief, and under a very young commander, 
and no doubt also with the clear appreciation which every 
Roman must have always had of the slender chance to be 
found in flight. And again Roman discipline prevailed. 
The Sotiates were defeated with great slaughter. 

Crassus then laid siege to their capital, placed variously 
at modern Lectoure or Sos, the principal of their towns on 
his line of march. The resistance was so effective that he 
was obliged to build vinese and turrets. The Sotiates, many 
of whom were copper-miners, developed great skill in resist¬ 
ing these means of siege, undermining the Roman ramparts, 
and themselves building vineae, but without eventual success. 
The Romans were so bold and persistent that they were 
obliged to surrender. During the capitulation the chief, 
Adcantuannus, with six hundred chosen men bound to him 
by a special oath, essayed to cut his way out, but was headed 
off. Despite this fact, he was not denied equal terms, out of 
regard to his gallantry. Crassus then marched upon the 
Vocates, also on the left bank of the Garumna, and the Taru- 
sates on the Aturis (Adour). 

These peoples were intelligent enough to send for auxil¬ 
iaries into Hither Spain, where war had been a long time 
waged with the Romans, and obtained from there not only 
men, but officers of rank familiar with the Roman method of 
warfare, many of whom, indeed, had served under Sertorius, 
the great partisan-chief. These officers, whose training had 
been of the very best, began to fortify suitable positions, to 


A BOLD ASSAULT. 


145 


occupy available defiles, and to harass Crassus to such an 
extent and in so able a way, that he found that unless he soon 
came to battle, he would be cut off from his bread and driven 
to a retreat beset by danger. He therefore called a council, 
as was usual. These Roman assemblies belie the saying that 
a council of war never fights, — the Romans held them and 
remained combative. They now decided to fight. 

Next day Crassus drew up in two lines with the auxiliaries 
in the centre, and offered battle. But the enemy, though 



greatly superior in numbers, preferred their Fabian tactics, 
intending not to attack the Romans until they could force 
them into retreat for want of corn, and thus have them at a 
disadvantage, loaded down, as they would be, with their bag¬ 
gage. Crassus saw that there was nothing left but for him¬ 
self to attack, though to assault fortifications was much 






146 


A CLEVER DIVERSION. 


against the rule. This he did, relying greatly on the eager¬ 
ness of his troops, who loudly demanded battle, and deemed 
the barbarians to be afraid. 

The enemy had occupied and intrenched a formidable 
camp, in the Roman fashion. The attack was boldly made 
on the front and flanks of the enemy’s works. By a heavy 
fire of missiles the Romans sought to drive the defenders 
from the ramparts, so that an assault might be made with 
success, if undertaken. The auxiliaries served to supply the 
legionaries and light troops with stones and weapons, to bring 
turf and material to fill the trench. While the battle was at 
its height, Crassus was informed that the Decuman, or rear 
gate of the enemy’s camp, was not well guarded. Moreover, 
as a rule, the rear of every camp was less well intrenched 
than the front and flanks. Selecting the horse and such of 
the cohorts as had been left to guard his own camp, and 
were therefore fresh, Crassus sent this force, with promises 
of great reward in case of success, by a long circuit and out 
of sight, around to the rear. The barbarians had so little 
anticipated this, that the Roman soldiers demolished the for¬ 
tifications of the rear gate and filed into the enemy’s camp, 
before the bulk of the foe were aware of their being at hand. 
The manoeuvre was crowned with success. The Romans fell 
upon the enemy’s rear with loud shouts and blare of trum¬ 
pets, encouraged by which the legionaries in front redoubled 
the ardor of their fighting. No assault appears to have been 
needed. The barbarians were unable to resist this double 
onset. Terrified, they turned from the battle, cast them¬ 
selves from the ramparts, and fled into the plains. Out of 
their entire number of fifty thousand men, barely a fourth 
escaped the sword of the Roman horse, which pursued them 
across the open. This battle, fought in the fall of b. c. 56, 
resulted in the submission of substantially all Aquitania. 


A BIG UNDERTAKING. 


147 


The whole of Gaul had now been reduced, save only the 
land of the Morini and Menapii, which extended along the 
coast southerly from the mouth of the Rhine to modern Bou¬ 
logne, the land which the Dutch have since so laboriously 
rescued from the ocean. These peoples had never sent am¬ 
bassadors to Caesar, and when he approached their territory, 
taught by defeat of other Gauls, they retired into the forests 



The Morini and Menapii. 

and morasses of the coast and bade him defiance. Having no 
towns, but dwelling in tents or in caverns, this was to them 
no great hardship. Caesar in person undertook to drive them 
from their lairs. Arrived at the edge of the forests border¬ 
ing on the lowlands of the sea, the vicinity of St. Omer, in¬ 
land from Calais, to which locality these tribes had removed 
all their possessions, some slight interchange of hostilities 
took place, the barbarians attacking the Romans while pre¬ 
paring to camp. Seeing that there was grave danger of am¬ 
buscades while advancing through the forests, Caesar began 
to cut a wide swath for his line of operations and astonished 
the enemy beyond measure by the rapidity with which he laid 



148 


THE EARLY DUTCH. 


the forest low. For their own poor tools enabled them to 
work but slowly. The cut timber Caesar piled on either 
side of his path as a rampart. He had particularly good 
engineers (prcefecti fabrum). Especially L. Cornelius Bal- 
bus and the knight Mamurra were noted for cleverness in 
enginery and sieges. This apparently vast undertaking tes¬ 
tifies to the ability of these officers. 

The Roman army, say the Commentaries, had already 
reached the rear of the retreating barbarian forces and had 
cut out a number of cattle and wagons from their train; but 
owing to the lateness of the season and the setting in of severe 
storms, Caesar was obliged to defer his operations against the 
Morini and Menapii and to go into winter-quarters. After 
ravaging the country and burning such dwellings as there 
were, the troops were camped among the Aulerci and Lexovii 
on the coast between the Sequana and Liger (Normandy). 

Caesar gives the best complexion to this as to his other 
campaigns; but the truth is that he never entirely subjugated 
the northwest of Gaul. The Morini and Menapii were but 
prevented from spreading mischief. They remained indepen¬ 
dent. 

To Caesar belongs the credit of the intelligent cutting out 
of the work of this campaign. But the success of Sabinus 
and Crassus must remain their own. Their execution of Cae¬ 
sar’s plans came fully up to expectation, and redounds much 
to their credit. The outcome of Caesar’s fourth campaign, 
against the Veneti, must be set down in no small measure to 
the able conduct of Brutus with a quantum of good fortune 
added. No criticism can belittle the splendid achievements 
of Caesar; neither must they be overestimated. With the 
best troops in the then world, perfect in discipline, com¬ 
manded by officers trained in all the minutiae of war, he was 
contending with peoples all but savage, unapt at regular war, 


CREDIT OF THESE OPERATIONS. 


149 


disunited in counsel, and unable to put into tlie field forces 
mucb superior to the Romans in numbers, and in view of all 
conditions far inferior to them. 

The fifth campaign, against the Morini, has been called one 
of pure ambition, quite unnecessary for the conquest of Gaul. 
But this does not so readily appear. The Rhine, the ocean 
and the Pyrenees were the only boundaries which Caesar could 
set to his conquest of Gaul, if he was to make it at all; and 
without entering into the question of Caesar’s right to con¬ 
quer a square rood of the country, it may be assumed that 
everything within those boundaries must be counted under 
the same head. 

As usual, Caesar personally returned to Cisalpine Gaul for 
the winter months of B. c. 56-55. 



Light-Armed Soldier. 














X. 


THE RHINE. SPRING OF 55 B. C. 

Some German tribes, the Usipetes and Tenchtheri, had crossed the Rhine not 
far above its mouth, crowded from their homes by the Suevi, the most powerful 
of the Teutonic nations. Once in Gaul, they had advanced into the Vosegus 
country. Caesar’s plan necessitated a check to these barbarians, who had over 
one hundred thousand warriors. From his winter-quarters near Amiens, he 
marched to the Meuse in May. In the ensuing negotiations, the enemy acted, 
Caesar claims, with duplicity. So, confessedly, did he. And when their am¬ 
bassadors next came to his camp, he detained them, put his legions in order of 
battle, marched upon the unsuspecting Germans, surprised and put the entire 
body — four hundred and thirty thousand men, women and children — to the 
sword. A very few escaped across the Rhine. This is unquestionably the most 
atrocious act of which any civilized man has ever been guilty. It accomplished 
its end, but this fact does not palliate its enormity. Csesar then built his cele¬ 
brated bridge, and crossed the Rhine, probably near Bonn. The Suevi retired 
into the forests beyond their domain. After eighteen days he returned and 
broke down the bridge. The foray had no useful results. 

At the beginning of the next year, b. c. 55, there was an 
incursion across the Rhine, not far above its mouth, by some 
German tribes which three years before had been harassed 
and driven from their lands by the Suevi. They had wan¬ 
dered about in Germany during the three years and finally, 
as a last resort, had crossed the Rhine and devastated the 
land of the Menapii with great slaughter. The preceding 
winter (b. c. 56—55) had been spent there, and no one knew 
what their next movements might be. 

The Suevi have been already mentioned. They had sent 
over the troops which Caesar had defeated two years before 
under Ariovistus. They were a fierce and warlike people. 


ANOTHER GERMAN INVASION. 


151 


They subsisted on meat and milk rather than corn, were great 
hunters, and celebrated for their strength and stature. In 
the coldest weather they wore nothing but skins which scantily 
covered their bodies, and constantly bathed in the open rivers. 
Their cavalry was drilled to dismount and fight on foot, the 
horses being trained to remain where left, until the riders 
could again rejoin them. They used no housings upon their 
horses, and presumably, like the Numidians, no bridle, de¬ 
spised luxury and forbade wine. On the east side of this 
people the territory was said to be devastated for six hundred 
miles; on the west they bordered, among other peoples, on the 
Ubii, whom they had reduced to the payment of tribute. It 
was some of these Ubian tribes, the Usipetes and Tenchtheri, 
which had now forced a passage of the Rhine to the number 
of four hundred and thirty thousand souls, and had advanced 
some distance inland. It was thought, and truly, that this 
advance had been made with the consent of some of the Gauls, 
who hoped by this immigration to be able to increase their 
power of opposing the Romans. The place of crossing was 
probably near modern Cleves and Xanten, which were oppo¬ 
site their territory. On the left bank, from Xanten down, is 
a chain of heights some thirty miles long, at the foot of which 
the river used to flow. Two gaps pierce these heights, at 
Xanten and near Cleves. That these passes were used by the 
Germans in their incursions is shown by their having been 
fortified by the Romans after the conquest. The Usipetes 
and Tenchtheri had moved forward nearly to the Mosa 
(Meuse). 

Caesar joined his legions in Normandy in April, b. c. 55, 
earlier than usual. He determined to make immediate war 
upon these Germans, who, justified by the invitation of sun¬ 
dry Gallic tribes, had already made incursions as far as the 
Eburones and Condrusi, the latter clients of the Treviri. 


152 


CjESAR meets it. 


He mobilized his army in the early spring, from his winter- 
quarters between the Sequana and Liger. Calling together 
the tribes of the vicinity at Samarobriva (Amiens), he wisely 



refrained from accusing them of complicity with this incur¬ 
sion, but used his powers of persuasion to such effect as to 
secure from them victual, a goodly number of auxiliary 
troops, and especially a fine body of five thousand horse. 
From the winter - quarters of his legions, Caesar probably 
rendezvoused, early in May, at Amiens, and thence marched 
to Cambrai, Charleroi, Tongres and Maestricht, where he 
crossed the Mosa towards the end of the month. This would 
have been his most natural route. There was need of 
prompt measures. The danger was imminent. There must 
have been over one hundred thousand warriors among these 
migrating peoples. 

Before he reached the Mosa, Caesar met ambassadors sent 
by the Germans, who were authorized to treat, provided Cae¬ 
sar would consent to their keeping the lands they had already 




A CAVALRY SKIRMISH. 


153 


conquered. But this Caesar would by no means permit, in¬ 
forming them that they must go back across the Rhine, where, 
he suggested, the Ubii, who dwelt near modern Cologne, 
would now grant them territory willingly; for this tribe had 
begged his aid against the Suevi, and stood ready to perform 
his behests. The German ambassadors pretended to assent 
to these terms, but asked Caesar to delay his advance for a 
short space until they could report to their senate and return. 
This delay Caesar would not grant, as, according to the Com¬ 
mentaries, he believed that they desired only to gain time 
until their horse, which had gone on a distant raid among 
the Ambivariti beyond the Mosa for provision, could return. 
Crossing the Mosa and continuing his advance to within some 
twelve miles of the enemy, Caesar, perhaps near Straelen, 
again met the ambassadors, who made similar excuses, and 
prayed for a delay of at least three days, when the tribes 
would cross the Rhine if the Ubii bound themselves by oath 
to receive them. 

It was early in June. Caesar had left the vicinity of the 
Mosa, and had probably advanced beyond modern Venloo. 
The Usipetes and Tenchtheri were on the levels near Goch on 
the Niers River. He agreed to advance but four miles, to 
the nearest place where he could get water for the army. If 
our topographical assumption is so far correct, this was the 
Niers. No sooner had his cavalry moved forward to its vicin¬ 
ity than the Germans attacked this body with some eight 
hundred horse and threw it back in disorder, killing seventy- 
four of their number. Their tactics were peculiar. They 
“made an onset on our men and soon threw them into dis¬ 
order. When our men in their turn made a stand, they 
according to their practice leaped from their horses to their 
feet, and, stabbing our horses in the belly and overturning a 
great many of our men, put the rest to flight, and drove 


154 


ALLEGED TREACHERY. 


them forward so much alarmed that they did not desist from 
their retreat till they had come in sight of our army.” This 
looks like a serious case of fright. The attack appears to 



have been caused by some misunderstanding. It seems curi¬ 
ous that five thousand of the Roman allied horse should have 
been thus driven back by so small a force. The attack must 
have been vigorously made and weakly met. This German 
horse was always a fighting arm. Irritated at the defeat, 
Caesar determined to avenge it as an act of treachery, for, 
as he explains, the attack had been made while the ambassa¬ 
dors were still treating, and a truce existed; “ after having- 
sued for peace by way of stratagem and treachery, they had 





155 


AN AWFUL BUTCHERY. 

made war without provocation.” He at once proceeded to 
do the same act he so heartily condemns, paying no heed to 
explanations or apologies. 

The next day the Germans again sent a large embassy to 
apologize for the yesterday’s misadventure; but Caesar con¬ 
strued the act to be for the original purpose of obtaining a 
father truce till their still absent horse could arrive. The 
ambassadors Caesar detained, and putting his army in three 
lines, probably in columns by cohorts, with the cavalry beaten 
the previous day in the rear, moved forward the intervening 
eight miles at a double-quick, and reaching their camp in an 
incredibly short time, took the Germans entirely by surprise, 
and fell on them with fury. Such was their consternation 
that, after a short resistance by a few who were not panic- 
stricken, the Germans threw away their arms and fled in all 
directions. The cavalry was sent in pursuit and drove the 
fugitives into the cul cle sac formed by the confluence of the 
Mosa and Rhine. Here those who did not perish by the 
sword threw themselves into the river and were mostly 
drowned. Few succeeded in getting across. All, including 
women and children, were indiscriminately butchered, to the 
number of four hundred and thirty thousand souls. The whole 
nation was exterminated, save only the absent cavalry, and 
but a few Romans were wounded. 

This whole campaign lacks clearness in the Commentaries. 
Florus confuses it still more by placing the defeat of the 
Usipetes and Tenchtheri in the confluence of the Moselle and 
Rhine, and Dion Cassius by stating that Caesar reached them 
among the Treviri. This latter has been the theory of many, 
who, in compiling their data, stray unwarranted from the 
Commentaries. The country in the Moselle-Rhine angle is 
much cut up, has no traces of ancient roads, and could scarcely 
have supported these tribes. To conduct his march on the 


156 


CjESAR VERSUS HANNIBAL. 


theory that he reached the enemy there, Caesar would have 
heen led through the Forest of Ardennes, a fact which he 
does not mention, as he most likely would have done. It looks 
more probable that the situation was as described, and that, 
on learning of Caesar’s approach, the Usipetes and Tenclitheri 
withdrew their foragers and retired towards their base among 
the Menapii. To cross the Rhine near the Moselle wo*ld 
have led them to their enemies, the Ubii; and to make them 
head that way is an improbable assumption. 

This awful act in the Gallic drama has uniformly received 
the severest condemnation of thinking men. None of the 
extensive acts of retaliation of Alexander, not all the deeds 
of Punic cruelty charged upon Hannibal by his bitterest ene¬ 
mies during his fifteen years in Italy put together, can equal 
the sum of destruction of human life here wantonly exhibited. 
Unlike some of the holocausts of Alexander, — which were 
required for his own and his army’s safety at the distance 
from his base at which he found himself, — this slaughter 
appears to have been absolutely uncalled for. If the barba¬ 
rians broke the laws of international intercourse, Caesar had 
done the like. So indignant were his political enemies in 
Rome, that Cato openly proposed that Caesar’s head should be 
sent to the surviving Usipetes and Tenchtheri in expiation of 
his attack while their ambassadors were in his camp. Per¬ 
haps no more inexcusable act was ever perpetrated. Even 
the plausible tone of the Commentaries quite fails to convey 
an extenuation. 

The unnecessarily harsh measures of Caesar would not be 
thus insisted on were it not that of all the great soldiers of 
antiquity, the one least deserving the accusation, Hannibal, 
has come down to us bearing the reproach of cruelty. That 
the charge is unjust has been abundantly proven. It may be 
that none of these captains can be properly taxed with inhu- 


CROSSING THE RHINE . 


157 


manity; that the trait belongs to the age and not to the men. 
But if cruelty is to he imputed to any of them, it is certain 
that, of the three great captains of antiquity, Caesar was by 
far the most reprehensible, Hannibal the least. 

Having accomplished this “brilliant success,” as Napoleon 
III. phrases it, Caesar determined, as a means of imposing 
on the Germans, to cross the Rhine, so that those tribes 
which were still unconvinced of his power might feel that 
they were not safe from Caesar’s reach even in their own 
territory. He deemed it wise to show the Germans that no 
obstacle, natural or national, could arrest the Roman arms, 
and to make them see that, however distant, they could be 
reached and punished if they indulged in any more incursions 
into Gaul. 

The occasion was good. The party of cavalry which had 
been on a raid at the time of the destruction of the Usipetes 
and Tenchtheri had retired across the Rhine and joined the 
Sugambri, which was one of the most powerful tribes between ♦ 
where the modern Ruhr and Sieg join the Rhine. Caesar 
sent and demanded their surrender by the Sugambri, as be¬ 
longing to those who had treacherously attacked the Romans. 
This demand was refused, and at the same time the Ubii sent 
again to beg for aid against the Suevi, who were grievously 
oppressing them. They offered all their ships for transporta¬ 
tion across the river, but this means Caesar neither deemed 
safe, nor, says he, was it consistent with the dignity of the 
Roman republic to depend on others. 

This invasion of German soil was dictated solely by ambi¬ 
tion. It was beyond Caesar’s province. Without an unpre¬ 
cedented construction of the rule of the Roman Senate, he had 
indeed no authority to go beyond Gaul. Under the then 
well-understood laws of nations, he had no right to attack a 
tribe which had committed no covert or overt act of hostility 


158 


CAESAR REFUSES SHIPS. 


against himself or Rome, other than the right of conquest. 
This it is not desired to deny to him. So much is said of his 
rights and motives only to brush away the often made asser¬ 
tion that Caesar was actuated by no motive save the patriotic 
one of defending the Roman republic. 

The refusal of the ships and the project of building a 


tenchte Rl 



bridge was probably the result of a desire to have a perfectly 
secure means of returning to Gaul in case of any reverse. 
This was wise. But it is a question whether the invasion 
itself was wise. In Gaul, Caesar had of course maintained 
the offensive, as he must, if he was to subdue the whole 
country. But it is scarcely doubtful that the best military 
policy beyond the borders of Gaul was a strict defensive, 
especially at so distinct a natural barrier as the Rhine. He 
had made an example of all who had crossed it into Gaul, 
and this was sufficient. 

The location of the bridge has been much disputed. It 


J 


LOCATION OF BRIDGE. 159 

cannot be absolutely proven. The confluence of the Rhine 
and Moselle below modern Coblentz has many advocates. 
Those who place the slaughter of the Usipetes and Tench - 
theri at this place naturally favor it as the crossing point. 
Some authorities put the passage as far down the river as 
Cologne. 

There is reason for selecting Bonn as the crossing point. 
The fact given in the Commentaries, that Caesar passed from 
the land of the Treviri to that of the Ubii, would suit many 
localities. But he was at no great distance from the Sugam- 
bri, and the confluence of the Moselle and Rhine is far above 
the territory of this people. The next year but one, having 
crossed “a little above’’the present bridge, Caesar started 
from the Rhine and marched to Aduatuca (Tongres) through 
the forest of Arduenna, from east to west, near by the Segni 
and Condrusi. From Cologne he would have marched north 
of these peoples; from Coblentz, south. The bed of the Rhine 
about Bonn is well suited for piles; south of Bonn it is more 
rocky, and the mountainous banks would make the location 
less desirable for a bridge. Fifty years later, as we are told 
by Floras, Drusus crossed at this place to attack the Sugam- 
bri; and Drusus would likely have profited by Caesar’s expe¬ 
rience. The probabilities run strongly in favor of Bonn. 

To rapidly build a bridge at this point over the Rhine, 
without previous preparation or a bridge train, is to-day no 
contemptible engineering feat. The river is over a quarter 
of a mile wide. Caesar accomplished the task in ten days 
from the time when he began to cut the timber. It was 
mid-June. The bridge was supported on piles driven into 
the bed of the river and held firmly in place by cross pieces 
and braces. His own description is clear: “ He devised this 
plan of a bridge. He joined together at the distance of two 
feet, two piles, each a foot and a half thick, sharpened a little 


PLAN OF BRIDGE. 


160 

at the lower end, and proportioned in length to the depth of 
the river. After he had, by means of engines, sunk these 
into the river, and fixed them at the bottom and then driven 
them in with rammers, not quite perpendicularly, like a stake, 
but bending forward and sloping, so as to incline in the 
direction of the current of the river; he also placed two (other 
piles) opposite to these, at the distance of forty feet lower 
down, fastened together in the same manner, but directed 
against the force and current of the river. Both these, 

O 

moreover, were kept firmly apart by beams two feet thick 



10 S 0 1# 40 


The Rhine Bridge (cross section). 

(the space which the binding of the piles occupied), laid in at 
their extremities between two braces on each side; and in 
consequence of these being in different directions and fas¬ 
tened on sides the one opposite to the other, so great was 
the strength of the work, and such the arrangement of the 
materials, that in proportion as the greater body of water 
dashed against the bridge, so much the closer were its parts 
held fastened together. These beams were bound together 
by timber laid over them in the direction of the length of 
the, bridge, and were (then) covered over with laths and 
hurdles; and, in addition to this, piles were driven into the 
water obliquely, at the lower side of the bridge, and these 






































161 


/ 

CESAR’S DESCRIPTIO N, 

serving as buttresses, and being connected with every portion 
of the work, sustained the force of the stream; and there were 
others also above the bridge at a moderate distance, that if 



The Rhine Bridge (elevation). 

trunks of trees or vessels were floated down the river by the 
barbarians for the purpose of destroying the work, the vio¬ 
lence of such things might be diminished by these defenses, 



FEET _ 

JO 5 0 tO 

The Rhine Bridge (plan). 




and might not injure the bridge.” Plans best describe 
the structure. 

Engineering feats are measured largely by the amount of 
available material and labor. As Caesar had all the men he 




























































































































































162 SHORT CAMPAIGN. 

could use and more, as the material was close at hand, and 
as the form of bridge was one well-known to the Romans, 
the construction is noted chiefly for its great size and the 
remarkable speed with which it was accomplished. And it 
has already been stated that Caesar had exceptionally good 
engineers. He did not have to contend with opposition to 
his passage. 

Having completed the structure and posting a strong guard 
at either end in a suitable bridgehead, Caesar led his army 
across and moved up the Sieg and Agger. Several nations 
at once offered submission; the Sugambri retired from their 
territory with all their wealth, “and concealed themselves in 
deserts and woods.” Caesar devastated their country, and 
marched into the land of the Ubii. This fact also points to 
the vicinity of Bonn as the crossing-place. Had it been at 
Coblentz, he would have been in Ubian territory on reaching 
the right bank. 

Among the Ubii, Caesar learned that the Suevi had also 
sent away all their possessions and wives and children; had 
collected all their fighting men at a spot about the centre of 
their land, a number of days’ march to the east, and were 
awaiting the arrival of the Romans. But having, as the 
Commentaries state, accomplished all he intended, and having 
spent eighteen days beyond the Rhine, Caesar returned to 
Gaul and broke down the bridge. 

He had really accomplished nothing. He had not recovered 
the cavalry demanded of the Sugambri; he had done no more 
than promise help to the Ubii; he had failed to attack the 
Suevi. The question arises whether he would not have stood 
better in the eyes of the Germans if he had not crossed at all, 
except, indeed, for their wonder at the bridge. In a military 
sense, he would, perhaps, have acted more wisely if he had 
remained in Gaul. This land had been sufficiently defended 


NOTHING GAINED. 


163 


by twice driving the Germans back across the Rhine with so 
savage a punishment; his invasion of the German territory 
had brought absolutely no result. In fact, it may be said, 
that his failure to accomplish anything on the east shore of 
the Rhine must have tended to lower his standing- among 
the Germans. But his reputation in Rome and his self-esteem 
had been greatly raised by the performance, to which his 
letters, as well as the Commentaries, lent great lustre. And 
his friends in Rome had something to offset against the 
avalanche of reproach with which his enemies sought to over¬ 
whelm him for his slaughter of the Usipetes and Tenchtheri. 
The passage of the Rhine was as splendid a subject to enlarge 
on as it was, in a certain sense, a brilliant achievement. 
















XI. 


BRITAIN. FALL OF 55 B. C. 

C.33SAR had the traveler’s instinct. To invade Britain was even less a part of 
his Gallic problem than to cross the Rhine. But he determined to see that 
island, and a pretext — that they had given help to resisting Gallic tribes — 
was readily conjured up. He sought information from merchants and leading 
Gauls and sent a subordinate over to Britain to prospect; but he learned little. 
He shipped two legions and some cavalry in transports and crossed in August. 
He reached the Dover cliffs and actually landed at Deal, though with difficulty, 
owing to the warlike opposition of the Britons. After a few days, a storm 
damaged the fleet; the Britons attacked Caesar, but were defeated; a peace 
was patched up ; hostages were promised, who were never delivered; and hav¬ 
ing accomplished nothing whatever except as a discoverer, Caesar returned to 
Gaul. He had run great risk of being cut off, and had illy provided against 
probable contingencies. There is little commendable in a military sense in the 
first invasion of Britain. It had no connection with the Gallic theatre of war. 

Though the season was well advanced — it was late in 
the summer — Caesar determined to move over to Britain, 
“because,” as he says, “he discovered that in almost all the 
wars with the Gauls succors had been furnished to our 
enemy from that country; and even if the time of year should 
be insufficient for carrying on the war, yet he thought it 
would be of great service to him if he only entered the island 
and saw into the character of the people, and got knowledge 
of their localities, harbors and landing-places, all which were, 
for the most part, unknown to the Gauls.” This explanation 
has the look of an afterthought. The fact of British aid to 
the Gauls seems doubtful, and rests almost entirely on this 
statement and another that the Suessiones, under Divitiacus, 
had extended their control to Britain. 


THE BRITONS. 


165 


It is probable that Caesar had a good deal of the traveler’s 

instinct in addition to his ambition, and desired to know 

• 

something about the island and its people, its harbors, 
resources and accessibility. Plutarch and Dion Cassius 
agree that the expedition against Britain was of no use to 
Rome. Suetonius says Caesar was in search for pearls, a 
rather weak motive. Any reason, good or bad, which could 
plausibly be used, sufficed fora casus belli when Caesar wished 
to invade a country. And so it was with Britain. Returning 
to the coast in July, and calling to him all the merchants he 
could find, he interrogated them, and ascertained that these 
people knew only that part of the British coast which was 
immediately opposite to Gaul, and little indeed of that, 
inasmuch as they had never been able to go inland, and had 
traded only in one or two places. 

Caesar’s description of Britain is vague, but good consider¬ 
ing the difficulties of obtaining information. He thought the 
climate of Britain more temperate than that of Gaul. The 
same products of the soil were known, but ripened more 
slowly. The population was considerable, and the east and 
south coasts had been peopled by the Belgse, who had crossed 
the Channel for spoil and ended by settling in Britain. Can- 
tium (Kent) had thus been settled. Each tribe had its king. 
Csesar mentions the Trinobantes, in modern Essex and Mid¬ 
dlesex, whose oppidum was no doubt London; the Cenimagni 
in Suffolk; the Segontiaci in Hampshire and Berkshire; the 
Bibroci in Sussex and Surrey; the Ancalites and the Cassii 
farther north. The Britons were, on the whole, less advanced 
in civilization than the Gauls. Their habitations were huts 
of wood and rough thatch. They buried their corn in under¬ 
ground vaults. Their towns were mere places of refuge in 
forests, defended by a ditch and rampart. They had tire same 
bodily structure as the Gauls, but the Britons were taller and 


166 


THE FLEET ASSEMBLED. 


bolder, with long blond, rather than red hair. They wore 


skins and lived on flesh and milk, with little vegetable food. 
They painted their bodies blue with woad. Polyandry was 


common. They sold tin to the Phoenicians at a very early 
age, but relied on foreign nations for bronze. They had no 
ships. Their 'religion was Druidical. They fought with 
long swords and small bucklers, and skirmished, rather than 
fought in masses, as the Gauls did. Their chariots were nu¬ 
merous and able. 

As Caesar could ascertain little about Britain, he sent 
Caius Volusenus with a ship of war to make a rapid exami- 

>ast, to 



ascertain what harbors 
there might be for a 


large fleet, and something 
about the peoples, their sys¬ 
tem of war and customs. He 
ordered the fleet to assemble 
in one of the harbors of the 


Gaul to Britain. 


Morini,— later Portus Itius, 

not improbably Boulogne, though it cannot be taken as set¬ 
tled,— whither he himself, by steady marches from the Bhine, 
repaired with all his forces, and commanded to be brought 
many ships from all directions, including those with which 
he had fought the Veneti. While this was going on, sev¬ 
eral tribes from Britain, who had, no doubt, heard through 




THE FORCES. 


167 

merchants of Caesar’s victories, and of his preparations to 
invade their land, sent in their offers of submission. These 
ambassadors he received with courtesy, and sent back with 
them Commius, a Gallic chief, whom Caesar had made kins’ 
of the Atrebates, and in whom he reposed great confidence* 
This*man, Caesar says, stood high in the sight of many 
leading Britons. Commius was to visit as many of the 
British tribes as he could; make them familiar with Caesar’s 
exploits; tell them what manner of people the Homans were; 
satisfy them that the new-comers would be friends and not 
foes; and say that Caesar in person would shortly arrive. 

Volusenus brought back his report in five days. He had 
not even landed. He had seen and could tell but little. 
This brief time, and apparent lack of push, had enabled him 
to catch but a glimpse of the coast. 

The Morini had luckily given in their submission and 
surrendered numerous hostages, excusing their late resistance 
on the score of want of knowledge of the Homans. This had 
been done without a further campaign, which Caesar had 
anticipated; there was now no enemy left to prejudice his 
rear. He had, during August, provided eighty transports, 
which sufficed for the two legions, the Seventh and Tenth, 
presumably under Galba and Labienus, which he proposed 
to take with him, to be escorted by a suitable number of war 
galleys. The two legions must have been less than ten 
thousand strong. The horse, four hundred and fifty effective, 
was marched to and embarked on eighteen transports from 
another harbor some eight miles up the coast, Portus Ulterior 
(Ambleteuse), where, in addition to some tardiness, they had 
been held by contrary winds. The quaestor, the legates and 
praefects were divided up among the men of war, in such a 
manner that each had a certain number under his charge. 
The rest of the army Caesar left with Titurius Sabinus and 


168 


LANDING OPPOSED. 


Arunculeius Cotta to hold head against those coast-trihes 
of the Menapii and Morini which had not yet so frankly 
submitted as to make him feel confident he could trust them 
unwatched. A garrison under Sulpicius Rufus was also left 
in camp in the harbor of departure. 

Caesar set sail with the first favorable wind, towards the 
end of August, b. C. 55, and in a few hours (one to ten 
A. M.) arrived on the British shore opposite the chalk cliffs 
of Dover. In Caesar’s day the sea came so close to the cliffs 
that a dart thrown from the top would reach the tide-covered 
beach; but by about 950 A. d., the old port had been quite 
blocked up by alluvium. As this spot did not appear to be 
a good place for landing, after cautioning his officers to act 
promptly in their orders, he sailed — at about three P. M. — 
some seven miles farther up the coast, doubling, according 
to Dion Cassius, a lofty promontory, no doubt South Fore¬ 
land, and stopped at Deal. 

The Britons, who had assembled in great numbers on the 
shore to oppose his landing, guessed his intention and 
followed up his movement, sending cavalry and chariots on 
ahead. Their opposition to the landing of the Romans was 
very spirited. This they conducted by advancing into the 
water and casting their javelins at the Roman legionaries as 
they attempted to land. The men thus found it difficult to 
get out of the boats, because these drew too much water to 
get close to shore, and they themselves were heavy-armed and 
laden with camp-gear. Caesar, to escape from this dilemma, 
sent some ships of war to a cove close by, where, with sling- 
stones, arrows and engines he could attack the Britons in 
flank. This diversion surprised them and obliged them to 
retire somewhat up the beach. Perceiving that the soldiers 
were still slow to land, the standard-bearer of the Tenth 
legion leaped into the waves with the legionary eagle, and 


ANCIENT AND MODERN SOLDIERS. 


169 


called on the men to follow him if they would not see their 
sacred emblem captured by the enemy under their very eyes. 
The soldiers of the Tenth at once swarmed to the shore, 
which example so encouraged the whole body of the Romans 
that they speedily leaped into the water to drive away the 
enemy. 

“The battle was maintained vigorously on both sides. 
Our men, however, as they could neither keep their ranks, 
nor get firm footing, nor follow their standards, and as one 
from one ship and another from another assembled around 
whatever standard they met, were thrown into great confu¬ 
sion. But the enemy, who were acquainted with all the 
shallows, when from the shore they saw any coming from a 
ship one by one, spurred on their horses and attacked them 
while embarrassed; many surrounded a few, others threw 
their weapons upon our collected forces on their exposed 
flank. When Caesar observed this, he ordered the boats of 
the ships of war and the spy-sloops to be filled with soldiers 
and sent them up to the succor of those whom he had ob¬ 
served in distress. Our men, as soon as they made good 
their footing on dry ground, and all their comrades had 
joined them, made an attack upon the enemy, and put them 
to flight, but could not pursue them very far, because the 
horse had not been able to maintain their course at sea and 
reach the island. This alone was wanting to Caesar’s accus¬ 
tomed success.” 

It is little items like these which enable one to draw a com¬ 
parison between the ancient and modern soldier. To read 
of a disembarkation of troops to-day, under heavy fire, con¬ 
ducted in such a haphazard way, where each man appeared 
to consult his own ideas of prudence or courage instead of 
acting under the orders of his officers, would savor of absurd¬ 
ity. Discipline of old was good, but even under Caesar it 


170 


THE FLEET DAMAGED. 


did not seem to reach the grade of the best discipline of 
to-day; that is, what they called discipline was a different 
thing from ours. 

The particular tribe of Britons which had been thus beaten 
concluded to sue for peace, and there came back with the 
British ambassadors Commius, whom Caesar had sent into 
Britain with the messengers that had been dispatched to him 
into Gaul. This man the Britons had seized and thrown into 
chains, a fact which seems to deny the influence the Com¬ 
mentaries claim that Commius had in Britain. The Britons 
now returned Commius with pretended excuses for their con¬ 
duct, saying that the multitude had overwhelmed them. The 
apparent complete submission of these coast-tribes constrained 
Caesar to forgive this breach of the law of nations. He felt 
that he was not strong enough to do less. He took some 
hostages and required more. These were promised, but not 
presently delivered. Thus in four days after the legions had 
landed, a peace was patched up with the peoples who inhab¬ 
ited the shore line on which he had landed, to wit, Kent. 

The cavalry, which had sailed in eighteen transports from 
another port, reached the coast, but met with a serious storm 
near by. They were unable to land, though they tried to do 
so, and returned to Gaul. At the same time a very high tide 
destroyed and damaged a large number of the vessels in which 
the legions had crossed the Channel. This was the season of 
full moon and high tides, at the end of August, 55 B. c. 
The Romans had not drawn their ships far enough up on the 
shore. The war-galleys had been beached; the transports 
were riding at anchor. The heavy seas filled the galleys and 
dashed the transports one against the other. Those that were 
not crushed lost their anchors, tackling and sails. The 
inability to repair this loss, and the fact that the Romans had 
not corn enough to winter in Britain, not only caused a 


TREACHEROUS PEACE. 


171 


certain feeling of insecurity among the soldiery, hut afforded 
the Britons an opportunity to reconsider their action in 
submitting to Caesar. Therefore, instead of bringing in their 
promised hostages, they conferred together, and agreed to 
attack Caesar’s camp, in the belief that if they could destroy 
this army, none other would ever cross to Britain. Caesar’s 
camp was small. The legionaries had come without much 
baggage. Caesar, we hear, had but three servants with him, 
though this does not give one much of an idea of the general 
impedimenta. The barbarians saw he had no cavalry and 
had lost many ships. The opportunity looked favorable to 
expel him. 

Suspecting, though not informed of their designs, Caesar 
made provision against every probable contingency, and saw 
personally to it that the discipline of the camp was strin¬ 
gently enforced. Peace was not ruptured, and the barba¬ 
rians went to and fro in the Roman quarters. The ships 
were duly repaired — for there were numberless shipwrights 
in the expedition—by using the seasoned timber and the 
brass of the worst damaged ones to repair the rest. Such 
materials as had been lost in the wreckage were sent for to 
the continent. Only twelve remained unfit for further use. 

Not long after, the Seventh legion, having gone out as 
usual to forage at the only place left near by where the wheat 
had not been cut, was attacked by the enemy from an am¬ 
bush while the men were scattered filling their sacks. This 
legion, surrounded by a host of cavalry and chariots, was on 
the .point of succumbing, for the novelty of the dashing char¬ 
iots and the strange shouts given by the Britons had greatly 
demoralized the men. They had huddled together in a mass, 
and the barbarians were casting weapons on them from all 
sides. Even the Gallic wars had not yet made them proof 
to panic. 



172 


A SUDDEN ATTACK. 


u Their mode of fighting with their chariots is this: firstly, 
they drive about in all directions and throw their weapons, 
and generally break the ranks of the enemy with the very 
dread of their horses and the noise of their wheels; and when 
they have worked themselves in between the troops of horse, 
leap from their chariots and engage on foot. The charioteers 
in the mean time withdraw some little distance from the 
battle, and so place themselves with the chariots that, if their 
masters are overpowered by the number of the enemy, they 
may have a ready retreat to their own troops. Thus they 
display in battle the speed of horse, together with the firmness 
of infantry; and by daily practice and exercise attain to such 
expertness that they are accustomed, even on a declining and 
steep place, to check their horses at full speed, and manage 
and turn them in an instant, and run along the pole and stand 
on the yoke, and thence betake themselves, with the greatest 
celerity, to their chariots again.” 

Caesar, perceiving that something was wrong from the 
great clouds of dust which could be seen from the camp, had 
speeded to the assistance of the legion attacked, with those 
cohorts of the Tenth which happened to be on duty. Disen¬ 
gaging it by a vigorous assault on the Britons, who promptly 
retreated, he deemed it wise to retire at once to the shelter 
of the camp. The Seventh legion had lost heavily. For 
several days no further action was taken on account of the 
rainy weather; Caesar was kept close to the limits of his 
works preparing for a further attack; while the Britons 
collected troops from all the neighboring tribes, urging that 
now was their opportunity to redeem their cause. Caesar 
had no cavalry save about thirty horsemen brought over by 
Commius, but he determined nevertheless to engage the 
enemy so soon as his troops were again in proper condition. 
He thought he could accomplish something with even thirty 


RETURN TO GAUL. 


173 


horsemen. After the lapse of a few clays, the Britons made 
a demonstration on the camp. Csesar drew up his legions 
in its front with the purpose of accepting battle. But the 
Britons, though they made a smart assault, were unable long 
to withstand the well-drilled ranks of the legions, and being 
routed and pursued, lost many men; whereupon the Romans 
devastated the vicinity and returned to camp. 

The Britons now again sued for peace, which Csesar deemed 
it wise to grant after doubling the number of hostages they 
were to furnish. And, no doubt fearing that he could not 
enforce their present delivery, he ordered these to be brought 
over to the continent by a given time. Then, the autumnal 
equinox being near at hand, which Csesar desired not to 
encounter at sea, he embarked and safely reached the shores 
of Gaul. He had been less than three weeks in Britain. 

Two ships were, however, carried farther down the coast. 
The three hundred soldiers in these, after safely landing, 
were on the march to rejoin the main army, when they were 
surrounded and attacked by some warriors belonging to the 
Morini, who were shortly reinforced up to six thousand men. 
The legionaries defended themselves manfully, drawn up in a 
circle for nearly four hours, until Csesar’s cavalry, which he 
had sent out in quest of them, happened at the eleventh hour 
to come to the rescue. The Morini were penned in by the 
cavalry and large numbers were killed. 

For this act of the Morini speedy vengeance was taken. 
Labienus, with the Seventh and Tenth legions, just back 
from Britain, marched into their land, and, as the morasses 
were almost dry at this season, was able to reach and capture 
all the tribes which had taken part in the attack. These 
were no doubt summarily dealt with. 

The legions under Sabinus and Cotta, which had been sent 
out among the Menapii, had been unable to hunt up the 


174 


A USELESS CAMPAIGN. 


natives in their forest retreats. Having, therefore, mowed 
down all the crops and burned the habitations, they returned 
to camp. 

The limited effect of Caesar’s invasion of Britain is well 
shown by the fact that out of all the tribes who handed in 
their submission, only two sent over the hostages demanded. 
The peace and its security had been a mere farce. 

Caesar now took up winter-quarters among the Belgae, and, 
returning himself to Borne, was decreed a thanksgiving of 
twenty days. This decree was, however, violently opposed 
by his enemies under leadership of Cato, who depreciated or 
laughed at his performances as much as his friends extolled 
and overrated them. 

It cannot be claimed that the campaigns of this year had 
been brilliant. The crossing of both the Rhine and the 
Channel had been without result. In the former case this 
has already been pointed out. The campaign into Britain is 
subject to equal criticism. Caesar’s preparations for crossing 
were lamentably wanting. He had too few ships; he sailed 
without his cavalry, absolutely essential among tribes which 
had chariots and horses in plenty. The expedition may be 
said to have been undertaken in a happy-go-lucky way. 

The invasion of Britain was no part of Caesar's military 
scheme so far as concerned the mere protection of Rome by 
the conquest of Gaul. But Caesar was looking to his own 
interests quite as much as to those of Rome. To him his 
own success was Rome’s. Each conquered land enhanced his 
reputation and might add to his riches; fame and wealth fur¬ 
thered his political aspirations. This ambition was proper 
enough. It is what has inspired some of the greatest of men 
and soldiers. But it was the ambition of a Napoleon, not of 
a Gustavus. It led to over-rapid operations, not carefully 
planned, the results, or rather the lack of failure of which are 


ITS DEFECTS. 


175 


largely due to good fortune. The most necessary elements of 
the work of a great captain are: a distinct conception of his 
plan; scrupulous preparation for what he undertakes; and 
courage tempered with caution in its execution. He should 
not undertake operations without full consideration of what 
every step may mean. These elements scarcely appeared in 
either the German or British campaign of this year. Caesar’s 
right to go to Britain he based upon an unproven, perhaps 
quite improbable assertion, that the Britons had aided the 
Gauls during his campaign against them. He made no pre¬ 
tense of examining the ground. Yolusenus, sailing alone 
along the coast, could at best bring him but little infor¬ 
mation— quite insufficient to warrant him in risking his 
two legions. His preparations and conduct were deficient in 
that he left no force whose special duty it was to protect his 
return should he be driven back; that he carried along no 
victuals or baggage; that he left his cavalry to come behind 
in a haphazard way; that he had no vessels in reserve; that 
he apparently knew nothing about the ebb and flow of the 
tide on the shores of Britain, or had not thought of it; 
that he inflicted harm on the enemy rather than gained an 
advantage himself ; and that he showed an unnecessary 
cruelty against the Britons as he had against the Gauls 
and Germans. Some of the best critics go so far as to say 
that both campaigns of this year were awkward and deficient 
in conception and execution, and were as far from useful as 
from glorious. Had Alexander planned his steps after this 
fashion, he would never have penetrated beyond the edge of 
the Persian empire; had Hannibal contrived his work in 
Italy as carelessly, he would not have held his own for one 
campaign. Indeed, it may be said that Caesar’s good star 
was at the bottom of his coming out whole. 

And yet, if viewed in the light of reconnoissances in force, 


176 


RECONNOISSANCE IN FORCE. 


to ascertain, in unknown lands, what he might be able to do 
with a stronger expedition thereafter, perhaps both these 
campaigns may be absolved from such criticism. On no 
other ground, however, are they even tenable. But is the 
commander-in-chief, whose death would mean the destruction 
of his army, warranted in leading such a reconnoissance in 
person 0 



Gallic Swords. 











XII. 


CASSIVELLAUNUS. SPRING AND SUMMER, 54 B. C. 

Not satisfied with his first trip to Britain, Csesar prepared to cross again. 
This time he took better precautions, though there is little to justify either in¬ 
vasion from a military point of view. In all he had eight hundred craft, carry¬ 
ing eight legions and four thousand horse. The balance of his force he left on 
the Gallic coast under Labienus, to protect his base. He set sail in July, landed 
safely, and marched inland to attack the Britons. Once more a storm damaged 
the fleet. Caesar returned, hauled up the fleet on the beach, intrenched it, and 
again set out. After several engagements with the Britons, he forced a passage 
of the Thames near Kingston. Cassivellaunus, who commanded the Britons, 
opposed him ably, but Caesar marched as far as St. Albans, for many tribes 
deserted the national standard, and Cassivellaunus was unable to do much to 
check him. When Caesar was at a distance, the tribes in the rear attacked 
the fleet camp and compelled his retreat. Caesar recognized that there was 
nothing for him to gain by subduing the island. He had seen what manner of 
land and people there were in Britain. He retired, having accomplished much 
as a traveler, nothing as a soldier, and returned to Gaul in two embarkations 
without accident. 

Ca:sar had not yet satisfied his curiosity with regard to 
Britain. When leaving for Italy to attend to political 
affairs after the campaign of the preceding year, he com¬ 
manded his lieutenants to construct as many new vessels as 
possible during the winter, and to have the old ones well 
repaired, purposing to cross the Channel a second time. He 
planned the new ships himself, making them somewhat 
broader, so as better to accommodate the cavalry and other 
burden, and with lower sides, so as to be more easily loaded 
and unloaded. They could also be more readily drawn up on 
the beach. These, as described by Caesar, were for a similar 
purpose substantially imitated by Napoleon, in 1804, showing 


178 


1LLYRICUM. 


t]ie conditions to have remained practically the same for the 

intervening centuries. They were fitted to row or to sail. 

The equipments were brought from Spain. No doubt Caesar 

recognized the failure and faults in his first invasion of Brit- 
© 

ain. No man was more ready to profit by his own or his 
opponent’s errors than he. This is really one of Caesar’s 
strong points, though in writing the Commentaries he is unapt 
to acknowledge as much. He determined that he would do 
the work over again in a more business-like manner, so that 
it might not only add to the dominion of Home, but to his 
own reputation in such a fashion as to silence those wordy 
and troublesome adversaries who had laughed at his first 
expedition. 

During Caesar’s winter absence from his Gallic legions, he 
was called on to settle what promised to prove a warlike 
question in Illyricum. The Pirustae had been laying waste 
the boundaries of that province. To meet the emergency 
Caesar at once began to raise troops. But seeing his prompt¬ 
ness and having heard of his Gallic exploits, the Pirustae sent 
ambassadors to make their peace, praying humbly for pardon, 
and offering to make compensation for all damage committed. 
These terms were accepted, for Caesar did not wish to turn 
from the Gallic problem, and hostages were given for their 
performance. 

On returning to his Gallic army in June, Caesar found that 
about six hundred transports and twenty-eight ships of war 
had been constructed or repaired and made ready to launch. 
Strabo says he had established a naval arsenal at the mouth 
of the Sequana. Ordering the fleet, when ready, to rendez¬ 
vous and await his arrival at Portus Itius, which was the 
nearest harbor, as he supposed, to Britain, he himself took 
four legions without baggage and eight hundred horse, and 
marched against the Treviri, who were threatening trouble, 


THE NEW FLEET . 


179 


and it was said had again invited the Germans across the 
Rhine. There is no cine to which legions he took. The Tre- 
viri, we remember, were very numerous and strong in cavalry, 
and occupied territory bordering on the great river. Two 
chiefs, Indutiomarus and Cingetorix, his son-in-law, were 
contending among the Treviri for the upper hand in the gov¬ 
ernment. Indutiomarus placed in the Ardennes forest all the 
people incapable of bearing arms, raised an army and pre¬ 
pared to fight. But when many chiefs deserted him to make 
submission to Caesar, he concluded to do the like. Caesar 
gave the power to Cingetorix, who had been singularly at¬ 
tached to him. This made of Indutiomarus an implacable 
enemy. Both having brought in their submission and deliv¬ 
ered -up two hundred hostages, including Indutiomarus’ rel¬ 
atives, Caesar, being anxious to go to Britain, settled the 
matter for the time being, though leaving the two chieftains 
unreconciled, and returned to Portus Itius. His trip had 
consumed the month of June. 

Here he found that all the ships, save forty, which had not 
been able to reach this port from the Matrona, where they 
were built, stood ready for sailing. He had six hundred 
transports and twenty-eight galleys, plus a number of private 
barks, eight hundred in all. In order to leave less chance of 
trouble in the rear during his coming absence, he proposed to 
carry with him nearly all the Gallic horse, numbering four 
thousand men. They would be in the nature of hostages for 
the good behavior of the tribes to which they belonged. 
With them he also insisted upon taking Dumnorix, the chief 
of the JEdui, a man “fond of change, fond of power, possess¬ 
ing great resolution and great influence among the Gauls,” 
with whom he had heretofore had difficulty, for Dumnorix 
was aiming at the chieftaincy of the iEdui, and the autocracy 
of Gaul. This man used every artifice to persuade Csesar to 


180 


DUMNORIX KILLED. 


leave him behind, and finally, unable to accomplish his 
purpose, he broke out into open revolt and rode away with 
the whole cavalry force of the JEdui. Though Caesar had 
been detained twenty-five days waiting for a favorable wind, 
and one had just begun to blow, he saw that he could not for 
a moment temporize with so grave a matter. He sent the 
bulk of his horse in pursuit. The fugitives were caught up 
with, and the mutiny came to a speedy termination by the 
killing of Dumnorix; for the commanders of the pursuing 
troops had been ordered to bring him back, dead or alive. 

Caesar made much more careful preparations for his present 
descent on Britain, and for the protection of his rear. There 
were assembled at Boulogne eight legions and four thousand 
cavalry. His legate, Labienus, was placed in command of 
the detachment left in Gaul, which consisted of three legions 
and two thousand horse, — seventeen thousand men, at 
normal strength, — a force amply large to provide tempo¬ 
rarily for the safety of the land. Labienus was also to take 
steps to insure Caesar a steady supply of corn. His orders 
were general, to act for the best interests of Caesar under 
any circumstances which might arise. Labienus was, to all 
appearances, a faithful, and was unquestionably a clever 
lieutenant. One can but wonder how he could prove so 
treacherous as he later did, or sink so low in ability. Caesar 
took with him the other five legions and two thousand horse, 
— some twenty-seven thousand men, if we assume the legions 
to be full. There is no means of telling how strong the 
legions at this time were. Later they were greatly depleted, 
and it is probable that at this date they fell below the 
numbers given. 

Caesar embarked and set sail, with over eight hundred 
craft, one day at sunset, thought to have been the twentieth 
of July. The fleet sailed with a southwest wind till mid- 


LANDING IN BRITAIN. 


181 


night, when the wind fell; hut, by dint of hard rowing and 
continuous, the British coast was made in the morning, and 
next midday, after having been carried somewhat too far 



Britain. 


north, probably to Goodwin Sands, from whence the vessels 
were rowed back, made good the landing at several points, 
at a place which the preceding year Caesar had discovered to 
be a suitable spot. 

The Britons had been frightened by the appearance of this 
enormous fleet, — the like of which they had never imagined, 
— and in lieu of opposing the landing, had, as Caesar learned 
from some prisoners, concealed themselves some distance back 
of the coast on the high land. 

The operation of this year stands out in marked contrast 
to that of the last. Caesar had brought victuals, baggage, a 
sufficient fleet, his cavalry, and enough troops to enable him 




182 


ADVANCE INLAND. 


to accomplish some result. For quite a season he could 
subsist on what he had, and he had perfected arrangements 
for future supplies. Caesar probably chose his camp in a 
safer place, taught by the experience of the last year. 

Leaving Q. Atrius in charge of the ships, with a strong 
guard of ten cohorts — two from each legion — and three 
hundred horse, Caesar marched by night towards the place, 
some twelve miles distant, where prisoners had told him the 
enemy lay encamped. Here he was met by an advanced 
party of warriors, who, with chariots and horsemen, essayed 
to dispute his passage of a small river, very probably the 
Little Stour, near Kingston or Littlebourne. The Gallic 
cavalry, however, easily threw this force back, and following 
it up, Caesar found the main army strongly intrenched in a 
fort well protected by felled trees, “which the Britons had 
before prepared on account of a civil war.” The locality 
cannot be identified, nor indeed are most of the places set¬ 
tled beyond dispute. But some of them may be considered 
as practically determined. The Britons, not content with 
having harassed the marching column very materially, offered 
in a desultory way quite a stubborn defense of their fort; 
but the Seventh legionaries, having thrown up a temporary 
terrace and forming a testudo, overwhelmed the barbarians 
with missiles, captured the fort, and drove the Britons out of 
the woods. The loss of the Homans was small. Csesar 
forbade their pursuing to any distance, lest they should fall 
into an ambuscade. He desired, moreover, to intrench his 
camp more carefully than usual. 

On the morrow, when Csesar was about to pursue the 
Britons, and had already given marching orders to several 
detachments of foot and horse, three of which had proceeded 
some distance, had caught up with the barbarian rear, and 
were pushing them to a fight in retreat, he received by 


THE FLEET DAMAGED. 


188 


mounted messengers word from Atrius that a storm had 
destroyed and damaged a number of the ships. These had 
been left at anchor, and had been violently dashed against 
each other by the heavy sea. The experience of the last year 
had not been heeded, and the same danger had been incurred. 
Recalling the cohorts already in pursuit, Caesar marched back 
to the fleet. Here he found that forty of the vessels had been 
seriously broken, but that the damage to the rest could be 
repaired with time and labor. He detailed skilled workmen 
from the legions for this purpose. He also deemed it wise 
to send to Labienus in Gaul to have additional ships built. 
And he now took the precaution, though at great labor, to 
haul the ships up on the beach out of the reach of the waves, 
and strongly fortified the position. This work consumed ten 
days and nights of unremitting toil, for eight hundred ships 
would take up much space and were not easily handled. If 
each was eighty feet long by twenty wide, and they were put 
six feet apart and in four lines ten feet apart, they would 
occupy a mile of beach three hundred and fifty feet wide. 
To add the space required for the crews and room to receive 
the legions as well would make a camp covering much 
ground. This was, however, no unusual feat for the Romans. 
The time occupied was mainly used in putting the fortifica¬ 
tions beyond fear of capture. August had come, and Caesar 
had made small headway. 

The same cohorts were left to protect the new camp, and 
Caesar marched back to the place where he had last met the 
enemy. Here he found the Britons assembled under com¬ 
mand of Cassivellaunus, a noble chieftain whose territories 
were separated from the maritime states by the Tamesis 
(Thames) about eighty miles up from the sea, above London. 
The several tribes, who were constantly at war, had laid aside 
their own feuds in order to meet the common enemy, and 


184 


BRITISH CHARIOTEERS. 


though Cassivellaunus was universally disliked, he had been 
recognized as the best commander. 

The British foot was useless against the legions. Cassivel¬ 
launus recognized this fact, and appears to have discharged it. 
But the cavalry and chariots proved useful. They hovered 
about Caesar’s column on the march, made frequent attacks, 
and gave unceasing trouble to the Homans, who, at first, 
daunted by the fierce looks of these barbarians, their woad- 
stained skins, and their courageous demeanor, ended by find¬ 
ing discipline more than a match for their wild tactics. After 
camping, a constant skirmish was kept up with the outposts. 
The Britons at one time appeared suddenly from the woods 
and drove in a Koman guard with serious loss. But Caesar 
sent forward two cohorts as reinforcement, and the action 
after some time resulted in greater loss, by far, to the Britons, 
who were driven back to the forest. The method of fighting 
of the Britons was novel to the Romans. The charioteers 
did not act in large bodies, nor indeed the cavalry, but in 
small squads, relying upon their individual prowess. They 
would often purposely retreat and then turn furiously upon 
the pursuers, and as often as necessary they relieved the 
fighting men with fresh ones. The drill and heavy masses 
of the Roman legions were by no means suited to this method 
of warfare. The Roman allied horse was subjected to the 
same difficulty, for the Britons, seeing that they could not 
meet the squadrons on equal terms, merely skirmished in 
loose order and cut out an occasional horseman whenever 
chance offered. 

Caesar does not give us details of just what means he 
adopted to meet these novel tactics. One is led to believe 
that Caesar’s legionaries in this their fifth year of campaign¬ 
ing were not as apt at coping with the unusual as Alexander’s 
phalangites, who could and did skirmish as well as they 


ANOTHER AMBUSH. 


185 


fought in line or column, against any and all coiners. Still, 
Caesar’s legionary was an adaptable fellow, able to turn his 
hand to almost anything. He had already had considerable 
experience in dealing with new methods of warfare, and to 
rank him as he was at this period after the Macedonians, who 
had been trained by Philip, is no disgrace. Later, he came 
well up to their standard. Probably without altering any¬ 
thing of the regular formation or manoeuvring of the legion, 
Caesar was able to meet the Britons at their own tactics. 

Next day the enemy assembled “with less spirit than the 
day before,” on the hills surrounding the camp, and chal¬ 
lenged the Romans to battle by advancing cavalry skirmish¬ 
ers, who galloped tauntingly around the Roman horse without 
venturing to make a serious attack. This challenge being 
refused, when towards noon Caesar sent out the legate Trebo- 
nius with three legions and all the cavalry on a foraging 
expedition, the Britons, who lay in ambush, suddenly and 
from all sides, fell upon them. The barbarians fought with 
uncommon vigor and daring. They pressed on so sharply 
that the legionaries were compelled to close in round their 
standards. But, as always, Roman discipline under able 
leadership prevailed; the Britons were driven back and 
broken, and in the pursuit, a vast number of them were 
killed. The cavalry, finding itself sustained by the foot, 
kept so close to their heels that they were unable to display 
their peculiar tactics. Reinforcements which came up to 
their aid were likewise dispersed. The punishment was 
severe, and thereafter no attack in force was made on the 
Roman columns. 

After these preliminary combats, Caesar advanced on Cassi- 
vellaunus via Maidstone and Westerham. He saw that the 
enemy proposed to draw the war out to a great length and 
believed that he h^jj. better force the fighting. In order to 


186 


FORCING THE THAMES. 

% 

reach Cassivellaunus, he must cross the Thames. Several 
places were fordable, and at each of these localities the enemy 
had erected defenses. Caesar chose a spot between Kingston 
and Brentford. Here he found that Cassivellaunus had 
driven sharp stakes into the farther bank and into the river 
bed near by, with the points below the surface of the water, 
and expected to be able to overwhelm the Romans when they 
should get into disorder in forcing the ford. These stakes 
were probably driven both above and below. Caesar had got 
wind of this device from prisoners, and was able to avoid the 
snare. Sending his cavalry to points up or down the river 
so as to cross and take the Britons in flank, and following up 
its manoeuvre with the legions, who, though the water was up 
to their necks, dashed into the ford with courage, the com¬ 
bined onset was so sharp and vigorous that Cassivellaunus’ 
men sought safety in flight. Polyamus says Caesar had an 
elephant, the sight of which greatly disturbed the Britons. 
This is not elsewhere mentioned, and is doubtful. 

It was the middle of August. Many of the auxiliaries of 
Cassivellaunus now deserted him, and he was reduced to de¬ 
fend himself with his own forces, amounting to four thousand 
men in chariots, perhaps seven or eight hundred chariots, 
with their auxiliary fighters. He showed himself an adept 
in a small system of warfare. Knowing all the paths of the 
country, he was able adequately to hide his people, cattle and 
goods, and to fall upon the Roman foragers wherever they 
went, from one ambush after another. So clever were his 
devices, that he succeeded in almost entirely preventing for¬ 
aging at a distance from the main body of the legions; and 
so effectively did he interfere with their obtaining corn, that 
one is tempted to make the same criticism upon Csesar’s 
passing over to the north side of the Thames which was 
applied as a whole to his first invasion oL Britain. 


SOME TRIBES SUCCUMB. 


187 


At this time, the Trinobantes, who lived in modern Essex 
and Middlesex, came in and surrendered, they being one of 
the most powerful tribes and inimical to Cassivellaunus. No 
doubt Caesar had exerted all his diplomacy to bring about 
this result. The Trinobantes were secured from plundering 
by the Roman soldiers, and on giving forty hostages, and 
furnishing corn for the troops, Caesar reinstated their chief, 
Mandubratius, who had been to Gaul to see Caesar, and was 
still with him. The old king, his father, Cassivellaunus had 
killed. Other tribes, the Cenimagni, Segontiaci, Ancalites, 
Bibroci and Cassi, soon followed this example. These tribes 
covered substantially the entire southeast section of Britain. 
Learning from the new allies to what place Cassivellaunus 
had retired, that he had fortified his capital, — at modern 
St. Albans, probably,— though it could have been little more 
than a camp, and had collected in it a large force and much 
cattle, Caesar took up his march thither. After reconnoitring 
the camp, —it had a rampart and ditch, “admirably fortified 
by nature and by art,” and lay in a thickly wooded district, 
— he determined upon attacking it from two directions. The 
storming columns made short work. The Britons did not 
long resist the assault, but hurriedly retreated by the gate 
on one of the sides which had not been attacked, leaving be¬ 
hind corn and cattle, and losing many people in the flight 
and pursuit. This was not a very flattering victory, nor a 
decisive, but it furnished a pretext to declare the advance 
a success, and enabled Caesar to withdraw from a campaign 
which promised no eventual gain. 

While Caesar was thus engaged, Cassivellaunus sent mes¬ 
sengers to the tribes in Kent whose kings were Cingetorix, 
Carvilius, Taximagulus, and Segonax, and persuaded them 
to make a sudden attack on the Roman fleet and camp. This 
they did with a large force, but the Romans, expertly sallying 


188 


CASSIVELLAUNUS SURRENDERS. 


out upon them, routed them, killed a vast number, and 
captured Lugotorix, a celebrated leader. This was, indeed, 
fortunate. A disaster at the rear would have meant destruc¬ 
tion of all Caesar’s forces. 

After this defeat Cassivellaunus, thoroughly alarmed by his 
want of success, by the wasting of the country, and by the 
desertion of many tribes, concluded to treat for peace. He 
employed Commius to make advances for him. Caesar, as 
the summer was far spent, — it was now the end of August, 
and he felt that he must return to Gaul, where some tribes 
had revolted and others were threatening to follow suit, — 
after taking great numbers of hostages and prescribing a 
tribute to be paid the Roman people, and forbidding Cassi¬ 
vellaunus, moreover, to attack the Trinobantes or Mandu- 
bratius, concluded peace. By no means all of the vessels 
which had been sent back to Gaul for supplies had returned 
to Britain. Many had gone astray. Csesar had fewer ships 
by far than he had brought over. He was compelled to 
convey his army back to Gaul in two trips, for his numbers 
were swelled by an array of hostages and prisoners. There 
were many disasters to vessels returning empty from the first 
crossing, but the transfer was managed without loss of a ship 
containing soldiers, and Csesar reached Gaul after an absence 
of two months. Having housed his ships, he called a great 
congress of the Gallic tribes at Samarobriva (Amiens) in the 
land of the Ambiani. 

The operations of this year in Britain were practically as 
resultless as those of the previous one, though the care and 
skill with which the invasion was conducted were in this case 
commendable. Csesar had accomplished nothing substantial. 
As Tacitus remarks, he had made rather a survey than a 
reduction of Britain. He had not added a new province to 
Rome, nor indeed paved the way for so doing. He had not 


INEFFECTIVE CAMPAIGN. 


189 


left a force to hold what he had conquered. He had brought 
back hostages, to be sure, but their possession was unable to 
assure him any control over the island. We are constrained 
to look upon the expeditions to Britain in the light of inva¬ 
sions made without proper warranty, consideration or effect. 
They had no influence upon the military problem in Gaul. 
However valuable as giving historians their earliest bird’s-eye 
view of Britain, from a military point of view they were 
unnecessary and ineffective. 



Wounded Gaul. 
(From a Sarcophagus.) 
















XIII. 


AMBIORIX. WINTER, 54-53 B. C. 

The crops had been poor. Csesar spread his legions in winter-quarters over 
a large area, so as more readily to subsist. The camps were three hundred 
miles apart between extremes. Of this fact the Gauls took advantage. Am- 
biorix attacked Sabinus at Aduatuca. Instead of fighting it out, Sabinus relied 
upon Ambiorix’s promise of free exit, and sought to march to Cicero’s camp, 
the nearest to his own. But he did this carelessly, was attacked, and entirely 
cut up. Ambiorix then marched to Cicero’s camp and tried the same artifice 
of promising free exit. Cicero acted the soldier’s part and held to his camp. 
Csesar heard of these events. He had but seven thousand men whom on the 
spur of the moment he could concentrate. With these he set out to rescue 
Cicero. So soon as he reached the vicinity, Ambiorix quitted the siege of 
Cicero’s camp and advanced to meet him. It was nine to one. Csesar, with 
admirable ruse, led on Ambiorix, who despised his meagre numbers, to attack 
him in careless order; and falling suddenly on him, defeated his army and 
dispersed it. He thus released Cicero from his bad case. Few of Cicero’s men 
had escaped wounds or death. Labienus meanwhile had been attacked by the 
Treviri, but had won a brilliant victory. 

Owing to an exceptionally dry season the corn-crop had 
not been good in Gaul during the year 54 b. c. ; so that 
Csesar, as he says, was obliged to disperse his legions to 
provide them food in winter-quarters during the succeeding 
winter. Fabius, with one legion, was sent to the Morini, 
and established himself at modern St. Pol; Q. Cicero, bro¬ 
ther of the orator, went with one to the Nervii, between 
the Scaldis and Sabis, and camped probably at Charleroi; 
Roscius, with one, was placed among the Esuvii, in southern 
Normandy, near Seez; Labienus, with one, was among the 
Remi, near the Treviri, very likely at Lavacherie; Crassus, 
Plancus and Trebonius, with three legions, occupied Bel- 


WINTER-QUARTERS. 191 

gium, between the Scaldis and Isara, — Trebonius at Ami¬ 
ens, Crassus among the Bellovaci at Montdidier, twenty- 
five miles from Amiens, Plancus near the confluence of the 



Oise and Aisne; and the new legion last raised on the Po, 
and five cohorts, under Sabinus and Cotta, were placed near 
the Meuse, among the Eburones, the country governed by 
Ambiorix and Cativolcus, at Aduatuca (Tongres). The bulk 
of the legions were thus in the northwest section of Gaul. 
The exact locations are, of course, not certain. The only 
ones which are determined are Samarobriva and Aduatuca. 
The others are set down according as topographical features 
or the subsequent establishment of Roman oppida, or camps, 
suggest the probable earlier locations, and are approximately 
correct. 

These forces made up a grand total of eight legions and 
five cohorts. This was the same number Caesar had had for 
a year. No new ones were raised till later, — though some 


192 


GAUL DANGEROUS. 


authorities claim that there was, at this time, one extra one, 
or nine legions and a half. 

Caesar determined to remain with the army until the 
camps were all fortified. One legion (Plancus’) was later 
hastily sent to the Carnutes in the neighborhood of modern 
Chartres, where Tasgetius, who was one of Caesar’s firm 
allies, — for Caesar had replaced him on the throne of his 
forefathers from which he had been driven, — had been 

4 

murdered by his subjects. Plancus’ orders were to hunt up 
the murderers, and send them to Caesar for trial. 

It proved in the event that these several camps were un¬ 
able to support each other in case of need. They were, as 
the crow flies, over three hundred miles distant between 
extremes; or if the camp of Roscius be left out, the other 
camps could not be contained in a circle of a diameter less 
than one hundred and sixty miles. Why Caesar chose to so 
divide his forces can be explained only on the score of ex¬ 
treme stress of victual. Even this scarcely suffices. Corn 
he had or must procure, despite the bad harvests, and he 
could in some fashion have brought the supplies into mag¬ 
azines. His method was clearly a miscalculation, natural 
enough, but not Caesarian. 

Having, not far from the end of October, received word 
from his quaestor that the camps were all intrenched, — it 
appears that he did not personally inspect the camps, — 
Caesar prepared to leave for Cisalpine Gaul. 

Gaul was only outwardly quiet. The Roman legions were 
really camping on a volcano. The Gallic tribes had been 
fearfully maltreated, and the mistaken policy was now 
bearing fruit. The people were poor, their chiefs had lost 
all power and influence, large districts had been devastated, 
and starvation promised to be the lot of thousands. The 
Romans were always careless in providing for conquered 


NO RENDEZVOUS. 


193 


peoples. Csesar had been particularly so in Gaul. He imag¬ 
ined that this very fact would prevent insurrection; but it 
produced the reverse effect. Fury and despair outweighed 
calculation or common sense. 

It does not appear that a general rendezvous had been 
given the legions, in case it became essential for them to 
concentrate. To do this was, in fact, not the method of 
Caesar, who had not yet taught himself some of the most 
necessary lessons of the military art, which even among 
barbarians require to be observed. In the African cam¬ 
paign, we shall see a still more glaring instance of this, the 
outcome of a certain habit of carelessness on Caesar’s part. 
Caesar’s theory was that each isolated body, as was possible 
in a well intrenched and victualed Roman camp, should 
defend itself, and take the most available means of procuring 
succor from neighboring legions. When he was absent, he 
did not, in fact, leave any one in command. Each legate 
was independent. With his enormous grasp of the requisites 
of any military situation, this is somewhat curious. 

Two weeks after all the legions had been settled, a sudden 
insurrection arose among the Eburones (a tribe south of the 
confluence of the Meuse and the Rhine), under leadership 
of Ambiorix and Cativolcus. These chiefs had apparently 
been friendly. They had at least brought in provisions to 
Sabinus and Cotta. Though these chiefs struck the first 
blow, Indutiomarus of the Treviri is thought to have been 
the prime mover of the rising. 

The insurgents began by making an assault on the Roman 
soldiers who were gathering forage and wood for the camp 
under Sabinus at Aduatuca. That this was Tongres is not 
doubtful. No other place satisfies all the requirements of 
distances and topography made by the Commentaries. These 
parties rallied, held together and reached camp, whose 


194 


AMBIORIX ATTACKS. 


defenses had just been completed. The Spanish cavalry 
made a successful sortie, which, coupled to the stanch front 
of the legionaries, broke up the attack. Then, after their 
usual treacherous manner, the barbarians asked for a confer¬ 
ence. This was unwisely granted. C. Arpineius, a Roman 
knight, and Q. Junius, a Spaniard, who personally knew 
Ambiorix, being sent on the parley, the Gallic chief informed 
the messengers, with every show of truth, that he had been 
compelled by his people to make the attack on the camp; that 
he himself was Caesar’s constant friend; that this day had 
been selected throughout Gaul for an attack on the isolated 
legions; that a large force of Germans was within two days’ 
march; that for their own safety, Sabinus and Cotta had best 
retire; and he promised under oath that he would give them. 
a safe-conduct. 

Upon these statements being reported, a council of war 
was held, at which the most opposite opinions were storm- 
ily expressed. Cotta, backed by many of the tribunes and 
centurions, was for holding on. They had rations; he be¬ 
lieved that Caesar would come to their relief, and that untold 
forces of the Germans could be encountered in their fortified 
winter-quarters; why, then, should they, on the advice of 
the enemy, cast aside these advantages? But finally, late 
at night, Sabinus succeeded in imposing his opinion on the 
others. This was to the effect that though the information 
did come from an enemy, they would do well to regard it 
and not wait till the Germans arrived; that Caesar had prob¬ 
ably started for Italy; that they had the choice of quick 
retreat or a prolonged siege; that they could easily join the 
nearest Roman winter-quarters, which were but sixty miles 
away; that the statement of Ambiorix bore the stamp of 
probability, though he was an enemy. It was determined 
to retreat towards Cicero at early dawn. 


A HASTY RETREAT . 


195 


The soldiers spent the night without sleep, making prepa¬ 
rations for the march. At daybreak the column started on 
its way, not in close order and with due precautions, but 
strung out and hampered by an immense amount of baggage, 
as if relying solely on Ambiorix’s promise of safe-conduct, 
and not in the least on their own resources. This utterly 


V.v 

t.lA 





Camp at Aduatuca. 


un-Roman conduct shows how much more the safety of an 
army depends upon the commander than upon the men. 

The enemy, from the stir of the camp, quickly perceived 
that the Romans had decided on retreat. They accordingly 
placed an ambuscade in the woods about two miles from the 
camp, on the road the Romans must pursue on the march 
towards Cicero’s camp. This was in the defile of Lowaige, 
on the heights north and south of the village, where the 
Geer flows between two hills. The Gauls occupied both exits 
and the adjoining eminences. 

The Roman army started on its ill-fated march. No 
sooner had it descended into the valley where the Gallic 








19G 


THE GAULS BEHAVE WISELY. 


troops lay hid, than the barbarians emerged from cover and 
attacked the head and rear of the Roman column. Sabinus, 
who had been for retreat, quite lost his head; Cotta, who had 
yielded to his views only after long persuasion, was active and 
full of vigor. The discipline of the soldiers was lax, and 
each one, instead of rallying on the standards, sought rather 
to save some of his goods from the baggage-train. The 
column was much extended. It was hard to convey orders. 
The march had been begun without the precautions essential 
to such an operation. The men were not kept closed up; 
no method of defense was apparent; every one worked on an 
independent basis. The train soon had to be abandoned. 
Danger crowded the legionaries together, and the army was 
drawn up in a square (orbis) for defense. 

The Gauls behaved wisely. They did not seek plunder, 
but first victory. They began a system of tiring out the 
Roman legions. Out of the square, from time to time, 
certain cohorts would charge on the enemy and uniformly 
defeat him; then retire again to their place in the line. The 
barbarians soon ceased to offer resistance to these charges. 
Whenever one was made, they would retire; but so soon as 
the Roman cohorts turned back, being lighter armed, they 
would rush forward and beset their flanks, and the flanks 
of the cohorts exposed by their advance. Though, in the 
square, the Roman lost his initiative, the impetus which 
made him strong, yet from early morning till near nightfall 
the legionaries held their ground without disgrace, but at a 
serious loss in men and officers. Sabinus, still weakly relying 
on Ambiorix’s word, sent Cnaeus Pompeius, during a lull in 
the fighting, to ask a conference with him. To this being 
granted and protection again promised under oath, he himself 
and a number of tribunes went; but during the conference 
they were surrounded and slain; whereupon the Gauls again 


A MASSACRE. 


197 


attacked the circle, and, owing to the demoralization of the 
men, speedily forced their way into it. Cotta was slain; a 
few of the cohorts cut their way out of the melee and managed 
to get back to the camp, where the survivors all committed 
suicide during the night. A handful of fugitives found their 
way to the camp of Labienus, nearly seventy miles distant. 

Ambiorix, elated at his victory, made forced marches with 
his cavalry, — the infantry following as rapidly as possible, 
— to the westerly clans of the Aduatuci and the Nervii, to 
rouse them to embrace this opportunity of revenge and free¬ 
dom. These tribes, elated by his exaggerated promises, will¬ 
ingly joined him, and all the neighboring and dependent 
tribes were sent for. Having assembled a large force with 
the utmost dispatch, they attacked some foraging parties, and 
then the camp of Cicero at Charleroi, who had heard not a 
word of the disaster to Sabinus and Cotta, and who was ex¬ 
pecting nothing so little as an insurrection. The legionaries 
rushed to" arms and manned the vallum, and the Gauls were 
foiled in their hope of seizing the place out of hand. Cicero 
at once dispatched messengers to Csesar, but of these — 
despite great promises of reward — none made their way 
through the enemy’s lines. The roads and passes had been 
all beset by the Gauls. Ambiorix had taken his precautions 
well. 

The Romans had got together a great deal of timber for 
winter-quarter fortifications. During the night after the 
attack they worked hard at the defenses of the camp, shortly 
building one hundred and twenty towers (the towers were 
built as they still build scaffolds in Italy, by lashing together 
upright and cross poles), weaving hurdles and preparing 
burned stakes and mural spikes for use from the battlements. 
Not even the wounded could cease from labor. The enemy 
attacked next day, and thanks to the preparations were 


198 


A SOLDIER’S ANSWER. 


beaten back. Desultory attempts to take the camp continued 
for some days. Cicero, though sick, would give himself no 
rest until obliged to do so by his men. The legionaries de¬ 
fended the camp well, though with difficulty. A winter camp 
was more extended than the daily camp and gave a much 



Cicero’s Camp. 


longer rampart to defend. Unable to make sensible prog¬ 
ress, the Gallic chiefs signified their desire to confer with 
Cicero. On this being granted, Ambiorix plausibly stated 
the same things with which he had persuaded Sabinus, re¬ 
fraining however, from promises, and told of the destruction 
of that legion. He claimed that the cause of war was the 
burden laid on the Gauls by the Romans in wintering regu¬ 
larly in the country and consuming the corn which was 
needed to keep their own people in life. To all this Cicero 
made the soldier’s answer that the Romans never treated with 
foes in arms, but that if the enemy would lay down their 
arms and state their case as supplicants, no doubt Caesar 
would do them ample justice. Ambiorix retired baffled. 

The Nervii then set about to besiege the Roman camp, and 
built around it a rampart eleven feet high and a ditch thir¬ 
teen feet deep. They had learned these methods from Roman 





A BRAVE DEFENSE. 


199 


prisoners and former wars. Though they had few tools to 
work with, but were “forced to cut the turf with their swords 
and to empty out the earth with their hands and cloaks,” so 
vast was their number that in three hours they had made 
a rampart fifteen thousand feet long. The text here says 
passuum , but it is probably meant for pedum. The former 
would make the length of the rampart ten miles; it was in 
effect less than three, for they had to surround only the 
camp of a legion. Next day they built towers, mantelets 
and galleries, and made mural hooks. They had attained 
some skill in the minutiae of sieges. 

Cicero was now entirely shut in. On the seventh day there 
was a high wind, and the barbarians, by means of hot clay 
balls and heated javelins, set on fire the camp-huts which 
were thatched after the Gallic fashion, and under cover of 
the confusion of the flames made a vehement assault. The 
legionaries stood manfully to their work, despite the fact 
that their baggage was being consumed, and utterly worsted 
the enemy. 

The Commentaries give prominence to some acts of personal 
gallantry. “In that legion there were two very brave men, 
centurions, who were now approaching the first ranks, T. 
Pulfio and L. Varenus. These used to have continual dis¬ 
putes between them which of them should be preferred, and 
every year used to contend for promotion with the utmost 
animosity. When the fight was going on most vigorously 
before the fortifications, Pulfio, one of them, says: ‘Why do 
you hesitate Varenus? or what better opportunity of signal¬ 
izing your valor do you seek? This very day shall decide 
our disputes.’ When he had uttered these words, he pro¬ 
ceeds beyond the fortifications, and rushes on that part of the 
enemy which appeared the thickest. Nor does Varenus re¬ 
main within the rampart, but respecting the high opinion pf 


200 


TWO RIVALS. 


all, follows close after. Then, when an inconsiderable space 
intervened, Pulfio throws his javelin at the enemy, and 
pierces one of the multitude who was running up, and while 
the latter was wounded and slain, the enemy cover him with 
their shields and all throw their weapons at the other and 
afford him no opportunity of retreating. The shield of Pul¬ 
fio is pierced and a javelin is fastened in his belt. This cir¬ 
cumstance turns aside his scabbard and obstructs his right 
hand when attempting to draw his sword; the enemy crowd 
around him when thus embarrassed. His rival runs up to 
him and succors him in this emergency. Immediately, the 
whole host turn from Pulfio to him, supposing the other to 
be pierced through by the javelin. Varenus rushes on briskly 
with his sword and carries on the combat hand to hand, and 
having slain one man, for a short time drove back the rest; 
while he urges on too eagerly, slipping into a hollow, he fell. 
To him, in his turn, when surrounded, Pulfio brings relief; 
and both having slain a great number, retreat into the fortifi¬ 
cations amidst the highest applause. Fortune so dealt with 
both in this rivalry and conflict, that the one competitor was 
a succor and a safeguard to the other, nor could it be deter¬ 
mined which of the two appeared worthy of being preferred 
to the other.” This story lends local color to the rivalries of 
the Roman soldier’s life. 

The number of defenders of the Roman camp was daily 
becoming smaller, and these were weakened by exertion. Of 
the messengers dispatched to Caesar, none reached him. Some 
were captured and tortured in sight of the camp. Finally, 
a Nervian who had deserted to the Romans undertook to 
carry a message and succeeded in reaching the chief. 

Caesar was at Samarobriva. He had not left for Italy so 
soon as he expected. He at once headed Trebonius’ legion 
f(jr the scene of danger, and ordered Crassus, who was at 


SPEEDY MEASURES. 


201 


Montdidier, to march to headquarters with his legion to 
replace Trebonius. Fabius, with his legion, was directed to 
march from St. Pol toward the Nervian frontiers, and join 
Caesar among the Atrebates. 

Caesar received notice of Cicero’s peril about four p. M. 
So rapid was his message and so alert was Crassus that this 
officer reached Caesar at ten a. m. next day, a march of fully 



twenty-five miles. The camp at Samarobriva was protected 
by the rearguard of Trebonius’ legion until Crassus’ arrival, 
when it set out to rejoin the column. Crassus was left 
behind at the main camp to protect the baggage, treasure, 
prisoners, archives and the vast amount of corn there 
collected. 

At the same moment Caesar had sent word to Labienus 
to march to meet him in the vicinity of Cicero’s camp; but 
Labienus replied, explaining the state of revolt of the 
Eburones and the imminent danger from the Treviri. He 
knew the confidence Caesar reposed in his judgment and 
relied on his properly gauging the reason of his failure to 
obey orders. He was right. 

Caesar instantly followed Trebonius’ legion. He had, in 
addition to that body, but four hundred horse available at 




202 


GOOD WINTER MARCHING. 


headquarters, or a total of only two small legions, perhaps 
seven thousand to eight thousand men. One of the most 
singular facts in the military history of Caesar is the manner 
in which he was repeatedly caught in dilemmas with but a 
handful of troops at his disposal. We shall see him at 
Alexandria, Zela and Hadrumetum in a desperate strait from 
lack of foresight. It required luck superior to Alexander’s, 
as well as his own splendid resources, to save him from 
destruction in these false positions. Caesar’s fortune will 
ever remain proverbial, and indeed, had not the fickle god¬ 
dess laid aside her wonted character to favor him, Caesar 
would have ended his career before he had made himself an 
enduring name. No great captain was ever rescued from the 
results of his own neglect so often as was Caesar. 

Caesar now had but a handful, but he felt that dispatch 
was of more moment than larger forces. On the first day he 
covered twenty miles in the direction of modern Cambrai, 
and was joined on the road by Fabius, not far from that 
place. Pushing on, he reached the borders of the Nervii, 
and learned from prisoners what the conditions were. He 
managed to send word to Cicero that he was coming, by a 
Gallic horseman, who shot an arrow, or threw a javelin with 
the message tied to the thong into his camp, and urged him 
to hold out to the last. The message was in Greek. Po- 
lyaenus says it was brief: “Courage! Expect succor! ” 

In five days Caesar marched from Samarobriva to near the 
winter-quarters of Cicero, not far from one hundred and ten 
miles, twenty-two miles a day, over winter roads, a good but 
not wonderful performance. He camped in the vicinity of 
Binche. So soon as the Nervii discovered Caesar’s approach, 
they raised the blockade and marched towards him, some 
sixty thousand strong. Cicero sent Caesar word that the 
enemy had turned against him. He had no men left to send 



V 


CAESAR'S RUSE. 203 

as a reinforcement to liis chief. Caesar had hut about seven 
thousand men, and saw the necessity for caution. His hav¬ 
ing but one man to nine of the enemy was due to his mis¬ 
calculated system of winter-quarters. He broke camp at 
Binche, advanced, and soon ran across the enemy. He first 
caught sight of them across the valley of the Haine. He 
camped on Mount St. Aldegonde in a very contracted space, 
to make the Nervii underestimate even the paltry force he 
had with him. He then sent forward his horse to skirmish 



with the enemy, and by simulating retreat, draw them on to 
attack the camp. He and his legion lay west of the Haine; 
the barbarians were on its east bank; Caesar manoeuvred so 
as to get them to cross the stream to the attack. He also 
began fortifying and gave orders to the soldiers to act with 
apparent confusion, as if in fear, so as still more to lure the 
Nervii on. 

The ruse succeeded, and the barbarians advanced, took up 






204 


CICERO'S HEAVY LOSS. 



a disadvantageous and careless position, and sent out a 
proclamation that they would receive and spare any deserters 
from the Roman legions. They believed that they had 
bagged their game. They then began the fight as if nothing 
were so sure as victory, advancing to the gates and ramparts 
in enthusiastic disorder. Caesar still simulated fear, to 
render them yet more careless, and held his men sharply 
in hand, intending to take them unawares. At the proper 
moment he gave the signal. The legionaries rushed from all 
the gates at once; and the cavalry sallied out with unexpected 
dash. So entirely surprised were the barbarians by the vigor 
and courage of their opponents that they fled in dismay. 
They were pursued with great loss, but the pursuit was not 
kept up to any distance, owing to the wooded and cut-up 
nature of the country. In pursuit, Caesar was never equal to 
the great Macedonian. No one but Napoleon was. 

Having thus opened the way, Caesar marched to Cicero’s 
camp, where he found the garrison in sad case, but still full 
of courage. “The legion having been drawn out he finds 
that even every tenth soldier had not escaped without 
wounds.” This was a heavy loss, which might be estimated 
at seven per cent, killed, and eighty-three per cent, wounded; 
or, out of a legion of five thousand men, three hundred and 
fifty killed and four thousand one hundred wounded. Caesar 
highly commended the legions and officers for their valor, 
and distributed rewards among the bravest. Both praise 
and gifts had been gallantly won. 

News of this victory was speedily conveyed to the Treviri. 
This determined Indutiomarus, who had been on the point of 
attacking Labienus, to withdraw from his front, — at least 
for the time being. The news had traveled sixty miles 
between the ninth hour and midnight. Caesar had reached 
Cicero’s camp at three P. M. ; before midnight some of the 


NEW WINTER-QUARTERS. 


205 


Remi raised a shout of joy which announced the victory to 
Labienus. This is not so wonderful a performance as it 
sounds. A single courier might have done it; three or four, 
relieving each other, very handily. Fifty miles have been 
run in less than seven hours, in these so-called degenerate 
days. 

No sooner was the campaign thus happily decided than 
Fabius was sent back to his winter-quarters. Caesar deter¬ 
mined to remain in Gaul. Profiting by his bitter experience, 
he concentrated his forces; established his own headquarters 
at Samarobriva, with three legions, Crassus’, Cicero’s, Tre- 
bonius’, in three several camps. Of these there are some 
relics still: a camp at the citadel of Amiens; the Camp de 
l’Etoile; and one near modern Tirancourt. Labienus, Plan- 
cus and Roscius remained in situ. 

The defeat of Sabinus and Cotta had bred a feeling of un¬ 
certainty all through the land; nocturnal meetings were held, 



and insurrections were threatened and expected on every 
hand. An attack on Roscius had all but occurred. Among 
the Senones, on the Upper Sequana, there was a political 


206 


ATTACK ON LABIENUS. 


upheaval, and a refusal to comply with Csesar’s demands, 
which he does not appear to have felt in a position to en¬ 
force. This badly affected the tribes. The Remi and iEdui 
alone remained quite true. By calling together the principal 
citizens and alternately using threats and courtesies, most 
troubles were for the moment averted, though a constant 
turmoil Avent on. 

Indutiomarus, chief of the Treviri, was, it appears, the 
head and front of this entire movement. He tried to get 



the Germans across the Rhine, but they had conceived a 
hearty dread of Csesar. Still Indutiomarus ceased not his 
work, and finally his efforts induced some isolated tribes of 
the Senones and Carnutes to join him; and the Aduatuci and 
Nervii seemed ready to help. But his army was largely 
composed of outlaws and criminals. He called an armed 
assembly of chiefs, and under its inspiration advanced and 
camped again before Labienus. This officer kept to his 
ramparts, simulating fear, — a trick whose repetition never 
seemed to make it stale, — but watching keenly for a good 




DEFEAT OF INDUTIOMARUS. 


20T 


chance for attack. Growing more careless day by day, 
Indutiomarus finally laid himself open. 

Labienns had a good body of native horse which he had 
quietly assembled and introduced into the camp. Indutio¬ 
marus made, as usual, a threatening advance to the Roman 
ramparts, and towards evening withdrew in more than 
usually careless order, no doubt laughing at the cowardice of 
the legionaries. This was Labienus’ opportunity. Throw¬ 
ing open the two main gates of the camp, the cavalry issued, 
followed by the cohorts. Taken by surprise the enemy 
fled. Indutiomarus himself was slain, and much loss was 
inflicted on the barbarians. This victory and the death of 
the chief plotter allayed the turmoil greatly; but though 
the Nervii and Eburones dispersed to their homes, it 
was far from quieting Csesar’s apprehensions of further 
trouble. 

These operations show the immense role the Roman forti¬ 
fied camp played in the days of short-carry weapons. Gun¬ 
powder first nullified the importance of the camp. A modern 
field battery would with a few rounds demolish a Roman 
vallum. To-day, anything like a camp would be subject to 
irresistible concentric fire. Well chosen natural positions 
had to be sought as a defense against artillery. 

Cicero’s defense at Charleroi leads Napoleon to contrast 
ancient war with modern very skillfully: “Si l’on disait 
aujourd’hui a un general: ‘Vous aurez, conune Ciceron, 
sous vos ordres, 5,000 hommes, 16 pieces de canon, 5,000 
outils de pionniers, 5,000 sacs a terre; vous serez a portee 
d’une foret, dans un terrain ordinaire; dans quinze jours 
vous serez attaque par une armee de 60,000 hommes ay ant 
120 pieces de canon; vous ne serez secouru que quatre-vingts 
ou quatre-vingt-seize lieures apres avoir ete attaque.’ Quels 
sont les ouvrages, quels sont les traces, quels sont les profils 


208 


DIVIDED COMMAND. 


que l’art lui present? L’art de l’ingenieur a-t-il des 
secrets qui puissent satisfaire a ce probleme?” 

The quartering of the legions in such widely separated 
localities was certainly a grave error, severely punished in 
the event. But the rapid, able and decisive measures 
adopted by Caesar to retrieve the disaster are quite beyond 
praise. The superb courage with which he set out with a 
mere handful of men to relieve his beleaguered lieutenant, 
and the skill he showed in dealing with the barbarians when 
he met them, cannot but excite the highest admiration. It is 
this sort of conduct on Caesar’s part which makes one forget 
the carelessness which lay at the root of so many of his 
brilliant strokes. Criticism seems to be almost out of order. 

Sabinus had given proofs of ability. How he contrived 
to allow himself, against the advice of Cotta and his other 
fellow officers, to enter into negotiations with the crafty 
Ambiorix is an enigma. And having left his camp to make 
a junction with Cicero, why he should have marched in loose 
order and without proper precautions is still more of a puzzle. 
His only real chance was to stick to his camp and defend it 
as Cicero did, and as he had Cesar’s orders as well as all 
precedent to do. There can be no excuse for the shiftlessness 
of his order of march. This disaster is one more instance of 
the folly of divided command, for Sabinus and Cotta were 
equal. Csesar should have given absolute command to one 
or the other legate. That the system of rotation and division 
of authority did not wreck the Roman army, is referable 
solely to the wonderful character of the people of Rome. No 
other army has ever had such a system and survived it. 

The conduct of Cicero stands out in marked contrast to 
that of Sabinus. 

The incisive conduct of Csesar in remedying the disaster 
did not fail of effect among the Gallic tribes, and produced 


EFFECT OF CAMPAIGN. 


209 


its full influence, political and military. The Nervii, Men- 
apii and Aduatuci, who had been in arms, returned home; 
the maritime cantons followed suit; the Treviri, and their 
clients, the Eburones, retired from before Labienus. In 
Rome Caesar’s reputation stood higher than ever. 



Caesar, from a Coin. 


XIV. 


THE TREVIRI AND EBURONES. SPRING, 53 B. C. 

Duking the winter another uprising- was planned, headed by the Treviri. 
Caesar determined to take the rebels unawares. He set out, despite the winter 
season, and successively surprised and punished the Nervii, Senones and Car- 
nutes. He then reduced the Menapii on the lower Meuse, while Labienus a 
second time defeated the Treviri. Caesar again crossed the Rhine, to impose on 
the Germans, having done which he begun his pursuit of Ambiorix, who was 
now isolated. He sent his cavalry ahead to surprise and capture this chief, if 
possible, but without success. The Eburones were now hunted down without 
mercy. Caesar divided his force into three columns, which advanced on three 
several lines throughout northern Gaul. His baggage he left at Aduatuca. 
During his absence, some German tribes, who had crossed on a foray, attacked 
the camp at that place and came close to capturing it. Though Caesar thoroughly 
suppressed the rising of this year, he was unable to catch Ambiorix. He went 
into winter-quarters near Sens. 

It had become necessary to raise and have on hand a 
greater number of men, as well as to fill large gaps occa¬ 
sioned by the last campaigns. Caesar deemed it essential to 
show the Gauls that the resources of Rome were ample; that 
to destroy one legion meant to have two others spring ready 
equipped from the earth. By negotiation with Pompey, 
whom business retained in Rome, he was able to obtain a 
legion which the latter had raised in Gaul when he was 
proconsul in Spain. The men had been furloughed to their 
homes, but they were recalled to the eagles and the legion 
took its place in line. Two additional legions were en¬ 
listed in Gaul by Caesar’s lieutenants, Silanus, Reginus and 
Sextius. The three new legions were the First, the Four¬ 
teenth (it took the number of the one destroyed at Adua- 



WINTER CAMPAIGN. 


211 


tuca), and the Fifteenth. Thus thirty cohorts replaced the 
fifteen lost by Sabinus. Caesar now commanded ten legions. 

After Indutiomarus’ death, the Treviri elected new chiefs 
from his family. They were unable to induce the near-by 
Germans to join their cause, but persuaded some of the Suevi 
to do so. Ambiorix joined them. Rumors of war were far 
spread. The Senones were still antagonistic, and the 
Carnutes abetted them. The Nervii, despite their fearful 
punishment, the Aduatuci and Menapii were under arms. 



Anticipating trouble with the tribes which had placed them¬ 
selves under the leadership of the Nervii, and knowing that 
they were constantly striving to induce the Germans to un¬ 
dertake another invasion, Caesar determined to strike them 


212 


GALLIC CONGRESS. 


unawares. Suddenly and before the season for campaigning 
opened, perhaps in March, he concentrated the four legions 
nearest headquarters at Samarobriva (under Fabius, Crassus, 
Cicero, Trebonius), marched upon the Nervii, rushed like a 
hurricane over their territory, captured great booty, devas¬ 
tated the land and carried off victual. By taking them off 
their guard, he had them at his mercy. Having cowed 
them, he compelled them to give him hostages for good 
behavior, and returned to his winter-quarters. 

Here he called an assembly of the Gauls. All sent 
representatives except the Senones, the Carnutes and the 
Treviri. Caesar transferred the congress to Lutetia (modern 
Paris), so as to do both his political and military scheme 
justice at the same time. From here, he made a demonstra¬ 
tion against the Senones and Carnutes, whose territory 
adjoined the Parisii. These tribes, under Acco, retired into 
their oppida; but they were unable to resist Caesar’s prompt 
measures. They respectively begged the 2Edui and Bemi to 
intercede for them; and on giving the hitherto refused hos¬ 
tages, Caesar overlooked their defection. He had no time 
to split hairs. He was content to check a growing disposi¬ 
tion to revolt. The hostages given were confided to the 
iEdui for security. Caesar then closed the congress. His 
rapid and well-considered action had tranquillized central 
Gaul, and he could devote himself to the war with Ambiorix, 
chief of the Eburones. It was of the highest importance, 
Caesar thought, in a military as well as a political sense, that 
the disgrace of Aduatuca should be wiped out. 

As a part of his scheme, Caesar had imposed a fresh levy 
of horse on the Gallic tribes. The Senonian cavalry under 
Cavarinus he ordered to accompany him. He was distrust¬ 
ful of its fidelity, as it contained many of the chief men of 
the tribe, unless he had it under his eye. 


AMBI ORIX. 


213 


The Menapii, north of and next to the Eburones, were the 
only tribe which had never sent ambassadors to Caesar. 
They were allies of Ambiorix, and Caesar desired first to 
detach this people from his alliance. So long as they were 
unsubdued, Ambiorix retained an inaccessible place of refuge 
in their woods and morasses. Next to the fear that Ambiorix 
would persuade the Germans to a fresh war, was the safety 
this chief possessed in this alliance. The two things to be 
accomplished were the reduction of the Treviri and the 
detaching from Ambiorix of the Menapii. The last task he 



undertook himself, the first he left to the management of 
Labienus, who knew the problem well, as he had wintered on 
the borders of the Treviri, and had already tried issues with 
them. 

Sending all his baggage and two legions to Labienus, 
Csesar moved with five legions, in light marching order and 
in three columns, against the Menapii, who at once took 




214 


A MAN HUNT. 


refuge in their natural fastnesses. They had assembled no 
forces. Csesar divided his five legions into three columns, 
under Fabius, Crassus and himself. By the aid of the 
Senonian cavalry, and by bridging the marshes and streams, 
he advanced on three lines into their land. These lines 
were probably down both banks of the Meuse and down the 
Aa or Dommel, affluents of the Meuse, running from south 
to north through the Menapian territory. Caesar began by 
relentlessly devastating their country, capturing their cattle, 
and taking prisoners all the prominent men he could reach. 
Shortly the Menapii sued for peace. Though independent 
from their isolation, they were not wont to act in unison, 
and were quite unable to resist organized invasion. Caesar 
granted their petition on their undertaking by no means to 
harbor Ambiorix; and leaving some of the cavalry, under 
Commius the Atrebatian, among them, he marched towards 
Labienus and the Treviri. His route was probably up the 
Rhine, for we next find him at Bonn. 

Labienus had wintered in his old camp at modern La- 
vacherie. The Treviri had harbored certain designs against 
him, and even since the victory over Indutiomarus made 
sundry demonstrations against his camp; but hearing that 
he had received two fresh legions from Caesar, they deter¬ 
mined to await the Germans, whom they had now some reason 
to expect. They established themselves on the right bank of 
the Ourthe. Labienus did not await the barbarians. Taking 
twenty-five of his thirty cohorts and his cavalry, five remain¬ 
ing to guard the baggage, he anticipated their advance by 
marching against them, and camping on the other side of 
the Ourthe, a mile distant from their station. 

The enemy were evidently anxious to wait for German suc¬ 
cor. Labienus desired to bring them to speedy battle. He 
stated in public, in such a manner that the rumor might be 


LABIENUS ’ VICTORY. 


215 


carried to them, that, not desiring to measure swords with 
both Treviri and Germans, he proposed to retreat the next 
day, and made certain preparations which looked like hurried 
and confused withdrawal, actually leaving his intrenchments. 
This fact the enemy’s scouts soon saw, and some deserters 
carried to them the statement of Labienus. Fearing that 
they might lose the booty of the Roman camp, and encouraged 
by the apparent flight, the barbarians crossed the river and 
attacked the Roman rear so soon as it had filed out of camp, 
with the expectation of an easy victory. They had placed 
themselves in a danger¬ 
ous position, with the 
river at their back, and, 
the river banks being 
precipitous, had lost all 
semblance of order in 
the crossing. Labienus 
had explained the whole 
purpose to his lieuten¬ 
ants and centurions, and 
had placed his baggage 
under its guard on a 
secure eminence. Ex¬ 
horting his legions to 
fight as they should, Labienus, whose troops were well in 
hand and whose simulated retreat was but a well-drilled 
manoeuvre, speedily gave the order to face the eagles to the 
enemy, and deploy into line. The command was executed 
with clockwork precision. The horse was thrown in on the 
enemy’s flanks. The battle-shout was clear and crisp. The 
Treviri, taken utterly at a disadvantage, showed little fight. 
Falling upon them with the utmost fury, the legions and 
cavalry cut most of them to pieces. The rest fled to the 














216 


SECOND CROSSING OF RHINE. 


forests. Labienus had ably used his knowledge of the im¬ 
petuosity and lack of cool calculation in the Gauls. This 
sharp lesson forestalled the threatened irruption of the Ger¬ 
mans, who returned home. The state was turned over to 
Cingetorix, who had always been an ally of Rome, in the 
place of Indutiomarus. 

It will be noticed that whenever the Roman troops fought 
with steady discipline, the Gauls, whatever their numbers, 
were inevitably beaten. There were no open-field pitched 
battles in the Gallic war, in the sense we understand the 
words. At the river Sabis, Caesar had to fight, because he 
had allowed himself to be surprised. The Gauls were always 
ready to fight; they clung strenuously to their struggle 
against the Roman conquest, and deserve credit for heroic 
efforts. But in line of battle they could never face the 
legions. 

Ambiorix was now isolated. The Menapii on one hand 
and the Treviri on the other were subdued, and the Germans 
could no longer be counted on. 

Caesar, from the land of the Menapii, had marched up the 
Rhine, and hearing of Labienus’ victory, remained at Bonn, 
near the place where he had crossed two years before. He 
determined again to cross the river, principally, as he states, 
to impose upon the Germans by a show of force, because they 
had assisted the Treviri, but also in order to prevent their 
receiving Ambiorix. He built again a similar bridge at a 
place a little above where he had built the first one. This 
bridge was completed yet more quickly; still “by great ex¬ 
ertion of the soldiers.” Leaving a large and suitable guard 
at the west bridgehead, he crossed with the legions and cav¬ 
alry and advanced into the German territory. The Ubii at 
once approached and easily proved to him that they had been 
faithful to their alliance, and that it was the Suevi who had 


ON GERMAN TERRITORY. 


217 

sent auxiliaries to Ambiorix. The Suevi had gone so far as 
to make drafts on their clients and assemble a large army 
ready for invasion. Caesar employed the Ubii as scouts to 
discover the movements of the Suevi, and through them as¬ 
certained that, on learning of Caesar’s approach, they had re¬ 
treated to the Bacenis forest (Hartz mountains) on the bound- 
ary of their territory. Caesar did not deem it wise to march 
against them, on account of the impossibility of rationing his 
men in a land whose inhabitants had paid no heed to agricul¬ 
ture, and which would therefore be little better than a desert 
after the Suevi had driven off their flocks and herds. The 
barbarians had calculated shrewdly. But in order to leave 
them convinced that he would return and thereby prevent 
their undertaking immediate operations, after recrossing his 
army to the west bank, he broke down two hundred feet of 
the farther end of the bridge and “at the extremity of the 
bridge raised towers of four stories,” and “strengthening the 
place with considerable fortifications” on the left bank, left 
therein a strong guard of twelve cohorts under Voleatius 
Tullus. He himself with the bulk of his ten legions, so 
soon as corn began to ripen, set out across the Forest of Ar- 
duenna against Ambiorix, determined to punish him for his 
treachery to Sabinus. 

Caesar marched from the bridge via Zulpich and Eupen. 
He sent forward all the cavalry force, under L. Minucius 
Basilus, to endeavor to surprise Ambiorix, promising to fol¬ 
low rapidly with the legions. He instructed Basilus to march 
secretly and refrain from lighting camp-fires. This officer 
performed his duty with excellent discretion and skill, direct¬ 
ing his course by information got from prisoners taken on 
the way to a place where Ambiorix was said to be hiding 
with a small body of cavalry. So speedily did he march that 
he reached the retreat of Ambiorix before any rumor of his 


218 


AMBIORIX ESCAPES. 


being on the road had come to the ears of this chief; surprised 
and almost succeeded in capturing him. But “Fortune 
accomplishes much,” says Caesar, “not only in other matters, 



Pursuit of Ambiorix. 


but also in the chances of war.” And Ambiorix, by a rare 
stroke of luck, made good his escape. His escort proved 
loyal, made a smart fight, and under cover of it he mounted 
a horse and fled. 

It seems that this chieftain had begun to see the folly of 
continuing the struggle against Caesar, for he sent notice to 
his allies that each one must now provide for his own se¬ 
curity, — an act of desertion which roused up fury against 
him. Cativolcus, king of the Eburones, committed suicide. 
Many of the tribes which had risen in arms fled with their 
possessions from the anger of Caesar into the forests and 
morasses. The Segni and Condrusi threw themselves on his 
mercy and were forgiven, having proven that they had not 
abetted Ambiorix. But they were cautioned to secure and sur¬ 
render to Caesar all Eburones who took refuge among them. 


THREE COLUMNS. 


219 


Caesar’s task was now vastly easier. He could deal with 
the barbarians in detail, and needed much fewer men under 
his own command. Having reached the ancient ford on the 
Mosa (at Vise), he divided his army into three parts. His 
baggage he sent to the camp at Aduatuca, among the Ebu- 
rones, where Sabinus' legion had been destroyed, and where 
many of the fortifications still stood, which would relieve the 
soldiers from much of the work incident to preparing a fresh 
camp. He left the Fourteenth legion and two hundred cav¬ 
alry to guard it, under command of Cicero. Labienus with 



three legions he sent toward the ocean, near the boundary 
between the Eburones and Menapii, on a reconnoissance to 
ascertain the standing of this part of Gaul, and to take 
measures accordingly. Trebonius he sent southwest with 
three to lay waste the region contiguous to the Aduatuci; he 
himself, with three legions, marched towards the Scaldis 
(Scheldt), intending to pursue Ambiorix to the confines of 
the Forest of Arduenna, between modern Brussels and Ant- 






220 


AN IMPOSSIBLE RENDEZVOUS. 


werp, whither he had retired with a few mounted compan¬ 
ions. 

By some authorities the river Sabis is read instead of the 
Scheldt, because the latter does not flow into the Mosa, as 
is stated by the Commentaries. The phrase is, “the river 
Scaldis which flows into the Mosa.” But Caesar could read¬ 
ily be in error geographically, and the Scheldt does empty 
into the sea not far from the mouth of the Meuse; the 
Scheldt was more likely to be the objective of one of the 
columns than the Sabis. A column which marched only so 
far as the Sabis could accomplish nothing, and this, more¬ 
over, was Trebonius’ direction. 

A rendezvous was given to both Labienus and Trebonius 
if possible to again rejoin Caesar at Aduatuca on the seventh 
day, when, from their several reports, Caesar would be able 
to determine the situation and decide upon future operations. 
On this day rations were due to the troops remaining in 
garrison. The amount of work thus cut out for the short 
space of a se’nnight reminds one forcibly of some of Alex¬ 
ander’s campaigns against mountain barbarians. The three 
columns were really more like three forced reconnoissances. 
Little could be accomplished in so short a time. 

The tribes which had scattered from their allegiance to 
Ambiorix had so effectually done this, that there was neither 
town nor camp nor army to attack. They had retreated in 
small parties to the woods, and the only warfare they could 
wage was to attack isolated soldiers who were foraging or 
straggling for booty. “There was, as we have observed, no 
regular army, nor a town, nor a garrison which could defend 
itself by arms; but the people were scattered in all directions. 
Where either a hidden valley, or a woody spot, or a difficult 
morass furnished any hope of protection or of security to any 
one, there he had fixed himself. These places were known 


A MAN-HUNT PARTY. 


221 

to those that dwell in the neighborhood, and the matter 
demanded great attention, not so much in protecting the 
main body of the army (for no peril could occur to them 
all together from those alarmed and scattered troops), as in 
preserving individual soldiers, which in some measure tended 
to the safety of the army. For both the desire of booty was 
leading many too far, and the woods with their unknown and 
hidden routes would not allow them to go in large bodies. 
If he desired the business to be completed and the race of 
those infamous people to be cut off, more bodies of men must 
be sent in several directions, and the soldiers must be 
detached on all sides; if he were disposed to keep the com¬ 
panies at their standards, as the established discipline and 
practice of the Roman army required, the situation itself was 
a safeguard to the barbarians, nor was there wanting to 
individuals the daring to lay secret ambuscades and beset 
scattered soldiers. But amidst difficulties of this nature, as 
far as precautions could be taken by vigilance, such precau¬ 
tions were taken; so that some opportunities of injuring the 
enemy were neglected, though the minds of all were burning 
to take revenge, rather than that injury should be effected 
with any loss to our soldiers.” 

Caesar found that his time would not admit of his dealing 
single-handed with the question as it stood; and he desired 
to spare his legionaries. He invited the neighboring tribes, 
by promise of abundant booty, to come and aid in exter¬ 
minating these tribes, which were chiefly Eburones. This 
he had made up his mind to do, as a punishment for their 
destruction of the legion of Sabinus and Cotta, under cir¬ 
cumstances which, according to his view, were treacherous in 
the extreme. Caesar could not forgive the tribes the bad 
faith of their leader. He visited them with punishment the 
more terrible as it ended only with their extinction. 


222 CICERO SURPRISED. 

Rumor of this invitation reached the Germans across the 
Rhine, who deemed that it also applied to them, and gave 
them a rare chance of plunder. A certain tribe, the 
Sugambri, abutting on the Rhine, crossed a force of two 
thousand horsemen in boats thirty miles below Caesar’s 
bridge, and began collecting and driving off cattle, “of which 
the barbarians are extremely covetous.” Learning at the 
same time that the camp at Aduatuca had been left without 
much of a garrison, and drawing small distinction between 
friend and foe, their greed of gain tempted them to try their 
fortunes there. They concealed their booty and marched on 
Aduatuca, crossing the Mosa at Maestricht. 

Caesar and his lieutenants were unable to return to the 
camp at Aduatuca by the seventh day, — by no means a re¬ 
markable circumstance, — and the garrison, which had been 
left with but seven days’ rations, began to clamor to go for¬ 
aging. Cicero had so far kept them closely within the ram¬ 
parts. To collect victuals soon became a matter of necessity, 
and Cicero determined to send out some parties for food, not 
imagining that there could be any grave danger, as all the 
tribes had been scattered and there must be nine legions at 
no great distance. He erred in sending out too large a force, 
— five cohorts, and these probably the best, — leaving the 
camp by no means safely garrisoned. As ill-luck would have 
it, not long after these foraging parties had left camp, the two 
thousand German horse put in an appearance and found 
the camp insufficiently defended. Though his position had 
indeed been a trying one, the condition of affairs showed 
lack of care on the part of Cicero. A soldier must assume 
that the improbable will happen. 

The Germans had so suddenly approached by the Decuman 
gate, that a number of sutlers had been surprised with their 
booths outside, and the cohort there on guard was unable to 



A PITFALL. 


223 


do aught but retire in confusion and close the entrance behind 
them. Inside the camp everything was in disorder, and the 
forces all but lost their power to act. It was even surmised 
that Caesar must have been defeated, and that this was the 
van of the victorious army of Gauls. But for the presence 
of mind of Sextius Baculus, who was invalided by wounds, 
but who nevertheless seized weapons and encouraged the men 



Cicero at Aduatuca. 


to defend the ramparts, the enemy could readily have forced 
an entrance. Thus state the Commentaries; but it seems as 
if five cohorts inside a camp were more than a match for two 
thousand horsemen outside. Where Cicero was is not stated; 
yet he had earned reputation last year by stanclily defending 
his camp. Aduatuca seemed to be a pitfall to Caesar. 

But while the German horsemen were debating how to 
make good their capture, the foragers returned. These, in 
their turn, were unable to effect an entrance; for the whole 















224 


THE GERMANS RETIRE. 


camp was surrounded by tlie barbarians. Different counsels 
prevailed among them; the veterans urging one course, the 
new soldiers and camp-followers another. The foragers had 
apparently been sent out under several officers. No one 
seems to have had sole authority. The veterans, under com¬ 
mand of C. Trebonius, a knight, took the only reasonable 
view of the case and resolved to cut their way through. 
Forming a compact column, a wedge or triangle ( cuneus ), 
by a bold push they reached the camp in good order and in 
safety, with the horse and camp-attendants. Another party, 
less well-led, had endeavored to make a stand on an adjoin¬ 
ing knoll; but on perceiving the success of the veterans, 
attempted to do the same thing. Of this party, however, a 
number were cut out and slain; for not only were the Ger¬ 
mans on the lookout for such a manoeuvre, but the party 
presumably acted inexpertly, and passed over unfavorable 
ground. The entire matter shows demoralization and lack 
of management. 

The camp having been regarrisoned, the Germans saw 
their chance of success gone, and withdrew, carrying their 
plunder beyond the Rhine. The forces in the camp were in 
a sorry state, and scarcely believed that Caesar was safe when 
his cavalry vanguard, under Volusenus, actually arrived. 
Caesar had returned with his work half done, because he had 
promised Cicero to do so, and had agreed to meet Labienus 
and Trebonius. 

Having reestablished affairs in the camp, he again set forth 
in pursuit of Ambiorix, this time accompanied by auxiliaries 
from all the neighboring tribes, who scouted the country 
traversed by the army, and burned and ravaged to such an 
extent that those insurgents who escaped the sword would 
surely perish by hunger. But despite the greatest rewards 
offered for the capture of Ambiorix, this wily chief eluded 


ACCO EXECUTED. 


225 


every snare, though frequently nearly taken. With but 
four companions, it is said, he moved from one fort or hid¬ 
ing-place to another and escaped the closest pursuit. 

Caesar next marched back to Durocortorum (Reims), the 
chief town of the Remi, the tribe which of all others, except 
the .zEdui, was most faithful to and most highly esteemed by 
Rome. Here he held a council of the Gallic tribes, to decide 
upon the conspiracy of the Senones and Carnutes. Acco, 
the chief of the conspirators, was found guilty, together with 
a number of others. Acco was punished “according to the 



custom of our ancestors ” (more majorum ), by being stood in 
a collar and beaten to death. Some of the conspirators fled, 
and to these all allies were forbidden to furnish fire and 
water. 

Caesar now went into winter-quarters. Two legions were 
camped on the frontiers of the Treviri, two among the Lin- 
gones; the remaining six at Agendicum (Sens) in the land of 
the Senones. The legions were thus within better supporting 
distance of each other, in lieu of isolated, as they had been 
the year before. Corn having been provided in abundance 
and stored in safety, Caesar himself set out for Italy, feeling 
that his army was safe from insurrections for some months. 




226 


A SUCCESSFUL YEAR. 


The operations of this year are characterized by the able 
and rapid dispositions and manoeuvres of Caesar against the 
equally subtle work of Ambiorix in northeast Gaul. The 
campaign was accompanied by thorough devastation of the 
country, but in this instance the devastation was not only 
not an unusual act, but it may perhaps be claimed to be the 
only means of subduing the tribes actually in revolt. Such 
measures have to be judged, even at that day, by the atten¬ 
dant circumstances. What on one occasion was a simple act 
of war, on another occasion might be an act of simple bar¬ 
barity. 

The one point of criticism in this year’s operations is the 
carelessness of Cicero at Aduatuca, which Caesar felt called 
on gravely to rebuke. As good fortune would have it, no 
great evil came of it, but it might well have resulted in 
another Sabinus affair. 



Gallic Helmet. 








XV. 


VERCINGETORIX. WINTER 53-52 B. C. 

Gaul had apparently been reduced; Caesar could look back on a good six 
years’ work. But Gaid was really ripe for a fresh revolt, for the Roman yoke 
was bitter. No one was habitually left by Caesar in supreme command while 
he was absent; the Gauls had free play. They rose under Vercingetorix, a man 
of remarkable ability and breadth, and before Caesar could rejoin his legions 
they had cut off his access to them. The outlook was desperate; so soon as 
Caesar reached the Province, he saw his dilemma. The Province was threat¬ 
ened ; but by activity he was able sufficiently to protect it. By a bold and 
difficult winter march across the Cebenna mountains with a few cohorts, 
Caesar attracted the attention of Vercingetorix, who, surprised at his audacity, 
advanced to meet him. Upon this, Caesar with a mere escort of horse pushed 
through the gap the enemy had opened, and by riding night and day kept well 
ahead of danger, rejoined his legions, and concentrated them at Agendicum in 

> f 

February. He had a critical war on his hands. Vercingetorix, finding that 
Caesar had eluded him, retraced his steps to the Liger. Caesar advanced from 
Agendicum south, taking Vellaunodunum and Genabum. 

When Caesar reached Cisalpine Gaul, he heard of the 
intestine turmoils in Borne, of the murder of Clodius, and the 
report that all the youth had been ordered to take the military 
oath, or in other words to report for duty with the eagles. 
He therefore felt warranted in ordering a general draft in 
Cisalpine Gaul and the Province. His six years’ campaign 
had borne good fruit. To all appearance Gaul had been 
subdued and her neighbors in Germany and Britain taught 
not to interfere with her internal economies. Rumors of 
these grave troubles in Roman politics had also reached 
Gaul, and though this country had been fully tranquillized, 
the quiet was but skin deep. No sooner had Caesar’s back 


228 


SECRET MEETINGS. 


been turned than the chiefs of the leading tribes began con¬ 
spiring to rid their country of the burden of the Roman 
people. This was a favorable season, as Caesar, they thought, 
would be obliged to remain in Italy to protect his own in¬ 
terests in the home government; a necessity they deemed 
of far greater consequence to him than the allegiance of 
Gaul. 

The conspirators met in secret and retired places; they 
discussed their grievances; they made especial complaint of 
the cruel death of Acco, and other leading Gauls; they 
foresaw the possibility of a similar fate befalling themselves; 
they denounced the devastation of their land; they bewailed 
the yoke put upon their country, and they bound themselves 
with a solemn oath to die, if need be, in freeing her. It was 
planned to attack, or at least blockade, the Roman camps 
before Caesar could return, and to try to cut him off from 
return by waylaying him on the road. This seemed all the 
more easy to accomplish because these chieftains knew that 
not one of the legions could move its camp without Caesar’s 
personal orders,—it was not Caesar’s custom to leave any 
special officer in full command, — and with the roads beset, 
Caesar could not himself reach the legions without an escort¬ 
ing army. 

That there should be no one left in supreme command 
during Caesar’s absence strikes us as a singularly weak 
method. Lack of positive rules of rank and command had 
more than once brought about disastrous results; but this 
custom, as well as the constant rotation in command among’ 
Roman officers, appears to have wrought less injury than 
might be expected. It worked, barely worked, in the 
Roman army; in no other army could such a system have 
worked at all. 

The Carnutes, who had been most seriously struck by the 


CENTRAL GAUL 


229 



V 1 


Central Gaul. 


death of Acco, were first under arms and agreed to begin the 
war, providing the other tribes would sustain them. An 
oath so to do was taken by all, and was pledged on their 
military standards in the most solemn manner. Accord- 






230 


CONVEYING NEWS. 


ingly, on the clay set for the insurrection, under command of 
Cotuatus and Conetoclunus, two desperate men, the Carnutes 
rendezvoused at Genabum (perhaps Orleans, but more likely 
Gien, to the east of Orleans) and massacred all the Romans, 
mostly traders, in the place. Among them was C. Fusius 
Cita, Csesar’s commissary of this department. 

The intelligence of this act traveled like lightning. It is 
said to have reached the Arverni (Auvergne), in other 
words, to have gone from Genabum to Gergovia, one hundred 
and sixty miles through the valleys of the Loire and Allier, 
from sunrise to the end of the first watch, nine A. M. The 
news was passed along by men stationed in towers on con¬ 
venient hills, who gave out shouts of peculiar kinds, or as 
it is phrased “sonorous monosyllables.” The habit of thus 
conveying intelligence continued in Gaul through the Mid¬ 
dle Ages. Some remains of these towers still exist. If the 
wind was contrary, fire was employed in lieu of the voice. 
Similar means have been used in many lands and ages. It 
is a natural thing to do. Signaling is very old; but alpha¬ 
betical signaling is of quite recent origin. 

Vercingetorix, a young, intelligent and powerful chief, 
born in Gergovia, — son of Celtillus the Arvernian who had 
been put to death for aspiring to the sovereignty of all Gaul, 
— excited the passions of his subjects and caused them to 
rise against their Roman tyrants. The older chiefs did not 
deem the movement opportune, for the Arverni had long 
been faithful allies of Rome. They caused Vercingetorix to 
be expelled from Gergovia, their chief fortress. But Ver¬ 
cingetorix was not to be so readily turned from his purpose. 
He called to his standard all the poor and desperate, and 
many of the young and ambitious; and in a short period of 
time grew so strong that he drove out all the other chiefs and 
established himself in Gergovia. Saluted as king, he won 


A SEVERE DRAFT. 


231 


the ear of all the neighboring tribes along the Liger to the 
sea, and even beyond that river, — Senones, Parisii, Pic- 
tones, Cadurci, Turones, Aulerci, Lemnovices, — and was 
chosen chief leader of the uprising. The AEdui declined to 
take part, and kept some of the tribes east of the Liger 
from joining in the insurrection. 

Vercingetorix’ army grew apace, though his discipline 
was so severe and cruel that he is said often to have forced 
recruits into his ranks from fear of death or mayhem. In 
one fashion or another, at all events, he assembled an army 
of vast numbers, which was especially excellent in cavalry. 
The infantry was not so good, but the horse was increased in 
numbers by mixing light troops with the squadrons. 

Vercingetorix was undoubtedly a man of exceptional 
ability. His time, as it turned out, was inopportune, but 
this error can scarcely be attributed to want of judgment. 
At that moment, neither he nor any person could foresee 
how much more dangerous for the Romans and promising 
of success to his countrymen an uprising would be, if put off 
a few years, until Caesar was so deeply engaged in the Civil 
War that he could not personally come to Gaul. Fortunate 
indeed for Caesar, that so strong an adversary as Vercinget¬ 
orix should not have delayed his action until after the final 
rupture with Pompey. 

Vercingetorix opened his campaign by sending a force 
under the Cadurcan Lucterius into the land of the Ruteni in 
southern Gaul, while he himself marched on the Bituriges 

south of the Liger, who had not joined his cause. The latter 

¥ 

sent for aid to the 2Edui, the ever faithful allies of Rome, 
who dispatched a force to their assistance. On arriving at 
the Liger, which is the boundary of the iEdui, this force 
heard, or the anti-Romans in it pretended to hear, that the 
Bituriges had treacherously planned to attack them; and, 


CAESAR. HURRIES TO GAUL. 


232 

acting on this ground, returned home. The Bituriges then 
joined Vercingetorix. 

Caesar heard of these things while in Italy. Ponrpey and 
he had again placed affairs in Rome on a basis satisfactory 
to both, and Caesar was enabled to leave. But so soon as he 
reached Cisalpine Gaul, perhaps at the Rhone, he perceived 
his dilemma. He was quite at a loss how to join his army. 
The Gallic chieftains had been shrewd in their plans. He 
could not send for the legions. He could get no messengers 
through to any one of his camps, nor indeed direct their 
movements. Isolated as they were, they might each be cut 
to pieces in detail if they attempted to move, and before they 
could concentrate. They had no special head on whom he 
could rely to do the wisest thing under the circumstances. 
Nor could he go to the legions, for he dare not trust himself 
to any one, the disaffection had become so general. 

Meanwhile Lucterius had gained over the Ruteni and the 
Nitiobriges and Gabali, adjoining tribes, and was preparing 
to make a descent on Narbo, in the Province near the coast. 
But Caesar was fertile in expedients. His restless nature 
recognized no impossibilities. Like all great soldiers he rose 
to the occasion, and gained in strength as the dangers thick¬ 
ened. He set out for Narbo, and reaching the place, — as 
he readily could, for the Province was in no wise associated 
with the uprising, — he took the reins in hand. 

Caesar’s appearance restored confidence; he garrisoned 
Narbo, and by encouraging the populations near by, raised a 
sufficient body of recruits to enable him to protect the bor¬ 
der towns along the Tarnis river, adjoining the Ruteni, and 
those among the Volcae Arecomici and Tolosates. He thus 
made it impossible for Lucterius to invade the Province, for 
the front presented to him was too bold to promise lasting 
results. 


i 


A WINTER CAMPAIGN. 233 

Having secured the left flank of the Province front, Csesar 
moved northward towards the Helvii, where he had mean¬ 
while ordered to assemble a number of recruits from Italy 
and some forces from the Province. He feared that Vercin- 
getorix would move against his legions, and he planned to 
attract his attention away from them and towards himself. 



Something must be done to draw the Gallic leader near the 
Province, where he could be neutralized. Caesar saw that 
he must undertake some daring operation to arrest the notice 
of Vercingetorix, if he would gain a chance to reach his 
army 5 and though the snow was six feet deep, he marched 
his troops with incredible labor and sufferings across the 
Cebenna mountains, — substantially up the Ardeclie and 
down the Loire valleys by modern Aps, Aubenas, and St. 
Cirgues,—debouched into the territory of the Arverni 
towards Le Puy, and advanced to Brioude, He then sent 


234 


A SUCCESSFUL DIVERSION. 


his cavalry forward to cut a wide swath through the land to 
inspire dread and terror. 

Dumfounded at seeing their land made the scene of war 

in lieu of the Province, 
as well as at the sight 
of a fully equipped 
army emerging from 
mountains which not 
even an individual had 
ever before attempted 
to cross in winter, the 
Arverni cried aloud to 
Vercingetorix for aid. 
The latter left the Bi- 
turiges question to set¬ 
tle itself, and with his 
best troops moved by 
forced marches towards 
the Roman army. Cae¬ 
sar’s diversion had lured 
Y ercingetorix away 
from where he was most 
useful to his cause. 
Leaving the younger 
Brutus in command, 
with orders to use his 
cavalry in vigorous scout¬ 
ing and to keep restless¬ 
ly on the move, Caesar 
himself hurried to Vienna on the Rhone; there, finding some 
cavalry which had been newly recruited, and had at his 
orders assembled in this town, he placed himself at their 
head, set out and marched day and night through the land of 



I0U0E 




Csesar’s March to his Legions. 



A BOLD RIDE. 


235 

tliG .ZEdui to that of the Lingones, where two of his legions 
were wintering at Andaematunum (Langres). He had thrust 
aside a danger which menaced his entire scheme of conquest 



by a markedly fine diversion; he had, without a moment’s 
hesitation, run a serious personal risk, — which, however, 
was unavoidable, and therefore advisable, — and had com¬ 
pletely baffled the enemy. He was now safe. He had trav¬ 
eled so rapidly that he had kept ahead of the danger of dis¬ 
covery. From Andaematunum Caesar sent orders to the two 
legions among the Treviri to move towards him, so as again 
to gather his forces into one body. The other six had win¬ 
tered at Agendicum, among the Senones. At this place he 
summarily rendezvoused all the legions. These exceedingly 
rapid and well conceived movements puzzled the Gauls as to 
his intentions, and forestalled any of the tribes engaged in 
the plot in an attack which they might otherwise have made 


236 CAESAR CONCENTRATES. 

on the legions during their concentration. Caesar reached 
Agendicum about the end of February. One cannot admire 
his conduct of this affair too highly. 

Hearing that Caesar was thus concentrating, Vercingetorix 
moved back to the land of the Bituriges, and thence to Ger- 
gobina Bojorum (St. Parize le Cliatel) at the confluence of 
the Liger and Elaver, which he determined to attack. This 
was the capital of the Boii, who had remained faithful to 
Rome. They had been settled there by Caesar after their 
defeat in the Helvetian campaign. It was a difficult task for 
Caesar to undertake a winter campaign, as the transportation 
of supplies was almost impossible; one can scarcely imagine 
how bad the few roads there were could be; but everything 
must be risked, lest the allied tribes should lose confidence in 
Rome, and, still more important, lose confidence in Caesar, 
which they would be sure to do if he allowed one of their 
chief towns to be taken. He concluded to rely largely on 
the good will of the aEdui to keep him supplied with corn. 

Having got his forces well in hand, he left two legions 
and the baggage at Agendicum, and moved towards the Boii, 
hoping to keep them in allegiance by extending to them his 
protection. He sent forward messengers to encourage them 
to stout resistance and assure them of his speedy arrival. 
Coming on the second day after starting to Vellaunodunum 
(Trigueres), he made arrangements to capture it, as he not 
only needed it for a storehouse, but could not leave it in the 
enemy’s hands in his rear. In two days Caesar had drawn 
up his lines of contravallation, and the town, seeing plainly 
that resistance would be useless, capitulated, and gave up its 
arms and six hundred hostages. Leaving Trebonius to com¬ 
plete the surrender, Caesar marched without delay on Gena- 
bum of the Carnutes. This, as above said, was probably 
modern Gien, though generally assumed to be Orleans. In 


GENABUM. 


237 


pushing for Gergobina, which he aimed quickly to reach, it 
would be much out of Caesar’s way and over a bad tract of 
country to march to Orleans, and as it was not essential to 
do so, he would not be likely at this moment to vary from 
his straight course. Moreover, Gien is a better location for 
an oppidum, being on a hill, while Orleans is on a slope. 
This town, Genabum, the Carnutes had not yet garrisoned, 
as they expected Caesar would be delayed a long time at 
Vellaunodunum, whereas he reached Genabum, much to the 
surprise of the inhabitants, in two days after Vellauno¬ 
dunum had capitulated, when they had barely received news 
of the fact. He could scarcely have reached Orleans, ham¬ 
pered by his considerable trains, which is fifty miles as 
the crow flies, in this short time — another argument in 
favor of Gien. The population at midnight endeavored to 
escape across the Liger, near by, over which there was a 
bridge, but Caesar had already detailed two legions to ob¬ 
serve the town; and the inhabitants, being much delayed at 
the bridge on account of its narrowness, were prevented from 
escaping and driven back into the place. Caesar entered the 
town and gave it up to pillage, as punishment for the recent 
murder of Romans within its walls. Thence he marched 
south on Noviodunum (Sancerre) and Avaricum of the 
Bituriges (Bourges). 



Gallic Horseman. 

(From a terra-cotta Statuette.) 





XVI. 


AVARICUM. LATE WINTER AND EARLY SPRING, 

52 B. C. 

Vercingetorix sought to interfere with Csesar’s siege of Noviodunum, hut 
to no effect. He conceived the idea that it was unwise to risk battle with the 
Romans; that more could be accomplished by a system of small-war. This 
was a remarkable plan of campaign for a barbarian. It is what gave Fabius 
his fame in the second Punic War. The Gauls burned their crops and towns to 
prevent Caesar from victualling his army. Avaricum alone in that section was 
spared. This town (Bourges) had hut one approach. Here Caesar began siege 
works and built a mound. Vercingetorix tried to raise the siege by harassing 
the Roman army. He suffered much from the jealousies and dissensions of the 
allied tribes, but his ability and character sufficed to hold them together. The 
Gauls ably managed the siege. The wall, built up of logs, stones and earth, 
was strong and tough. Sallies were made with considerable success, still 
there was but one end possible ; the place was taken and forty thousand souls 
perished. Caesar found on hand much corn. Labienus was sent from here 
against the Parisii. Vercingetorix, foreseeing Caesar’s plans, sought to defend 
the line of the Elaver, but Csesar cleverly stole a passage, and marched on 
Gergovia. 

Vercingetorix, on hearing of the havoc Caesar was play¬ 
ing with his allied towns, gave up the siege of Gergobina 
and moved forward to meet the Romans. Caesar had just 
completed the siege of Noviodunum. The inhabitants were 
in the act of delivering up hostages, horses and arms to the 
centurions, when the arrival of Vercingetorix’ cavalry van¬ 
guard was seen in the distance. Encouraged by this apparent 
relief, a certain party of citizens again resorted to arms, shut 
the gates, manned the walls and refused to surrender. They 
were with difficulty suppressed, though the centurions receiv¬ 
ing the surrender behaved with consummate skill. At the 


VERCINGETORIX’ ABILITY. 289 

same time Caesar, by a smart attack of his cavalry, drove 
back the van of the Gauls with considerable loss. In the 
combat his native cavalry came near to being beaten, but a 
body of four hundred Germans newly recruited proved equal 
to their reputation, and by their vigorous and unusual tactics 
turned the tide. 

Vercingetorix retired, and Caesar marched to Avaricum, 
the best fortified town of the Bituriges. He proposed to 
besiege it, in the belief that its capture would reduce all 
the region to obedience. The name Avaricum comes from 
the River Avara(Euse); Bourges is a relic of Bituriges. 

Vercingetorix, who was by long odds the strongest oppo¬ 
nent Caesar ever had in Gaul, was taught by the failures at 
Vellaunodunum, Genabum and Noviodunum, that he could 
not deal with Caesar in open warfare. He convoked an as¬ 
sembly of the tribes, and informed the chiefs that, in order 
to win success, he must undertake a system of small-war, 
so as, if possible, to cut the Romans off from rations and 
forage for their beasts, the want of which latter would ren¬ 
der Caesar’s cavalry more or less harmless. By self-sacrifice 
alone could they save Gaul from Roman oppression. They 
must burn and destroy their own farms and villages; every¬ 
thing not beyond capture from its defenses or position must 
be made unavailable to the enemy. This course would oblige 
the Romans to send to a distance to gather supplies, and 
Vercingetorix could then fall upon their detachments and 
beat them in detail. So long as the legions could keep 
together, there was no Gallic courage or discipline which 
could cope with them. 

This plan, however severely it fell on his own people, was 
full of wisdom in regard to the enemy. With a sufficiency 
of victual in his own rear, Vercingetorix proposed to starve 
out the Roman armies. As much credit is due to this barba- 


240 


COSTLY WARFARE. 


rian chief for his masterly conception of the proper means of 
opposing Caesar’s legions as was due to Fabius for the same 
method of meeting the victorious phalanxes of Hannibal. 
The plan was the more easy for the barbarians to carry out, 
as they scoured the country to a much greater extent than 
the soldiers of Caesar; were more familiar with its resources 
and topography, and had the population on their side. 

Acting on the scheme thus devised for them by Vercinget- 
orix, the Bituriges began to destroy all the towns and pro¬ 
visions which could possibly fall into the Roman possession. 
It was a hard lot, but they preferred this loss to the prospect 
of death themselves, and the sale of their wives and daugh¬ 
ters into slavery — a certain fate, as they believed, if Caesar 
should now succeed in conquering the land. Twenty towns 
were burned in one day. Almost alone and after long debate, 
Avaricum was spared on account of its exceptional situation 
for defense, and a proper garrison was thrown into the town. 
And, at a distance of fifteen miles, Vercingetorix camped 
with his army in a spot defended by woods and marshes, 
probably near Dun-le-roy, at the confluence of the Taisseau 
and Auron, some eighteen miles southeast of Avaricum. The 
marshes have now dried up and the streams have been nar¬ 
rowed. He did not dare to interfere with the siesre of Avar- 

O 

icum, but closely watched the operations of the Romans, 
faithfully scouted the neighborhood, attacked their foraging 
parties whenever he could safely do so, and kept well posted 
in all their movements. He “received intelligence every 
hour in the day.” 

Avaricum, in the middle of an extended level stretch of 
country, was surrounded on north and east and west by 
marshy rivers, the modern Yevres, Yevrette and Auron, 
affluents of the Liger, and the marsh they produced. It had 
but one narrow approach on the southwest. This is now 


AVARICUM. 


241 

much wider than it used to be. The rivers of Bourges have 
gradually been canalled, a work which has broadened the 
strip of land, while constant accretions have raised the level 
of its slopes. The entire marsh has by the industry of gen¬ 
erations been reclaimed, and rich fields and gardens now 
occupy its site. The plateau descends to these low-lying 
fields in a gentle grade. The general height of the plateau 
above the meadows is still what Caesar gives it, but its edges 
are less abrupt. 

Avaricum had forty thousand souls. Caesar camped be¬ 
tween the Auron and Yevrette, on an eminence half a mile 



from the gates. The site of his camp is now, appropriately 
enough, occupied by a government gun-foundry and shop, 
and by other military establishments. Between the camp 
and town was a depression in the ground protecting the lat¬ 
ter like a huge ditch. This has now been filled up to accom¬ 
modate modern structures, though it can still be traced, if 
carefully sought. Caesar began the erection of a terrace, 




















242 


DEPRIVATIONS OF BESIEGERS. 


vineae and two towers. Owing to the marshes, a line of 
contravallation was neither feasible nor necessary. He must 
attack along the narrow approach, which was not over four 
hundred feet wide. The top of the wall of Avaricum was 
eighty feet higher than the floor of the ravine. 

Yercingetorix carried out his small-war programme well. 

AVARICUM 



Terrace at Avaricum (plan). 

The Romans could not go far to forage without being 
attacked. Rations began to fail; the iEdui, growing lax in 
their fealty, were by no means prompt in furnishing corn; 
the Boii were poor; foraging was an altogether uncertain 
resource, now that the country was devastated. Still, the 
soldiers bore their deprivations well. Caesar not infrequently 
consulted the wishes of his army, as a matter of policy as 
well as precedent. Now, in his anxiety for the welfare of his 
legions, he went so far as to offer to raise the siege if the 

















































































































CAESAR’S SCOUTING. 


243 


men felt that their hardships were too great; the answer 
came promptly, an emphatic “No.” They would avenge the 
manes of their comrades at any cost. Thus rings with no 
uncertain sound the voice of all soldiers who recognize the 
great captain in their chief. 

While the siege was progressing, and it was pressed with 
all vigor, Vercingetorix, from his camp to the south, 
approached near to Avaricum and camped on its northwest. 
He hoped for some chance to deal the Romans a blow. With 
his. horse and the attendant light foot he soon after made his 



100 F E F-T 


Terrace at Avaricum (section on line A-B). 


way to a place which the Roman foragers were wont to pass 
in going out on this daily duty, hoping to catch a large 
party of them in an ambush. Caesar fortunately learned of 
this attempt. 

We do not hear much of the details of Caesar's scouting 
and spy system, but he was generally so well informed of 
what went on in the enemy’s camp that we can but draw the 
conclusion that he had organized an effective “secret ser¬ 
vice ” system. 

Caesar set out at midnight with the bulk of his force to 
checkmate the scheme of the barbarian leader by attacking 
his camp in his absence, where no person, he heard, was left 
in absolute command. On reaching the place he “ordered 



































244 


AN AMBUSH THWARTED. 


the baggage to be piled and the arms to be got ready,” in 
other words, prepared for battle. Vercingetorix had placed 
his camp on a height surrounded by the Avaricum morass, 
where it was but fifty feet wide; had broken down the 
bridges leading to it, and occupied the few fords in force. 
On reconnoitring it, Caesar found the position so strong, that 
he sensibly declined an unequal combat from which nothing 
could be gained. The soldiers, not recognizing the dangers 
of the ground, demanded battle, but Caesar showed them that 
it would be too costly in life, and as he had already accom¬ 
plished his aim in forestalling the ambush of Vercingetorix, 
it was not worth the doing. The army returned to the siege. 

On the return to camp of Vercingetorix, the failure to 
bring the Romans to a fight on unequal terms, his having 
gone off with the cavalry just before Caesar appeared before 
the camp, and the general delay in affairs, raised a clamor 
against him among his fickle-minded Gallic allies, who 
accused him of treacherously playing into Caesar’s hands. 
But this accusation and feeling Vercingetorix, by represent¬ 
ing his case and prospects with great cleverness, managed to 
turn aside, and, indeed, change into so favorable a senti¬ 
ment, that the Gauls determined to send ten thousand men 
to Avaricum, lest the Bituriges alone should reap all the 
glory of defeating Caesar. Still, the difference between the 
hearty cooperation of Caesar’s legionaries, and the suspicious 
and jealous dissensions in the camp of Vercingetorix was 
marked, and made the chances run all the more in favor of 
the Romans. That Vercingetorix was able to hold these con¬ 
flicting elements together redounds much to his credit. 

The Gauls ably managed the defense of Avaricum. They 
opposed the Roman method of sieges with great ingenuity. 
The mural hooks and rams used by the Romans to pull and 
batter down the walls they would catch with a noose, and 


GALLIC WALL. 


245 


drag into the town. They undermined the Roman mound, 
at which work they were expert, as there were many iron and 
copper miners in the country; they raised towers as high as 
the Romans on the threatened side of their wall, and covered 
the woodwork with skins; they set the vineae on fire by noc¬ 
turnal sallies; they made sorties every day, and impeded the 
work greatly by throwing sharp stakes, stones and hot pitch 
upon the besiegers. A civilized garrison could scarcely have 
done the defense greater justice. 


The Gallic wall, of heavy 
difficult to attack with bat¬ 
tering-ram or fire. The logs 
were laid across the line of 
the wall, two feet apart, and 
held in place by heavy cross 
logs mortised together. These 
were packed with earth, and 
the ends of the logs at the 
outer side of the wall* were 
held in place with the stones 
which made its facing. The 
stone protected the walls 
from fire; the ends of the 
logs would only char, and the 
logs and earth, from their 
greater elasticity, resisted 
the rams far better than 
stone alone could do. The 
wall had to be broken down 


and stones, was peculiarly 



PLAN of ONE LAVER 



ELEVATION 

Gallic Wall. 


piecemeal; it would not tumble 


together. 

Still, the legions persevered, despite wet and cold, and in 
twenty-five days had raised a mound three liundi ed and 
thirty feet broad and eighty feet high. These figures are 



































































246 


ANCIENT GALLANTRY. 


disputed by some critics, though given by the Commentaries. 
They are not exceptional, and the topography bears them 
out. When the mound had all but reached the enemy’s 
walls, it began to sink. It had been undermined, and was, 
moreover, fired from the mine. This occurred at midnight, 
when Caesar happened to be making a tour of inspection, and 
at the same moment a vigorous sally from two gates on each 
side of the tower was made by the besieged. The Avaricans 
threw torches, pitch, dry wood and other inflammables on the 
towers and terrace. Two legions were generally on guard 
at night, and these were taken unawares. The fight lasted 
all night. The pent-houses were destroyed, and the Romans 
for a while had to march to and fro from the towers without 
cover. The besieged now saw a good chance of victory. 

Caesar here mentions an occurrence which enables us to 
compare ancient with modern gallantry under fire: “There 
happened in my own view a circumstance which, having 
appeared to be worthy of record, we thought it ought not to 
be omitted. A certain Gaul before 'the gate of the town, 
who was casting into the fire opposite the turret balls of 
tallow and fire which were passed along to him, was pierced 
with a dart on the right side and fell dead. One of those 
next him stepped over him as he lay, and discharged the 
same office; when the second man was slain in the same 
manner by a wound from a cross-bow, a third succeeded him, 
and a fourth succeeded the third; nor was this post left 
vacant by the besieged, until, the fire of the mound having 
been extinguished and the enemy repulsed in every direction, 
an end was put to the fighting.” It seems that three men or 
more were shot down at their post, and that the post was at 
once filled by fresh men. This is mentioned as an excep¬ 
tional piece of courage. In our day we have seen many such. 
Entire color-guards have not infrequently been shot down in 


ANOTHER MASSACRE. 


247 


battle; but there has never been a lack of men eager to take 
their places. 

The sortie was, after a fierce struggle, beaten back. The 
Gallic soldiers in the city now formed a project of leaving 
the town by retiring across the marshes in its rear by night, 
and making for the camp of Yercingetorix; but the clamor 
of the women, who were to be left behind to the tender 
mercies of the besiegers, gave notice to the Romans of this 
evasion, and, for fear of being cut off, the garrison desisted. 

Next day, a heavy rain coming on, the ramparts of the 
town were carelessly guarded. Caesar, perceiving this, 
quietly made his preparations, sharply advanced the towers 
and ordered the walls to be scaled, offering great rewards to 
those who first mounted them. The Romans broke from 
cover with exceptional energy, and assaulted in good form. 
The enemy, surprised and disconcerted, was driven in; but 
with admirable constancy drew up in the market-place in 
wedges (or close order), determined to resist to the end. 
And here no doubt they would have stubbornly fought; but 
when they saw the Romans moving along the walls so as to 
surround all who should be left in the city, the columns 
dissolved, and each man sought his individual safety in 
flight. Most fled to the northern extremity of the oppidum. 
Thus broken up, the Gauls lost head; and having thrown 
away their arms, the Romans had them at their mercy, and 
cut them down remorselessly, sparing neither age nor sex. 
What the infantry could not reach fell at the hands of the 
cavalry. Out of forty thousand men, women and children, 
barely eight hundred escaped across the marshes to Yercin¬ 
getorix’ camp. The Gallic chief received and distributed 
them among the several divisions of his army, lest in one 
body their sad tale should breed a mutiny. 

Once again, Yercingetorix had a hard task in reconciling 


248 


jEDUAN imbroglio. 


his fellow-citizens to this disaster; and nothing shows the 
native ability of this remarkable man better than the way in 
which, under the stress of misfortune, he kept his ascend¬ 
ancy over this fickle, unreasonable people. “As ill success 
weakens the authority of other generals, so on the contrary 
his dignity increased daily, though a loss had been sus¬ 
tained.” Vercingetorix now advised the Gauls to imitate the 
Roman method and to fortify their camps. This counsel 
they followed and thenceforward continued to do. He also 
by skillful appeals to the neighboring tribes succeeded in 
winning all over to his cause, and very shortly replaced the 
troops lost at Avaricum with a still larger force. Especially 
a fine body of cavalry came to him under Teutomatus, prince 
of the Nitiobriges. But though he would have been backed 
up by public sentiment in an offensive policy, this barbarian 
chief refrained from an attack on Caesar’s lines. He wisely 
kept to small-war. 

Caesar found in Avaricum also a large supply of corn and 
provender, and gave his army a much needed, well-earned 
rest. The spring and the time for more active operations 
were at hand, when the HDdui sent urgent messages to Caesar 
praying him to come to their assistance, as there had arisen 
a serious division in the state, two parties respectively under 
Cotus and Convictolitavis, both of high lineage and much 
power, claiming the government, which was governed by an 
annual chief magistrate. Caesar was loath to leave operations 
against Vercingetorix, whom he now hoped either to drive 
from the forest retreats to which he had retired, or else to 
close in and trap. But Caesar could neither allow danger to 
lurk in his rear, nor temporize with the fealty of the iEdui. 
He therefore turned backward. It was through their land 
that his line of operations ran from his base, in the Province. 
If the iEdui were to waver in their allegiance, it would 


THE TROUBLE SETTLED. 


249 


become a question of subsistence and not strategy. It was 
they kept his granary full of corn. They were indeed an 
intermediate base. Arrived 
among this people, — at 
Decetia (Decize) on the 
Liger, — Caesar sent for the 
senate of the ^Edui to meet 
him, and not only decided 
the matter in dispute by 
making Cotus, who had but 
a minority at his back, re¬ 
sign, and by placing the 
government in the hands of 
Convictolitavis, whom the 
priests favored; but he in¬ 
duced the ^Edui to promise 
ten thousand infantry and 
all their horse for him to 
use in garrisons along his 
line of operations, to pro¬ 
tect the trains of corn which 
they should forward him. 

Having shelved this 
danger, Caesar sent Labie- 
nus with four legions, two 
from the army and the two 
left at Agendicum, against 
the Senones and Parisii 
(or Lutetii), who had been 

roused by Vercingetorix; while he, with the six remaining, 
marched on Gergovia in the land of the Arverni, propos¬ 
ing to besiege it. The Arverni, though they had long been 
faithful allies of Rome, were now the centre of the rebellion. 



Avaricum to Gergovia. 


250 


MARCH UP THE EL AVER. 


The cavalry was divided between Labienus and Caesar. 
What Vercingetorix had been doing during Caesar’s absence 
is not told us. It looks as if he had retired into the hills 
and woods of the Bituriges, and had been watching his oppo¬ 
nent. On learning Caesar’s direction, he guessed his objec¬ 
tive and betook himself to the farther (left) bank of the 


Elaver (Allier), and occupied it 



before Caesar reached the 
right bank. This move¬ 
ment shows that Vercin¬ 
getorix, too, had either 
the true instincts of the 
soldier, or else possessed 
an equally good corps of 
scouts and spies. His 
manoeuvre placed him 
athwart Caesar ’ s path. He 
was intent on barring the 
Romans from approach to 
Gergovia, and he took 
care to break down all 
the bridges over the river. 
The Elaver is still a good- 
sized stream; it was then 
a mighty bulwark of his 
territory, and he must 
keep it intact at all haz¬ 
ards. This river was not 


then fordable except in the low-water season in autumn, 
and it was essential to Caesar to cross without delay — 
unless he was to acknowledge that Vercingetorix could 
force him to change his plans. He moved up the river, 
struck it near modern Moulins — from Decetia was an old 
Gaulish road which led to Moulins and was later made a 



STEALING A PASSAGE. 


251 


Roman road — and sought a chance to cross. From day 
to day Vercingetorix moved exactly as far as the Romans 
moved, and camped opposite to them at night. 

Caesar saw that he must resort to some stratagem to cross. 
Having camped one night at one of the broken bridges, 
most likely near Yarennes, Caesar next morning sent forward 
only two thirds of the army and all the baggage, ordering it 
to march in six corps, and in such order as to appear to be 
the entire force of six legions. With two legions he remained 
behind in hiding in the woods well back of the river. Ver¬ 
cingetorix followed the moving column on the other side up 
the river. So soon as the enemy was out of the way, Caesar 
emerged from his hiding-place, and speedily rebuilt the 
bridge on the old piles which had been left standing, crossed 
to the left bank and intrenched a bridgehead; having done 
which he sent on and recalled the body which had marched 
ahead. This rejoined by stealing a march on Vercingetorix 
during the coming night. Vercingetorix, when he saw that 
he had been outwitted and knew that the whole Roman 
army had crossed, moved by forced marches on Gergovia, 
so as not to be brought to battle against his will. 

This passage was skillfully accomplished. Caesar here 
earned as much credit for a clever stratagem as Vercingetorix 
showed that he had been careless in scouting the river-banks. 
But we cannot too much praise the native ability of this 
barbarian chief, who without military education or example 
was able to do so much to oppose one of the greatest soldiers 
the world has ever seen. We cannot compare Caesar’s oper¬ 
ation at the Elaver to the passage of the Hydaspes by Alex¬ 
ander, or that of the Rhone by Hannibal. It was far from 
as distinguished an operation. But nevertheless it was skill¬ 
ful and well-conceived; and was so well executed as to de¬ 
ceive a very keen-eyed opponent. 


XVII. 


THE SIEGE OF GEEGOVIA. SPRING, 52 B. C. 

The height of Gergovia stands twelve hundred feet above the plain, and 
has at the summit a plateau over a mile long. It could be attacked most easily 
from the south. Yercingetorix had drawn up his forces on this slope. So soon 
as the Romans arrived, cavalry skirmishes became common, but the Gallic 
infantry remained behind the defenses. Caesar camped southeast of the town 
and later seized a hill on its south, intrenched a second camp, and joined the 
two camps by works. This cut the Gergovians off from the river, and made 
their water supply uncertain. The HSdui, Caisar’s chief allies, had been giving 
him anxiety; rebellion now broke out in their army, which was on its way to 
join him. Caesar left Fabius in command at Gergovia, made a speedy march 
to the rear, brought the rebels to terms, and returned. In twenty-four hours, 
his column of four legions had marched fifty miles. After due consideration, 
Caesar determined to assault Gergovia. He laid his plans skillfully. Sending 
a force to make a demonstration against the west front, which the Gauls felt 
was not very strong, he drew all the Gallic troops to that quarter. He then 
suddenly threw forward his legions, which gallantly advanced and reached the 
very walls of the town. But they had not been furnished with scaling-ladders ; 
few only mounted the top of the walls; the Gauls returned from the western 
front; Caesar was driven back with heavy loss. He essays to gloss over this 
defeat in the Commentaries, but the facts are plain. The HCdui now broke out 
into open revolt, and Caesar had to give over the siege. He had been roundly 
defeated. 

In five days’ march, the first one being short on account 
of the fatigue of the column which moved up the river and 
back, and the last one short because he reached Gergovia 
early in the day, Csesar arrived at the capital of the Arverni. 
The enemy opposed him only by a slight cavalry skirmish, 
and then retired to the upper slope of the very high hill on 
which the town was built, where, outside the wall of the 
oppidum, they camped. 


Gergovia and Vicinity, 

















254 


HEIGHTS OF GERGOVIA. 


The heights of Gergovia, four miles south of modern Cler¬ 
mont-Ferrand, stand boldly up twelve hundred feet above 
the plain. It has been rechristened its ancient name. At 
the top is a quadrangular plateau a mile long by over a third 
of a mile wide. On the north and east the slope was prob¬ 
ably wooded; access to the plateau by a body of troops might 
have been difficult. The south slope is a succession of ter¬ 
races rather wide and not over steep. These apparently were 
not wooded. On the west lie the heights of Risolles, whose 
toj:> is only one hundred feet lower than Gergovia and is con¬ 
nected with it by a neck of land. Two other hills, Monts 
Rognon and Puy Giroux, flank the Risolles, and are north¬ 
west and southwest of Gergovia respectively. On the south, 
like a huge buttress, is the Roche Blanche, a long and narrow 
hill, with rocky face on the south and east, and easy slopes 
elsewhere, about five hundred feet below the plateau of Ger¬ 
govia. The Auzon flows south of Gergovia, and falls into 
the Allier. On the northwest runs a small brook. On the 
east was a large shallow lake, now drained. On the south 
and southeast, Gergovia was thought to be most accessible to 
attack. 

Caesar established his main camp on high and healthful 
ground south of the lake, perhaps one hundred feet above 
the plain. The Auzon ran behind his camp. It was cer¬ 
tainly a task of some danger to attempt to take Gergovia 
by storm until Vercingetorix’ army was disposed of, and 
Caesar must get together victual in abundance before he 
could blockade or besiege it. 

Descriptions and pictures of Gergovia are somewhat mis¬ 
leading. One is apt to conceive of a rocky eminence with 
top palisaded by nature and practically inaccessible. The 
north slope is wont to be described as impossible to capture. 
It is not so. The slope is not steep, though it is long. The 


GERGOVIA NOT INEXPUGNABLE. 


255 


cultivation of many generations — it is now covered with rich 
fields and vineyards — may have softened the slopes, but it 
cannot have materially altered them. It is probable that in 
Caesar’s day the slope was concealed by woods, and that he 
did not reconnoitre it thoroughly. But the position could 
have been surprised on the north far more easily than as¬ 
saulted on the south. So far from being, as it is generally 



said to be, inexpugnable, the men who captured Lookout 
Mountain, or who charged with Pickett up Cemetery Ridge, 
would have laughed at the idea. But ancient warfare was 
different. 

The terraces of the southern slopes were no doubt more 
open, and it was on these terraces that Vercingetorix drew 
up his army, which was protected by a wall of heavy stones, 
six feet high, running along its front. Here Vercingetorix 
posted his allies, in order by tribes, in the most skillful man¬ 
ner, and daily exercised his troops — especially his cavalry 





256 


ROCHE BLANCHE SEIZED. 




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Small Camp at Gergovia. 


mixed with light armed foot — in skirmishes with the 

© 

Romans, so as to ascertain and improve their courage and 
discipline. These combats took place on the plains between 
Caesar’s camp and the slopes of Gergovia; the barbarians 

debouching from the outlets of 
the south and east front of the 
oppidum. 

Caesar soon discovered that 
a hill south of the town, and 
opposite the eminence on which 
was built Gergovia (Roche 
Blanche), was essential to the 
enemy. By its posesssion the 
Gauls were able to protect 
themselves in getting at their 
water, corn and forage, and 
here Vercingetorix had a small advanced post. He should 
have held it in heavier force. The hill in places was no 
doubt steeper in Caesar’s day than it now is. Slides have 
since altered its slopes, but towards the plateau it could not 
have been steep. Caesar determined to capture this hill. 
By a carefully planned night attack he drove off the meagre 
garrison, and placing two le¬ 
gions in their stead, speedily 
intrenched a small camp upon 
it, and connected this hill with 
the main camp by a double 
trench, twelve feet wide, and a 
parapet, such that access from one to the other was secure. 
The two camps have been excavated. Their outlines are 
still distinct. This act of Caesar’s cut the Gergovians off 
from their main supply of water, for the Auzon, to which 
they had been going by the glen road from the plateau, was 



Profile of Double Trench. 




JEHU AN TREACHERY. 


257 


not easily accessible from another place. They now had to 
rely on springs on the plateau, which still exist and are fed 
from the higher mountains to the west, and on the brook at 
the northwest of the town. On this side Csesar had made 
no demonstration. 

Meanwhile the young HMuan nobles had been tampered 
with by the emissaries of Vercingetorix, who had contrived, 
by misrepresentations and gold, to abuse their minds about 
Caesar’s intentions respecting their nation. Convictolitavis, 
even, whom Caesar had made chief of this tribe, partook of 
this feeling, and ordered the ten thousand men who, it had 
been agreed, should guard Caesar’s line of supplies, and who 
were just setting out with a large convoy, to march ostensibly 
to join Caesar, but really to make a junction with Vercingeto¬ 
rix. The leader of this body was Litavicus. On the way, 
he and his men first exhibited their treachery, perhaps near 
modern Serbannes, by massacring the Romans who accom¬ 
panied the train. The plot was revealed to Caesar by Epo- 
redorix, the iEduan noble, who was part of his entourage . 

The matter was pressing. Caesar was between two fires. 
The danger was to the rations on which he relied. He 
delayed not a moment. Leaving Fabius in command at 
Gergovia, he hastened with four legions in light order, 
accompanied by all his cavalry, to the HCduan army, which 
was at Randan on the way to join Vercingetorix. Surround¬ 
ing it, he speedily brought it to terms. He convinced the 
soldiers of the faithlessness of their leaders, all of whom had 
fled to Gergovia so soon as their real intentions had been 
discovered. Eporedorix and Viridomarus, both serving with 
Caesar, added their wofcls to his; and their explanation and 
the conspirators’ flight restored quiet in the iEduan army. 

Csesar was, however, unable to reach the disaffected 
iEduan citizens at home. These, stirred up by sedition, fell 


258 


JEDUAN DUPLICITY. 


to massacring the Romans in their midst, and incited many 
others to take up arms. The whole nation was in turmoil. 
Many, indeed, when they heard that Caesar had done no 
harm to the iEduan army for its treachery, — as he had not 
because he was obliged to temporize, — were desirous of re¬ 
turning to their allegiance; others were boldly for insur¬ 
rection. In Bibracte, Convictolitavis murdered the Roman 
residents and plundered every Roman’s property. All this 
made it essential that Caesar should return to quell this 
tumult, which threatened his very base. Yercingetorix had 
by his machinations attacked him in his weakest spot. 

Many of the iEduans had acted with duplicity and faith¬ 
lessness; when they were put in the wrong, they professed 
contrition and humbly craved forgiveness. Part had been 
really misguided. It was hard to distinguish the honest 
from the perfidious. A Fabian policy had to be resorted to. 
Caesar’s military and political resources were taxed to the 
utmost. Though he had regained control of the AMuan 
army, the AGduan state was still capable of vast mischief. 

During Caesar’s absence to suppress the mutiny of the 
leaders of the AEduan army, Yercingetorix attacked the 
Roman camp; and owing to its large extent, the two legions 
left behind had much ado to defend the ramparts. Yercin¬ 
getorix forced the fighting, and constantly sent on relays of 
fresh troops. Though the defenses were strong, it was only 
with the aid of the engines and at great loss in men that 
the enemy could be held at bay. Fabius sent messengers 
to Caesar, who speeded his return, leaving the revolt in the 
Akluan territory — however dangerous — for the future. 

Caesar’s men made their long forced march with great 
alacrity. From the Gergovian camp to Randan, where 
Caesar met the ASduan army, is twenty-five miles. He 
heard of the plot “almost at midnight.” He left the camp 


A WONDERFUL MARCH . 


259 


presumably at sunrise, say at four a. m., reached Randan at 
noon, spent six or seven hours in negotiations and consequent 
action, then gave “three hours of the night to his soldiers for 
repose,” say seven to ten p. M. (the night watches began at 
six p. M.), and returned from Randan to the camp in six 
hours more, making twenty-four hours in all, during which 
his column covered fifty miles. Nor did they reach the camp 
any too soon to avert serious disaster. The two legions were 
well-nigh exhausted. 

Some days after, a favorable opportunity occurred for 
attacking the enemy. Ciesar gives us to understand that he 
had already determined to give up his attempt on Gergovia, 
owing partly to its difficulties, and especially to the JEduan 
imbroglio; but that he desired to make some demonstration, 
so as to retire with credit, and not allow Vercingetorix to 
accuse the legions of cowardice. He was not really besieg¬ 
ing Gergovia. He was only observing it. Except that he 
was annoying the enemy, he had in no sense even blockaded 
him. Vercingetorix could have retired at any time. 

This part of the Commentaries is plainly disingenuous. 
It may be true that Caesar felt that he would have to return 
to the HCduan territory before long, but the fact remains 
plain that he attacked the Gergovian stronghold in the full 
expectation that he could capture it out of hand, and that he 
was repulsed with a heavy loss. We have nothing but the 
Commentaries, with an occasional reference in other authors, 
added to the topography, on which to base our narrative; 
but, reading the Commentaries between the lines, and in the 
light of our other knowledge (as in the case of Hannibal, we 
must sometimes read Livy), and keeping the topography 
clearly in view, the fact of an assault in good faith and a 
bloody repulse is manifest. 

Csesar had a keen eye. In the days when field-glasses 


260 


A CHANCE FOR ATTACK. 


were unknown, the eye, if naturally good, was trained, like 
those of our Indians, to a surprising degree of accuracy. 
He noticed from the Roche Blanche, where he had located 
his lesser camp, that the defenses of the main plateau of the 
town, so far strongly beset, were quite disgarnislied of 
troops. Deserters, u a great number of whom flocked to him 
daily,” informed him that the top of one of the adjoining- 
heights, the Risolles, marked 1 on the chart, was level, and 
communicated with the oppidum by a wooded and narrow 
neck (2); and that Vercingetorix had conceived some danger 
from that quarter. The north of the Gergovian height, it will 
be remembered, was not attempted by Caesar in any sense; 
but he had seized the Roche Blanche, and might seize the 
Risolles, and thus win a nearer, and to the Gauls more dan¬ 
gerous, access to the plateau. The gate (3) of the oppi¬ 
dum, and the road to it from the westerly height (1), has 
been dug out so as to show the lay of the land in Caesar’s 
day. It varied but little from what it now is, except from a 
certain amount of natural debris, and gradual smoothing of 
the surface by generations of plowing since. Should Caesar 
get possession of the Risolles height (1), he could do more 
towards cutting the enemy off from water and forage, — 
a fact which they cared not to face. What Caesar might 
do next was the unknown quantity of the Gallic problem. 
Vercingetorix had foreseen the danger, and had sent all his 
force to fortify this flanking height. Some authors pick out 
Mont Rognon or Puy Giroux as the object of Vercingetorix’ 
solicitude; but for Caesar to take either of these would by 
no means compromise the Gergovians, both being beyond 
the range, and neither being connected with the plateau. 
Besides, the facts related show that the Gergovians were at 
work near at hand, at a place from which they could in a 
few minutes return to the oppidum. 


CLEVER PREPARATIONS . 


261 


Acting on this information, Caesar saw 
that here was an excellent opening for a 
general assault. He sent some turmae 
of cavalry at night round towards the 
height in question, to make a noisy dem¬ 
onstration on the west and south of it 
(6), and, to add to their number, he hel- 
meted many of his muleteers, and sent 
them at daylight on the same errand, 
instructing them by ranging about in the 
skirts of the woods to attract the atten¬ 
tion of the Gauls, and lead them to be¬ 
lieve that an attack was coming from that 
quarter. He also sent a legion in sup¬ 
port, with orders to take post below Puy 
Giroux, and to pretend to be hiding in 
the hollows and woods as if preparing a 
surprise. This demonstration, seen from 
the oppidum, resulted, as Caesar antici¬ 
pated, in the enemy withdrawing nearly 
all his force from the south front of the 
oppidum, and marching it over to the 
position (1) they thus deemed to be threat¬ 
ened. It was evident to them that Ver- 
cingetorix had been right in apprehend¬ 
ing trouble from this quarter. They set 
to work to fortify its west front (a to b), 
and presumably the neck of land, for this 
was not precipitous enough to be its 
own defense. Caesar’s capital feint had 
succeeded as it deserved to succeed. This Gergovia affair is 
one of the earliest where the terrain is so well explored as to 
give us a thorough insight into the manoeuvre. Barring the 












262 


INSTRUCTIONS. 


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use of artillery, the whole opera¬ 
tion closely resembles a modern as¬ 
sault, in its method of preparation 
and execution. 

Thus much accomplished, Gaesar, 
under cover of his feint, transferred 
the bulk of his force secretly and in 
small detachments from the greater 
to the lesser camp. The men 
marched behind the wall, as Poly- 
aenus says, crouching down so as 
not to be seen, and the ensigns, 
plumes and shields, which would 
have betrayed them, were covered 
so as not to attract attention to 
the manoeuvre. Then he gave out 
his instructions to his legates. The 
place, he said, could not be taken 
by assault, but only by surprise; 
the men were to be kept well in 
hand and not allowed to go beyond 
orders, either from zeal or hope of 
plunder, lest they should be taken 
in flank when in confused order.; 
of which, to judge from Caesar’s 
description, there was some dan¬ 
ger, which would not otherwise ap¬ 
pear. The ^Edui were sent from 
the greater camp by another circuit 
on the right to attack in another 


place. This was probably on the 
southeast angle of the oppidum (4). 

The town wall was twelve hundred paces distant from the 


m 













ATTACK AND RECALL. 263 

foot of the mountain, as the crow flies. Irregularities in the 
ground made the access circuitous, and added to this distance 
at least a half. The road up the mountain now runs by the 
glen where lies Merdogne, and must always have done so. 
Midway up the ascent there was the stone wall six feet high, 
already mentioned. No defenses or camps were below; but 
above the stone wall were the barbarians’ camps very closely 
packed together. 

The signal of attack was given. With a rush the legion¬ 
aries debouched from the gates of the lesser camp, advanced 
the short mile up the hill (9 and 10), and, swarming over the 
wall, at once became possessors of the camp. The surprise 
was complete. So much was this the fact that the king of 
the Nitiobriges, Teutomatus, barely escaped half-clothed 
from his tent, where he was resting during the noon-tide. 

At this point, and having made this gain, for some strange 
reason Caesar paused, and halted the Tenth legion, which 
he was with. This is one of the most inexplicable circum¬ 
stances of his career. He states in his Commentaries that 
this much was all he intended to do. “Caesar, having 
accomplished the object which he had in view, ordered the 
signal to be sounded for retreat.” But this is clearly an 
excuse framed after the event. It is probable that, from his 
position when the troops were swarming over the stone wall 
(it may have been the knoll marked 5 on the chart)-, he was 
better able to recognize the questionable nature of the task 
than from below, and decided to call off his men. It is not 
impossible that he purposed to hold this position and erect 
vineae and mounds; though, indeed, from what subsequently 
happened, it seems as if he might have been successful 
in a summary assault on the town, had he then and there 
pressed on. Writing afterwards, he says that “success 
depended on a surprise,” and he had succeeded in surprising 


264 


FAILURE IN ASSAULT. 


the enemy. Sounding the recall, he endeavored to arrest the 
onset of the other legions; hut though the centurions and 
tribunes did their utmost, the legionaries, with the flush of 
past victories and the hope of plunder, either would not or 
did not hear. There were accidents in the ground between 
Caesar and them to intercept the trumpet-blasts, but the 
legions at Thapsus broke away from Caesar, and perhaps 
they did so here. They pressed on till they reached the wall 
of the town, where they were stopped for want of means of 
escalading the rampart, which had not been provided — a 
curious lapse, if a surprise and assault was intended. So 
' little defended were the walls, that the women were seen 
hanging over them and imploring for mercy, expecting no 
less than immediate capture or death, as at Avaricum. 
Some of the men did reach the top of the wall. L. Fabius, 
centurion of the Eighth legion, lifted by his soldiers, scaled 
it, and others followed. Had the legionaries been furnished 
with ladders, it seems as if one vigorous effort would have 
met with success. Even as it was, the fact that some 
managed to scale the wall shows that in the absence of the 
garrison the thing was feasible. 

By this time the Gauls had heard of the Roman assault, 
and, preceded by the cavalry, came rushing back to the 
defense of the city. In a few moments the ground back of 
the wall was beset by defenders, and the women, who had 
been imploring mercy, now — as was their wont, with dis¬ 
heveled hair and holding up their infants — bade their hus¬ 
bands defend them. The speedy return of the Gergovians 
proves that they could not have been so far away as Mont 
Rognon or Puy Giroux. The contest was now quite un¬ 
equal, so much so that Caesar was constrained to send back 
to the camp for the cohorts left there on guard under T. 
Sextius, ordering them to take up a position at the foot of 


HEAVY LOSSES. 


265 


the hill, so as to threaten Vercingetorix’ right (8), and to 
protect the retreat if it should have to be made, by attacking 
the Gauls in flank. He himself, with the Tenth legion, now 
advanced somewhat to the support of the other legions which 
had gone beyond the position where he had halted the Tenth, 
and awaited the issue, holding his men well in hand. The 
other legionaries were still fighting bravely, but against odds 
of position and numbers, the Gauls having been able to make 
a sortie on their flank. T. Sextius and the others who had 
climbed it were thrown from the wall; the centurion, M. 
Petronius, also of the Eighth, attempting to burst the gates, 
was killed in trying to save his men. 

At this instant the iEdui emerged on the Roman right, 
and though they had their right shoulders bared, — as the 
Gallic allies of Caesar were in the habit of doing to distin¬ 
guish them from the other barbarians, — the legionaries 
assumed that these were fresh troops of the enemy who had 
bared their shoulders as a stratagem, and at once began to 
retire somewhat confusedly. They had lost in killed, seven 
hundred men and forty-six centurions, but had illustrated 
Roman valor in every phase. The great loss in officers shows 
that these by no means lacked devotion. 

The Tenth legion, by changes of position to suit the several 
cases, abundantly protected the retreat by threatening Ver¬ 
cingetorix ’ flank; the cohorts from the camp did their share, 
taking position on high ground to impose on Vercingetorix 
by endangering his advance. So soon as they reached the 
plain, the legions all turned and faced the enemy. Vercin¬ 
getorix, who had hoped to have them at his mercy and who 
had followed in pursuit, impressed by this bold front, decided 
not to risk an attack, but led back his forces into the town. 

On the return to camp, Caesar took occasion to “censure 
the rashness ” of the legionaries for not heeding the orders of 


266 


CAESAR DISINGENUOUS. 


tlieir officers, while commending their valor; and showed 
them how nearly they had come to suffering a fatal defeat. 
As at Avaricum, said he, he had desired not to risk the lives 
of his men in a futile assault; and he bade them remember 
that he, their general, was the best judge of what it was wise 
to do, and that he required in his soldiers forbearance and 
self-command not less than valor and magnanimity. At the 
same time he encouraged them not to lose heart from one 
piece of bad luck, “nor attribute to the valor of the enemy 
what disadvantage of position had caused.” 

Caesar had, as he says, not obtained such success over the 
enemy as would enable him under its cover to retire from the 
siege with honor. He felt that he must do more. On the 
next day he led out his army into the plain and offered battle 
to Vercingetorix, which this chief declined, and hostilities 
were confined to a cavalry skirmish, in which the Romans 
proved the victors. The succeeding day Caesar did the like, 
having made all preparations to raise the siege. But as 
Vercingetorix would not accept his gage and descend into 
the level, Caesar began to withdraw in open daylight, in full 
view of the enemy. Vercingetoidx did not pursue. 

One cannot refrain from contrasting this assault on (xer- 
govia with some of Alexander’s,—as, e. g., the Rock of 
Cliorienes, or Aornus, or the city of the Malli. The energy 
of Hannibal, one of whose weak points was his conduct of 
sieges, in more than one instance — as at Saguntum — stands 
out in marked relief from the lack of vigor here exhibited by 
Caesar. And we have to judge Hannibal from the accounts 
of his enemies; Caesar, by his own statements. 

Nor is this the only similar case. We shall see how he 
paused at Thapsus, until his men took matters into their own 
hands. At Munda he stopped at the brook which separated 
him from Cnaeus Pompey. With all Caesar’s consummate 


RET RE A T. 


267 


strategic courage, and a personal bearing above reproach, he 
was wont to lack the tremendous vitality in tactical initiative 
which we admire so heartily in other captains. 

There are in other authors hints that this Gergovia affair 
is not accurately given by Caesar, but that a really serious 
defeat is explained away in a manner which would do justice 
to the report of a modern general. It is related by Servirus 
Maurus Honoratus that so marked was the defeat that Caesar 
was taken prisoner in the confusion, and only escaped by a 
lucky accident. Plutarch, indeed, says the Arverni had a 
sword captured from Caesar’s person, either here or at the 
battle preceding the siege of Alesia. However apochryphal 
these statements may be, Caesar was clearly compelled to 
give up the siege for want of success in his assault. The 
HDduan question had, however, become so pressing that he 
was no doubt wise, for that reason alone, in retiring from 
Gergovia. That it was the only place he had failed to take 
in the Gallic war abundantly condones the failure. 

Caesar moved east, and on the third day after the assault 
he reached the Elaver, and repairing the bridge over the 
river, perhaps at Yicliy, he retired to the right bank on the 
way to the territory of his former “kinsmen.” 

Caesar now deliberately took up the question of the ^Edui, 
the treachery of many of whose prominent men was apparent, 
despite the manner in which he had honored and protected 
them. The iEduan army, under Viridomarus and Eporedo- 
rix, probably disgusted at the late defeat, was leaving for 
home, and “Litivacus had set out with all the cavalry to 
raise the iEdui,” but Caesar made no effort to retain them. 
He merely represented to them how he had found the iEdui 
at the mercy of their neighbors and had placed them in the 
highest position of any tribe in Gaul, and left them to draw 
the inference. 


268 


JEDUAN REVOLT. 


Caesar had collected a large amount of baggage, corn, 
horses and all his hostages in Noviodunum (Nevers), a town 
of the iEdui on the Liger. When the iEduan army came to 
this place, they found that the chief men of the state had 

sent to Vercingetorix to 
negotiate a peace, and 
that the Roman alliance 
had been thrown over. 
This act still more con¬ 
firms the idea of a seri¬ 
ous defeat at Gergovia. 
Not willing to neglect 
so favorable an opportu¬ 
nity for regaining their 
independence, Eporedo- 
rix and Yiridomarus 
seized and massacred 
the garrison of Novio¬ 
dunum and all its trad¬ 
ers, divided the 
sent the hostages to Bi- 
bracte, drove off the re¬ 
serve horses which Cae¬ 
sar had got from Italy 
and Spain for remounts, 
and burned the town, 
together with all the 
Gergovia to Agendicum. corn they could not 

carry away. They then placed troops at the fords of the 
Liger to prevent the Romans from crossing. They hoped 
to force Caesar by lack of provisions to retire to the Nar- 
bonese. They would then have Labienus, who was at Lute- 
tia, at their mercy. 





CAESAR AT HIS BEST. 


269 


Learning of these things on the march from the Elaver 
towards the Liger, Caesar saw that he was in a very dan¬ 
gerous position. His enemies were in high spirits at his late 
defeat; he was surrounded by troops in revolt — the victori¬ 
ous Arverni were on his rear, the iEdui in his front holding 
the Liger, the Bituriges on his left. But he also saw that 
it would be a shameful as well as a perilous thing to allow 
himself to be driven back to the Province, for this would iso¬ 
late Labienus. He proposed, come what might, to go to the 
bottom of the matter, join Labienus, and punish the traitors 
at their own threshold. 

Here we have Caesar at his best. No one ever rose to the 
occasion more splendidly than this captain. The graver the 
danger, the bolder the front this great man presented to it. 
At times Caesar appeared to lack a certain spirit of enter¬ 
prise, in which Alexander and Napoleon excelled. But once 
put impending disaster before him, and no general ever 
proved himself more energetic, more able. 

Caesar made speed to reach the Liger, and sought a ford. 
At modern Bourbon-Lancy there has always been one; it 
was on his direct road; and though this ford was not what 
he could have desired, it was the only one he could secure. 
He drove off the enemy and crossed, the legionaries being up 
to their armpits in water, but having the current broken for 
them by stationing cavalry obliquely in the water above 
them. On the other side he found corn — for the harvest 
was at hand —and cattle, and refreshed his troops. He 
then marched rapidly to the land of the Senones to join 
Labienus. It was still early in the year. 


XVIII. 


LABIENUS’ CAMPAIGN. SPRING, 52 B. C. 

Labienus had been conducting a campaign against the Parisii. He reached 
Lutetia, but shortly heard of Caesar’s failure before Gergovia. He was opposed 
by Camulogenus, an able man, and saw that he could not safely retire, as he 
ought to do, towards Caesar, without first imposing on the enemy. This he did 
in a bold and well-planned battle, and promptly retreated to Agendicum. The 
jiEduan rebellion practically cut Caesar off from his lieutenant; and Vercinget- 
orix was all the more active since Caesar’s defeat at Gergovia. But by a bold 
march northward, Caesar made a junction with Labienus, and thus reunited 
his eleven legions in one body. His manifest policy was now to push for the 
Province, from which he was cut off, reestablish his base securely, and again 
advance on the Gallic allies. He set out by the most promising route. Ver- 
cingetorix believed the moment to have come for a coup de grace. He gave up 
his policy of small-war, and intercepted Caesar on the way. But in the ensuing 
battle the Romans won, and Vercingetorix retired to Alesia, the last and main 
stronghold of the Gauls. This victory reopened Caesar’s communications with 
the Province, and he followed the Gauls to Alesia. 

During Caesar’s Gergovia campaign Labienus had marched 
on Lutetia of the Parisii with four legions, having left a 
suitable force of new recruits from Italy with his ba^ao'e 
and victuals at Agendicum. He marched down the left 
bank of the Icauna (Yonne) and the Sequana. A large army 
from the neighboring states assembled to oppose him as soon 
as his arrival was known. The town of Lutetia occupied 
the island in the Seine where now stands Notre Dame de 
Paris. The chief command had been given to an aged but 
excellent soldier named Camulogenus. This officer, perceiv¬ 
ing that Labienus was marching along the left bank, camped 
and drew up his army near a neighboring marsh. This was 


LABIENUS AT LUTETIA. 


271 

unquestionably where the Esonne flows into the Seine. It 
could not have been Le Marais, a part of Paris, as has been 

claimed. His position prevented the Romans from advan- 

* 



cing. Labienus tried to make a road across the marsh by 
using hurdles and branches, a sort of corduroy-road, but 
failed in the attempt. 

He then resorted to stratagem, and sought to steal a march 



272 


IN DIFFICULTY. 


on Camulogenus by a flank manoeuvre. Pie marched back at 
night by the way he came, along the left bank, on which he 
had so far been, to Melodunum (Melon), which was likewise 
on an island in the Seine. Here, by seizing boats, he crossed 
the left branch of the river to the island, captured the town 
and, having repaired the bridge which led to the right bank, 
moved down on the other side towards Lutetia. He reached 
the latter oppidum before Camulogenus, who did not at once 
see through Labienus* manoeuvre. But his delay was not 
long. He soon followed the Roman army. On his arrival 
he ordered Lutetia to be set on fire and its bridges to be 
destroyed. The two armies camped on either bank of the 
Sequana opposite the city. 

Labienus now heard of Caesar’s ill success at Gergovia, 
and the Gauls added to the story that his chief had been 
forced back to the Province by hunger. The near-by Bello- 
vaci, hearing of the revolt of the .ZEdui, assembled forces for 
war. Labienus was thus placed with this inimical tribe on 
one side, only separated from him by the Isara, and with the 
Sequana and the Parisii, on the other side. Pie was cut off 
from his depots at Agendicum, which was on the farther 
bank of the Sequana, and from the road to it leading up the 
left bank, the way he had advanced. He very properly 
thought it of no use to attempt to reduce the Parisii under 
these adverse conditions, but deemed that he had best retire 
towards his base and seek to preserve his army intact for 
Caesar. Single-handed, he could not suppress the insur¬ 
rection. 

In order to escape from his awkward situation, Labienus 
must recross to the left bank of the Sequana. To accomplish 
this in face of the army which was still on the other side and 
would oppose his passage, required ruse. To retrace his 
steps was to invite Camulogenus to oppose his crossing at 


ABLE MEASURES. 


273 


Melodunum, and his boats would be hard to get so far up 
the river. A slow process would not accomplish his end. 
Labienus was a good soldier and a bold. He saw that it was 
safer to impose on the enemy by daring than to encourage 
him by a retreat, which would convey the idea of weakness. 
He called his lieutenants together and impressed their task 



upon them. He placed the boats which he had brought from 
Melodunum under trusted Roman knights and ordered them 

quietly to fall down the river about four miles at an early 

• 

hour of the night. He left a force of five steady cohorts in 
camp; the other five cohorts of the same legion he ordered up 
the river and sent some boats with them, instructing them 
to proceed in a noisy manner, to lead the enemy to suppose 
that he was marching that way. His other three legions he 
led downstream to the boats and crossed them unperceived 
under cover of a storm. This was probably near modern 
Point du Joir. The Gallic posts were sheltering themselves 
from the weather, and were easily dispersed. 




274 


VICTORY WELL EARNED. 


Not knowing wliat Labienus was doing, but learning of 
these three parties, the enemy drew the inference that 
Labienus was trying to steal away in detachments, hoping 
that some might be saved by the sacrifice of the rest, and 
determined to capture all three. They broke up into three 
divisions, sending part up and part down the river, and leav¬ 
ing a part in camp. Camulogenus led the party which went 
down the river. By daylight the Romans were across, drew 
up in line and fell smartly upon the Gauls, who encountered 
them with equal boldness. The Seventh legion on the right 
at once routed the force opposed to it, but the Twelfth legion 
on the left, though it inflicted heavy loss on the barbarians, 
who were under the eye of their chief, was unable to break 
their ranks until the Seventh legion wheeled to the right and 
took them in flank and rear, and the cavalry rode them down. 
Even then the Gauls stood their ground until they were cut 
to pieces. The party in the camp, at the sound of battle, 
marched towards its chief, and took position on a hill (per¬ 
haps Vaugiraud). But they could not hold it. The cavalry 
cut down all who did not reach the woods. Camulogenus 
was killed. The detached forces of the enemy were next 
dispersed; and Labienus, having drawn in his own detach¬ 
ments, marched to Agendieum, where the baggage had been 
left. From here he moved towards Caesar. 

This campaign proves Labienus to have been an able 
officer. His manoeuvring was excellent in every respect. It 
is a grievous pity that the latter part of his military career 
was clouded with ingratitude to his former chief. Under 
Caesar’s control, Labienus did far better work than he later 
did when opposed to Caesar. 

The revolt of the ^Edui, the outbreak of which was an 
immediate consequence of the Gergovia defeat, gave a dan¬ 
gerous aspect to the war, for this people was all the more 


THE PROVINCE IN DANGER. 


275 

influential as having been long under Roman control. In 
order to terrify the neighboring tribes into joining the war, 
they murdered the hostages Caesar had committed to their 
keeping, and threatened to do the like by those of such 
nations as did not join them. They were all the more de¬ 
termined now that they had broken loose. A council of all 
Gaul was summoned to Bibracte. All but the Remi, Lin- 
gones and Treviri came. Here the iEdui claimed the chief 
command; but it was given by universal choice to Vercin- 
getorix, to whom, in consequence, the ^Eduan chiefs gave 
half-hearted support. 

Vercingetorix exacted hostages from the allies, and ordered 
a general levy of cavalry, to the number of fifteen thousand, 
which he used as body-guard. Of infantry he already had 
an abundance. All Gaul had risen, save only the Remi and 
their clients, the Suessiones, Leuci and Lingones. It was 
the only occasion when the entire country was in arms. Ver¬ 
cingetorix proposed to continue his cunctatory policy of 
harassing the Romans and keeping them from obtaining 
corn; and advised the allies again to set fire to the crops 
and houses and thus to hamper Caesar, as they had done 
before. An iEduan and Segusian army of ten thousand foot 
and eight hundred horse under Eporedorix, he sent against 
the Allobroges; some of the Arvernian tribes and the Gabali 
he sent into the land of the Helvii, in the Province, to de¬ 
vastate it; the Ruteni and Cadurci he sent against the Volcae 
Arecomici, hoping to tamper with some of the tribes in the 
Province. He tried to gain over the Allobroges by flattery 
and promises. 

The only force in the Province to oppose this host con¬ 
sisted of twenty-two cohorts put in the field by the legate 
Lucius Caesar. The Helvii were defeated by the enemy and 
driven within walls, with loss of many of their leading men; 



276 


RAISING THE LEGIONS. 


but the Allobroges held their boundary, the line of the 
Rhone, by a multitude of posts. 

Knowing how large the enemy’s force of cavalry had grown 
to be, Caesar was obliged to send to Germany, to those tribes 
he had rendered tributary, to increase his own squadrons, as 
the peculiar warfare waged by the barbarians made this arm 
one on which at all times great reliance could be placed, and 
which sometimes was indispensable. In this effort he suc¬ 
ceeded, and raised beyond the Rhine, in the states he had so 
far subdued, a most excellent though small body of cavalry, 
perhaps one thousand men, which he mixed with light troops. 
To add to its efficiency, as their horses were of poor quality, 
he dismounted the tribunes, knights and evocati, and gave 
their horses to the Germans. This was a radical measure, 
but Caesar never stopped halfway; nor was this the time to 
do so. 

After crossing the Liger on his way from Gergovia, Caesar 
apparently directed his march due north to join Labienus, 
who, when he had defeated Camulogenus, had made his way 
towards his chief. Not far south of Agendicum, the captain 
and lieutenant met. The enemy’s plan to divide the Romans 
had failed. 

Caesar now had eleven legions, the First, Sixth, Sev¬ 
enth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, Twelfth, Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth. The First was the one lent by 
Pompey. In 58 b. c. Caesar had six legions, the Seventh, 
Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, Twelfth. In 57 B. c. two 
new ones were raised, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth. In 
the winter of 55-54 B. c. he got five cohorts more. He 
lost at Aduatuca fifteen cohorts, a legion and a half, but in 
53 B. c. he raised three more legions, i. e., the new First, 
Fourteenth and the Fifteenth. Later the First and Fif¬ 
teenth were lent to Pompey, and the Fifteenth became the 


RETREAT TO PROVINCE. 


277 


Third. The legions were usually four to five thousand men 
strong. When reduced, they were so soon as possible 
recruited up to standard. When Caesar raised new levies, 
they were not generally made into new legions, but were 
distributed among the old ones. These legions, during the 
Gallic War, were thus about fifty thousand strong. Caesar 
had also some twenty thousand Gallic, Cretan or Numidian 
light troops, and five thousand cavalry, of which one thou¬ 
sand were Germans; a total of seventy-five thousand men. 
This is an estimate, but it is not far from accurate. Later, 
in the Civil War, the legions were more depleted, the aver¬ 
age being not much over three thousand men. 

Having made his junction with Labienus, Caesar deemed it 
essential to direct his march as speedily as possible on his 
base. He could not move south, straight towards the Prov¬ 
ince, because the iEdui lay between him and it, and they 
were in insurrection. He moved through the land of the 
Lingones to the east, and then heading south, purposed to 
make his way through the territory of the Sequani towards 
the Province. He had a good storehouse and intermediate 
base, should he require it, at Vesontio. He followed the 
same route he had pursued when going to meet Ariovistus, 
and when moving from Vienna to Agendicum. He intended 
to march up the valley of the Vingeanne and cross the Arar, 
on his way to Vesontio. This is what the Commentaries 
mean by saying that he marched “through the confines of 
the Lingones into the country of the Sequani, in order that 
he might the more easily render aid to the Province.” 

Caesar’s purpose in regaining the Province was not only 
to be able to protect this almost Roman territory; but, 
foreseeing that the uprising would probably be general, he 
preferred to base himself afresh on what was unquestionably 
a safe place of retreat, and the only place from which he 



278 


THE GAULS RISK BATTLE, 


could be certain to obtain victual, — in other words, to make 
a fresh start for the conquest of Gaul. 

Meanwhile, Vercingetorix, after driving Caesar from Ger- 
govia, had concentrated his forces, some eighty thousand 



men, near Bibracte, and had moved up and encamped on the 
road he divined the Homans would pursue. He placed his 
army so as to bar Caesar’s passage through tlie land of the 
Sequani. He camped at a fork in the roads in three divi¬ 
sions, each covering one of the paths Caesar might choose 
towards the Arar and Vesontio. Caesar marched to within 
ten miles of his enemy, ignorant of his presence. 


CJESAR SURPRISED. 


279 


Vercingetorix’ position on the modern heights of Sac- 
quenay was very strong. The heights bulged out in three 
promontories, so to speak, on each one of which lay a third 
of Vercingetorix’ army. The right flank of his army thus 
rested on the Vingeanne. The Badin brook was in its front. 

That this is the field of battle seems to be proven by the 
tumuli of the region, which contain skeletons identified from 
their ornaments as Gallic, and by the horseshoes, still occa¬ 
sionally dug up by the peasants. Moreover, it suits the 
distance from Alesia given by the Commentaries. 

Calling a council of war, Vercingetorix declared to the 
chiefs that now was the moment forever to put down Roman 
tyranny, as even at that moment the enemy was flying to 
the Province. If he reached it, he would return with even 
larger forces; if destroyed without delay, which he could be 
if attacked on the march, no Roman would ever return. He 
especially encouraged his mounted troops, and the men of 
this body bound themselves by solemn oath to deprive of all 
his rights any soldier who did not ride twice through and 
through the Roman armv. 

While Vercingetorix was camping on the heights of 
Sacquenay, Caesar kept on his march up the Vingeanne, 
camping near Longeau. Next day, Vercingetorix moved his 
foot up to the Badin and sent out his cavalry to attack Caesar 
as he should debouch on the plain north of the brook. The 
Gallic cavalry was divided into three bodies. Of these one 
was to attack each flank of the Roman army and one the 
head of column. As Caesar reached the plain, he saw 
Vercingetorix’ central division of cavalry opposite his own 
head of column. Shortly the other two columns appeared on 
its right and left. He was taken by surprise. 

Csesar had not anticipated this attack, but he was march¬ 
ing with care and with his troops well in hand. He met 



280 


GALLANT CAVALRY. 


the attack by ordering out three bodies of his own cavalry. 
He called a halt, collected his baggage, and drew up the 
army in battle order, probably in three lines of legions, a 



sort of square, for “the baggage was received within the 
ranks of the legions.” Whenever the horse seemed hard 
pressed, Caesar supported it by an advance of infantry, and 
by making a sharp demonstration in that quarter, and thus 
kept up the courage of the fighting line. The affair was 
only a cavalry fight; Caesar’s cavalry was supported by his 



THE GAULS DEFEATED. 


281 


foot, which was near at hand. Vercingetorix’ foot was not 
put in at all. After considerable skirmishing, the German 
cavalry on Caesar’s right got possession of the hill of 
Montsaugeon, drove the Gallic horse from it, and pursuing 
it to the infantry at the Badin, produced such demoralization 
as to weaken the other columns of the enemy’s cavalry, 
which, thus taken in reverse, precipitately retired from the 
field. This retreat enabled Caesar’s horse to kill many and 
capture more prisoners; among them Eporedorix and two 
other noted iEduan chiefs, Cotus commanding the cavalry, 
and Cavarillus commanding the foot. 

This check was a serious blow to the prestige of Vercin¬ 
getorix, and determined him to retire to Alesia (Mont 
Auxois) with his infantry and the baggage from his camp. 
Caesar followed up his advantage, parked his baggage on 
a hill near by, and by pursuing the retreating Gauls, in¬ 
flicted a loss of three thousand men on the enemy’s rear¬ 
guard. Vercingetorix was wise enough not to return to his 
camps on the hills of Sacquenay. Had he done so, Caesar 
could have cut him off from Alesia. But he risked his 
baggage to secure Alesia, which latter he did by moving at 
once by his left to the town. His baggage hurried thither 
by a parallel road farther to the south. Caesar, as it hap¬ 
pened, made no effort to capture it. 

Vercingetorix had been unwise in the last degree to give 
up his system of small-war. We do not know how much he 
was impelled to do this by the insistence of those who did not 
appreciate his Fabian policy. So long as he pursued this 
method, he might be more than a match for Caesar’s army. 
A fighting machine can accomplish little unless it can fight, 
and meanwhile it must subsist. But Vercingetorix should 
have known that he could not meet the well-drilled legion¬ 
aries in the open, especially when commanded by Caesar in 



282 


CAESAR'S STRATEGY CHANGES. 


person, and that Caesar’s German liorse, manoeuvred under 
his direction, would be more than a match for his own. 

Caesar, in this movement, showed distinctly his great qual¬ 
ities. Having drawn in the forces of Labienus, his one 
object was to reach the Province, from which he was now 
cut off, drive from its borders the hosts of hostiles which 
were threatening it, and thence make a fresh start. He pro¬ 
posed that no obstacle should obstruct him in his march. 
Yercingetorix could not have attacked him at a less oppor¬ 
tune moment. Nor when met by Yercingetorix, had Caesar 
any idea of fighting on the defensive. He at once undertook 
a sharp offensive. He sustained his cavalry handsomely, and 
by his able manoeuvres carried off a victory vastly more 
important in its moral effect than in its dimensions. For 
the affair itself was only a cavalry combat, and scarcely rose 
to the dignity of an engagement. 

When Yercingetorix retired towards Alesia, the road to 
the Province was thereby opened to Caesar. There was no 
more need for him to fray a path through the enemy’s lines 
to his base. He could now rely on the fact that Yercinget¬ 
orix would recall his outlying forces which were threatening 
the Province, or that the cohorts there would be able to 
defend themselves. He decided not to continue his march 
to his base, but to march directly upon the enemy’s army. 
There was no fear for his communications. He might at 
once pass over into a sharp offensive. 



Gallic Sword. 



XIX. 


THE SIEGE OF ALESIA. SUMMER AND FALL OF 

52 B. C. 

The siege of Alesia was foreseen by both parties to be the final act in the 
struggle. Yercingetorix retired into the city with his army, eighty thousand 
strong; Caesar sat down before it with sixty thousand men, and began to draw 
his lines of contravallation. Meanwhile cavalry skirmishes were frequent. 
Yercingetorix had provisions for thirty days ; he sent away his cavalry, and by 
them word to the allies that before that period was past he must be rescued or 
surrender. Caesar set to woi’k on his defenses. These were strongest at the 
western approaches, where there was a large plain. Aware that an army of 
relief would speedily come, lines of circumvallation were added. The works 
were singularly complete, and skillfully adapted to the ground. After about 
six weeks, an immense army of relief did, in fact, come up, numbering nearly 
a quarter of a million of men. This shortly attacked, and Yercingetorix from 
within lent his aid. But the attack was partial and did not succeed. A second 
attack had no better result. The Romans held their own. The failure of 
these two attacks did much to depress the Gauls. 

On the day but one (altero die) after the battle of the 
Vingeanne, Caesar reached Alesia, and determined upon its 
siege. This siege is one of the most notable of antiquity, 
and shows Caesar’s genius in high relief. The stronghold 
lay on an isolated hill (Mt. Auxois), or rather an elevated 
oval plateau, one and a quarter miles long east and west, by 
a half mile wide at the centre north and south, five hundred 
feet above the surrounding valleys, in the confluence of two 
of the small tributaries of the upper Sequana, the Lutosa 
(Ose) and Osera (Oserain) which bounded it on north and 
south. In front of the town to the west was a plain over 
three miles in length north and south — now called the 



< 




DIFFIC UL TIES 0 VERRA TED . 


285 


Plaine des Laumes — bisected by the Oserain and a little 
brook. Around the town on the three other sides, north, 
east and south, at the distance of a mile or so measured from 
the edges of the plateau, was a line of hills of about equal 
height as Mt. Auxois, separated each from the other by 
smoothly sloping valleys. There were springs on the pla¬ 
teau and many wells. The streams at the foot of the hill of 
Alesia were accessible by paths. The grade up the hill was 
easy, but at the top was a wall of rock interrupted at inter¬ 
vals, but on the whole steep and impracticable to assault. 

It has been the habit of most authors to overrate the 
difficulties of the position at Alesia. It is a sort of pocket 
edition of Gergovia. While the slopes are unquestionably 
easier to-day than they were in Caesar’s time, made so by the 
continuous labors of sixty generations of farmers, yet the 
ground itself can have changed comparatively little. This 
is abundantly demonstrated by the excavations of Caesar’s 
lines; and though the position of Alesia, considered in the 
light of ancient warfare, was very strong, it was by no means 
inexpugnable. The place could readily be taken along the 
neck of land leading from the heights on the southeast, 
which was a sort of a natural siege-mound. Caesar’s real 
difficulty lay in his knowledge of the fact that all Gaul would 
join hands in sending an army of relief before he could take 
the place by regular approaches. 

The Roman army approached from the east, south of Mt. 
Bussy. The Gauls were encamped on the east of the town 
under the walls, with a trench and stone wall six feet high 
(z) as defense. This was their weak spot, and here they 
expected the struggle. They had prolonged their wall down 
hill to the streams on either hand; and because this wall 
could be readily taken in reverse, they had made a double 
crotchet at either end. On reconnoitring the place, Caesar 


286 


AN ODD SIEGE. 


deemed it inexpedient to attempt to carry it by storm, from 
the number of its defenders and especially in view of his 
recent failure at Gergovia; but that it might be starved out 
by a complete investment he believed. He no doubt appre¬ 
ciated the advantages of moving along the neck on the south¬ 
east; but having decided on a siege and not an assault, he 
threw his decision in favor of an approach from the west at 
the plain. He manifestly desired to shut in Yercingetorix, 
and he made his chief works where the position was weakest. 

He had eleven legions, a scant fifty thousand men, five 
thousand Gallic and German horse, and perhaps ten thou¬ 
sand Gallic and other auxiliary foot. Yercingetorix is said 
to have had eighty thousand men. This has been doubted 
by many critics on account of the small size of the plateau 
and consequent lack of space to hold so large a body. But 
according to all the accounts, Caesar was undertaking with 
sixty to seventy thousand men to besiege eighty thousand. 
In all eras, a force less than twice that of the besieged has 
been considered too small to predicate success. But the 
question of number adds to or detracts little from the abil¬ 
ity, boldness and far-reaching results of this noted siege. 
It is probable that Caesar had made up his mind that here 
was his last chance. Another failure would mean such en¬ 
couragement of the Gauls as to prejudice his entire cam¬ 
paign. This must not be another Gergovia failure. 

Caesar’s first step was to seize all the hills on the north, 
east and south, place thereon suitable detachments, and de¬ 
termine where the lines of contravallation should run. The 
cavalry was established near the watercourses; the infantry 
on the hilltops. He then began along the slope of the hills, 
from point to point, the erection of intrenchments which 
were eleven miles in length. The camps were protected by 
twenty-three square and high earthwork redoubts near the 


Alesia, from the South. 


















































288 


THE CAMPS. 


foot of the slopes, and these were well guarded to prevent 
sallies, being held by day by small posts, at night by forces 
which bivouacked in them. The redoubts were as usual the 
first defenses constructed, and were later joined by lines of 
earthworks. 

There appear to have been four infantry camps, two (A 
and B) on the hilltop south of Alesia, one on the hill north¬ 
east (C), one on the hill northwest (D). The topography 
dictated the shape of these camps; the intrenchments com¬ 
manded the ground in their front. The naturally weak side 
was made the stronger by art; the camp A, for instance, had 
three lines on the south front. It may have been Ciesar’s 
headquarters. The camp B was larger. The debouches of 
the camps were all towards Alesia. The ditches of D were 
excavated and found full of relics, coins and weapons, bones 
and helmets, collars and rings. Four cavalry camps, three 
in the big plain (H, I, K), one north of Alesia (G), have 
been found. Their ditches were less deep than those of the 
infantry camps. Of the twenty-three castella, five have 
been exhumed, 10, 11, 15, 18, 22. These are, no doubt, 
the stoutest ones that were made. The others were presum¬ 
ably mere block-houses, which have disappeared. The 
probable positions of the other eighteen are indicated by the 
topography. 

The work on the lines had hardly been begun, when a 
cavalry action was brought about by Vercingetorix, who 
advanced into the open plain to the west. The fighting was 
obstinate. The Roman horse was at first unsuccessful. 
But the Roman infantry was ordered into line in front of 
the camps to forestall a sally from the town by its imposing 
front. Reanimated by the presence of the legions, which 
they had learned in the late battle could be relied on to 
sustain them heartily, the German horse took courage, 


Alesia, from the Northeast. 







































290 


THIRTY DAYS' RATIONS. 


redoubled the vigor of its charges, put the enemy’s horse to 
flight, and pursued them to the gates of the intrenchments. 
Caesar advanced the infantry at the proper moment, and this 
demonstration increased the rout. The Gauls endeavored to 
retire into the town, but Vercingetorix ordered the gates to 
be shut, so that the camp outside the city proper should not 
be left undefended. Many Gauls sought to climb the ditch 
and wall but failed. After inflicting a heavy loss on the 
enemy the Roman allied horse withdrew. It will be noted 
with curiosity how many of the engagements of the Gallic 
war were mere combats of cavalry. This arm did Caesar 
good service; and yet it was never used like the “Compan¬ 
ions ” or the Numidian horse. 

Vercingetorix now saw that a siege was inevitable. Still 
he was not bold enough to cut his way out before it was too 
late. He feared again to encounter the legionaries in the 
open; but he had strong hopes that this siege might result 
like the one of Gergovia, and determined to abide by the 
result. The position was, if anything, stronger. He sent 
away his fifteen thousand cavalry one night in the second 
watch, before the lines of contravallation were completed, 
not only because he was unable to provide forage for them, 
but particularly because he desired these men to visit and 
arouse all the tribes to his aid. The squadrons escaped up 
the valleys of the two rivers. Vercingetorix sent word by 
them that he and his sixty-five thousand foot had beef and 
corn for thirty days, which, by good management, might be 
made to last a trifle longer, and that they must have succor 
before the expiration of that time, or else Alesia and the 
whole cause would fall together. He then withdrew all the 
forces to the plateau, and took into his own hands the distri¬ 
bution of rations. He divided the cattle, but kept the corn 
for regular issue. It remains a question as to whether sixty- 


INTRENCHMENTS CONTINUED. 


291 


five thousand men could actually crowd into the small limits 
of the place. The old city walls have in places been found. 
By close camping it might be done; and the barbarians were 
used to herding together in a very small space. Vercin- 
getorix was now inclosed in a town whose well constructed 
walls rested on the edge of a cliff of stone which may have 
stood forty to sixty feet above the slope of the ground as it 
rises from the valley. This is the character, more or less 
marked, of all of the surrounding plateaux. Part of the 
slope and of the edge of the plateau was wooded or covered 
with bushes. Except from the neck of land on the east, 
nothing but hunger was apt to drive him out. He had a 
water-supply on the plateau. But his mouths were many. 
His main reliance was on the arrival of an army of relief. 

Caesar went at the business of the siege in the most work¬ 
manlike manner despite its exceptional difficulties. The 
earth in some places was rocky and unsuited to intrench- 
ments, and the land was, no doubt, rougher than it is to-day. 
As Vercingetorix could escape only by the plain or up one 
of the north ravines, Caesar devoted most of his attention to 
fortifying at these points. On the other sides the ground 
was in itself a defense, and less was needed. While the 
men were at work they had constantly to be protected by out¬ 
lying guards of light troops against the sallies of the gar¬ 
rison, which were many and fierce. 

Caesar’s preparations were on a remarkable scale of mag¬ 
nitude. He dug a trench on the west side of the town twenty 
feet deep and wide, with perpendicular sides, to protect the 
building of his other works (f). This trench was four 
hundred feet in front of the main line of contravallation, at 
the foot of the slope at the west end of the oppidum, and 
stretched from one stream to the other. It both prevented 
sudden sallies and left the regular lines beyond the throw of 



Profile of Work. 




































SEVERE LABOR. 


293 


javelins. The earth from the trench was piled up behind it. 
In front of the main line of works came two other trenches; 
first one trench (g) on low ground, fifteen feet wide and 
deep, which he located so as to be readily filled with water 
from the Osera. It now shows only eight or nine feet deep. 
Then back of it another equally big, dry trench on the same 
level. These ditches continued half a mile south of the 
Osera up the slope of the hill on the south. Thence the 
ditch was single. Back of these a rampart (agger) and wall 
( vallum ) twelve feet high. The top of this wall had a par¬ 
apet of hurdles ( lorica ) and battlements (pinna) and the top 
of the rampart was provided with stakes “like stags’ horns,” 
projecting outward and downward so as to hinder scalers, 



Face of Work. 


and was armed with towers eighty feet apart. When the 
length of the line is considered, — the front thus protected 
was over a mile and a half long, — this was indeed a fine 
piece of work. Caesar’s legionaries handled the pick and 
spade as effectively as the pilum and gladius. 

Performing all this work and foraging for corn at the 
same time made the duties severe on the men; and so long a 
line really needed more force than Caesar had at command. 
There were but three men per metre front; or if the men 
were all continuously on duty in three reliefs, there was but 















































294 


NOVEL ENTANGLEMENTS. 


one man per metre front, and no reserves to draw on. The 
enemy made many assaults or demonstrations during the 
progress of the work, which added to the annoyance. For 
this reason Caesar deemed the defenses not yet strong enough. 
He wanted to make them such that a small body of men 
could defend them, so that he could detach at need the bulk 
of his command to other points. The undertaking was one 
which demanded every possible aid from art, and he did not 
cease one instant from perfecting his lines. He devised 
several kinds of obstacles against sallies and drew up still 
another threefold line of entanglements. Five rows of 
slanting trenches, five feet deep, were dug, and sharpened 

branches like abatis sunk in 
the bottom. The men called 




these cippi . These five rows 
of cippi were close together, 
so that the abatis could be 
interlaced. Eight rows of 
conical pits ( scrobes ) three 
feet deep and three feet apart were placed checkerwise, each 
with a fire-hardened sharp stake as thick as one’s thigh at 
the bottom, and the surface covered with osiers and twiars. 

O 

These wolf-pits with stakes were nicknamed “lilies.” Many 
of these trous cle loup have been found. In front of these 
were sunk stakes close together, armed with iron hooks 
called stimuli (spurs), somewhat resembling huge fishing 
tackle. The fact that the Komans gave these devices new 
names looks as if they had not been previously used. 

Outside this vast line of contravallation and two hundred 
yards back, Caesar drew another similar line of circumvalla- 
tion (x) to provide defense against the Gauls who would cer¬ 
tainly soon arrive to raise the siege. These latter works 
covered an area of fourteen miles in circumference. The 






THE CAMPS. 


295 


defenses stopped at the perpendicular sides of the hills, and 
began again on the plateaux, as shown in the map. The 
line varied at places according to topography. Some author¬ 
ities have attempted to cast a doubt on the accuracy of the 
extent of these lines; but the Commentaries give the figures 
as eleven and fourteen miles, and they have been completely 
verified by modern excavations. These have proved very 
fruitful. Caesar’s intrenchments have been traced through 
their entire length, and many parts of the defenses plainly 
shown. There is no reason, if the work of an ancient histo¬ 
rian has come down to us intact, why, within the limits of 
his intelligence, his statements should not be as worthy of 
credit as those of an author of to-day. Caesar’s works at 
Alesia are clearly as described in the Commentaries. They 
are no more wonderful than those of Vicksburg or of Peters¬ 
burg. Unlimited numbers of men at work always accom¬ 
plish wonders. To man these works facing both ways, Caesar 
had in three reliefs but two men per five metres front. 

Caesar’s defenses, immense as were their dimensions, were 
completed in about forty days. Despite their hardships, the 
legionaries worked with the best of good will. Caesar said 
in later days that he could have overturned the heavens with 
such men. At Rome his friends were wont to say that 
scarcely a mortal man could imagine, none but a god execute 
such a work; his enemies, for once, were silenced. 

It is probable that camp D had two legions. The size of 
the others leads one to place one legion in A, two in B, three 
in C, in all eight. The other three were in castella. The 
eleven-mile circuit was the line of the camps and redoubts. 

Having completed this extraordinary task, each man was 
ordered to lay in provisions for thirty days, so as to reduce 
the danger due to foraging, and to provide against their 
being themselves blockaded by the army of relief. 


296 


HUGE ARMY OF RELIEF. 


Acting on tlie message of Vercingetorix sept out by his 
retiring cavalry, the Gauls immediately convened an assem¬ 
bly, probably at Bibraete, and decreed, from ali. the states, a 
levy, not a general but a specified levy, lest i;oo large an 
army should be hard to ration, — two hundred and forty 
thousand foot, and eight thousand horse in all. The paper 
strength was two hundred and eighty-three thousand. Even 
those Gauls whom Caesar had best treated now caught the 
national infection, revolted and put their best efforts at the 
service of the cause. The Bellovaci alone declined to send 
their contingent, but sent two thousand men as an act of 
friendship. They proposed to be subject to no control. The 
chief command of this enormous army was given to Commius 
the Atrebatian, the man Caesar had sent to Britain, Vercasi- 
velaunus the Arvernian, cousin to Vercingetorix, Viridoma- 
rus and Eporedorix the JEduan. How the latter escaped 
from imprisonment, for he was captured in the last battle, 
is not explained. A war council of members from each tribe 
was added to these chiefs. Full of confidence, as well it 
might be, for to barbarians strength resides solely in num¬ 
bers, this huge army rendezvoused on TEduan soil, and 
marched to Alesia, imagining that the Romans could not, 
for a moment, withstand such a multitude, especially when 
sallies should also be made from within. 

Not aware of the speedy arrival of this army, the besieged 
were already at a loss what to do. Six weeks had elapsed 
since Vercingetorix sent out his message, and he then had 
barely corn for thirty days. Starvation was at hand. It 
was proposed by Cirtognatus, an Arvernian, to eat the use¬ 
less soldiers and inhabitants; but this yielded to a project 
to send them away. The whole population (Mandubii) was 
accordingly marched out; but the Romans declined to receive 
them even as slaves, and drove them back into the city. 


FIRS7' ATTACK FAILS. 


297 


Commius and the great army finally, reached the Roman 
lines, and, camping on the heights southwest of the town, 
within a mile of Caesar’s lines, led out their cavalry the very 
next day to the large plain, where it was supported hy their 
infantry on the hills at their back. It covered the entire 
plain. Every movement could be distinctly seen from 
Alesia. Vercingetorix responded by marshaling his own 
army outside the city walls and making ready to sustain any 
assault by the relieving force. He had prepared great num¬ 
bers of hurdles to fill up the trenches and cover the entangle¬ 
ments. 

Vercingetorix’ troops advanced. They had actually be¬ 
gun to fill up the first ditch, and the affair promised to 
develop into a general engagement of infantry. Posting his 
forces on the walls facing both to the city and towards the 
army of relief, Caesar opened the action by sending in his 
German and Gallic allied cavalry. The enemy had light 
troops mixed with their cavalry, to lend it steadiness. In a 
short while the battle waxed hot, the Gauls feeling confident 
of victory from mere force of numbers, and urging on their 
men by yells and shouts. The people of Alesia encouraged 
their friends by equal clamor. The action lasted from noon 
till sundown. Vercingetorix did not push on, nor did the 
army of relief put in its foot. The action does not appear to 
have gone beyond a combat of cavalry aided by slingers and 
bowmen. Finally, after the cavalry of Caesar had been all 
but defeated, the Germans, rallying in column for a final 
effort, drove in the Gauls despite their numbers, and broke 
them up. Once fairly routed, they could not recover them¬ 
selves; Caesar’s squadrons pursued them to camp, killing 
many of the archers who were supporting them, and who 
could not so speedily get away. The forces from Alesia 
retired dejected. There had been no organized attack upon 


298 \ SECOND ATTACK. 

\ 

the intrenchments. \The prominent role played by the cav¬ 
alry in all Csesar’s wars shows that most of his battles were 
confined to a skirmishing contact. For pitched battle the 
legions alone were available. Caesar had no cavalry proper. 

The next day but one the army of relief again attacked, 
having, in the mean time, made a much greater number of 
hurdles, and provided themselves with scaling-ladders and 
wall-hooks. They selected midnight for the hour and deliv¬ 
ered the assault suddenly at the westerly plain. Their shouts 
aroused Vercingetorix and the forces in the town, who at 
once sallied forth to lend assistance to their friends outside. 
The Gauls, as best they might in the darkness, filled up the 
pits and trenches with fascines and hurdles, covering their 
operation with a fire of sling-stones and arrows. The 
Romans were fully alive to the necessities of the occasion. 
Each man knew his place. They sent for troops from those 
redoubts which were least exposed, to resist the onset where 
it was hottest. The legates Trebonius and Antonius brought 
up reinforcements. The Romans replied to the Gallic fire 
with arrows, sling-stones, hand-hurled stones of about a 
pound weight, of which they had gathered a large supply, 
and pointed stakes kept on the walls in reserve. The mili¬ 
tary engines also came into play. In the dark, shields were 
almost useless. While the enemy’s line was at a distance, 
the assault proved more harmful in loss to the Romans than 
when the barbarians neared the walls, for then many of them 
fell into the pits and trenches; this bred confusion and dis¬ 
may ; their aim grew wild, and their weapons inflicted little 
damage; the Romans, on the other hand, threw down their 
heavy siege pila from the intrenchments with deadly effect. 
Before long the vigor of the Gauls slackened. Finally, at 
daylight they conceived a fear of a demonstration on their 
uncovered right flank from the Roman lines on the hills 


IT ALSO FAILS. 


299 


south of the town, which, coupled to fatigue and loss of 
men, induced them to retire. Vercingetorix, from the town 
side, suffered equally from the entanglements. His men 
used up most of their time in filling the twenty-foot ditch, 
and did not get beyond it; and as daylight came on, seeing 
that the assault by the army of relief had failed, he also blew 
the signal to retire. 



Caesar, late in Gallic War. 
(British Museum.) 




XX. 


THE BATTLE OF ALESIA. FALL OF 52 B. C. 

The Gallic army of relief made a third and last assault on Caesar’s lines, 
after careful preparation. They skillfully probed the weakest spot in the 
Roman line, which was at the northwest camp, and made a violent attack on 
it with a chosen body of sixty thousand men. At the same moment the cav¬ 
alry made a demonstration at the western plain. The legions were put to it 
as never before to hold their own. Perceiving the attack by the army of relief, 
Vercingetorix moved against the lines from within. Caesar had an army equal 
to his own on either side of him, each delivering a desperate assault at the 
same moment, and with huge reserves in support. He himself was omnipres¬ 
ent and kept his men heartily to their work. The value of the defenses was 
now apparent. The Gauls could nowhere penetrate the line, though attacks 
were made at several places, and came dangerously close to success. Finally, 
by a well-timed sortie with the sword and a simultaneous cavalry charge on 
their flank, the Gauls were driven back, and discouraged at their threefold 
defeat, the army of relief retired ; Vercingetorix surrendered. The siege of 
Alesia practically sealed the doom of Gaul. 

The Gauls had now been defeated in two assaults. These, 
indeed, had been partial ones, but want of success had begun 
to discourage the men. The leaders distinctly foresaw fail¬ 
ure unless they could wrest a victory from the Romans in 
the next encounter. The Gallic character before the Chris¬ 
tian era is universally described as illy adapted to bear the 
strain of continued disaster. Commius proposed to make 
one more strong effort to break through Caesar’s lines, and 
the Gauls went to work systematically to discover the weakest 
part of the Roman walls. By inquiries of the country people 
they learned what were the troops and kinds of defenses at 
each point. 

On the northwest of the town was a hill which the 


ATTACK IN FORCE . 


301 


engineers liad not included in the circumvallation, on account 
of its area. They had been obliged to run the wall at its 
foot on comparatively low ground. Here was the camp D of 
two legions, under the legates Anstitius and Caninius. It 
was located on the steep slope of the hillside. Back of this 
point the Gallic chiefs decided to assemble sixty thousand 
men chosen from the tribes most noted for valor, and to 
attack on a given day at noon,—• Vercasivelaunus being 
given the command of the assaulting party. This force was 
moved at night by a circuit of a dozen miles to near the spot 
selected and was concealed under cover of the hill on its 
north slope. 

As noon approached, his men being well rested, fed and 
eager for the fray, Vercasivelaunus drew them up in order 
and marched rapidly against the Roman camp. There 
appear to have been some works on Mt. Rea; probably only 
an outpost. This body, at all events, was hustled out and 
the Gauls moved down the slope on camp D. At the same 
time, as agreed, the cavalry made a sharp demonstration 
upon the Roman defenses fronting the plain, sustained by an 
advance of the foot. Vercingetorix, in the town, was not 
slow to perceive what his countrymen were about, — he was 
constantly and anxiously on the outlook for their assault, — 
and sallied forth with all his implements, movable pent¬ 
houses, ladders, mural hooks and other tools, of which he had 
prepared a large supply for such an occasion. His attack 
was delivered opposite Vercasivelaunus, somewhat to the 
left. Thus, while at the plain the cavalry demonstration 
caused Caesar no little anxiety, two infantry armies, each 
nearly equal to the entire Roman force, were again attacking 
his lines front and rear on the side where perhaps he was 
weakest. The Roman forces were widely distributed, and it 
was hard to say what other part of the line might be 














THE ROMANS PUT TO IT. 


303 


attempted. In fact, Caesar could scarcely expect that with 
some three hundred thousand men the Gauls within and 
without would put into action less than half their force. 

The attack was sudden and severe. The Gauls, with every 
kind of expedient, pressed in on whatever part of the wall 
appeared most weak. They were evidently in earnest, and 
they fought as if they expected and meant to win. Their 
gallantry was consummate. Caesar had prepared several 
outlooks from which he could get a commanding view of the 
whole field. .In one of these he stationed himself, probably 
near the south end of the twenty-foot trench, and dispatched 
troops from place to place, wherever they seemed to be most 
needed. Each party was nerved up to do its best. The 
Gauls evidently felt this to be their last chance of freeing 
themselves from the hated Homan yoke; the Romans under¬ 
stood that this battle, if gained, would be the term of their 
labors. Moreover, they recognized their certain fate if they 
did not win. 

The brunt of the struggle came at the northwest camp, 
where, owing to the high ground above the Roman defenses, 
missiles could be more effectively hurled by the barbarians, 
and testudos put to use. Here, too, were the most renowned 
warriors, while at the main lines the Gauls were, however 
numerous, of no marked fighting quality. The abundant 
force at the northwest camp enabled the enemy to relieve the 
weary with fresh men at frequent intervals, and to heap 
mounds up against the Roman wall, which put them on a 
par with the legionaries. After some hours of combat the 
Roman soldiers at this point had used up all their missiles. 

Observing their distress, Caesar ordered Labienus with six 
cohorts from the northeast camp (C) to go to their relief, and 
if compelled to do so, to make a sally with the sword, while 
he himself repaired to the plain to encourage the troops. 


304 CAESAR’S ACTIVITY. 

The Gauls under Yercingetorix, within, in despair of effect¬ 
ing a lodgment in the Roman lines at the point where they 
had been fighting, made a fresh attempt on a more preci¬ 
pitous hut less guarded place, probably the foot of the south 
camp; and having brought engines and tools, which they 
used under cover of a storm of missiles, they succeeded in 
driving the defenders from the walls, in filling the ditches and 
tearing down the wattling cover of the palisades with mural 
hooks. To meet this new and threatening danger, Caesar 
dispatched Brutus with six cohorts to the point- assailed, and 
as this did not appear to suffice, followed him up by Fabius 
with seven more. Even this did not turn the tide; he was 
at last personally obliged to hurry to this point in order to 
rehabilitate the battle, a matter which he succeeded in 
accomplishing after some time and with considerable effort. 

As Labienus had been unable to hold the enemy in check 
at the northwest camp (D), Caesar sent a portion of his 
cavalry by a circuit outside the Avails, to debouch from the 
north ravine, file up along the slope of the hills, and attack 
the enemy in the rear. He himself, so soon as the assault of 
Yercingetorix had been beaten off, taking four cohorts and 
some horse, rushed to the support of Labienus. The latter, 
meanwhile, had drawn a large number of cohorts from the 
redoubts which could best spare them. The bulk of the 
barbarians, happily for Caesar, remained inactive in reserve. 
His arrival — which all the legionaries could see, for he 
wore the imperator’s robe, the purple 'paludamentum , over 
his armor — yielded the utmost encouragement to his men. 
They could always do wonders under the eye of Caesar. In 
their ardor they ceased the use of missiles and betook them¬ 
selves to the sword. 

At this moment the German cavalry, which Caesar had 
sent out, charged sharply in on the left rear of the Gauls, 


VERCINGETORIX SURRENDERED. 


305 


and raising a great shout the legionaries rushed upon them. 
Nothing could withstand their onset. Broken by its vigor, 
the enemy turned and fled, but only to be cut down by the 
cavalry. A number of the chiefs, among them Sedulius, 
prince of the Lemovices, were slain; others, principal among 
whom was Vercasivelaunus, were captured; and seventy-four 
standards were taken. The men under Yercingetorix, seeing 
their auxiliaries thus defeated, and Caesar ready to turn on 
them, withdrew from their attack and retired into Alesia, in 
the utmost dejection. The troops which had not been 
engaged caught the alarm and made haste to retreat; re¬ 
treat soon became rout. The flight of the Gauls from the 
battlefield was by no means arrested at their camp; the 
whole body of warriors began to seek safety wherever each 
could find it; had the cavalry been fresh, they could have 
been annihilated. As it was, a large number were cut down 
and the rest dispersed into the woods. Only after long 
wandering did they find their way to their respective states. 

The stake having been nobly played and lost, Yercingeto¬ 
rix surrendered himself to his countrymen to be dealt with 
as they saw fit; and these at once sent ambassadors to Cae¬ 
sar. There was no alternative. Caesar disarmed the Gallic 
soldiers and ordered them to surrender their leaders. u Yer¬ 
cingetorix, who was the chief spring of the war, putting his 
best armor on, and adorning his horse, rode out of the gates, 
and made a turn about Caesar as he was sitting, then quit¬ 
ting his horse, threw off his armor and remained quietly 
sitting at Caesar’s feet until he was led away. (Plutarch.) 
This gallant chieftain was kept for exhibition in Caesar’s 
triumph, and immediate death thereafter, a thing which, 
whatever the precedent, is scarcely creditable to the Koman, 
for though an enemy, Yercingetorix was assuredly a hero. 
The iEduan and Arvernian prisoners were reserved to use in 


306 


CAESAR’S CLEMENCY. 


once more gaining over their respective tribes. Of all the 
other prisoners, Caesar gave one apiece to the soldiers as 
plunder. These were sold to the traders, of whom there 
were always plenty not far from a Roman camp. After a 
battle, they always appeared, ready to profit by the abun¬ 
dance of bargains. 

The siege of Alesia exhibits the greatest art in Caesar and 
equal courage and endurance on the part of his troops. The 
inaction of the bulk of the barbarians in the last battle had 
been his salvation, as well as led to the loss of Gallic inde¬ 
pendence. Though there were, thereafter, isolated cases of 
insurrection, the country never again rose en masse . In a 
year Gaul was practically a Roman province. Her spirit of 
resistance had been finally crushed. 

After this brilliant success, Caesar marched back to the 
land of the iEdui, and found no difficulty in recovering that 
state; and the Arverni made haste to bring in their submis¬ 
sion and hostages. To both these tribes Caesar restored some 
twenty thousand prisoners. After his great victory he could 
well afford to make use of generosity in his treatment of the 
Gauls. He was then enabled to put his army into winter- 
quarters. Labienus, with the Seventh and Fifteenth legions 
and some cavalry, was placed among the Sequani with Ruti- 
lius as his lieutenant; Fabius with the Eighth, and Basilius 
with the Ninth, among the Remi to protect them against the 
Bellovaci; the legion of Antistius, the Eleventh, among the 
Ambivereti; that of Sextius, the Thirteenth, among the Bitu- 
riges; that of Caninius, the First, among the Ruteni; Cicero, 
with the Sixth at Matisco (Macon), and Sulpicius, with the 
Fourteenth, at Cabillonum (Chalons), charged with procur- ‘ 
ing corn along the Arar in the land of the iEdui. Caesar 
himself fixed his headquarters at Bibracte. The location of 
Antonius, with the Tenth and Twelfth, is not given. It was 


WIN TER-QUAR TERS. 307 

likely enough at headquarters. A supplicatio of twenty 
days was granted Caesar in Rome. 

During none of the campaigns in Gaul did the tribes put 
so large a force into the field as on this occasion. Forty of 
the eighty-five tribes, in the course of a month, contributed 



a quarter of a million men which, added to the eighty thou¬ 
sand under Yercingetorix, made a grand total of three hun¬ 
dred and thirty thousand, almost five times as many as the 
Roman legions, light troops and allied cavalry together. 
The danger had been grave for Caesar. But his own genius, 
the stanchness of the Roman legionaries and especially the 
divided counsels of the barbarians, had saved him. The 
sixty thousand men who assaulted at the northwest camp at 
Alesia had been picked; the bulk of the barbarians on the 





308 


A SPLENDID YEAR. 


west plain were of poor stuff. But had even this force 
attacked from the western face, while Caesar was with diffi¬ 
culty driving hack the front and rear assaults on the northern 
camp, and meeting Vercingetorix from within on the south, 
however good his lines, he must, it seems, have been over¬ 
whelmed. His own account of how hard pushed he was by 
the partial attack proves how near he came to a fatal out¬ 
come. Caesar’s courage, the ambition and brilliant gallantry 
of his men, the loyalty of the allied and the splendid quali¬ 
ties of the German horse, added to good fortune, which 
smiled on him with even more constancy than it did on 
Alexander, yielded him the victory. And this victory led 
‘ to results which were far reaching. 

This seventh year is the most interesting as well as the 
most important of the entire war. It exhibits Caesar’s power 
in engineering, in tactics, in strategy, in logistics. Let us 
recapitulate events, so as to group the superb list of achieve¬ 
ments. Caesar’s rapid appearance in the Province on hear¬ 
ing of the Gallic insurrection; his raising troops and crossing 
the Cebennae into the land of the Arverni, to forestall their 
invading the Province and deceive the enemy as to his inten¬ 
tions ; his personal forced march thence through a network 
of dangers to the land of the Lingones, where he concentrated 
his legions on the rear of Vercingetorix, made a splendid and 
successful strategical opening, particularly as Vercingetorix 
flattered himself that he had cut Caesar off from his army, 
and had that army at his mercy. Following this concentra¬ 
tion of his legions in the face of opposition came his march 
from Agendicum to Vellaunodunum, Genabum, Noviodunum 
and Avaricum, and his rapid successive capture of these 
towns. Thence he marched up the Elaver, cleverly stole a 
passage of that river under the very eyes of Vercingetorix, 
and besieged Gergovia. Called away from the siege by the 


VER CINGE TORIX. 


309 


iEcluan imbroglio, as lie represents, or beaten back from liis 
assault of it, as is the truth, which he could well afford to 
acknowledge, Caesar moved back over the Elaver through 
the land of the revolted JEdui and Senones, forcing the 
Liger and making his way to Agendicum, where he joined 
Labienus. Having recruited his forces, he retired through 
the land of the Lingones on his way to the Province, beat in 
fair fight Vercingetorix, who stood across his path, and 
reopened his communications. Thence following the enemy 
to Alesia, Caesar finished the year by his wonderful siege and 
capture of this stronghold. These operations, alike splendid 
in conception and execution, make a string of military jewels 
hard to match. 

Vercingetorix had proved a worthy antagonist. His plan 
to avoid open conflict with Caesar and to fight him by a 
Fabian policy is an extraordinary conception for a barba¬ 
rian. Vercingetorix exhibited a true natural genius for 
arms. His mistake lay in not clinging to his original plan. 
So soon as he wavered in it, he lost. This was not his fault, 
but that of the political combination against him among his 
own people. Despite the capacity of Vercingetorix and the 
fact that the Gauls had more than five times Caesar’s force, 
the genius of this great captain, added to Roman discipline 
and training, overcame the courage, but lack of unity, of 
the Gallic allies. Art versus mere strength — as always — 
could have but one ending. 


XXI. 


THE BELLOVACI. JANUARY TO APRIL, 51 B. C. 

The Gauls had learned that they were not equal to the Romans in whatever 
combination; hut they saw that a number of isolated insurrections gave Ciesar 
vastly more trouble than a single combined one. Several uprisings were there¬ 
fore initiated; but Caesar did not delay an instant. He made a series of winter 
campaigns, and by taking them unawares, successively reduced the Bituriges 
and Carnutes. He then marched against the Bellovaci, who, with their allies, 
had rendezvoused in what is now the Forest of Compi^gne. Caesar found them 
strongly intrenched. He camped on an adjacent hill, making a ditch and his 
wall in two stories. After some skirmishing between the rival outposts and 
cavalry, the barbarians prepared to retire, fearing another Alesia. Caesar made 
ready to follow, but the Gauls detained him by a clever stratagem, and escaped. 
Seeking shortly to entrap him in an ambuscade, the barbarians were them¬ 
selves surprised and defeated. Caesar then distributed his legions so as best 
to cope with the several insurrections, whose extent he could not yet gauge. 

The rest which the Roman legions hacl fairly earned in the 
splendid campaign just ended was not destined to last long. 
The Gauls had been beaten, to be sure, but not all of them 
were subdued. Then as now they added to native gallantry 
the habit of not yielding until they had tried a number of 
ways to accomplish a desired end. They had tried the 
experiment of rising in one body and had been distinctly 
worsted; they had learned that they were, in whatever num¬ 
bers, no match for Roman discipline, courage and intellect. 
But they had also learned that the most grievous blows they 
had inflicted on Caesar were those they had given by waging 
a judicious small-war in many localities at the same time. 
This system they determined once more to try. They were 
intelligent enough to understand that while Caesar could, no 


A NEW PERIL. 


311 


doubt, defeat them wherever he might be, he was unable to 
be everywhere at once. If the Gauls had all been willing to 
come within the scope of this plan, and if they had had 
another leader like Yercingetorix to carry through such a 
policy to the end, Caesar’s conquest of Gaul might never 
have been completed. But fortune did not favor the Gauls 
in their brave struggle for liberty. It was destined, happily 
for them and for us, that they, too, should bear the Homan 
yoke. 

Caesar was shortly informed of the consultations of the 



Gauls to this end, and determined to crush the uprising in 
the bud. While the leaders of the several tribes were still 
arguing and preparing, he went to work. Leaving Mark 



312 


CAMPAIGN AGAINST BITURIGES. 


Antony in charge of headquarters at Bibracte, on the day 
before the kalends of January, he set out with a body of 
horse for the Thirteenth legion, which was wintering among 
the Bituriges on their boundary nearest the iEdui. Lest a 
single legion should not be sufficient to keep the enemy in 
control, he added to the Thirteenth the Eleventh legion, 
which was stationed among the Ambivareti near by. Leav¬ 
ing two cohorts of each to guard the baggage and winter- 
quarters, he moved by forced marches upon the Bituriges 
and surprised them completely. He made many prisoners, 
but forbade plundering or burning, promising his men two 
hundred sestertii each, and every centurion two thousand 
sestertii in lieu thereof. He not only desired not to disaffect 
the population too seriously, but also to preserve the corn 
and forage for his own use. The burning stacks and farms 
would moreover serve to give warning of their danger to 
adjoining tribes, and it was Caesar’s plan to attack and com¬ 
pel each tribe separately to bring in its submission. 

The chiefs of the Bituriges endeavored to escape, for their 
preparations were barely begun, but so hot was Caesar’s pur¬ 
suit of them wherever they fled, that, by heading them off, 
and capturing them one by one, he speedily broke up their 
combinations. Those of the population who desired to retain 
their allegiance to Rome he protected by taking from their 
midst the conspirators who were leading them astray. This 
policy of vigor flavored with generosity forestalled a general 
uprising. The campaign had lasted but forty days. In its 
rapidity and success, it approaches some of Alexander’s 
short operations against mountain tribes. The two legions 
went back to winter-quarters. 

Eighteen days after Csesar had returned to Bibracte at the 
end of February, the Bituriges invoked his aid against the 
Carnutes who had begun war upon them. In order not to 


WINTER CAMPAIGNS. 


313 


disappoint this tribe in its newly sworn allegiance, Caesar 
called in Cicero’s Sixth legion from Cabillonum and Sulpi- 
cius’ Fourteenth legion from Matisco, on the Arar, and 
marched to Genabum. From this place as a centre he con¬ 
ducted a partisan warfare against the Carnutes with his 
allied horse. This tribe made no pretense at resistance but 
dispersed into the country, where at this season they had 
much ado to get provisions, and finally fled to other tribes. 
The soldiers gathered much booty. Caesar had scarcely used 
his infantry. He preferred for the sake of his men not to 
undertake further active operations at this inclement season, 
and left the two legions in Genabum, where he could quar¬ 
ter them to advantage. 

Caesar and Hannibal both disliked winter campaigns. 
Unlike Alexander, for whose exuberant physical and moral 
hardihood no season was too severe, they kept their troops in 
winter-quarters unless operations became imperative. But 
on this occasion Caesar sent out his cavalry detachments 
through the length and breadth of the land, and these, 
backed up by the presence of the legions, broke down all 
present opposition. He was fain to be content with so much 
at this season. 

This task finished, he placed Trebonius in command of the 
two legions at Genabum, and left for the land of the Remi, 
who had appealed to him against the Bellovaci and neighbor¬ 
ing tribes; for these were preparing war upon them and the 
Suessiones, their clients, under the leadership of Correus the 
Bellovacian and the so long faithful Caninius the Atrebatian. 
The Remi were allies of Rome and had been stanch friends, 
who must be helped at any cost. Their early usefulness in 
the Belgian campaign will be remembered. Caesar hastened 
to Durocortorum with the Eleventh legion and one drawn 
from Labienus at Vesontio. The Commentaries say that the 


314 


BELLOVACIAN CAMPAIGN. 


legion was drawn from Trebonius, but as this legate was 
later ordered to bring up both his from Genabum, it is 
probable that Labienus was meant. Caesar ordered Fabius 



to march to the land of the Suessiones with the two which, 
under his command, had been wintering among the Remi. 
By these details he endeavored to give duty alternately to 
the legions. He, individually, ceased not from work. 

Arrived in the territory of the Bellovaci, Caesar camped 
and sent his cavalry out to reconnoitre. He ascertained that 
all the able-bodied men of this and adjacent tribes (the 
Ambiani, Aulerci, Caletes, Yeliocasses and Atrebates) had 
left their dwellings, were on a war footing, and camped on 
a hill surrounded by a morass — modern Mt. St. Marc in 
the Forest of Compiegne — with their baggage hidden in the 
depths of the forest farther away; that Correus was in gen- 




FOREST WARFARE, 


315 


eral command, Commius being away to gather auxiliaries 
from the Germans on the Mosa; that they proposed to fight 
if Caesar had but three legions, but to remain in camp and 
harass him with small-war and cut off his forage, which was 
in any event hard to get, if he had more than three. “Cae¬ 
sar was convinced of the truth of this account by the concur¬ 
ring testimony of several prisoners.” 

This prudent resolution, so far as it applied to fighting 
only a small force, Caesar determined to encourage. Though 



Fight against Bellovaci. ' 

he had four legions with him, — three veteran, the Seventh, 
Eighth and Ninth, and the Eleventh “ composed of chosen 
young men of great hopes, who had served eight campaigns, 
but who, compared to the others, had not yet acquired any 




















316 


MARCHING IN SQUARE . 


great reputation for experience or valor,” — lie endeavored 
to make the enemy believe he had only three. He therefore 
marched the Seventh, Eighth and Ninth by themselves in the 
van, and left the Eleventh to follow the train at a convenient 
distance. u By this disposition he formed his army almost 
into a square, and brought them within sight of the enemy 
sooner than was anticipated.” He had given his officers full 
instructions as to his plans. There are frequent rather puz¬ 
zling statements in the Commentaries. This was largely a 
wooded country, and how Caesar could move his column in 
anything like a square seems to us, who are familiar with the 



limitations of modern armies, highly singular. But infan¬ 
try or cavalry, with no baggage except pack-mules, can, and 
on our Western plains does, get over ground which would be 
considered utterly impracticable for an army if hampered by 
artillery and trains. We may accept Caesar’s statement as a 
broad description of his order of march, and not assume his 




NOVEL DEFENSES. 317 

square to have been an exact equivalent of our modern 
square. 

On perceiving Caesar’s approach, the enemy drew up in 
front of their camp, but declined to leave their advantageous 
position on the heights. Caesar saw that their number was 


Section on AB 




much too great to attack without proper preparation, and 
went into camp on the other side of a deep valley, — on 
Mt. St. Pierre. His camp he fortified with a twelve-foot 
rampart, with roofed breastworks on it and down the slope 
two trenches fifteen feet wide, with, as he says, perpendicu¬ 
lar sides and square bottom, though the excavations do not 
show them such. It was easy, when he later wrote about 
it, to forget the kind of trench he may have dug. He built 
several turrets three stories high, intercommunicating with 
galleries, all protected by hurdles. Two rows of men, one 
above the other, could fight on the ramparts. Those on 
the galleries could throw their darts farther, while the 
lower rank on the vallum would be protected by the plat- 











318 


HEIN FOR CEMENTS. 


form against falling darts. The gates were flanked by 
heavy turrets. This camp would be secure when a part of 
the garrison had gone foraging; would make a safe maga¬ 
zine for stores; and Caesar hoped the enemy would suppose 
from all this preparation that he felt concerned for his 
safety and be induced to attack him in his intrenchments. 
This camp of Caesar’s at Mt. St. Pierre has been exploited, 
and its contours and area and many of its details have been 
brought to light. These are interesting to show how the 
accentuation of the ground was put to use to facilitate the 
erection of defenses. Caesar was fond of doing things in a 
novel way. Any new idea which occurred to him he was apt 
to carry out, to test its adaptability and usefulness. 

There was constant skirmishing at a ford across the marsh, 
now a piece of low meadow land, which lay between the rival 
camps; either party crossing and engaging the other with 
alternate success. The Homan foragers were constantly 
attacked by the barbarians. Some successes thus obtained, 
and particularly the arrival of five hundred German horse, 
under Commius, greatly encouraged the barbarians. 

Csesar deemed it wise to send back for more troops, as the 
Gauls were many and in a peculiarly strong situation, and 
as he deemed an investment the only safe means of attacking 
the barbarian stronghold. He ordered Trebonius to draw 
in the Thirteenth legion, which under Sextius was in the 
territory of the Bituriges, and with it and his own two, the 
Sixth and Fourteenth at Genabum, to join him by forced 
marches. 

Meanwhile the barbarians were all the more encouraged 
by an ambuscade into which they led the Reman, Lingonian, 
and other allied horse, and during which a number were 
killed, including their chief. Csesar had drafted a consid¬ 
erable tale of mounted men from all the tribes which he had 


BELL OVAC I RETIRE . 


319 


subdued. This was an easy and effectual way of insuring 
their good behavior, for it took from among them their lead¬ 
ing citizens, — in other words, those able to serve mounted, 
— and kept them under Csesar’s own eye. It had its 
corresponding danger in keeping with the army a sometimes 
uncertain element; but under Caesar’s immediate control the 
danger was minimized. 

A few days after the above defeat, some of the German 
foot auxiliaries crossed the marsh, and in a hand-to-hand 
combat drove the enemy into and a few even beyond their 
camp. This defeat and the arrival of Trebonius frightened 
and disheartened the enemy as much as they had been before 
encouraged. Fearing another Alesia siege they prepared 
to leave, and sent forward by night their baggage and old 
people. As daylight overtook them during this operation, 
not daring openly to continue the retreat, they drew up part 
of their army in front of their camp to protect it and conceal 
the movement in retreat. 

Caesar saw what the barbarians were doing. He bridged 
the morass in his front (there are still traces of this road), 
and making his way to a hill — Mt. Collet — overlooking 
the enemy, he drew up in line of battle. He did not wish 
to assault, nor was it worth while to follow the flying column, 
as owing to the river Axona on one side and the marsh on 
the other, he could not reach it except by exposing his flank. 
The enemy declined to leave their position. Caesar camped 
and fortified in that place and then remained in line of 
battle, the horses bridled ready for attack or pursuit, in case 
the enemy should divide in order to get away. The hill on 
which he lay had abrupt sides, and was separated from the 
Bellovacian position by a narrow valley in places but two 
hundred yards apart. The engines, it appears, could fire 
across it. This fire, which they were unable to return, galled 


820 


CLEVER STRATAGEM. 


the barbarians sensibly. Observing Caesar’s intention, the 
Bellovaci resorted to the following clever stratagem. Piling 
bundles of straw, of which they used much to sit and lie 
upon, with hurdles and other inflammables in their front, at 






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? 4 O O Q P ^ ^ V,Vl) 

<?• £> *1 iv f-.°do t-^O. 0 ^ ■ C A * 

V, 

^<i3. Q o n jVJ. U 



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a - ua-o'-o - 

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■^Vo c Vv i'b D •‘J >J c 

T V- J .: a■ • o £> ' ■ ■ u 7 

Theatre of Bellovacian Campaign 


nightfall they set all this on fire. Under cover of the smoke 
they precipitately retired. 

Caesar guessed as much, but advanced cautiously, natu¬ 
rally fearing some ambuscade. The horse could not easily 
advance through the line of fire. Thus the enemy was able 
to retreat in safety ten miles, where they took up another 
strong position on a hill fortified by nature. This is thought 
to have been Mont Ganelon, north of the confluence of the 
Aisne and Oise. It is only six miles from Mt. St. Marc as 
the crow flies, but a circuit may have been necessary to cross 
the rivers. It is not stated that Caesar followed them up. 
He probably kept to his camp and reconnoitred the vicinity 





AN AMBUSH FAILS. 321 

to await a favorable chance of action. From their new 
camp the barbarians again engaged in their small-war by a 
number of lesser ambushes, doing much harm to the Roman 
foragers. 

Learning soon after that Correus, the chief of the Bel- 
lovaci, had placed six thousand of his best foot and one 
thousand horse in an ambush where the Roman foragers were 



apt to go because there was considerable provision, Caesar 
himself accompanied these, and made his party somewhat 
larger than usual. His cavalry he mixed with light infantry 
and sustained by some cohorts of legionaries. The ground 
for the ambush was a plain about a mile in extent, — not far 
from Choisy au Bac, — surrounded by woods and the river 
Aisne. The enemy’s force was led by Correus. At the 
proper moment Correus emerged from the woods and at¬ 
tacked the column of foragers, expecting entire victory. The 
ambush proved a failure, as the Romans were in force and 
fully prepared for it; the cavalry was quickly sustained by 


822 


THREATENED EMIGRATION. 


the bowmen, and after a severe combat of the van, in which 
the cavalry and light troops fought with commendable brav¬ 
ery, the legions arrived and hemmed in the barbarians. 
Correus tried to retire, but he was himself in the trap he 
had laid for the Romans, with the river closing him in. 
The Romans killed all but a very few, Correus among them, 
despite the latter’s desperate resistance. 

Caesar then marched sharply upon the camp of the main 
body, but the other chiefs, believing resistance useless, sued 
for peace. Commius the Atrebatian, who was the chief 
instigator of the revolt, fled to the Germans. Caesar gave 
the Rellovaci to understand that they themselves were the 
cause of all their own troubles, but pursued a liberal policy 
in dealing with them. He had become convinced that his 
system of extermination was politically unsound. 

Caesar now saw that these nations were quite subjugated, 
but that many were endeavoring to get rid of the Roman 
dominion by emigration. To this he desired to put a stop. 
He distributed his army, the better to control the tribes. 
The legate, C. Caninius, had been previously sent south to 
the land of the Ruteni, with his two legions, the First and 
Tenth; but he found himself too weak to control the turbu¬ 
lent population on his route, and had stopped on the way, 
among the Pictones. To Caninius’ assistance, Caesar now 
sent C. Fabius with twenty-five cohorts. He ordered the 
Fifteenth legion to Cisalpine Gaul to protect that province 
from inroads of mountain tribes, and smaller detachments 
to one or other place where they were needed. He retained 
for his own disposition Mark Antony, now quaestor, and the 
Twelfth legion, together with Labienus and some of the other 
legions, and marched to the country of Ambiorix. 

This chief had fled, but Caesar thoroughly devastated the 
Eburonian territory by fire, sword and rapine. This was the 


IDENTIFYING THE LEGIONS. 


323 


second time he had thus visited the land. It was an act 
which was entirely uncalled for, and as inexcusable as it was 
inhuman and unworthy of Caesar. The Commentaries give 
as a reason that Caesar desired to leave no territory for 
Ambiorix to return to which could afford him support, and 
to make the few remaining people hate this chief for the 
evils he had brought on them. But this is no valid excuse 
even for ancient days. Ambiorix was an enemy and had 
inflicted a heavy penalty on Sabinus and Cotta. Revenge 
against Ambiorix’ person should not have been thus late 
carried forward upon his people. He had previously pun¬ 
ished the Eburones with sufficient severity. Csesar shines 
most when he is magnanimous, least when he is cruel. 

From the Eburonean land Csesar sent Labienus with two 
legions to overawe the Treviri, who were much like the Ger¬ 
mans, and never abode long in their allegiance. 

It is rare that the Commentaries mention the legions by 
name or number. They cannot, therefore, always be fol¬ 
lowed with certainty. Subsequent mention often enables 
a legion to be identified, but not in every instance. Occa¬ 
sionally the Commentaries are manifestly in error. When¬ 
ever possible, the legions have been specified by number, but 
generally they have to be dealt with in gross. The rotation 
in command of the officers of the Roman army conflicts with 
the individuality of the legion. Only the Tenth, Csesar’s 
favorite, and the one he was wont to have on the wing where 
he commanded, is specially prominent. This legion Caesar 
continually refers to. 


XXII. 


UXELLODUNUM. SPRING OF 51 B. C. 

Caninius and Fabius, with four legions and a half, had pursued an army of 
freebooters heading for the Province under Drappes and Lucterius, as far south 
as Uxellodunum, which these outlaws had seized. This oppidum was almost 
as difficult of access as Gergovia or Alesia. The barbarians having sent out a 
party to bring provisions to the place, the Romans managed to capture the 
entire convoy. Caninius and Fabius had the place invested when Caesar 
arrived. The enemy had enough corn, but relied for water on a stream flowing 
on the west of the place. Caesar cut off this supply by a system of outposts, 
and the Gauls were then confined to a spring on the hillside. Caesar set to 
work to cut this off also. He built a mound and tower from which he could 
direct missiles upon the water-carriers, and gradually undermined the spring, 
so as to tap and divert its flow. Uxellodunum then surrendered. Caesar spent 
the rest of the year in traversing Gaul from end to end to confirm the people in 
their allegiance, and to rectify the many abuses naturally arising from the war. 

C. Caninius, meanwhile, hearing that Duracius, a friendly 
ally, was besieged in Limonum (Poitiers), a town of the Pic- 
tones, by Dumnacus, chief of the Andes, marched from his 
winter-quarters among the Ruteni with his two legions, the 
First and Tenth, to his assistance. Finding himself unable 
to cope with the barbarians, who were in large force, he 
camped near by in a strong position. The barbarians 
attacked his camp but without success j they were driven 
back with loss. When it was reported, soon thereafter, that 
Caninius was to be reinforced by C. Fabius, whom Caesar 
had sent to his aid with twenty-five cohorts, the besiegers not 
only raised the siege and decamped, but retired beyond the 
Liger. Fabius, coming from the north, — he had been 
among the Remi, — caught them on the march, harassed 


CANINIUS. 


325 

their rear with great loss at the bridge where now stands 
Saumur, and gained much booty. The next day, the horse 
in pursuit, having gone too far beyond the infantry for the 



purpose of bringing the fugitive army to a halt, engaged in 
a combat with the rear of the enemy, who turned upon them 
and, sustaining their cavalry with foot, pressed them hard. 
The legions arrived when the Roman allied horse was all but 
exhausted, reestablished matters, and put the enemy to rout 
with a loss of not far from twelve thousand men. Their 
entire baggage-train was captured. 

The Andes having been disposed of and the land quieted 
by the destruction of all its warriors and warlike material, 



FABIUS. 


326 



Caninius was called on to follow towards the Province a body 
of some five thousand men, consisting of robbers, runaway 
slaves and other desperate characters, who under Drappes and 
Lucterius were moving thither. Fabius, with his twenty- 
five cohorts, marched to the land of the Carnutes, who had 
been engaged in the recent uprising, but with all the Armor- 

















UXELLODUNUM. 


327 


ican tribes between them and the ocean now brought in their 
submission. Dumnacus was obliged to flee to remotest 
Gaul. 

Caninius followed Drappes and Lucterius, who, knowing 
that they could accomplish nothing in the Province against 
his legions, had stopped in the land of the Cadurci, and 
seized Uxellodunum (Puy d’Issolu), a stronghold on very 
inaccessible rocks and hardly needing defenses. It had been 
formerly a vassal town of Drappes. The location of Uxello¬ 
dunum has been put on the Oltis (Lot), but late excavations 
have proved it to be modern Puy d’lssolu. Caninius fol¬ 
lowed the enemy, camped on three adjacent hills, and began 
to draw lines of contravallation to besiege the place. 

The plateau of Uxellodunum covers some two hundred acres 
and is six hundred feet above the plain. It is north of the 
Duranius (Dordogne), between which and it lies a flat plain. 
On its west is a range of hills separated from it by a narrow 
valley, and on its northeast is a smaller plateau (Pech 
Demont) joined to it by a ravine. On these heights Caninius 
established his camps, which were on a level with the oppi- 
dum. On the west and south of the Uxellodunum plateau 
were perpendicular rocks one hundred and forty feet high. 
On the east was an easier slope. Of the three camps, 1 and 
2 were not intrenched, as from the lay of the land it was not 
necessary, and there were few men in Uxellodunum; 3 was 
intrenched because it was accessible from the oppidum. The 
position of camps 1 and 2 is fixed upon from the topography. 
No remains have been found of their walls. 

The barbarians, fearing another Alesia and determined 
not to be starved into surrender, sent out all but two thou¬ 
sand of their force to gather corn, of which they established 
a depot some ten miles away. Meanwhile the garrison sim¬ 
ulated numbers by sundry attacks on Caninius’ camps, and 



Uxellodunum, from the North. 

























SUCCESSFUL DIVERSION . 


329 


interrupted his work. Lucterius and Drappes proposed to 
gradually convey the provision to the oppidum in small 
trains. But when Lucterius sought to carry some corn by 
night into the town on beasts of burden by a steep and 
wooded path, probably on the north side, passing camp 3 on 
the west, Caninius, notified by his outposts who had heard 
the sound of the moving convoy, fell upon and captured the 
whole train. Lucterius was cut off and could not rejoin 
Drappes, who, back in the supply-camp, knew nothing of the 
disaster but assumed his colleague to have reached the oppi¬ 
dum. Caninius then left one legion to guard his own camps 
and with the other and his cavalry he advanced on the ene¬ 
my’s supply-camp itself. This was on low ground, enabling 
Caninius to seize the hills around it and corral the whole 
party. Having well disposed his men, he fell on and 
destroyed the entire foraging force with the loss of but a few 
men wounded. Drappes was taken prisoner. Caninius then 
completed the lines around the town, and Fabius shortly 
joined him on completion of his work north of the Liger, 
thus giving him enough men to finish and man the lines. 
Fabius took one side of the town, Caninius the other. 

Caesar had, meanwhile, left Mark Antony and fifteen co¬ 
horts in the territory of the Bellovaci to keep them in sub¬ 
jection, while he himself was making a tour of Gaul. He 
visited each region in turn, and by politic generosity and 
some necessary severity he won over each tribe. Among the 
Carnutes, he caused Guturvatus, said to have been the 
instigator of the late rebellion, to be brought to him and on 
the clamor of the soldiers executed more majorum, i. e., 
beaten to death and decapitated. He did this, it is said, to 
save executing vengeance on the whole people. 

Learning by letters from Caninius the situation at Uxello- 
dunum, Csesar put Q. Calenus in charge of the two legions 


330 


CAESAR ARRIVES. 


which he had kept with himself, ordered him to follow by 
regular marches and, taking only the cavalry, moved rapidly 
to the aid of Caninius. This he did because it had now 
become essential speedily to stamp out all opposition; the 
natives well knew that his term in Gaul lasted but one 
summer more, and he feared they might argue that if they 
could hold out so much longer they would eventually get rid 
of the Romans. He therefore determined to make an 
example of this body of freebooters. 

Caesar was wont to leave as little to his lieutenants and to 
do as much personally as he could. While abundantly busy 
with the political questions of Gaul and Italy, he yet deemed 
it wise never to allow a military operation to drag for want 
of his own supervision. To this personal activity is trace¬ 
able the remarkable success of his Gallic campaigns, which 
from beginning to end breathe of Caesar’s genius, cool head, 
clear judgment, presence of mind, boldness and never-tiring 
energy. 

On his arrival he found that the inhabitants of Uxello- 
dunum had abundance of corn, and that, in order to accom¬ 
plish his end, he must cut them off from water. This he 
could not easily do, for a stream (the Tourmente) flowed at 
the foot of the crags on the west side of the town, and 
through a narrow ravine, so that its waters could not be 
diverted. But, by disposing slingers, archers and engines in 
certain places in the ravine, Caesar rendered the operation of 
getting water so hazardous, that he finally confined the 
enemy to procuring it in one place. 

This was between the town and the stream, where, near 
the walls, gushed out an ample spring (a). Caesar saw that 
he must also cut this off. He advanced vineae and a mound 
towards the place with great labor and constant skirmishing, 
in which a number of Romans were wounded. He also 


CUTTING OFF WATER . 


331 


undertook to tap the sources of the spring by a subterranean 
passage which was run some distance in the rock towards it. 



This passage has been discovered, and some traces also of the 
mound and works. 

Finally, the outside works were advanced so near the 
spring that the Romans from the mound, which was sixty 
feet high and surmounted by a ten-story turret, could cast 
their darts with marked effect upon any of the garrison who 
came for water; thus they succeeded in all but preventing 
its use. The tower was too far below the walls of the op- 
pidum to attack the latter. Thus deprived of the spring, 
many people and all the cattle in the town died of thirst. 

But the besieged, with the fury of despair, determined to 
make a supreme effort for their salvation. They accumu¬ 
lated an enormous amount of inflammable material, — tal¬ 
low, pitch and tar, — and filling barrels, rolled them down 
upon the Roman works, at the same time making a desper¬ 
ate sortie in force against them. The patiently constructed 
works speedily caught fire. To beat back this sortie and at 
the same time to enable his men to handle the fire to advan¬ 
tage, Caesar ordered a feigned general attack from all sides 
at once, which being stoutly given, the barbarians withdrew 
quickly into their town, for they did not know which quarter 
was most in danger, and they feared that the Romans might 















332 


UXELLODUNUM CAPTURED. 


enter the town. This enabled the legions to extinguish the 
flames and to gain a material amount of ground as well. 

Some days after, the Roman mine reached the sources of 
the spring and diverted its flow. The barbarians, consider¬ 
ing this to be an act of the gods and not of men, for they 
had deemed the spring unreachable, were compelled both by 
fear and by thirst to surrender. In pursuance of his deter¬ 
mination above explained, Caesar cut off the hands of all 
those who had here borne arms. Both leaders had been pre¬ 
viously captured and imprisoned. Drappes starved himself 
to death in prison to save himself from a worse fate. 

Meanwhile Labienus, among the Treviri, had got the 



insurgent chiefs into his hands, and Caesar, seeing that his 
return thither would not be necessary, marched throughout 





CAESAR'S POLICY . 


333 


Aquitania, where he received the submission of all the tribes 
which Crassus had already partly brought under control. 
This occupied the summer. When the time arrived for going 
into winter-quarters, four legions (under Mark Antony, C. 
Trebonius, P. Vatinius and Q. Tullius) were left among 
the Belgse; two among the -ZEdui; two among the Turoni 
near the Carnutes to hold the seaside tribes in check; two 
among the Lemnovices near the Arverni. Caesar then 
personally went to the Province, where he attended to the 
duties of the state, returned to the legions among the Belgae, 
and wintered at Nemetocenna (Arras). There were no rebels 
left except a few bands of rovers, who could accomplish 
nothing unaided. But Caesar had to rest content with a 
merely nominal submission, in the north of Gaul. There 
was always a relic of war in that quarter. Commius, after 
some cavalry exchanges with Volusenus, turned freebooter. 
According to Frontinus, he retired to Britain. Only he and 
Ambiorix, of all the Gallic chieftains, survived. 

Caesar now devoted his time to demonstrating to the Gallic 
tribes the advantages of the Roman alliance, as he had shown 
them the dangers of revolt. “Caesar, whilst in winter-quar¬ 
ters in the country of the Belgae, made it his only business 
to keep the states in amity with him, and to give none either 
hopes of or pretext for revolt. For nothing was further 
from his wishes than to be under the necessity of engaging 
in another war at his departure; lest, when he was drawing 
his army out of the country, any war should be left unfin¬ 
ished, which the Gauls would cheerfully undertake when 
there was no immediate danger. Therefore, by treating the 
states with respect, making rich presents to the leading men, 
imposing no new burdens, and making the terms of their 
subjection lighter, he easily kept Gaul (already exhausted by 
so many unsuccessful battles) in obedience.’’ 


334 


A GRAND REVIEW. 


Thus Caesar spent the winter, and when the spring opened, 
he proceeded towards Italy, visiting all the towns by the 
way, and confirming them in their allegiance, as far as Cisal¬ 
pine Gaul. He was received with the greatest honor and 
acclamations. He then returned to Nemetocenna, ordered 
his legions to the territory of the Treviri, and held there a 
grand review of his troops. Having settled the affairs of 
Gaul on a solid basis, Caesar journeyed to Ravenna to be 
near the events in Italy when his consulate should expire. 
He left Labienus in command, regarding whom, though 
warned that he was solicited by his enemies, he harbored no 
suspicion. 

The Gallic campaigns are peculiarly interesting to the 
military student as showing how Caesar schooled himself and 
his legions. He began with but the ordinary military train¬ 
ing, on a small basis of experience; he ended as a great gen¬ 
eral, with an experience which enabled him to rise to the 
most astounding height. His legions commenced green and 
untried; they ended as veterans equal to conquering the 
world. Each became so wedded to the other that mutual 
confidence and affection made the army commanded by 
Csesar irresistible. 

It was impossible that during this period of schooling Cae¬ 
sar should not make mistakes, — grave ones. But all his 
mistakes bore fruit, and raised the qualities of both general 
and legions. One can see, step by step, how Caesar’s suc¬ 
cesses and failures alike produced their effect; how his in¬ 
born ability came to the surface; how he impressed his own 
individuality on whatever he did; and how his intelligence 
led him to apply whatever he learned to his future conduct. 

No praise is too high for the conduct or moral qualities 
of the army. From Caesar down, through every grade, all 
military virtues were pronounced. In organization and dis- 


CJESAR’S OPPONENTS. 


335 


cipline, ability to do almost any work, endurance of danger 
and trial, toughness and courage, it was a model for the rest 
of Rome, — but a model unhappily not imitated. And not 
only his legionaries, but his auxiliary troops, were imbued 
with the same spirit, — all breathed not only devotion to 
Caesar, but reflected in a measure his own great qualities. 

All this, however, was of a nature different from the high 
qualities of the legions of the Punic wars. These were won¬ 
derful in their devotion, discipline and effectiveness because 
the material in them was incomparable. Caesar’s legions 
were equally wonderful, but it was because Caesar had fash¬ 
ioned and always commanded them. The discipline of the 
earlier legion depended largely on the men; that of Caesar’s 
entirely on himself. As in the case of Napoleon, the disci¬ 
pline of Caesar’s legions was often terribly lax; but in that 
quality which may be called battle-discipline they were 
unsurpassed. 

Caesar had in Gaul some opponents worthy even of him. 
Vercingetorix, Ariovistus, Casivelaunus were, each in his 
way, great leaders. That they were overcome by Caesar was 
but natural. Disciplined troops well led cannot but win 
against barbarians. The end could not be otherwise. And 
while the Gallic War does not show Caesar — as the Second 
Punic War did Hannibal — opposed to the strongest mili¬ 
tary machine in existence, it did show him opposed to gener¬ 
als and troops quite equal to most of those encountered by 
Alexander. The Gauls must not be underrated. Some of 
their operations and some of their fighting were of the high¬ 
est order. They contended nobly for their independence. 
Defeat did not discourage them. Once put down, they again 
rose in rebellion so soon as the strong hand was removed. 
They were in no sense weak opponents, and while in all 
things Caesar’s army was superior to theirs, yet in their 


336 


GAUL CONQUERED. 


motives and hearty cooperation they certainly were more 
commendable than Caesar in his mere love of conquest. 

Gaul was conquered. Even though the master’s grasp of 
the reins was soon relaxed, to reach for other and greater 
things, the subjected province rose not. There were small 
wars and rumors of wars, but these were so isolated and 
unimportant that the local governors could do them justice. 
In the remote corners of the new territory, the Pyrenees, 
the Scheldt, and the coast, some tribes were still de facto 
free. But time itself reduced these. Caesar’s work had 
been thorough, and it was the work of civilization. What¬ 
ever fault can be found with his method, or indeed his ab¬ 
stract rights, that Gaul should be conquered was a historical 
necessity, and it is well that it fell to the lot of a man as 
broad, as thorough, as enlightened as Caesar. 



Gallic Horseman. 

(From a terra-cotta Statuette.) 





Tribes of Gaul. 


V 


tozjrwnnooo 

CD > O O O | 

r 3 * n » 1 

1 ® a o ^ 

e r D c ° 

z c ^ 2 - « 





XXIII. 


CESAR’S METHOD. 

The Gauls had been the terror of Rome for centuries. Whoever conquered 
them would be the national hero. Caesar understood this. His mission was to 
protect the Province; he purposed to subdue Gaul. He worked for his own 
ends as much as for Rome, but he understood his problem thoroughly. He 
considered the strategic field of Gaul with a clear eye, and committed no errors 
in his general plan. It was natural that he should make early mistakes of 
detail, for Caesar had not been brought up as a soldier; and we find a hesi¬ 
tancy in his first campaigns which later he threw off. His line of advance from 
the Province through central Gaul was in strict accord with the topographical 
values, and he studied the tribal instincts keenly. He educated himself as he 
went along, profiting by all his mistakes. His campaigns across the Rhine and 
to Britain were useless ; they did not aid the general scheme. Cassar was ener¬ 
getic in obtaining information, ingenious in contending with new obstacles, in¬ 
telligent in selecting his objective, careful of his base. He demanded severe 
exertions from his men, but rewarded them handsomely. He was much aided 
by fortune, but under trial was doubly energetic. In view of the fact that 
Caesar entered the Gallic campaign without experience in war, it was a marvel¬ 
ous success. 

It has already been pointed out that Caesar, on being 
appointed governor of Gaul, had been vested with no right 
to do more than protect the exposed boundaries of the then 
Province. All prefects had confined themselves to this role. 
The laws of nations in Caesar’s day had already received 
some recognition; but right was no valid argument against 
might, and few rights were accorded to barbarian tribes by 
Rome in the last century before the Christian era, least of 
all to the redoubted Gauls, who had so often brought Rome to 
the verge of ruin. Rome at that day was lawless. Every 
great man wrought for himself. Caesar had been brought up 



CAESAR'S PLANS. 


339 


in a school which prompted him to bend all things to his am¬ 
bition. He represented a great party; only by his personal 
success could his party succeed. War meant to him an 
army; an army was to him but a means of winning power. 
When he went to Gaul, Pompey was distinctly the leader 
of the triumvirate. With a man of Caesar’s make-up, this 
could not last. Like his colleague, Caesar soon recognized 
that he must aim at the sole control of Rome if he would 
win any standing. Without war and conquest, he could 
gain neither the experience, fame nor influence requisite to 
this end. This was no unworthy ambition. Caesar could 
not be great with a lesser end in view, and the importance of 
his object was equaled by the splendor of his means. To 
deliver the republic forever from the Gauls was to make their 
conqueror the foremost of the Romans, as the Gauls had been 
the most dreaded of the foes of Rome. To subdue Gaul 
was a stepping-stone to certain and unapproached renown. 

Caesar was fortunate. At the very inception of his charge 
of Gaul, the outbreak of the Helvetii opportunely occurred, 
and led, in its progress, to the current of events which ended 
in the conquest of the entire country. One thing after 
another, with Caesar’s uniform good fortune, was sure to 
happen, to give him at least a pretense of right in extending 
his conquests. The Helvetian question solved, the iEdui 
called in his aid against the Germans under Ariovistus. In 
this, too, Caesar could assert that he was but protecting the 
allies of the Province. The Romans always helped their 
allies when by so doing they could help themselves. Caesar 
worked on the like theory. Gaul publicly thanked the 
consul for freeing her from the Helvetii and the Germans; 
but Gaul did not then anticipate her own subjugation. 

Caesar’s next step requires more of his own plausible 
explanation. It is hard to justify his action in carrying the 


340 


CAESAR’S AMBITION. 


war among the Belgae, but he solves the enigma by reciting 
the danger to which the Province would be subjected by any 
combination of tribes, even if not offensively meant. The 
same course of argument carried Caesar beyond the Rhine, 
and into Britain, and was the motive of all his other con¬ 
quests. However unjustifiable this may have been, — and 
yet we see the same process of conquest going on in the nine¬ 
teenth century,—Caesar’s purpose was clear and definite, 
and he played his cards well. His course was consistent 
throughout; and he had the happy faculty in his public utter¬ 
ances of arguing the law to his side, of placing there the 
appearance of right. Whatever he undertook resulted in 
his favor, and, greatest accomplishment of all, he disciplined 
and hardened an army devoted to himself, by means of which 
he was able to make himself master of Rome. 

All this is by no means to Caesar’s discredit. He did but 
what other leading men had been doing in Rome for genera¬ 
tions. The old-fashioned Roman patriotism had long since 
vanished. There was scarce another road to honor and 
power than the selfish one, scarce another means of safety 
for those who held high rank. Caesar cannot fairly be 
blamed for self-seeking; neither should he be held up as a 
model patriot. Judged by his own Commentaries, he never 
rose to the plane of a Washington, a Gustavus, a Hannibal. 
Vbi bene , ibi patria was a serviceable motto for him, so long 
as the good ran in his own favor. Rome needed a Caesar to 
shape the destiny to which she was manifestly drifting. It 
is well that such a man was at hand, and that he did his 
work with thoroughness; but though Caesar Was as useful to 
the ancient world as Napoleon to modern Europe, it cannot 
be said that either worked on the instincts of elevated patri¬ 
otism. 

Whatever criticism may be passed upon Caesar in a politi- 


HIS STATECRAFT. 


341 


cal aspect, as a great captain lie is almost beyond cavil. 
Barring such errors of vigilance and judgment as are of pe¬ 
culiar interest in showing certain characteristics as well as 
how Caesar educated himself to arms, his military conduct 
through this memorable series of campaigns is a fruitful 
study. His errors were more often in policy than in war. 
At times he could be generous, even magnanimous, to sub¬ 
jugated peoples. At times he was cruel beyond what any 
civilized conqueror has ever been, unnecessarily, unwisely 
cruel. The world had advanced since the days of Alexander, 
and while what is now known as the law of nations was not 
then a code, certain of its tenets had been established. But 
Caesar absolutely disregarded any such when they interfered 
with his own projects. 

Statecraft counts for much in a great captain’s work. 
Caesar’s policy in Gaul was on the whole so harsh as scarcely 
to rate as policy at all. This is the civil aspect of the mat¬ 
ter. From another point of view it was as masterly as the 
problem was difficult. Caesar had to conciliate some tribes 
while attacking other neighboring and friendly tribes. He 
had to supply himself while destroying victual for the enemy. 
He had to elevate part of the people in order to suppress 
another part. He had to play one half of the population 
against the other half. He had a population of eight million 
Gauls to oppose his dozen legions. In no other way could 
he do his work. So far as this his military policy goes, his 
conduct was irreproachable. 

Caesar’s strategy was Tarsightscl air*d sound. The Pro¬ 
vince, when Gaul fell to his lot, as one of the triumvirs, was 
a sort of salient thrust forward into the midst of the country. 
West and north of its boundary, the Rhone, lived allied 
peoples; from the mountains on the east danger threatened 
from a number of restless tribes. The advantages of this 


342 


CAESAR'S STRATEGY. 


salient position were by no means lost on Caesar, nor the 
power of concentrated action which it gave him. His first 
campaign, against the Helvetii, was intended to protect and 



resulted in protecting the right flank of the salient, an abso¬ 
lute essential to safety in advancing into north or northwest 
Gaul. From this point duly secured, northerly, the Rhine 
and the Jura and Vosegus mountains protected to a certain 
degree the right of an advancing army, provided the tribes on 
the left bank of the great river were not unfriendly; and it 
will be noticed that one of Caesar’s early efforts was directed 
to making as many of these tribes as possible his firm friends 
by generous treatment and effective protection against their 
enemies. When he could not quickly accomplish his end by 





CENTRAL LINES. 


343 


negotiation, he resorted to drastic measures. In carrying 
out his scheme of conquest, Caesar advanced his salient along 
the Arar and the Mosa as far as the Sabis, and could then 
debouch from the watershed to the west of these rivers down 
the valleys of the Sequana and its tributaries, the Matrona 
and Axona, with perfect safety. And Caesar not only 
secured the friendship of the abutting tribes, but always kept 
several strongly fortified camps among them as an additional 
protection. 

The flow of the Axona across his line of operations 
furnished Caesar an advanced base from which he could move 
against the Belgae. This line from his first base in the 
Province to the secondary one on the Axona lay along the 
Arar and the Mosa. From Belgian territory, when once in 
his hands, Caesar could safely move even so far as Britain, 
provided he properly protected his rear and was careful that 
his victuals were accumulated or certain to be delivered by 
friendly tribes. Having subdued the Belgae, he could turn 
without danger to the southwest corner of Gaul, against 
Aquitania. Caesar thus exemplified in the fullest degree the 
advantage in grand strategy of central lines of operation. 
Neither Alexander nor Hannibal exhibited a clearer grasp of 
his strategical problem than Caesar. It is noticeable that 
the hardest part of Caesar’s work was to establish this 
central salient by alliance or conquest of the tribes which 
abutted on it; his gravest danger when the iEdui, who 
guarded his line of operations, joined their revolting 
brethren. But this salient definitely gained, Caesar was 
able to reduce the operations of the war to the basis of single 
isolated campaigns. These, indeed, were difficult, but 
dangerous only when they threatened with intestine broils the 
military structure he had erected. 

The several campaigns, from the cautious handling of the 


344 


SEEKING INFORMATION. 


Helvetian question to the splendid management of the siege 
of Alesia, have each received comment in its proper place. 

Caesar, as a Roman general, carried out the Roman idea 
of a conquest of the world by virtue of a constant offensive. 
In studying Caesar, one studies the Roman military status 
at its best, so far as generalship goes; so far as concerns the 
soldier, all that was best in the burgess-militia of Rome had 
long ago disappeared. Caesar’s legionary was a professional 
soldier in every sense. Caesar began the war by a defensive 
operation against the Helvetii; after that he always assumed 
the offensive, though in the Commentaries he frequently goes 
out of his way to convince his readers that he was the 
aggrieved party. If he ever resorted to the defensive it was 
but for a moment, shortly to resume the offensive and push 
it vigorously. 

Like all generals who are careful of their men, Caesar 
preferred to campaign only in the season of good weather, 
and to lie in quarters in winter. But that he could conduct 
a winter campaign was more than once demonstrated. 
While in quarters he appears to have been fairly careful of 
good discipline and studious to keep his men busy. The 
panic at Vesontio was a good object-lesson, by which he 
profited. His teachableness was one of Caesar’s admirable 
qualities. 

Caesar was energetic in procuring information on which to 
form his plans. This was often both hard to get and unre¬ 
liable when got, but he sought it intelligently. He con¬ 
stantly kept afoot some of his Gallic officers or horsemen; 
used spies from allied tribes or gained friends within the 
enemy’s lines. Deserters were put to use and were hand¬ 
somely rewarded. If information could not be otherwise 
procured, Caesar made reconnoissances in force. As such we 
may well treat Caesar’s first expeditions against Germany and 


CESAR'S OBJECTIVE. 


345 


Britain. On no other ground can these be justified as 
military operations; and a reconnoissance in force should 
never risk the existence of army or commander, — as the 
first crossing to Britain did. 

Caesar as a rule was numerically weaker than the enen^, 
but he was not so vastly overmatched as was Alexander, nor 
can the opposition to him be in any sense compared to what 
Hannibal encountered during his entire military life. Caesar 
was far stronger than his enemies in everything but numbers, 
especially in self-confidence and power of work. His legion¬ 
aries would bear anything and could do anything. They 
were very Yankees for ingenuity. Caesar did not willingly 
mix the allies with his legions; he employed the native foot 
mostly as bowmen and slingers; his cavalry was uniformly 
native. He worked his army habitually well' concentrated. 
If he divided his forces it was but for a short time, soon 
again to concentrate. This is an almost uniform test of 
military capacity. But Caesar sought to attack the enemy 
before the latter had concentrated, and generally made good 
use of such a chance. Nimbleness of movement stood in the 
stead of numbers. He understood how, as Napoleon phrases 
it, “se multiplier par la vitesse.” 

Caesar’s objective was always well chosen. It was either 
the most important strategic point, or more usually the army 
of the enemy. Thus in the campaign against the Belgae, he 
threw himself upon the Remi, who had not yet decided 
whether to join the confederacy, and by preventing their so 
doin£ at once made secure a secondarv base. He chose the 
shortest road to march by. In 52 the enemy concentrated 
his forces between the Cebennae mountains and the upper 
Liger. Caesar’s army lay between the Sequana and Ma- 
trona. He joined it, got his forces well in hand, and 
marched from Agendicum by way of Genabum straight on 


346 


CJESAWS BASE. 


the enemy. In the division of his forces he was usually care¬ 
ful so to march as to be able again to make a junction of the 
bulk of his forces. In the campaign against the Veneti, 
while the army was divided into several parts, two of these, 
comprising six legions under himself and Titurius, were 
placed where they could easily be concentrated. 

Caesar was careful of his base. This cannot be said to 
apply to the first British expedition, but in the second he left 
half of all his cavalry and three legions on the coast of Gaul 
as an intermediate base. In 52, in the general insurrection, 
the Province was his first base, with twenty-two cohorts 
under L. Caesar the legate. The second base was the land 
of the friendly Remi, and the line from the first to the second 
base lay along the Arar, through the land of the likewise 
friendly Sequani and Lingones, and was strengthened by 
Yesontio midway. In order to secure another line along the 
Liger, Caesar left Labienus with two (later reinforced to 
four) legions at Agendicum, well intrenched. Even these 
dispositions barely saved him. His leaving the fleet pro¬ 
tected by an intrenched camp on the coast of Britain was a 
simpler instance of his care for his base, taught by unfortu¬ 
nate experience. 

Caesar always sought to induce his enemy to divide his 
forces. In the war with the Belgae he sent the iEdui to 
attack the Bellovacian territory, thus easily detaching this 
powerful tribe from the confederacy. His diversions were 
well conceived and well timed. When he drew Vercino-et- 

O 

orix down to meet him by crossing the Cebennae, and when, 
after so doing, he personally hurried to his legions, Cjesar 
showed that he was a master of the art of blinding the 
enemy as to his real intentions. This was a device in the 
style of Hannibal. 

Caesar was careful of his soldiers. But he called on them 


THE ROMAN SYSTEM. 


347 

for the severest exertions at any time or under any circum¬ 
stances. His logistics was good. He showed in Gaul more 
foresight in the matter of rations and magazines than in later 
campaigns. Protection of Gallic tribes was paid for by 
victual. He got rations from those neighboring tribes whose 
alliance he had accepted. A beaten people was always 
mulcted in a given amount of corn. He was rarely in a 
strait for bread. Still he campaigned only when there was 
forage, if this was possible. A train of pack-animals accom¬ 
panied his column, loaded with a supply in addition to what 
the men themselves carried. 

Caesar speaks in his Commentaries of a threefold advantage 
of the Roman, or what Napoleon called the methodical system 
of conducting war, over that of any other nation, namely: 
the holding of decisive points, the intrenching of camps, and 
the breaking up of the enemy’s communications. The cap¬ 
ture of decisive points opened the campaign, and placed the 
troops where they were advantageously located for winning a 
victory; the Roman intrenched camp was a movable fortress 
which from its effect on the morale of the troops made 
victory more certain as well as neutralized defeat; by the 
breaking up of his communications the enemy was compelled 
to shift his ground, to fight under adverse circumstances, or 
surrender. 

Decisive points were to be reached if possible through 
friendly or at least neutral territory. If they must be 
reached through the enemy’s, then every step must be 
protected to secure his own communications. On Caesar’s 
march from Agendicum to the Bituriges, he could not leave 
Yellaunodunum in his rear, but must capture it to keep open 
his communications with Labienus. Caesar describes a deci¬ 
sive point as one having many advantages, the most impor¬ 
tant being that of opening and holding an entrance into the 


348 


DECISIVE POINTS. 


enemy’s country. In the march above instanced, such a 
point was Genabum where there was a bridge over the Liger. 
This bridge Caesar must have in order to approach Vercin- 
getorix. In his campaign against the Belgae, so soon as he 
had crossed the Axona he was on the enemy’s territory, and 
therefore his camp on the Axona was located at a decisive 
point. In moving on the Helvetii, after crossing the Rhone, 
Caesar intrenched in the angle of that river and the Arar, 
where he was among the friendly AEdui, and from here he 
could readily attack the enemy. This was a decisive point. 

Whether Caesar laid much stress on secrecy in relation to 
his plans among his own men does not appear. In secrecy, 
even to his lieutenants, Hannibal was unapproached. 
Alexander, too, kept his own counsel, but rather as master 
than for military reasons. Hephaestion knew his every pur¬ 
pose. Caesar deemed great speed in executing his projects 
the equivalent of secrecy. 

A captain must be largely gauged by the strength of his 
opponents. Caesar’s in Gaul by no means lacked ability. 
Ariovistus was a man of exceptional strength, and Vercin- 
getorix came near to being a genius. Both recognized the 
value of decisive points as well as Ctesar, — though war to 
them was not a science, and what Caesar relied on against 
such men was not so much secrecy as the rapidity of his 
marches and the discipline of his legions. 

The decisive point secured, a battle was sought or an 
attack on a town was made, or some operation was under¬ 
taken to bring the enemy to such action that he might be 
overwhelmed. Caesar preferred a battle in the open field 
because a victory so won was apt to result in many towns 
falling into his hands or in making their capture easier. 
But if the enemy constantly avoided it, he was compelled 
to forego a battle and to resort to a siege or a blockade. 


CAMPING. 


349 


While it is true that Caesar sought battle, the fact that 
there were few pitched battles proper in the Gallic campaign 
shows how much stronger the legions were than any troops 
opposed to them. Defeat was often inflicted by Caesar’s 
native cavalry alone. 

When Caesar camped in the presence of the enemy in 
expectation of battle, he sought to lure him away from his 
camp so that should he win a victory, he might make the 
most of it by pursuit, without the enemy taking refuge 
within it and compelling an assault. With secret forced 
marches he approached the foe, camped a short march from 
him, and next day endeavored to take him unawares. Thus 
he approached Ariovistus, thus the Usipetes and Tenchtheri. 
Sometimes Caesar would move nearer to the enemy the even¬ 
ing before he intended to bring on a battle, if there was 
some obstacle behind which he could easily camp unob¬ 
served, or he would do the same thing in case he needed 
more information before engaging. Occasionally he camped 
at a distance of two short marches. 

In determining the locality of a camp, Csesar paid strict 
heed to his own communications and sought to prejudice the 
enemy’s. At the outset he paid the more heed to his own. 
Later he showed more dash, more reliance on the enemy’s 
inertia. When Ariovistus moved around his flank, Caesar 
at once took up a defensive and moved only a small body on 
Ariovistus’ flank. In Britain Cassivellaunus moved on Cae¬ 
sar’s communications. Yercingetorix cut Caesar’s line at 
Gergovia by rousing the 2Edui in his rear. There is some¬ 
times a lack of strategic dash in Caesar’s movements in the 
Gallic campaign. We do not see him moving on the ene¬ 
my’s communications by the great turning movements he 
afterwards employed. He simply secured his own commu¬ 
nications and fought. In besieging towns he disturbed the 


350 


PURSUIT. 


enemy’s communications after a fashion, but not by turning 
movements. This was caution bred of self-distrust which 
wore away before the Civil War. 

When Caesar conquered in open fight, he pursued vigor¬ 
ously, as a rule with his cavalry, but not infrequently with 
the legions, — unless he had been very much exhausted. It 
was only the cavalry, however, which actually reached the 
enemy. No one ever pursued so remorselessly as Alexander, 
until Napoleon dawned upon the world and showed it how to 
utilize victories to the fullest. Caesar followed up the politi¬ 
cal chances keenly, and appearing after a victory in the very 
midst of his enemies had no difficulty in subjecting them 
and in forcing them to furnish victuals and transportation. 
He insisted on dictating what their government should be. 
After a victory, when danger was over, he divided his 
forces, the better to work on the moral nature of the people 
by a sudden display of his legions in many places at once. 

The results of the summer’s campaign having been gath¬ 
ered, Caesar went into such winter-quarters as best fostered 
what had been accomplished. He avoided loading the 
Province with the care of the legions. His winter-quarters 
accustomed the newly subjected tribes to the army, to the 
Roman yoke and to furnishing regular supplies. After the 
victory over Ariovistus, winter-quarters were taken up in 
the east part of the land of the Sequani about Yesontio, 
where were rich supplies, with the Province near by; and at 
the same time Caesar was threatening the Belgae and keeping 
the Sequani well in hand. In 57 he took up winter-quar¬ 
ters on the lower Liger, when Crassus had already accus¬ 
tomed the Belgae to their masters. The Sequani needed rest 
from furnishing provisions, the Remi had been on Caesar’s 
side, the Belgae were exhausted, and the A2dui and neighbors 
were friendly. Besides, Caesar wished to see what effect his 



ANCIENT AND MODERN WAR. 


351 


eastern victories had had in the west, and whether it would 
still require force to subdue the western tribes. In 56 and 
55 winter-quarters were taken with reference to the British 
expedition. In 54, after this expedition, he had winter- 
quarters near the coast, but spread over a large area because 
of the late bad harvest. In consequence of the terrible 
experience gained by distributing the legions too widely, in 
53 and 52 they were kept close together; six were in Agen- 
dicum. 

When Caesar had bad luck, his energy markedly grew. 
He particularly watched for and guarded against any loss of 
morale among his men. In such circumstances he could use 
his fluent tongue to the greatest advantage. He would 
convince his men that they were not beaten, turn to another 
field and by redoubled energy wrest victory out of failure. 
This he did after Gergovia. Caesar throughout his cam¬ 
paigns shows best after a backset. We shall meet notable 
instances of this in the Civil War. 

It has been said that ancient differs so entirely from 
modern war that one can learn little from the great deeds of 
the captains antedating the Christian era. But what can be 
said of Caesar would be high praise for the best of the gen¬ 
erals of modern times. When we read the old campaigns, 
not superficially but for their inmost meaning, they convey 
to us the same broad lessons which the most able captains 
since the Middle Ages have given us. An artist learns his 
technique in a modern studio; he gathers his inspiration 
from the old masters. So with war. In no better way can 
the characteristic quality essential to the soldier be developed 
than by the study of the work of the ancient captains; by 
searching earnestly for the reasons which led them to what 
they did. Every great general has confessed his debt to the 
soldiers of antiquity. 


XXIV. 


CAESAR’S ARMY. 

Caesar’s legionary was no longer a citizen-soldier, as in the Punic wars; he 
was a professional, or a mercenary. He served for a livelihood, not as a duty. 
The legion was no longer set up in three lines according to property rating ; it 
was marshaled in two or three lines of cohorts, the cohort being a body of four 
to six hundred men, ranked according to military qualities, and ten cohorts 
went to the legion. The men retained substantially the old equipment; they 
occupied in line a space of but three feet front instead of five. The intervals 
between cohorts had sensibly decreased. The camp and camp-followers, musi¬ 
cians, standards and petty details of all kinds remained much as before. Light 
troops and cavalry were recruited from conquered tribes. Each legion had six 
tribunes who commanded it in turn under a legate. The general staff of the 
army had quartermasters, aides, engineers, lictors, scouts and a body-guard. 
The legionary’s pay was about that of a day-laborer, but largesses and booty 
were bountiful. For defense, the legion or army formed square or circle. It 
readily ployed into column or deployed into line. The orders of march were 
accurately laid down and well observed. The average march was about fif¬ 
teen miles. The train was less long than ours, there being neither artillery nor 
ammunition. For battle the army was drawn up on the slope of a hill; it still 
attacked, as had always been its habit. The legion of the Punic war was good 
because the men were good; Caesar’s was effective because he was able. 

The tactical formation of the early Roman army was 
described in the volume on Hannibal. Considerable changes 
in this tactical formation had taken place since the Punic 
wars; some were introduced by Marius, or by Caesar as a 
consequence of his campaigns. The Roman soldier as to 
arms, equipment and minor tactics, was to all intents and 
purposes the same as he had been in the time of Hannibal. 
He still wore helmet, cuirass, and greave on right leg; he 
still bore spear, shield and sword. But in character, quality 



CESAR'S LEGION. 


353 


and discipline, he was no longer the splendid citizen-soldier 
of that day. He was a professional if a Roman; a merce¬ 
nary if a foreigner; and as such he was exactly what his 
commander made him. A similar change had obtained in 
the officers. The six tribunes of a legion were no longer 
appointed for their military qualifications or long service, 
but claimed their rank on the score of political or social 
standing, or of friendship for the chief. 

The original smaller tactical unit of the Romans had been 
the century. It next became the maniple of two centuries. 
Later the three maniples of the hastati, principes and triarii, 
with some cavalry and velites, were merged into one body 
called a cohort. But the name alone remained. Under 
Caesar the cohort was no longer the ancient one, but a body 
the evolution of which has already been traced. It was 
divided only for the smaller details. It was practically the 
tactical unit of the legion, and all manoeuvres were by 
cohorts. The three-class formation of each cohort had 
entirely disappeared. 

It seems odd, with all that has been written about Roman 
tactics and organization from Polybius to Vegetius and 
Onosander, that the exact structure of Csesar’s legion, 
cohort, maniple and century cannot be given. The addi¬ 
tion of a few words in some paragraphs would elucidate the 
difficulties we encounter in construing these authors. But, 
as the omission of the name of some single well-known spot 
by Polybius has given rise to endless discussion as to Hanni¬ 
bal’s reuto across the Alps, so a certain lapse in explanation 
in all the Latin authors who treat of tactics has produced 
many different views as to the details of organization of 
Gaesar’s legion. Particularly Riistow, Goler and Stoffel 
h Ive discussed the matter au fond . But they disagree on 
• any points. 



354 


ANCIENT COHORT. 


120 


30 

HASTATI 

TURMA 


( 



110 

PRfNCiPtS 



tio 


VEUTE3 


The maniples of the cohort, according to Riistow, stood 
beside each other; according to Gdler still in rear of each 

other. It seems much more probable 
that they stood in line; the manoeuvres, 
of which we are given a more or less 
detailed account, can thus alone be 
readily understood. Goler’s plan tends 
to make a deep file, whereas the ten¬ 
dency was to make the line of battle 
less rather than more deep as time wore 
on. If beside each other, the maniples 
would have come to stand from right to 
left: pilani (ancient triarii), principes, 
hastati, though these dis¬ 
tinctions gradually disap¬ 
peared. 

The cohort which op¬ 
posed Hannibal was formed 
of three maniples or com¬ 
panies, each maniple in 
two centuries or platoons, 


so 


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and the maniples standing 


Early Cohorts. 

in rear of each other with intervals between hastati, prin 

HASTATI P RlNC I PE.S PlLANI 

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cipes, triarii, and with cavalry and light troops conveniei 
disposed. The cohort with which Csesar conquered the wc 


% 

d 









* 


CJESAWS COHORT. 355 

was a body of three maniples, each in two centuries ( ordines ) 
and the maniples standing side by side without intervals. 
The first ordo comprised the front five ranks of the mani¬ 
ple, the second ordo the rear five ranks. Or if the cohort 
was set up in eight ranks, there were four in each century. 

The normal numerical force of Caesar’s legions cannot be 
determined with the accuracy of the legions of the Punic 
wars. At times they had five or even six thousand men; at 
Pharsalus they had been reduced by service to an average 
of but twenty-seven hundred and fifty. Piistow construes 
the various authorities to give the legion an average field 
strength of thirty-six hundred men; Goler puts it at forty- 
eight hundred. This latter is perhaps nearer the normal 
force, not often reached in time of war. 

Ten cohorts composed the legion. If the cohorts had 
three hundred and sixty men, ten deep, there would be 
thirty-six men in each rank. If eight deep, which was not 
unlikely the usual case, and at Pharsalus probably so, there 
would be forty-five men in each rank. If these thirty-six 
men in close order for the march or parade or column of 
assault took up three feet each in breadth and six feet in 
depth and there was six feet between maniples, the size of a 
cohort would be one hundred and twenty feet front by sixty 
feet depth. If there were forty-five men in rank and eight 
in file, the size of a cohort would be, in close order, with say 
seven and a half feet between maniples, one hundred and 
fifty feet front by fifty feet depth. 

But three feet front was not sufficient to enable the legion¬ 
ary to hurl his pilum or use his gladius to advantage. There 
was therefore an open order of battle. This was either 
taken by each odd-numbered man stepping three feet for¬ 
ward to gain arm-room, or more likely each rank deployed 
by a face to right or left from the centre and took distance 




356 FIELD STRENGTH. 


as needed. This doubled the front of a cohort. On this 
latter supposition there must have been, in close order, 
intervals between cohorts equal to their front so as to provide 
for deployment; in open order — after deployment — there 
would be no intervals at all. 


Taking the eight-deep formation, with close-order intervals 
equal to cohort front added, the cohort would occupy, in 
open or in close order, three hundred feet front by fifty 
depth. Taking the ten-deep formation, equally with inter¬ 
vals, it would occupy two hundred and forty feet front by 
sixty feet depth. 


Riistow makes calculations on the average strength of a 
legion in active service being thirty-six hundred men. At 


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Maniple of 120 Men. 


Ilerda, Csesar tells us that a certain 
ridge, well identified to-day, was wide 
enough for three cohorts in line. The 
ridge, says Riistow, measures three hun¬ 
dred and sixty feet in width — which 
gives one hundred and twenty feet front 
to a cohort — as they stood without in¬ 
tervals. But the actual width of the 


ridge varies as it descends to the plain. This vitiates the 
calculation, though the deduction is not far from correct. 
We may fairly assume the average front of Caesar’s cohort 
without intervals as one hundred and twenty to one hundred 
and fifty feet, and the cohort as commonly numbering not 
over three hundred and sixty men during his campaigns. 

Each maniple had two centurions, a senior and a junior, 
and to each centurion there was a sub-centurion. These, 
like our company officers, all served on foot. The senior 
centurion of the cohort was its commander. While, like 
the non-commissioned officers of modern armies, the cen¬ 
turions could not rise in rank beyond their own grade, and 


MUSIC AND TRAIN. 


357 


while their duties were assimilated to these, they more nearly 
approached, in the extent of their command, our company 
officers than our sergeants. „ 

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legion was well deter- oooooooooooooooooooo 

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ards of the cohorts and 
legions were much like 
those of the Punic wars. 


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Maniple of 200 Men. 


Each maniple had an ensign; each cohort an eagle. The 
baggage consisted of pack-train ( impedimenta ) and the sol¬ 
dier’s own load ( sarcince ), which Cicero says was sixty 
pounds in addition to his armor and weapons, — a possible 
maximum. Sutlers ( mercatores ) were the only persons ac¬ 
companying the army who used carts. The tents were of 
skins, ten feet square. Each tent could accommodate ten 
men, of whom two would probably be on duty. Each 
centurion had a tent; the camp - followers must be shel¬ 
tered ; the higher officers had servants 
and more tents than the lesser. With 
tools for intrenching, tent-poles and pegs 
and the usual baggage carried, Riistow 
estimates five hundred and twenty sump- 
ter-mules for a field legion of thirty-six 
hundred men, — or one animal for every 
seven men. This was all there was to the 
pack-train, and is not far astray. Marius 
invented a forked stick or pole (muli 
Mariani ) for convenience in carrying the 
sarcinae. The bundles of rations, cloth¬ 
ing, etc., were tied to this, and it was 
borne on the shoulder. The ration for fifteen days, grain 


















358 


TRIBUNES . 


unground, weighed probably twenty-five pounds. The rest 
of the kit, armor, etc., much more than doubled this load. 
Cicero’s estimate may be considered high. 


The allied legions of old times had all disappeared. A 
10 9 8 7 <o 5 4 - 3 1 1 


P • i T 

~ [—’.“T - r- t- : 




; 

L . z±z t 

i i i 






Legion in One Line. 


legion no longer meant one Roman and one allied legion, or 
ten thousand men. It meant simply a body of ten cohorts. 
In place of the allied legions there was a larger force than 

theretofore of light troops armed like 
legionaries, but less heavily, and consid¬ 
erably more bowmen and slingers. The 
light troops had a leather jerkin but 
no armor, and carried the round shield 
(parma) instead of the cylindrical scutum. 
The bowmen and slingers wore no armor 
at all. 

The six tribunes were divided into sets 
of two. Each set com¬ 
manded the legion for 
two months, the two tri- 

T . . x . . __ bunes alternating daily, 

Light-Armed Man. ° J 7 

after the odd Roman 
fashion, which only among them could 
work without destroying all idea of disci¬ 
pline. The four tribunes off duty acted 
much as quartermasters, commissaries or 
aides de camp do in modern times. All 
of them served mounted. To be sure that 

each legion should not suffer from the_, 

divided command, a legate was put in su- T . , „ 

x Legionary ready for 

preme supervisory control. Later Caesar Battle. 














































































GENERAL STAFF. 


359 

put him in actual command, and under him the two tribunes 
on duty probably acted as chief of staff and adjutant gen¬ 
eral of a modern brigade. 

The general staff of Caesar’s army comprised: — 

Legates, assigned by the Senate to the consul, and de¬ 
riving their authority from him. • They were the general 
officers. Caesar had one for each of his legions. This was 
the first time their duty had been made definite. 

Quaestors, who superintended the business of a province 
or of an army. The quaestor was a sort of quartermaster- 
general. 

Contubernales and comites praetorii, who were volunteer 
aides, or if numerous a sort of gentleman body-guard. 

The Cohors praetoria, consisting of lictors, secretaries, 
marshals, spies, servants and orderlies. 

Speculators (scouts), who acted as vanguard and flankers 
on the march, — each legion had ten, — and who were gener¬ 
ally sent out to reconnoitre. We must conclude that these 
had placed under them such details as the immediate circum¬ 
stances called for. 

The Body-guard, sometimes a small cavalry detachment, 
but principally evocati, — veterans past duty years who 
remained voluntarily in service. Though footmen, they had 
horses and servants, were highly honored, served near the 
general, and were put into places of trust. 

Fabri, or engineers, under a prcefectus fabrorvm, of whom 
mention has already been made. They were used to repair 
weapons, construct bridges, siege-mounds and towers, and 
generally do the engineering work of the army. Csesar had 
some very able engineers. 

Antesignani, thought by some historians to have been a 
select body of a few men from each cohort, for service in 
delicate cases requiring skill and experience. They carried 


360 


OFFENSIVE FORMATION. 


no baggage, and from them were often selected the centu¬ 
rions. But it is not improbable that the antesignani were 
actually what their name designates; that in each maniple 
they formed the first two ranks, to protect the ensign, which 
was carried in the second rank; and that they were thus a 
quarter or a fifth of the entire body. Some events, as at 
Ilerda, lead up to this belief. 

The pay of Caesar’s legionaries was two hundred and 
twenty-five denarii (forty dollars) a year. This was about 
the pay of a day-laborer. His rations and clothing were 
deducted from his pay, but booty and largesses greatly 
increased it. His ration is variously stated to have been 
from one to three pecks of wheat, or other grain, a month; 
which was probably supplemented by beef, and such vegetables 
and fruit as the foragers could find. 

The offensive formation of the legion was in two, three or 
four lines (cities duplex, triplex or quadrupled). In two 

5 4 3 2 1 

ED ODD Em Em Em 

10 9 9 7 t 

cm. cm cm cm cm 

Legion in Two Lines. 

lines there were five cohorts in each, standing checker wise. 
In three lines, which was usual, four cohorts were in the first 
and three in each of the others, also checker wise. Intervals 
between cohorts in battle order are, by many commentators, 
said to have been equal to the cohort front; but though this 
was true of the era of the Punic wars, there is much room 
to doubt such intervals in Caesar’s time. No doubt there 
was an interval, especially when the men stood in close order, 
that is, three feet apart; but the quincuncial formation, whose 

























CJESAR'S legion. 


361 


intervals must be equal to the front of the bodies and so 
remain in battle, had tended to disappear by gradual decrease 
of the intervals. What these actually were at this time we 
do not know. They may have been prescribed in the Drill 
Regulations, and used on 4 5 ^ 

parade; but it is probable 
that in action they were 
often reduced to a mini¬ 
mum. The best explana¬ 
tion of which the involved 
statements of the old au¬ 
thorities are capable seems 


□XJ ED ED 


10 


8 


to be the one already I 1 -i -1 l~J I 1 L I. I I 
given, that in close (three- Legion in Three Lines ' 

foot) order there were intervals between cohorts equal to 
cohort front; and in open or battle (six-foot) order, these 
intervals were quite filled up. As the third line was apt to 
be held in reserve and in close order, a legion in battle order 
would have the first two lines deployed, — i. e., without in¬ 
tervals between cohorts and the third line ployed into close 
order with intervals equal to cohort front. 


HAS PR PIL 



4 3 Z COH. 1 


OPEN OROER 




10 9 8 

Caesar’s Legion. 


The lines were some one hundred and fifty feet apart, 
though this distance is also disputed. This would give, in 












































862 


DEFENSIVE FORMATION. 


an eight-rank formation, about four hundred and fifty feet 
depth and ten hundred and fifty feet front for a legion in 
three lines. The weight of such a legion was, therefore, 
very great, and still its mobility was well preserved. The 
phalanx of Alexander had twenty-eight men per metre of 
front line. The legion of the Second Punic War and Cae¬ 
sar’s era had eleven men. The modern army has not far 
from seven. 

An army of seven legions in three lines — twenty - five 
thousand men field strength — would take up somewhat less 
than a mile and a half of front. 

The defensive formation of the legion was in one line 
(cities simplex ), or in a square (acies quadrata ), or a circle 
(orbis). The one line was usual for the defense of breast- 

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Seven Legions in Three Lines. 

works or of the camp, — depth being unnecessary, as re¬ 
serves were kept for the protection of the gates and for 
sorties. The five front ranks were on the rampart without 
intervals, the five rear ones at the foot of the rampart. 
Sometimes only two ranks were on the rampart and the 
three other ranks of the or do back of it in reserve, while the 

V 

rear ordo of five ranks was similarly disposed at the left of 
the front ordo. The space allowed for the usual defensive 
line was six feet per man; or with only ordo depth and 
assuming that the centurions were not in line, two hundred 
and sixteen feet for the maniple, four hundred and thirty- 
two feet for the cohort, and forty-three hundred and twenty 
feet, four fifths of a mile, for the legion. A single line dis¬ 
position was sometimes practiced to resist attacks in the 


THE ORBIS. 363 

field, but the cohort retained its front of about one hundred 
and twenty feet, and the intervals being closed, the legion 
had but twelve hundred feet front. How much of a circle 
the orbis was, we do not know. It was formed for defense in 
the field against overwhelming and surrounding forces. To 
resist such an attack, the cohorts drew up in what was the 
equivalent of our hollow square. Smaller bodies might form 
circular groups, using their shields and hurling their spears 
and occasionally falling to with the sword. Were not the 
hollow square also described we should be tempted to believe 
that the orbis was the same formation. 

A legion in three lines could readily form square by leav¬ 
ing the first, second and third cohorts facing to the front; 
by facing the fifth and sixth to the right; the fourth and 
seventh to the left, and by facing the eighth, ninth and tenth 
to the rear. The term orbis may have come from the nat¬ 
ural habit of flattening out the corners of such a square for 
easier defense. It is difficult to imagine the manoeuvre by 
which a legion ployed into anything approaching an actual 
circle and again deployed into line. It may have been an 
irregular half-square, half-circle, according to the accentua¬ 
tion of the ground or to the conditions demanding a defen¬ 
sive formation. 

On rare occasions there was a quadruple line. The fourth 
was intended to protect a flank and might consist of some 
cohorts specially detailed and marshaled at an angle to the 
general line. Such was Caesar’s disposition at Pharsalus. 

The auxiliary troops were drilled to conform to the same 
methods. They had not the cohort formation, but they were 
utilized so as to sustain the legionary tactics, much as the 
velites of old had been. The bowmen and slingers were 
mere skirmishers having no definite tactical position. 

In the cavalry, the turma of thirty-two enlisted men was 


364 


CAVALRY FORMATION. 




the tactical unit. It rode in four ranks of eight front. It 

has been thought that the ranks were 
open so that the men stood checker- 
wise. There were three decurions to 
each turma, the senior being its chief. 
The turma must have been a body 
about forty feet square, reckoning 
crudely five feet front and ten feet 
dejDth per mounted man. Twelve 
turmse were an ala (wing) or regi¬ 
ment, which may have been formed in two (or three) lines, 
each say four hundred and forty (or two hundred and eighty) 


iiiiiiM 


Turma. 


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Ala jn Two Lines. 


feet long, counting intervals equal to turma-front between 
turmse, which were more essential in the cavalry than the 
infantry. The cavalry was commanded by a prcpfectus equi- 


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turn. In larger bodies, in which the cavalry often acted, we 
must guess at the formation. It no doubt, at this era, con- 


ORDER OF MARCH. 


365 


formed much to the habits of the peoples furnishing the 
troops, modified by Roman experience and the necessities of 
the army. Caesar had no Roman cavalry, properly speak¬ 
ing. It was all recruited among the Gauls or Germans. 

The order of march ( agmen ) was quickly formed by facing 
the legion to the right or left, according as it was to move. 
The cohorts thus followed each other in order. If to the 
right, the maniples of each cohort would be pilani, principes, 
hastati; if to the left, the reverse. The depth of the file, on 
facing to the right or left, would be column front, i. e., 
eight or ten men; and as the men could comfortably march 
in a breadth of three feet each, this front could be reduced to 
twenty-four or thirty feet by simply dressing on the front rank 
man; or by making each second ordo fall in behind its first, 
this could be again reduced to fifteen or twelve feet front. 


HAS 


PRlN 


PiL 


H t 


i»T 


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oro o: 




V. *• • 


Agmen Manipulating 


j • • 
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• • • • • 

M « • • 

• « • • • 


It was a “column of fives or fours.” This was called 
marching in column of maniples ( manipulatim ). The 
legion in column of maniples could then file in any 
direction. 

Or the legion could march in column of centuries 
(centuriatim or ordinatim ) by the maniple on the 
right or left marching straight forward, followed in 
order by each succeeding maniple. In this order 
each cohort would march with its centuries in regu¬ 
lar sequence: first ordo of pilani, second ditto; first 
ordo of principes, second ditto; first ordo of hastati, second 
ditto. In other words, the centuries ( ordines ) would succes- 


PR 2. PR 1 PIL z Pit- 










































































366 


DEPLOYMENTS. 


sively follow each other. This column would have a front 
of twelve men if the cohort had only field strength; but 

t we can imagine it ployed into 


pi i a “column of sixes.” In its 
full width it was employed 

Pi 1 1 

only in open country. Few 
p * 1 roads would accommodate so 
. wide a column. 

pa i 

Line was again quickly 
H 1 formed from column by con- 
H ^ verse means, just as it is 
to-day. Deployments were 
sometimes made by the left 
instead of the right, as, e. #., 
when circumstances would 
expose the right flank, which, 
has* pfUN pil with the shield on the left 

Agmen Centuriatim. arm, it will be remembered, 

was considered the weak or open side (latus apertum). Thus, 
in debouching from a defile, to deploy at its mouth, the col¬ 
umn might issue left in front, and deploy to the right of the 
leading century or cohort. The open side would not be thus 
exposed. 

The men could readily march each in a space of four feet 
from front to rear. A cohort of field strength (three hun¬ 
dred and sixty men) would thus take up, in length of col¬ 
umn, if marching centuriatim , full front, one hundred and 
twenty feet; half front, two hundred and forty feet. If 
manipulatim , and the men kept their distance of three feet, 
as they could for short distances, it would be one hundred 
and eight feet long; if the column was extended so as to 
allow each man four feet, it would be one hundred and fifty- 
two feet long in full front, three hundred and four feet in 



















MARCHES. 


867 


half front. It scarcely seems probable that the column could 
be allowed to drag its length out so much beyond the space 
required by the line of battle. But marches then were gov¬ 
erned by the condition of the roads as they are to-day, and 
it was, no doubt, difficult to keep the column closed up. 

The legion could march in line (acies instructa ); in 
column (agmen pilatum ); in square (agmen quadrature). 



7 6 S 7 6 5 

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By Lines to the Right. 



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The march in line was only employed on the battlefield and 
had the same advantages and disadvantages, saving the 
absence of artillery, as it has to-day. If the legion in three 
lines wished to take ground to 

0 * a ^ 

the right, and still remain in 
line of battle, it could do so by 
facing the whole body to the 
right and marching the three 
columns so made as far as de¬ 
sired. By a halt and front the 

line of battle was again formed , . ^ 

1 * 

in three lines. This enabled a 
legion to change its position ob- j- 
liquely without great difficulty. 

If the line was on difficult 
ground it could advance by col¬ 
umn of wings (cornu). The right 
wing would have cohorts 1, 5, 

8: the centre would have co- 


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if m 

r~*— Y ! 


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3; dzf 


y? c 


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10 


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c==y czzt c 


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By Wings to the Front. 

horts 2, 6, 9; the left wing would have cohorts 4, 8, 7, 10. 



























































































COLUMN OF MARCH. 


868 

Each of these would march by the flank and file to the front, 
like our forward by the right of companies. On halting, 
each cohort would file to its proper place in line and dress 
forward on its right. 

In marching in column the cohorts followed each other 
according to number (No. 1 to No. 10 from right to left). 
Thus marching centuriatim gave the legion, with an interval 
of twenty feet between cohorts, some fourteen hundred feet 
of length; if doubled up, twenty-six hundred feet. 

The baggage-train of a legion Riistow lias estimated at five 
hundred and twenty pack-animals. In a breadth of forty feet 
eight animals could go abreast, which gave sixty-five ranks 
of them; or allowing ten feet for each, six hundred and fifty 
feet for the pack-train, or thirteen hundred feet if doubled 
on a road twenty feet wide. Thus the marching length of a 
legion of thirty-six hundred men, with its train, was not 
far from two thousand feet, or doubled, four thousand feet, 
say three quarters of a mile. If the legion was marching 
manipulation in “column of fives,” the cohorts would take 
up over three thousand feet, and with baggage added would 
stretch out somewhat more; on a bad road, a full mile. 

In presence of the enemy, or in line of battle, the troops 
were drilled to ploy into column or deploy back into line, to 
march by the right or left flank, to the front or rear, much 
as modern armies do. The drill-ground or battlefield ma¬ 
noeuvres of a legion were almost identical in principle and 
performance with our own, the variation relating mainly to 
the greater depth of the Roman lines, the difference in arms 
and the absence of artillery. The manoeuvres of one of our 
civil war brigades, in a line of battalion-columns doubled on 
the centre, would not be much unlike those of a legion. 

The legion in presence of the enemy also marched, when 
the ground permitted, in a sort of square formed by a van 


TO FORM SQUARE. 


369 


and rear with baggage between, and heavy flanking columns 
on each side of the train. The square was quickly formed 
for the march from the legion in line. Cohorts 1, 2 and 3 
kept straight on. Cohorts 5 and 6 formed column left in 
front so as to face outwardly 
when coming to a front. Co¬ 
horts 4 and 7 formed column 
right in front. Cohorts 8, 9 and 
10 formed line to the rear, and 
then broke by the right of co¬ 
horts or maniples to the rear and 
marched behind the baggage. 

These last were then in such 
order as readily to form line to 
the rear and complete the square. 

The baggage was thus inclosed 
in the centre; its length might 
somewhat modify the formation 
of the marching square. We 
hear of the Roman army march- L. 1 i, .. 1 L. 1 1 1 

ing over what we know must 7 6 5 

have been very difficult ground ' - ^ ^ - ' CZZD 

in this formation. It is not to j- 1Q ^ ^9^ ^ 8 ^ 
be presumed that accurate order 
was preserved when the ground 
was wooded or much cut up. 

Caesar is as perfectly exact in 
his use of terms to describe these manoeuvres as if writing 
a book of tactics. And the Roman “drill-regulations” had 
been established for generations and modified only as re¬ 
quirements from age to age dictated. Still there are many 
minor points which cannot be positively elucidated. 

The cavalry wings of four hundred men marched by turmae 


con o ~ n rm 

BAGGACE 

c m cm mn 

March Forward in Square. 

















































370 


THE DATS MARCH. 


forty feet wide, taking up, without baggage, nearly five 
hundred feet length of column. The train probably added 
half as much. The ranks of the turmse column were also 
doubled in narrow ways, just how is not known. They must 
often have been obliged to reduce front and thus lengthen 
the column. A body of four thousand horse, such as Caesar 
had in Gaul, with baggage, would take up, in simple column, 
nearly a mile and a half; doubled up, three miles. 

All this was naturally subject to precisely the same diffi¬ 
culties which are encountered by every army in the field. 
And the more wooded and broken the territory the less 
accurately could the “tactics ” be conformed to. In Gaul, 
no doubt, there was constant and great deviation from the 
regulations. 

The day’s march (iter) was reckoned from camp to camp. 
A day of rest was customary after every three or four 
marches. Each night, or whenever a stop was made, the 
camp was fortified. This intrenching practically took the 
place of our outpost system, besides being something else. 
The legions usually fought with their camp in their rear. 
If they came across the enemy on the march, they stopped, 
half the men fortified a camp, while the others protected 
them, placed the baggage in it and then fought, — provided, 
indeed, they could so long fend off the enemy. The ordinary 
day’s march was from fifteen to eighteen miles, theoretically 
supposed to be done in five summer hours, nearly seven of 
ours, generally from early morning to noon, there being thus 
enough time left for camping. 

The step (gradus) was two and one half Roman feet long; 
the route step one hundred to the minute; the quick step one 
hundred and twenty. This is about our own standard. The 
pace (pcissus) was two steps, from right heel to right heel. 
The Roman foot was nine tenths of ours. 


EXCEPTIONAL MARCHES. 


871 


The average Roman 
march was no greater 
than that of modern 
days. Some excep¬ 
tional marches were re¬ 
markable. Caesar left 
Gergovia at daybreak 
to move on Litavicus, 
marched twenty - five 
Roman miles, struck 
him and brought him 
to reason the same day, 
marched back twenty- 
five miles, and the next 
day reached Gergovia 
before daybreak, the 
legions having rested 
three hours during the 
twenty - four, and six 
more having been con¬ 
sumed in watching the 
enemy under arms. The 
only superior to this 
march which can be 
quickly recalled is that 
of the Spartans to Ma¬ 
rathon, one hundred 
and fifty miles in three 
days. Crassus marched 
to join Caesar, who was 
moving to the assist¬ 
ance of Cicero, and 
made from midnight to 


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Army on the March. 


FLANKERS 


























372 


VAN AND REARGUARD. 


nine A. M. twenty-five Roman miles. In the Zeta raid, 
Caesar’s legions marched thirty-six miles from before day¬ 
break to nightfall, capturing a town and fighting four hours 
in retreat on the way. We do not know just what periods 
of rest were allowed during the day’s march. We rest 
usually ten minutes every hour. On occasion marches were 
made without baggage. It goes without saying that the 
Roman marches were subject to the same interruptions, diffi¬ 
culties and delays as our own. Muddy roads and freshets 
in rivers were as common in Gaul as in Mexico or Virginia. 

A vanguard (primum agmeri) was usual, and consisted of 
the bulk of the cavalry and light troops, scouts, staff-officers 
and camp men supported by some cohorts without baggage. 
The main body followed. A guard brought up the rear. The 
duty of the van was to attack and hold the enemy, if met, so 
as to enable the main body to form; to reconnoitre the front 
and advance flanks; to select and stake out a camp. The 
cavalry Caesar sometimes kept with the main body when he 
did not deem it reliable, or when one of the flanks had to be 
protected from danger of attack. Light troops alone were 
used as vanguard when the cavalry was on other duty. 

The rearguard (agmen extremum ) in marches towards the 
enemy had no duties except to keep order at the tail of the 
column and pick up stragglers. 

The main body marched in simple column or in battle 
order by the flank, according as the enemy was far or near, 
or the land was friendly or inimical. An army of five 
legions, with baggage, eighteen to twenty thousand men, all 
told, took, in a forty-foot wide order, from two to two and a 
half miles of length, with ranks doubled twice as much. In 
practice, the column was much more strung out than this 
when the roads were not good. 

Out of presence of the enemy, the train of each legion 


FLANK MARCHES. 


373 


accompanied it for greater convenience; in his presence, the 
train was kept together in one body. When moving on the 
enemy, the bulk — say three quarters — of the main army 
was in front, then the train, then the remainder as baggage 
and rearguard. 

In battle order the legions were not intended to march any 
distance. This order was used only in the immediate vicinity 
of the enemy. When Caesar moved against the Usipetes 
and Tenchtheri, each legion is supposed to have marched 
ployed into three columns at deploying distance. There 
were thus fifteen parallel columns for the five legions. The 
whole could at once deploy forward into line. The legion¬ 
aries had their helmets on, their shields uncovered and their 
weapons ready; the baggage had been left in the camp. 

We remember that on the march the legionary had his 
helmet hanging on his chest, his shield in a case, and his 
plumes, and other insignia of rank or corps, wrapped up. 
If suddenly attacked the men must lay down their baggage, 
prepare and put on their badges and get ready their weapons. 
At the river Sabis the Romans had to fight without this 
preparation. 

The marches in retreat were conducted on reverse princi¬ 
ples, with similar precautions. The baggage went with the 
vanguard, followed by the bulk of the army; then came a 
strong rearguard. The marches in squares were made 
through an enemy’s territory, or in times of insurrection, 
or when the enemy was on every side. Sometimes the 
square was composed of the whole army; sometimes each 
legion marched in square. On every front of such a square, 
cavalry, bowmen and slingers were thrown out as skirmish¬ 
ers. The baggage was in the centre of the one large square, 
or that of the legion in the centre of each legionary square. 

Flank marches were made in battle order, with baggage 


374 


BRIDGES AND FORDS. 


on the side opposite the enemy, or between the lines if there 
were more than one. Such marches were not usually made 
for any great distance. In the open field the legions so 
marching were protected by flankers. In a valley a stream 
might serve to protect the column. Caesar marched up the 
Elaver in battle order by the flank for several days. 

The order of march was changed daily, to equalize the 
labor of the legionaries. Caesar’s legions crossed rivers with 
ease, wading fords up to the waist, breast and even neck. 
They carried no ammunition; their armor and weapons 
could not be spoiled. Bridges took as a rule too long to 
build; Caesar preferred fords when available. If the river 
was deep and the current rapid, a line of cavalry was 
stationed above and below, the first in an oblique line to 
break the current, the last to catch men who were carried 
down. Fords were now and then passed in line of battle, as 
at the Thames. 

Bridges were as quickly built as to-day. The absence of 
pontoon-trains was no apparent hindrance. They were built 
of boats picked up along the river, as often as on piles; 
whichever was at the moment handier. But once did Caesar 
in the Gallic War cross a river directly in the face of the 
enemy. This was the Thames. Bridgeheads usually pro¬ 
tected both ends of a bridge. 

Caesar kept to the uniform ancient habit of drawing up his 
legions for battle on the gentle slope of a hill, so that they 
might have the advantage of the descent for casting their 
pila as well as for the rush upon the enemy. The utmost 
reliance was put upon the initiative so as to make the first 
shock a telling one when possible. The legions were wont to 
await the advance of the enemy to within two hundred and 
fifty paces (if, indeed, he would advance), then at the 
common step to move upon him, and when within half this 


I 


METHOD OF FIGHTING. 375 

space to take the run ( cursus ). The distance was not great 
enough to wind the men, even in their heavy armor. The 
first two ranks held their spears aloft in readiness and hurled 
them at ten to twenty paces from the enemy. If the volley 
produced sufficient gaps, falling to with the sword the 
legionaries would penetrate into these and have the enemy at 
their mercy. In case the enemy was brave and determined, 
the legions often remained longer at javelin-casting distance 
and used their spears only, the rear ranks advancing through 
the front ranks to hurl their pila in their turn. The ten 
ranks could thus deliver five heavy volleys of javelins, having 
exhausted which, the first line of cohorts drew the sword or 
allowed the second line to advance in its turn. It sometimes 
occurred that the enemy was so rapid as to leave no time to 
hurl the pila, and the legionaries set to at once with the 
gladius. But this was rare. The light troops kept the 
fighting line supplied with javelins, collected from those 
hurled at it. Or again the two first lines, after casting their 
pila, would at once close in with the sword. When 
exhausted they would allow the next two ranks to come 
forward, hurl their pila and use the sword; and thus the 
ranks worked successively, — hours being often consumed in 
this array of duels between the individuals of each fighting 
line. 

The old legionary always pushed his enemy with his bossed 
shield. He was so well armed and so expert that he could 
sometimes fight all day without receiving a wound. He 
was physically strong and could gradually force the enemy 
back in places by sheer pressure and thus make gaps into 
which he could penetrate with deadly effect. During battle, 
few legionaries were either killed or wounded, — but when 
one line broke, the other could cut it to pieces. 

In case the enemy awaited the Roman advance, this was 


376 INFANTRY AND CAVALRY. 

conducted in similar manner. The first ranks were sustained 
by the backward ones in such a manner that there was a 
never-ceasing motion in each cohort as those who still held 
their pila in their turn advanced to hurl them; yet there was 
no loss of formation, as the space occupied by each man gave 
ample room to advance and retire within the body of the 
cohort. The second and third lines remained at a suitable 
distance in the rear, — two hundred feet or more, — ready to 
support the front line by advancing into or through its inter¬ 
vals. The second line was ordered forward when the first 
line ceased to gain a perceptible advantage over the enemy. 
All the lines gradually came into action, — the third at the 
critical moment. 

The legion in Caesar’s time excelled because he was at its 
head. It was not without its disadvantages. The soldiery 
was brave and well disciplined, but the Roman army was 
not independent of terrain. The work of the skirmishers, 
slingers and bowmen, of the auxiliaries, and of the veteran 
antesignani did not always chime in with that of the legions. 
The two kinds of infantry would sometimes clash, owing to 
their different formation. The cavalry was often inefficient, 
and had to be strengthened by bodies of light infantry placed 
in the intervals of the turmse. This infantry, when the 
shock with the enemy’s horse came, could inflict serious 
damage on it. It helped to steady the movements of the 
turmse, while protected at the same time from being run 
down by the enemy’s cavalry. This mixing cavalry and foot 
is one of the most ancient of devices. In a modified form 
it has survived to our day. The Roman cavalry was service¬ 
able, but at its very best it was not cavalry, such as were 
Alexander’s Companions or the squadrons of Seidlitz. 

The real battle was fought out by the legions. In fact, 
the legions could be independent of any other troops. Cav- 


THEIR DUTIES. 


377 


airy could attack cavalry; it could cut up broken infantry; 
but unbroken cohorts could not be successfully attacked by 
cavalry except in flank. By a front attack, steady infantry 
could drive cavalry in every instance. During battle, cav¬ 
alry was useful only against the enemy’s squadrons. The 
cavalry and skirmishers were chiefly of use in outpost and 
reconnoitring duties and in pursuit. In actual battle, the 
cavalry was not much employed. Since Alexander’s day, it 
will be seen, cavalry had degenerated. 

The cohorts were all-sufficient. When cavalry and light 
troops were not on hand, the legions found no difficulty in 
doing all the work themselves. Still they relied on the 
cavalry and light troops, if present, to protect their flanks 
while fighting. In case there was grave danger of a flank 
attack, especially on the right, a fourth line was more than 
once made by Caesar, the duty of which it was to stand near 
and defend the threatened quarter. 

Habitually the line of cohorts in each legion was threefold 
as before detailed. This arrangement in an army of six 
legions in line would give twenty-four cohorts in the first 
line and eighteen cohorts in each of the others. The third 
was considered as a reserve not to go into action till ordered 
by the general. It was on occasion used to sustain the flanks 
of the legions, or threaten the enemy’s. Its utility was 
shown at Bibracte and in the battle against Ariovistus. A 
curious feature of Caesar’s formation, due probably to Marius, 
was that the oldest and best cohorts were placed in the front 
line, and the younger ones in the rear. This was the direct 
reverse of the principle which in the old legion had ranked 
the three class-lines as hastati, principes, triarii. 

The cavalry was placed as occasion required. As a rule 
it was on the flanks. It might be posted in the rear, as was 
the case at Bibracte, because it was not deemed reliable, and 


378 CENTRE AND WINGS. 

in the battle against Ariovistus because the barbarians were 
protected in flank and rear by their wagons set up as defense, 
and cavalry against these was useless. 

The light troops were only available as a curtain or as 
skirmishers. In battle they were harmful rather than of use. 
They do not appear to have been employed to open the 
action as uniformly as in earlier days, but rather in collat¬ 
eral duties. But they collected darts and kept the legiona¬ 
ries supplied with them. 

The line had a centre (acies media), and right and left 
wing (cornu dextrum , smistrum). The cavalry wings some¬ 
times first advanced; then legion after legion under the 
legates in command. This was, as it were, an order of 
battle with the centre withdrawn. The oldest and most 
experienced legions were posted on the right and left. If 
there were no prevailing reasons to the contrary, Caesar pre¬ 
ferred to attack with his right in advance, where, like Alex¬ 
ander, he was wont to take his stand. This resulted in a 
species of oblique order of battle. It was more the result of 
Caesar’s predilection for personally leading off in action than 
a definite tactical oblique order, like that of Epaminondas, 
or as most perfectly exemplified by Frederick at Leuthen. 
On the signal being blown, the right cohorts at once 
advanced, those on their left successively following. It was 
not a tactical advance in echelon with heavily reinforced 
right flank, but a gradual rushing to battle of the cohorts 
from right to left. In a measure it had similar results. The 
best legions would naturally be stationed on the attacking 
wing. 

The line of cohorts impinged upon the enemy only along 
part of its front when there were intervals between the 
cohorts; and the enemy might and sometimes did penetrate 
into these intervals, and take the cohorts on the sensitive 


ACTS OF A BATTLE. 


379 


right flank. But the second line was always on the watch 
for just this thing, and was ready to correct the evil by a 
vigorous onset. Caesar’s probable formation, by which the 
cohorts deployed into a battle order without intervals, elimi¬ 
nated this danger. During the fighting contact there was 
not only a succession of smaller shocks by the several ranks 
of each cohort, but the first, second and third lines could 
deliver their heavier blows in succession, following each 
other as the tired lines got rest from the advance of those in 
rear. A hard-fought field was one of incessant motion. 

The different acts of a battle might be stated as these. 
Before the action opened — unless it was precipitated — the 
general rode the lines and made a short address ( cohortatio ) 
to each of his legions, to rouse their martial ardor. He 
then went to the attacking flank and gave the trumpet signal, 
which was repeated down the line. The legions of the 
attacking flank advanced with their battle-cry and the 
legions on their right or left successively came on in a spe¬ 
cies of rough echelon. The legions of the first line were 
followed after a certain lapse of time, perhaps minutes, per¬ 
haps hours, by the second and third lines, the cavalry riding 
forward at the same time to protect the flank or attack the 
enemy’s cavalry, or — when this was beaten — the flank of 
the infantry line. When the first line was exhausted, the 
lines in rear replaced them in places or along the whole 
front as ordered, and special bodies of troops were brought 
up to support decimated legions much as in our own days; 
moving forward through intervals when these existed, or 
allowing the broken lines in front to fall irregularly through 
intervals specially opened for the purpose. Victory being 
won, the cavalry pursued. Defeat ensuing, the legions 
withdrew to the fortified camp and re-formed there, the 
general holding back the enemy with his reserves or the 


380 


DEFENSIVE BATTLES. 


legions least exhausted, and the cavalry. The battles of 
remote antiquity were very different; the battles of Alex¬ 
ander, Hannibal and Caesar bear more resemblance, in a 
general way, to our own. , 

Defensive battles were not fought unless the terrain was 
especially suitable. The flanks were then leaned on natural 
obstacles, and the front was protected by wolf-pits or other 
entanglements. If possible, the army backed on the camp, 
protected their flanks, and gave the enemy only one approach, 
in front and up a slope. The camp of Caesar on the Axona, 
where he invited an attack, was a good sample of this. If 
the barbarians had crossed the morass in his front, they 
must have broken ranks in so doing, and Caesar could have 
charged down on their phalanx with decisive effect, for his 
flanks were protected by ramparts. At Alesia, the fighting 
was defensive, coupled with sallies. But in the open field, 
the Roman strength lay in attack, or in inviting attack and 
in meeting it halfway. 





XXV. 


CAMPS, SIEGES AND BALLISTICS. 

In camp the men had tents, which were carried in the column by pack-mules. 
In winter-quarters the camps were larger and more carefully intrenched, but 
similar to the daily camps. These latter could be intrenched in a few hours. 
Little change in fortification and siege work took place from Alexander’s era 
to Caesar’s. The walls of the Italian cities were by no means like those of 
Babylon and Nineveh ; but they were high and well built, and much skill was 
put to defend and take them. The same sheds and screens for approaching 
walls were used; mounds and towers were built, and the lines of contra- and 
circumvallation were thrown up as of yore. The walls were undermined or 
battered down by rams. Sorties were made by the garrison to destroy the be¬ 
sieger’s works. The ballistic machines of the Romans do not strike us as being 
as good as those of Alexander, whose field artillery was excellent and easily 
transported. Still there were small engines used on the walls of camps and 
sometimes in line of battle. Caesar’s sieges were expert; that of Alesia is one 
of the finest of antiquity. 

We do not know exactly how Caesar’s camps were laid out. 
Polybius gives us the plan of the Roman camps in the Second 
Punic War; Hyginus gives us that of the time of the 
Empire. As Riistow says, what is common to both was no 
doubt a constituent of Caesar’s camp. Caesar’s was presum¬ 
ably much the same as either, the changes relating merely to 
the differences in organization of troops. Caesar had no 
definite number of auxiliaries, as was usual in the War 
against Hannibal, and the camp was calculated accordingly. 
Its general arrangement was what it had been for centuries. 
It was pitched on high ground, fronting down a slope, favor¬ 
ably near wood and water, and away from probable opportu¬ 
nity for ambush. A desirable place was the slope towards 


382 


CAMP OF FIVE LEGIONS. 


a stream, particularly if the enemy lay beyond. But the 
Romans camped where they must, if the best site was not at 
hand, and the shape of the camp was modified by the ground. 

A camping party always went ahead to select and stake 
out camp, and the legionaries pitched and intrenched it in 

the course of a few 
hours, while the cav¬ 
alry served as out¬ 
posts. Each legion 
and cohort as it ar¬ 
rived was marched 
into its appointed 
place, the detail for 
guard was selected, 
the baggage was laid 
down, the weapons, 
except the sword, 
put aside. The camp 
was then fortified, 
and the tents after¬ 
wards put up. If the 
weather was stormy 
the tents were put 
up first. Then the 
troops took sapper, 
the officers assembled for orders, and much the same routine 
was gone through which has been described in a previous 
volume. The fortifications took the place of outpost-duty, 
which the Romans did not practice in our sense. In the im¬ 
mediate presence of the enemy the work would be done by 
the third line, the two first being sent out to protect the 
fatigue party; or by the second line if only two, the first 
standing in line in front, ready to meet an attack. When 
































































































































































DITCH AND WALL. 


the legions marched out to battle, the camp was left in en 
order under a guard, usually composed of the younger troops, 
who were fully able to hold it. The camps were rectangular 
unless modified by the ground. 

The same thing applies to the little camps or redoubts 
( castella ) which were built in siege operations or for outpost 
defenses of a general camp. Of these castella the smallest 
were one hundred and twenty feet square, for a garrison of 
a cohort. The corners of all camps were rounded off to 
prevent the enemy getting a footing on them in the assault. 
The gates, wide enough for a maniple front (forty feet), were 
protected by half-moons, and materials were on hand for 
closing them quickly in case of threatened attack. Gates 
like our modern ones seem to have been unknown, except in 
permanent fortifications. 

The ditch (fossa) was nine to twelve feet wide at the top, 
with a depth of seven to nine feet. It was often deeper and 



Camp Wall (section). 


wider, the ratio being preserved. The scarp and counter¬ 
scarp had) one or both, a slope or not, according to the 
nature of the soil. The height of the wall (agger) was not 
leemed so important, for the shield of the ancient soldier 





















INTRENCHING THE CAMP. 


jtected him abundantly. The percentage of darts which 
took actual effect was, as in the case of bullets, very small. 
From the wall the soldier could, however, cast his own 
missiles with better effect upon the enemy below, whom the 
ditch stopped at a good spear-hurling distance. This, 
indeed, was the main object of the wall. The height of the 
wall was supposed to be about two thirds of the surface-width 
of the ditch. Its thickness was about equal to the height, or 
a bit greater. The slopes were covered with sods, or inter¬ 
laced with branches, fascines or hurdles. There was a 
banquette of suitable width, and palisades ( vallum .) were 
planted at the top. The word vallum is often used for the 
entire palisaded wall. Embrasures in the palisades were 
common and towers were generally built. The inside slope 
of the wall was cut in steps for easy access, or faced with 
logs in steps. 

It took, as a rule, four or five hours to complete the in¬ 
trenching of a camp. It could, under favorable conditions, 
be done in three. The Roman used his spade to good effect. 
If the troops reached camp by noon, they would have fin¬ 
ished their work by sundown of a short day. 

The division of the camp was, in nomenclature, much like 
that of the War against Hannibal. The cohorts camped 
in their regular order. Each cohort took up a space one 
hundred and twenty feet wide, with a depth of one hundred 
and eighty feet, cut into six parts, thirty feet wide, one for 
each century. The century tents were pitched back to back 
and front to front, in streets. A cavalry turma took up one 
hundred and twenty feet by thirty. A regiment of twelve 
turmse took up as much space as two cohorts. 

The accompanying sketch, added to what has already been 
given in a previous volume, suffices to show the details of 
Caesar’s camp. 



i 


PICKETS. 385 

A cavalry picket was usual, which sent out scouts and 
spies. The gates were specially guarded, the wall was duly 
lined with sentinels, averaging one every thirty feet. The 


180 FT 


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FI FI . 

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Cohort Tents (Hyginus). 

reliefs, every three hours, were called by the trumpet, and 
there was blown a sort of tattoo and reveille. The same 
rounds were made by an officer of the day as of yore. 

The winter-quarters were the same as the summer-quar¬ 
ters, but more permanently and comfortably arranged. 
Huts took the place of tents. It may again be mentioned 
here that the Roman day was divided into two parts, the 
day from six A. M. to six p. M., and the night from six P. M. 
to six a. M. The hours were: the first, from six to seven 
A. M., the second, seven to eight A. M., and so on. Thus 
noon was the sixth hour, and four P. M. the tenth hour of the 
day, or midnight the sixth hour of the night. The day and 
night were also divided into four watches of three hours 
each. Thus six to nine A. M. was the first watch of the day; 
midnight to three A. M. was the third watch of the night. 









386 


ANCIENT SIEGES. 


Occasionally summer hours are spoken of, being the time 
from sunrise to sunset, divided into twelve hours. This 
would at times lengthen the hour materially from what it 
would be if the day had been reckoned as from six a. m. to 
six p. M. 

The art of attacking and defending strong places under¬ 
went comparatively little change for more than a thousand 
years. As far back as there are any records, written or 
sculptured, the processes of a siege are shown to be substan¬ 
tially the same. The following verses from Ezekiel iv. 1, 
2, 3, speak of a siege about 600 b. c.: “Thou also, son of 
man, take thee a tile, and lay it before thee, and portray 
upon it a city, even Jerusalem.” This was the plan of the 
works to be undertaken. “And lay siege against it, and 
build forts against it, and cast up a mount (mound) against 
it; set camps also against it, and plant battering rams against 
it round about.” These are the usual steps of the siege. 
“Moreover take thou unto thee an iron pan, and set it for 
a wall of iron between thee and the city,”—this refers to 
iron mantelets used in preparing the approaches, — “ and set 
thy face against it, and it shall be besieged, and thou slialt 
lay siege against it.” 

At certain periods, as during the wonderful activity of 
Alexander’s military career, or during the siege of Rhodes 
by Demetrius Poliorcetes, or the defense of Syracuse by 
Archimedes, or Sylla’s siege of Athens, a marked advance 
was made, but this again was wont to be lost, and the 
methods and machines remained almost identical. In fact, 
from dim antiquity they were so. 

The walls of towns were generally of stone, and very high 
and thick. Those of the Gauls were, as we have seen, some¬ 
times of earth, logs and stone. They were guarded by 
towers at regular intervals, and were apt to be fronted by a 


METHOD OF SIEGES. 


387 


ditch, wet or dry. Immense skill and patience were devoted 
to the defenses of cities and their interior citadels. To 
capture a town, one must resort to blockade, or siege, or 
assault. To attack the walls there was no artillery capable 
of making breaches. The catapults and ballistas could throw 
heavy stones and huge arrows to a remarkable distance, but 
had not penetration enough to break down walls. To oper¬ 
ate a breach, it was essential to approach near to the wall, 
and either undermine it, or break it down by battering-rams 
or mural hooks. This approach could not be made except 
under artificial cover, and hence arose the more or less 
effective series of tortoises, galleries and mantelets, terraces 
and towers, added to mining and countermining, which were 
good or poor according as the skill and energy of the besieg¬ 
ers varied. All this remained unchanged so far as principle 
was concerned, until the invention of gunpowder reduced the 
ancient walls to uselessness in the same summary fashion as 
it unseated the knight in armor. 

In sieges either towers were erected to override the wall, 
or else simple battering was resorted to at its foot. In the 
former case, so soon as the place had been approached, the 
army was camped, generally in several suitable locations, 
having heed to health, sustenance and siege operations. 
Each camp was fortified by a stockade and ditch, and often 
much more elaborately. Communications were established 
between these camps, and a line of investment — or con- 
travallation — was drawn around the city. If there was dan¬ 
ger of an enemy’s army coming to the relief of the place, 
another line — of circumvallation — was drawn outside the 
besieger’s camps, facing outward to forestall an attempt to 
raise the siege. Caesar generally uses the term circumval¬ 
lation for what was earlier and more properly known as 
contravallation, — i. e ., the works erected against a town. 


( 


388 


BUILDING A MOUND. 



\ 


A terrace or mound (agger) 
was then begun, which should 
slope up to the bottom of the 
city wall. In case the city was 
on a level a terrace was not es¬ 
sential. It might be raised to 
a point part way up the wall, 
but this was not usual. Its 
surface was smooth enough to 
allow the moving of towers 
along it. The labor was per¬ 
formed by the soldiers and such 
part of the surrounding pop¬ 
ulation as could be set at it. 

* It was built of any material at 

J hand. As terraces were often 
set on fire, it is to be presumed 

.2 that much wood was used in 

O 

m their construction, — logs, hur¬ 
dles, etc. That it was gen¬ 
erally a sort of cob-house 
work, on the edges at least, 
filled with loose material in 
the middle, is to be inferred 
from the rapidity with which 
it was set on fire and burned, 
a fact which argues a strong 
draft. The terrace was proba¬ 
bly built a story at a time. A 
line of mantelets (plutei) was 
placed as near the wall as pos¬ 
sible, but still out of range. 
Behind these, galleries made 


)/ 

























































































PLAN OF APPROACHES. 


389 

of a succession of small pent-houses ( vinece ), placed end to 
end, protected the men going to and fro, who brought mate¬ 
rial through the galleries and began work behind the man- 



Plan of Approaches to a Town. 

telets. Movable towers with artillery and bowmen kept up 
a constant fire upon the walls to clear from them the missile- 
throwers of the enemy who interfered with the work, and 





















390 


BIG TERRACES. 


suitable details were posted to check sorties. When as much 
was finished as one set of mantelets were calculated to pro¬ 
tect, these were advanced and another section built. Upon 
this first section or story a second was constructed, and a 
third and more, as desirable. The end near the wall was made 
esj)ecially strong so as to bear the weight of heavy towers. 

The size of some of these terraces excites the same wonder 
as temporary structures that the Pyramids do as monuments 
for all time. They are explained by the fact that so many 
thousands of hands worked at them. The terrace was made 
as wide as convenient, to contain all the necessary engines — 
if these were to be used on it — and to allow a storming 
column to advance along it, say fifty feet. When completed 
the terrace was crowned by towers which were higher than 
the city walls, and which were connected by curtains or walls. 
Such a terrace appears at first blush to be a work more 
gigantic than called for; but it was made necessary by the 
fact that so long as the garrison could hold the platform of 
the wall, they could prevent the approach of the battering- 
ram or the filling of the ditch, 1 by throwing missiles, inflam¬ 
mables, hot tar and heavy stones from above; or they could 
interfere by grappling tackle with the free swing of the ram 
essential to an effective blow, or deaden its effect by cable- 
aprons hung at its point of impact. But so soon as the 
besiegers had reached the height of the wall, so as to be able 
by their greater numbers to drive the garrison from the 
platform, they could secure free play for the ram, fill up the 
ditch, and make ready to storm the walls by bridges from 
the towers, or through a breach after one had been operated. 

When the ram was got fairly at work, the capture of the 
place was deemed secure, and no capitulation was received 
on any save harsh terms. Sometimes, on a breach being 
made, a new wall or demi-lune was found to have been con- 


PENT-HOUSES. 


391 



Musculus, light. 


structed within, which obliged the besiegers to begin their 
work all over again. 

The pent-house galleries ( vinece , musculi ) took the place 

' of our trenches and 
parallels. But these 
latter were not un¬ 
known. The galleries 
were set up obliquely 
to the wall as trenches 
are to - day, but less 
so. Accidents in the 
ground were utilized 
for cover, but so soon 
as the approaches arrived in the open, they were run with 
regularity on a most intelligent system. Parallels were not 
so deep as ours because the missiles were not so destructive. 
Portable curtains and defenses were common for surprises. 

Mantelets ( plu - 
tei ) were made of 
skins, cable-mats, 
mattresses, etc., 
suspended on 
masts, and not in¬ 
frequently iron 
plates or heavy 
lumber. They 
were not unlike 



Musculus, strong. 


huge snow-plows mounted on wheels. 

The vineae were constructed of a roof of plank and 
wicker-work covered with rawhide, ropes and wet cloth to 
resist missiles and fire, and were usually sixteen feet long 
and seven feet wide, resting on posts eight feet high. The 
sides were also protected by wicker-work. These vinese were 







































392 


MANTELETS. MINES. 


carried forward by the men. If heavier, they were rolled 
on wheels. They were then pushed forward obliquely, a 
number were joined together, and under their cover the 

terrace foundations were 
laid close to the ditch. 
Wet ditches were 
and drained. The muscu- 
lus was a low triangular 
hut on rollers for the pro¬ 
tection of the men; when 
working near the walls it 
was heavier. The testudo 
was much like the musculus, but larger. 

The building of the terrace was opposed by every contriv¬ 
ance imaginable. Sorties were made at night to destroy the 
work of the day. Mines were driven underneath the terrace 



Plutei (3 styles). 


and filled with inflammables which, set on fire, would crum¬ 
ble the earth and drop in its foundation. These were 
opposed by counter-mines. Mines were run under the walls 
by the besiegers with a similar object; and they were often 
run as a means of throwing a force into a town under its 





























































CITY WALLS. 


393 


walls, which force, once in, would open the gates to the 
besiegers. Such mines often showed ability to a high degree 
in design and execution. 

The towers with which the terraces were surmounted were 
often many stories in height. They were usually structures 
of wood, but sometimes of earth, stone or brick, so high as 
to dominate the walls of the town. 

The heavy machines of the city were within the walls on 
the level. Only soldiers and light engines occupied the walls 
and towers. Where a wall was escaladed and the assaulting 
party had reached the platform, it still had to descend into 
the inclosure, a work of yet greater danger. On the plat¬ 
form the party had to encounter the cross-fire from the 
towers, and must get ropes and ladders to descend on the 

i 

inner side. The operation was difficult. Hence the greater 
practicability of breaches. 

The walls were not usually of solid masonry; one front 
and one back wall were built of stone, perhaps twenty feet 
apart; the space between was filled in with the earth taken 
from the ditch, or with rubble or other available material. 
Huge earthen ramparts were not uncommon, as at Gaza. 

The immensity of the towers which surmounted the terraces 
is perhaps the most astonishing feature of sieges. Vitruvius 
(who was one of Caesar’s engineers in the African war) 
speaks of two ordinary sizes. The smaller had sixty cubits 
of height (a cubit is one and a half feet) by seventeen cubits 
square, and decreased one fifth in going up. The larger 
was one hundred and twenty cubits high by twenty-seven 
cubits square. Each had ten stories. Demetrius at Rhodes 
made one much larger than even this. 

These towers were usually prepared in advance with fitted 
beams, were brought as close to the walls as could be under 
cover of mantelets, and there set up. They generally carried 


394 


SIEGE TOWERS . 


a ram in the lower story, and were furnished with draw¬ 
bridges to drop on the enemy’s wall. The ram could operate 
under cover of the armed men above, who kept the platform 
clear by their missiles. These towers were furnished with 



huge wheels on which they were moved forward. The 
approach of such a tower to the walls was generally followed 
by the capture of the town, unless it could be destroyed by 
fire. 

Fire and heavy missiles were the means of combating the 
approach of these towers. The object of sorties was to fire 
the towers. The falling drawbridges were kept off by long 
sharpened beams fastened on the walls of the city. 

Rams were either mounted on wheels or suspended by ropes 








































DEFENSE AGAINST RAMS. 


395 


or chains. A huge beam (or one made of several lashed 
together) was furnished with a heavy cast-iron end, frequently 
in the form of a ram’s head, fixed to it by iron bands. The 
beam was reinforced in the centre, the better to withstand 
the shock. The head was at times furnished with a mural 
hook as well as a ram. The ram was hung or mounted in a 



Ram and Tongs. 

shed, well protected from fire, and was manipulated by 
soldiers. The size and weight of these rams excite our 
surprise. Demetrius used a ram one hundred and twenty 
feet long against Rhodes. Appian speaks of one, at the 
siege of Carthage, which required six thousand men to mount 
it. Perhaps this means their labor used in speedily building 
its emplacement and covering. 





















396 


TELE NON. ARTILLERY. 


To resist the ram, the walls were covered with soft 
material hung upon them from above, such as bags of 
feathers and wool, or mattresses, or plaited cordage. Heavy 
suspended beams were dropped upon it to disable it. Big 
grappling devices to seize not only rams but other machines, 
and even to pick up men, were common. Callias, at Rhodes, 
enjoyed a great reputation for such fishing tackle, until De¬ 
metrius constructed such heavy rams and engines that Callias’ 
tackling would no longer work. 

The telenon was a rude crane by which was raised a cage 

containing s o 1 - 
diers who could 
thus reach and at¬ 
tack the platform, 
or make observa¬ 
tions of what was 
being done inside 
the walls. 

The artillery of 
the ancients was 
far from despica¬ 
ble. Caesar calls 
all the missile- 
throwers tor- 
menta , because 
they derived their 
propulsive power 
„ . from twis ted 

lelenon. 

ropes, sinews or 

hair ( torquere ). The catapults and ballistas of the Greeks 
had no doubt survived and been little altered. These have 
been described in previous volumes. The ballistas were 
able to throw stones weighing five hundred to six hundred 




















































CATAPULTS AND BALLISTAS. 


397 


pounds. Smaller ballistas ( scorpiones ) threw one-hundred 
pound stones, and were known as centenaria . A bundle of 
arrows placed on the 
horizontal upper beam 
at the proper angle and 
struck by the ballista 
head could be thrown 
a great distance. Dead 
pestilential bodies or 
other such matter were 
thrown into the enemy’s 
lines. The average bal¬ 
lista could hurl up to 
twelve hundred feet. 

The catapults were on the principle of huge bows, and 
threw sharpened beams, darts, leaden bullets, fire-pots and 
fire-darts with great effect. These machines were really. 



Catapult. 



except for size and convenience, almost as powerful as the 
early artillery. Their aim was good. 
















































398 


COURSE OF A SIEGE. 


The walls of cities and towns were plentifully provided 
with missile-throwers. Besiegers had to await the bringing 
up of a siege-train or the construction of fresh machines, 
which was a long process. There is nothing to show that 
Csesar had anything like as effective artillery, or artillery as 
easily transported, as Alexander. But Caesar had missile- 
throwers with his army, for they are mentioned as being 
mounted on the walls of his camp. 

After a breach was opened, heavy columns assaulted it and 
were met with the resistance of like bodies. A breach by no 
means always brought about the capture of a city. A half¬ 
moon, or reentering angle, which the besieged could build 
in rear of the place where a breach was being made, was all 
the more difficult to take because the besieged during its 
attack lay on the besieger’s flanks and rear. At Rhodes such 
a half-moon was faced with a ditch. 

Ancient sieges were much more obstinately contested 
than modern ones, and for good reason. The besieged 
had to face the alternative of victory, or of slavery or 
death. 

The ordinary course of a siege might be stated as: — 

1. A reconnoissance of the place. 

2. The establishment of camps in suitable positions. 

3. The collection of material for the siege. 

4. The manufacture of vinece , plutei , musculi , etc. 

5. The building of redoubts and joining them with lines of 
contra- and perhaps circumvallation. 

6. The preparation of covered ways to the town, mines and 
subterranean passages. 

7. The building of a terrace, by legionaries within reach 
of darts, by natives beyond range. 

8. The erection of towers on the terrace, or pushing them 
forward along it. 


END OF A SIEGE. 


399 


9. The operation of breaches. 

10. Storming the breaches. 

This chapter is largely a recapitulation of what has been 
told in former volumes; but it has been deemed essential to 
the proper appreciation of Caesar’s numerous sieges. 



Scorpion. 












XXVI. 


THE OPENING OF THE CIVIL WAR. DECEMBER, 50, 

TO MAY, 49 B. C. 

The triumvirate had been broken up by the death of Crassus in the Parthian 
campaign. The friendship of Csesar and Pompey had ended in competition for 
the sole control. Csesar represented the democratic, Pompey the aristocratic 
party. War was forced on Csesar. Though he entered into it in self-protection, 
it was he who took the initiative, when the tribunes of the people fled to him for 
safety. He marched into Italy with one legion ; Pompey had many, — but they 
were on paper. Great numbers of recruits joined Csesar’s standard, while Pom¬ 
pey, from lack of preparation and energy, found his forces dwindle. Csesar’s 
legions were veterans; Pompey had but fresh levies. Gradually Csesar forced 
his way down the Adriatic coast to Brundisium, where Pompey with his ad¬ 
herents had taken refuge. On the way, the gates of most of the towns were 
opened to Csesar; some, especially Corfinium, had to be besieged. Many of 
Pompey’s cohorts voluntarily went over to Csesar; others were captured, and 
then joined his cause. The people were with Csesar; the Senate, the aristocrats 
and the rich with Pompey. The latter, overwhelmed by Csesar’s rapidity and 
his own lethargy, resolved to transfer the war to Greece instead of fighting in 
Italy. 

When the triumvirs assumed power, Pompey was looked 
upon as the ruling spirit, Caesar and Crassus much in the 
light of Pompey’s adjutants. To Pompey were opened the 
treasures and the power of the entire state; to Caesar only 
those he was given by law. Pompey’s term was unlimited; 
Caesar’s was a long but fixed term. Pompey remained at 
the capital; Caesar was sent to a distant province. But the 
important work undertaken by Pompey soon developed his 
weakness. So far from ruling Rome, its rival factions 
reduced the capital to a state of anarchy which Pompey had 
not the ability to check. “The rabble of every sort never 


THE TRIUMVIRATE. 401 

found a merrier arena.” The leaders of the several bands 
which played fast and loose in the city followed their own 
sweet will. Never was capital so ungoverned. It is no 
part of the purpose of this volume to describe political 
imbroglios; suffice it that Pompey gradually lost his grasp 
and his standing. He was at times reduced to the condition 
of a mere puppet. Caesar was gaining laurels in the north, 
while Pompey’s military reputation was in a way to be 
forgotten. Having lost control of the rabble, Pompey was 
unable to control the popular assembly; his strength and 
ability were unequal to the exceptional conditions, and his 
failure to perform his share in the scheme of joint govern¬ 
ment necessarily ended by estranging himself and Caesar. 
This state of things worked against Caesar, who was distant 
from Rome and with difficulty able to control what friends 
he had. Power might slip away from him. 

The triumvirs held a meeting at Luca in the spring of 
56 B. C. There were two hundred senators present and 
numbers of other men of mark. Here a further division of 
provinces was agreed upon, but it was evident that Pompey 
had ceded a substantial part of the controlling voice to 
Caesar. 

The aristocrats, meanwhile, were combining against the 
triumvirate. Yet every one seemed to be his own master. 
Caesar raised legions without authority; Crassus equally so 
conducted the Parthian war. The forms of law were 
observed, but money or violence carried the votes in every 
election. There was abundant manifestation of the unli¬ 
censed spirit of all in the constant armed conflicts in the 
streets. These finally culminated in the murder of Clodius 
by Milo, an episode which roused the energy of Pompey to 
the point of seizing the dictatorship, and to a certain degree 
bringing the law again into operation. 


402 


CRASS US’ CAMPAIGN. 


Crassus had been a make-weight between Caesar and 
Pompey, but steadily leaned to Caesar’s side. In the late 
division of provinces he was afforded a chance to gain mili¬ 
tary power and still greater wealth in a Parthian war, which 
had come about by Pompey’s bad faith in failing to respect 
the line of the Euphrates. Crassus reached Syria instinct 
with the purpose of another Alexander, resolved to penetrate 
to India. He had two routes. He could invade Parthia 
through mountainous and allied Armenia, or through the 



Mesopotamian desert. He chose the latter route, on the 
mistaken testimony of a native friendly prince. He had 
seven full legions, four thousand cavalry and an equal 
number of archers and slingers, — nearly fifty thousand men. 
The great Macedonian had made this march nearly three 
centuries before. 

Careless scouting led Crassus into an ambush of the 
enemy not far from Carrhse. Surenas, the Parthian vizier 
who commanded the enemy, had recognized the fact that 
Eastern foot could accomplish nothing against Roman 
legions; he had utilized his infantry to keep a large body 



CAVALRY VERSUS LEGIONS. 


403 


of Armenian horse from joining Crassus, and with a keen 
tactical appreciation of the conditions had chosen to do his 
fighting solely with cavalry. Crassus advanced into the 
desert; soon his marching column of foot was met by a body 
of mail-clad horsemen, partly heavy lancers, partly lighter 




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Battle of Carrhae. 


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archers. The legionary was more than a match for his man 
when he could get at him, but here the foe could fight or 
decline to fight as he chose; could cut the Roman communi¬ 
cations by his superior activity; could move with twice the 
Roman’s speed. The armies were on a limitless rolling plain, 
the very arena for a huge body of horse, a very pitfall for 
foot in those days of short-carry weapons. There was on 
the sandy soil scarce a chance to intrench a camp; water 
was at distant intervals; the Roman was out of his bearing, 
the Oriental in his element. For the first time the legions 
met a native tactical array with which they could not cope. 
Close combat weapons were useless. The mounted archer 
was master of the situation, and the Parthian had made the 
bow a national weapon. 

















404 


A MASSACRE. 


The battle of Carrhae is interesting as a defeat of the best 
of infantry by inferior horse, and yet not by cavalry tactics 
so called. The Parthians drew up in an extended order 
affording the greatest scope for their fire. The Romans 
drew up in their usual dense square. Here we have the 
deployed line of superior fire — generally assumed to be a 
modern idea — against a dense mass limited in its ability to 
hurl missiles. There was but one outcome. The Parthian 
mounted archers were accompanied by camel-loads of spare 
arrows. The legions had absolutely no means of attack or 
defense. Their own archers were of small avail. They 
were speedily defeated when sent out. 

Gradually the thin Oriental line swept by and outflanked 
the Roman square. Fearing to be surrounded and thus 
have his progress checked, Crassus sent his son Publius, one 
of Caesar’s young veterans, to attack the enemy with a select 
body of six thousand mixed troops. This diversion for a 
moment arrested the Orientals, who summarily retired, 
pursued by the brave young soldier. But his gallantry had 
sealed his fate. Luring him to a distance, the Parthians 
made about face on his column, and, surrounding it, cut the 
entire force to pieces. They then turned again on the re¬ 
treating Roman square. 

Darkness alone saved the wreck of the Roman army. The 
Orientals, fearing a night surprise, rode off to camp at a 
distance, intending to return to their prey next day. But 
the Romans, by leaving behind some four thousand wounded 
to be massacred, continued the march and reached Carrhae. 
Thence, after a brief rest, the mere remnant of the force, 
some five thousand men, made their way to Sinnaca, a for¬ 
tress on the foothills of Armenia, only to be followed by 
the Parthians, and again cut up. The entire army was lost, 
and Crassus killed. This was in June, B. c. 53. 


BEGINNING OF RUPTURE. 


405 


The end of the triumvirate thus came. Caesar and 
Pompey between them controlled the state, but they had 
already begun to be politically estranged; socially, the death 
of Julia, in 54 b. c., severed the last tie. When Pompey 
had secured for himself the undivided consulship, he was 
fully prepared to fling his gauntlet at the feet of the man 
who, he foresaw, would soon outstrip him unless overridden 
before he acquired more headway. The death of Crassus 
was a grievous blow to Caesar, who could uniformly rely on 
his colleague’s fidelity. It was in this same year that the 
insurrection of Yercingetorix occurred; had Pompey taken 
the vigorous step of having Caesar recalled from Gaul, it 
would have put a term to Caesar’s career. But Pompey was 
never ready to seize an opportunity; lack of incisiveness was 
fatally characteristic of the man. 

Caesar was strictly and from the beginning a democrat, and 
was now the leader of the party. Pompey had been playing 
with democracy and shortly reverted to his old Sullan tradi¬ 
tions. He easily effected a reconciliation with the Catonians, 
and became the head of the aristocratic party. Thus Caesar 
and he were formally arrayed against each other. Caesar 
desired no rupture. He had, at Luca, been promised the 
consulship in B. C. 48, and this he was anxious to obtain 
peacefully, as a base from which to exert his influence. 
Through the legal trickery of Pompey and the Catonians this 
was denied him, and it was sought to disable him by an 
order to break up his legions. Caesar offered to disarm 
whenever Pompey was made to do the like. It was during 
the debate on this matter that Caesar was completing the 
pacification of Gaul, holding his grand review on the 
Scheldt, and making his triumphal march through the 
province of Cisalpine Gaul. Finally, through the manage¬ 
ment of Curio, Caesar’s henchman in Rome, the Senate voted 




406 POMPEY BEGINS WAR. 

that both Pompey and Caesar, as proconsuls of Spain and 
Gaul, should lay down their offices. Caesar was willing to 
do so; Pompey declined. On the assumption that Caesar 
was disobeying orders, Pompey asked to be instructed by 
the Senate to march against him. This was refused. But 
the old consul and the newly elected ones gave Pompey 
the authority the Senate had denied. On this slender 
pretense Pompey put himself at the head of the only two 
legions at hand, — they were the two sent by Caesar to be 
used in the Parthian war, but wrongfully detained by 
Pompey, and were far from reliable against their old com¬ 
mander, — and began levies of fresh troops. 

Of the prominent Pompeians, Cicero remained in Cam¬ 
pania to recruit; Minucius Thermus was sent to Umbria; 
Lentulus Spinther and Attius Varus to Picenum; Scribonius 
Libo to Etruria; Domitius Ahenobarbus, whom the Senate 
had designated as Caesar’s successor in Gaul, went to Cor- 
finium. 

This proceeding was substantially a declaration of war. 
Caesar, if forced to it, was ready to strike the first blow. 

Caesar had passed the winter at Ravenna, some two 
hundred and forty miles from Rome. Here Curio joined 
him. The news he brought decided Caesar’s action. He 
ordered his nearest legion to Ravenna, — the Thirteenth 
from Tergeste (Trieste), — a body which he speedily recruited 
up to nearly or quite normal strength, five thousand foot and 
three hundred horse. His other eight legions were far away: 
four among the Belgae, under Trebonius; four among the 
2Edui, under Fabius; all in winter-quarters. He had already 
ordered Fabius to send him the Eighth and Twelfth, and 
Trebonius to give over one of his own to Fabius, and with 
the rest to approach the Arar. Fabius, with the three legions 
thus under his command, was sent to Narbo, lest Pompey’s 


CROSSING THE RUBICON . 


407 


seven legions in the Spanish peninsula should invade Gaul. 
The strength of Caesar’s legions in Gaul varied from three 
thousand to thirty-five hundred men each. 

Caesar, in due course, sent an ultimatum to Rome, couched 
in a reasonable spirit. Under Pompey’s dictation the Senate 
replied by ordering Caesar to lay down his arms uncondition¬ 
ally, or be deemed a traitor. The tribunes of the people, 
Mark Antony and Q. Cassius, vetoed the resolution, but 
were forced by Pompey’s adherents to flee for their lives. 
They started north to join Caesar, who was the recognized 
centre point of the democratic party. 

Caesar’s mind was soon made up. War was his only 
resource. He harangued the Thirteenth legion, to explain 
why he struck the first blow in a civil war. His cause was 
equaled by his eloquence, and he found a generous response. 
With these cohorts he advanced towards the border of his 
province, December 16, 50 b. c. The Thirteenth legion 
crossed the Rubicon on the night of December 16-17. The 
Civil War had begun. 

In Gaul, Caesar had not been noted for foolhardy opera¬ 
tions. Bold as Alexander when boldness was demanded, as 
when he started with seven thousand men to rescue Cicero 
from sixty thousand Nervii, yet Caesar exhibited as a rule the 
virtue of caution rather than the error of untimely boldness. 
We shall, from the outbreak of the Civil War, however, 
find him in a new role, constantly committing acts of preci¬ 
pitancy which are never altogether admirable, and sometimes 
much to be condemned. For the present proceeding, even, 
he has been severely blamed by many critics and historians. 
It can scarcely be classed as prudent generalship, it is said, 
however bold, for Caesar to set out with five thousand men 
against Pompey, an excellent tactician and a man of large 
experience, who would probably array considerable forces 


408 


CAESAR ADVANCES. 


against him. But in this instance it the rather appears that 
Caesar was both bold and prudent. The temerity was in 
Caesar’s own style. He knew the condition of his enemy’s 
forces: that Pompey had not got his levies made in season; 
that the two Apulian legions were too far off to be immedi¬ 
ately available, even if they were reliable; that the towns 
on his route were illy garrisoned; that there was a strong 
sentiment in his own favor if suitably met. Moreover, he 
could not afford to wait; he believed that a surprise of the 
enemy before he increased his numbers was his safest course, 
and that rapid work would secure him control of the northern 
provinces of Italy. His course, fortunately, was the right 
as it was the bold one. 

Caesar had no difficulty in assuring himself of the personal 
fidelity of the rest of his legions, of which he ordered some 
in from Gaul so soon as he learned that the tribunes of the 
people had fled to him from Rome for protection. This 
latter fact gave him the required appearance of right. It 
was in a mood distinctly conciliatory, but determined to give 
his enemies no unfair advantage, that Caesar set out towards 
Ariminum. The handful of troops he had with him reflected 
the feeling of the rest in declaring that they would know how 
to protect their insulted chief and the tribunes of the people. 

Caesar’s pause at the Rubicon has pointed many morals. 
With his quick habit of judgment and action, it was unques¬ 
tionably of short duration. 

From Ravenna were two roads to Rome. One ran from 
Bononia across the Apennines to Arretium; one down the 
coast to Fanum, thence southwest. Caesar chose the coast 
road. His plan was not to move on Rome. He proposed to 
seize the Adriatic coast, with its many and rich towns, and 
thus not only rob Pompey of much of his territory, but create 
a base for himself in Italy. 


WHOSE FAULT? 


409 


At Ariminum, taken by surprise December 17, Caesar met 
the tribunes, and also messengers from Pompey. The latter 
were Roscius the praetor, and young L. Caesar, whose father 
was one of Caesar’s legates. They offered in indefinite terms 
an accommodation. Pompey, no doubt, had been alarmed 
lest Caesar should take him unawares. Caesar replied by a 
message agreeing to lay down arms and retire to his province 
if Pompey would do the like at the same moment and retire 
to Spain; and requested an interview either in Pompey’s 
camp or his own. To this message, which Roscius and 
Caesar conveyed to their chief, Pompey, and the Senate, 
replied by the same messengers that whenever Caesar had 
disbanded his army and gone to Gaul, he, Pompey, would 
do the like and go to Spain. It is not improbable that 
Pompey was desirous of coming to an accommodation; but 
he did not adopt the proper tone or terms to secure such a 
result. Caesar was reasonable, but he demanded a crisp 
understanding. One of our authorities for the tone of these 
messages is the Commentaries. They are presumably accu¬ 
rate as to facts, but they were penned by one of the negotiat¬ 
ing parties. Either rival was right in opposing the sole 
exercise of authority by the other; but we must judge mainly 
from the facts and from the other authorities, and not from 
the statements of Caesar, which was least to blame for the 
war that for years decimated the republic. 

The material power of the two chiefs when they should be 
properly concentrated was very different. Caesar at this time 
had nine legions; two had been spirited away from him to 
Pompey, and were now arrayed against him. He had no 
fleet, and but himself to rely on. Pompey, on the contrary, 
had the formal power of the Roman state in his own or his 
friends’ hands, and could retain it, if it was not forfeited by 
some signal error; he practically controlled the entire Italian 






13 










CAESAR AND POMPEY. 


411 


peninsula except the regions abutting on Caesar’s province; 
he had his Spanish and African legions, and all the forces 
of Italy, Greece, Egypt and the East. Caesar controlled 
Gaul — Cisalpine, Narbonese and Transalpine, the latter only 
just subdued — and Illyricum; Pompey practically controlled 
the rest of Rome’s enormous territory, and especially in the 
provinces was Pompey’s influence still strong. Pompey had 
the chief officers of the republic, the Senate, the aristo¬ 
cracy, the rich burgesses on his side; Caesar had but his 
few adherents, the tribunes of the people and the many 
headed. 

But Caesar possessed what Pompey lacked. His authority 
was undivided within his camp and his party. His lieuten¬ 
ants were truly such. His legions were his, body and soul, 
and were veterans used to victory. He could do with them 
what no other captain could do. Their imperator was the 
embodiment of success not only in their eyes, but in the eyes 
of all soldiers in the service of Rome. Wherever Caesar 
went, armies would gather from the multitude. Moreover, 
Caesar was untrammeled and able to act as best to him 
seemed, while Pompey was really little more than the tool 
of his party. And above all, deeming the power to be all 
in their own hands, Pompey’s party had taken no immediate 
measures to defend themselves against Caesar. What they 
had was scattered at arm’s length; what Caesar had he could 
put to instant use. The material weight was on Pompey’s 
side, the moral weight and the power of initiative on Caesar’s. 
Pompey’s reputation was for deeds long gone by; Caesar’s 
was fresh in the minds of all. 

Of Caesar’s lieutenants every man, save Labienus, who 
aspired to higher office, had remained faithful. Caesar’s 
plan of keeping his lieutenants in subordinate positions 
worked well with him, who purposed to do everything him- 


412 


THE RIVAL FORCES. 


self; but it robbed him sometimes of efficient marshals, who, 
on occasion, would have served him better. 

Pompey’s military forces were enormous, but they were 
scattered. He had seven legions in Spain, and numberless 
cohorts in every part of the empire, — Sicily, Africa, Syria, 
Asia, Macedonia. In addition to the two legions at Luceria, 
there were three legions of the levy of 55 B. C., and men 
already sworn in of the general levy of 52 B. c. in Italy. 
There was a total of ten legions in the peninsula, not count¬ 
ing the seven in Spain, — not far from one hundred thousand 
men; but they were not yet under the eagles. It was really 
no idle boast that “ Pompey had but to stamp with his foot to 
cover the ground with armed men.” But time is of the 
essence in war. Pompey’s army was yet a skeleton. As we 
have seen, he had recognized the fact and had at once sent 
out eminent nobles to bring in the levies to rendezvous in 
the various provinces. 

The force of Caesar’s legions is very hard to gauge. 
Judging by what they were afterwards at Pharsalus, when 
they had been reduced by campaigning, Caesar’s cohorts 
may at this time have been three hundred to three hundred 
and fifty men strong. This would have made the average 
of each legion three thousand to thirty-five hundred men, so 
that Caesar had under his control a minimum of some thirty- 
two thousand heavy infantry. No better ever bore arms. 
Added to this force was a body of auxiliaries and some 
cavalry. All told, Caesar’s army exceeded forty thousand 
men. Closer calculations are often made, but the data are 
all founded on estimates. Caesar’s manifest advantage lay 
in the fact that his legions were veteran and at hand; Pom¬ 
pey’s weakness was that the legions he might have had ready 
for the field, though strong on the morning reports, had yet 
to be assembled. 


STRATEGIC OPENING. 


413 


From Ariminum Caesar sent Mark Antony with five 
cohorts to Arretium. This was for the purpose of antici¬ 
pating an advance against his line of communications with 
Graul by way of that place, and across the Apennines to 
either Faventia or Bononia. Libo, at Arretium, had taken 
no measures of defense; Antony seized the place the 20th. 
Caesar himself remained at Ariminum with two cohorts, to 
raise levies, while he made Pisaurum, Fanum and Ancona 
secure, with a cohort each, on the succeeding two days. If 
he could get possession of Iguvium, on the Flaminian Way, 
he would thus gain a base line from Arretium to Ancona, 
securely protecting Gaul. 

Learning that the praetor Thermus, w^tli five cohorts, was 
fortifying Iguvium, whose inhabitants were well disposed 
towards Caesar, he sent Curio, on the 23d, to that town, with 
the three cohorts drawn from Ariminum and Pisaurum. On 
his approach, December 25, Thermus drew out his forces 
and marched away; but his troops dispersed to their homes, 
unwilling probably to oppose Caesar. Curio entered the 
town and later occupied Iguvium. This put an end to any 
danger to Caesar’s rear. 

Pompey being nowhere within reach, Caesar then withdrew 
Antony from Arretium, for by advancing down the coast he 
would minimize any danger of operations against his commu¬ 
nications. Antony drew in Curio at Iguvium and moved to 
Ancona, where he joined his chief, and Caesar gave the 
men a day’s rest on January 4. 

Brief repose was all Caesar could give his troops. In two 
days he marched on Attius Varus at Auximum, southwest of 
Ancona, where this legate was recruiting for Pompey. His 
chief, Lentulus Spinther, was at Asculum. The senate of 
Auximum refused support to Attius. The latter retired 
from the place. Caesar’s van pursued and struck Attius’ 


414 


LEANING TOWARD CAESAR. 


soldiers. These either dispersed or were for the most part 
glad to join Caesar, who was welcomed by the inhabitants 
with loud acclaim. Lucius Pupius, the chief centurion of 
Attius Varus, on being brought to Caesar as a prisoner, was 
at once released. Caesar had no quarrel with the individ¬ 
uals of his enemy’s army. He knew the value of generous 
treatment. About the same time Hirrus evacuated Cameri- 
num with three thousand men. 

At Auximum Caesar was dealt a heavy blow by learning 
the desertion of Labienus, his hitherto apparently most 
devoted and able lieutenant. Caesar made no attempt to 
stop him, but sent his properties and money after him. What 
was the immediate ^3ause of this sad mishap is not known, 
but Labienus, after joining the cause of Pompey, exhibited 
the greatest hatred towards the chief he had for ten years 
so ably and cordially served. 

Though thousands of recruits were willing to leave their 
homes and cast in their fortunes with Pompey, thus testi¬ 
fying to a strong sentiment for his party, this manifest 
leaning towards Caesar on the part of the population pro¬ 
duced great consternation in Rome, where news of his 
Umbrian successes arrived the 20th and 21st. It was 
rumored that “the monster” was marching on the city. 
The consuls, Lentulus and Marcellus, followed by most of 
the magistrates, within two days fled from the protection of 
its walls. It is curious how infectious the dread of the con¬ 
queror of the Gauls could be. It was as if these dreaded 
barbarians themselves had once more marched on Rome. 
The enemies of Csesar did not feel secure at any point north 
of Capua. Here they arrested their flight, and reestablished 
the Roman government. But in their haste they forgot to 
make the usual sacrifices to the gods, and, worse still, omitted 
to carry away the public treasure. 


LISTLESS POMPEY. 


415 


Having abandoned Rome, Pompey held a conference with 
his chief supporters at Teanum Sidicinum on the 27th. The 
various chances of the campaign were canvassed, Labienus 
being present, and Pompey decided to take the two legions 
in Apulia and advance on Picenum, where, by hurrying up 
the collection of the levies, he might gather a force sufficient 
to arrest Caesar’s farther progress. It was in this province, 
thirty-five years before, that Pompey had first acquired his 
reputation by raising troops for Sulla. 

Pompey accordingly repaired to Luceria to carry out his 
plan of campaign. But with his usual listless method he sat 
down, gave out his work to others to do, and practically 
accomplished nothing until it was too late. 

Caesar moved down Picenum, received with hearty good will 
and material support by most of the towns, and recruiting 
with success in each locality. Even Cingulum, a town La¬ 
bienus had founded, —in fact owned, —offered to join him 
and sent him soldiers. How great the number of his recruits 
may have been it is impossible to say. The Twelfth legion 
now joined him, and with these two, the Twelfth and Thir¬ 
teenth, Caesar marched, via Firmum and Truentum, to Ascu- 
lum, the chief town of Picenum. Lentulus Spinther here had 
ten cohorts, —five thousand men; but he, too, fled at Caesar’s 
approach, and his soldiers largely deserted to the new chief. 

9 

Caesar entered the town January 11. Military glory is con¬ 
tagious. All soldiers were anxious to serve under a chief 
who had accomplished such wonders in Gaul, and in the 
company of men who had served in so many glorious 
campaigns. 

Yibullius Rufus, an old soldier and a good, had been sent 
by Pompey into Picenum to check the growing sentiment for 
Caesar. Meeting Lentulus Spinther on his retreat, Yibullius 
took his few remaining cohorts and dismissed him. To these 


416 


SENATE AT CAPUA. 


he added those of Hirrus. He then collected as many as 
possible of the new levies which had been made for Pompey; 
these with some other retreating Pompeian garrisons made 
up thirteen cohorts, with which he fell back January 11 on 
Domitius Ahenobarbus, Pompey’s lieutenant at Corfinium, 
— a recruiting rendezvous, —and reported Caesar’s advance. 

Domitius had about twenty cohorts, collected in neighbor¬ 
ing states where recruiting seemed better than elsewhere. 
With those of Vibullius he made up thirty-three cohorts. 
Had these lieutenants possessed the true soldier’s instinct, 
they would have marched north on Caesar, to seek, by a bold 
offense, to hold head against him. They might not have 
succeeded, but it was the thing to do. 

Caesar had two legions. He added to their numbers by 
seeking out the deserters from Lentulus and bringing them 
under the colors. Having delayed but one day beyond the 
time needed for the muster of these men to provide corn, he 
at once marched south to Corfinium, by way of Interamnum 
and Pinna. In Corfinium were assembled many notables 
and refugees. 

Meanwhile the Senate at Capua was laying the blame of 
all these losses on Pompey; the new levies did not come in; 
volunteers were few; and the cause of the aristocrats looked 
worse and worse. Instead of Pompey’s collecting endless 
cohorts to oppose Caesar, it was Caesar whose forces were 
growing in number and enthusiasm, while Pompey had but 
two legions rather weak in their allegiance, and a few newly 
recruited cohorts, not yet consolidated into legions. 

Caesar found the outposts of Domitius, five cohorts strong, 
breaking down the bridge over the Aternus, three miles 
north of Corfinium. By an unexpected and impetuous 
attack his van was able to drive off the party and save the 
structure. Caesar passed over and sat down before Corfinium 


SIEGE OF CORFINIUM. 


417 


on the 18th of January. His position was on the east of 
Corfinium, cutting Domitius off from communication with 
Pompey. Domitius, who had thirty cohorts, prepared for 
vigorous defense. He had previously sent hurriedly for aid 
to Pompey, who was still in Apulia. He told Pompey that 
Caesar could between them easily be surrounded in the 
narrow valley in which lay Corfinium, but that without help 
he himself was apt to be shut up and to lose his army. He 
promised his men largesses out of his own estate, in the 
event of success, — to each soldier four acres, with corre¬ 
sponding increase to veterans and centurions. Corfinium 
was situated on a plain surrounded by high and abrupt 
mountains, — the bed of an ancient lake. It was a place of 
much importance and strength. It was protected by a 
wall compassing over one hundred acres, and could only be 
attacked from the south. The plain can alone be entered 
from the north through the two ravines of the Aternus. 
Domitius had been wise in selecting Corfinium for his base. 
Caesar, who was awaiting farther reinforcements from Gaul, 
pitched two camps before it, on the road to Sulmo. 

Caesar shortly received notice that Sulmo, ten miles 
southeast from Corfinium, was ready to declare for him, but 
was held in check by a garrison of seven cohorts under 
Lucretius and Attius. Sending Antony thither with five 
cohorts of the Thirteenth legion, the gates were opened to 
him and the cohorts enlisted under Caesar’s standards. 
Caesar cared naught for the leaders. Lucretius escaped; 
Attius, taken prisoner, was sent away in safety. Antony 
returned the same day to Caesar’s camp, having made a 
successful campaign in a few hours. 

At Corfinium Caesar determined to gather corn, fortify 
and wait for some of his other troops. In addition to the 
Eighth legion there shortly arrived twenty-two newly levied 


418 


DOMITIUS DESERTED . 


cohorts, with three hundred Gallic horse from Noricum. 
He formed a camp in his investment line for these troops, 
such that it would hold the Via Valeria, and placed Curio in 
command. He went on with his contravallation, joining the 
two camps with a line of works crowned by towers. The 



entire line was nearly five miles long. His three old legions, 
the Eighth, Twelfth and Thirteenth, and some thirty cohorts 
of new levies made up an army approaching twenty thousand 
men. Of the new cohorts he formed three new legions. 

By the time that the works in front of Corfinium were 
completed, Pompey, after some exchanges of correspondence, 
had finally replied that he could send no help to Domitius, 
but that the latter must save his force as best he might and 
join him. Domitius now changed his conduct; he misled 
the soldiers by false declarations while personally contemplat- 


POMPEY WEAKENS, 


419 


ing flight; and the men, discovering the treachery, mutinied, 
seized his person, January 23, and sent word to Caesar that 
they would surrender him. While believing in their inten¬ 
tion, Caesar left nothing to chance. He paraded his entire 
force on his works, exhorted the officers to extra caution, 
and ordered that no man should sleep that night. Every one 
was on the alert. During the night Lentulus was surren¬ 
dered, and on being pardoned by Caesar returned to Corfin- 
ium, where he reported Caesar’s generosity. Next morning, 
January 24, Domitius, Vibullius, Varus and Rubrius were 
given up, with many other magnates. Caesar forgave them 
all for their ingratitude, each one being indebted to him for 
past favors, protected them from the taunts of the soldiers, 
and restored to Domitius six millions of sestertii which he 
had brought with him to pay the soldiers, and which had 
been taken from him. Caesar’s clemency at Corfinium was 
as much a surprise to Rome as his advance had been a terror. 
He was no longer “the monster.” The popular tide began 
to set in his favor. 

Having sworn in the legionaries of Domitius under his 
own eagles, Caesar, after only a week’s delay before Corfin¬ 
ium, marched into Apulia, along the coast through the land 
of the Marrucini, Frentani and Larinates. He guessed that 
Pompey would seek to leave Italy for Greece. He knew his 
man as well as the conditions. The port of Brundisium was 
the most available one for this purpose, in fact all but the 
only one, and Caesar hoped that he could succeed in antici¬ 
pating Pompey at this place, and thus confine him to Italy 
and all the sooner bring him to battle. 

This was, indeed, since early in January, Pompey’s inten¬ 
tion. He saw that almost all the available men in the penin¬ 
sula were joining the enemy’s standard. In all he had lost 
by defection nearly sixty cohorts. He had got together a 


420 


POMPE Y’S PR OCR A S TINA TION. 


number of men in the vicinity of Rome, and these had been 
marched down to Campania. He was certain about no other 
levies. As matters had eventuated, Pompey could scarcely 
expect to hold himself in Italy. With a potential army at 
his command, large enough to crush out Caesar before he 
fairly reached Picenum, he had allowed all his chances to 
slip away. His ancient habit of procrastination had grown 
on him; and it was Caesar’s just estimate of this fact which 
had made his temerity in advancing into Italy safe. Pom¬ 
pey, who now had only the two Luceria legions, the recent 
recruits from Campania, together with the few remaining 
faithful cohorts in Picenum, was no longer a match for his 
rapid-thrusting opponent. He deemed it advisable not to 
come to a general encounter with Caesar in Italy, but to draw 
him over to Greece, where he could assemble many more 
troops, and where Caesar would not be so near a friendly 
population to support him. Every step taken by either of 
the two men is characteristic. Caesar was positive in what he 
did. He knew his own intentions well; he was ready and 
anxious to fight. Pompey was hesitating and uncertain in 
his purpose; he appeared shy of crossing swords. 

Instead of taking the matter personally in hand, he had 
been lying in and near Luceria, the “key of Apulia,” often 
so valuable to Hannibal. His headquarters were at Lari- 
num. Some cohorts had previously moved from Luceria to 
Canusium; all were now marched to Brundisium, and his 
levies were instructed to repair thither to join him. He 
himself reached the place January 28. Not a few, however, 
of his new cohorts deserted and went over to Caesar. Thither 
he also ordered all available galleys and transports from 
every near-by port. 

Pompey’s calculations had from the outset been essentially 
wrong. He had taken no seasonable means to defend Italy, 


HE PREPARES TO LEAVE ITALY. 


421 


and he was now leaving it to Caesar as a prize. He was 
giving up what he ought to have been prepared to hold at 
all hazards for its mere moral effect. When he had once 
abandoned Italy, Caesar would have full control of Rome, 
and would not again afford him a chance to return. Driven 
from Rome, how long could Pompey maintain his influence 
over the provinces? His leaving was to all intents and pur¬ 
poses a flight. Unprepared when the struggle came, — 
though himself had brought it about, — he had now taken 
such action as to throw a first great advantage over to Cae¬ 
sar’s side. His conduct showed a lack of calculation and 
decision as marked as his apparent dread of Caesar. It is 
but fair to his colleagues to say that most of them objected 
strenuously to Pompey’s policy. 



Caesar, at Opening 1 of Civil War. 
(Berlin Museum.) 



XXVII. 


BRUNDISIUM AND MASSILIA. FEBRUARY TO APRIL, 

49 B. C. 

Lacking force to meet Caesar in Italy, Pompey retired to Epirus. Caesar had 
no fleet and could not at once follow. He sought to pen Pompey in Brundi- 
sium, and there bring him to a decisive conflict, surrounded the place, and 
built moles to close the harbor mouth. But Pompey managed his escape with 
great cleverness, and took with him to Epirus the Senate, consuls and many 
notables. He had rejected all Caesar’s overtures of peace. There were seven 
Pompeian legions in Spain, under good lieutenants. Caesar feared that these 
might invade Gaul and thus strike him at his weakest point. Relying on Pom- 
pey’s inertia, he determined to go first to Spain and neutralize these legions 
before he followed Pompey to Greece. He placed affairs in Rome on a basis 
to uphold his own interests, and set out for Massilia. This city he found in 
the hands of the Pompeians. He laid siege to it, and, placing Trebonius in 
command, left for Spain. 

Haying concluded that he could not hold Italy, and hav¬ 
ing made Brundisium his headquarters, Pompey there col¬ 
lected his troops. He had armed a large number of slaves 
and had made a corps of three hundred horse from the Cam¬ 
panian herders, — the cow-boys of Italy, — a good material 
for irregular cavalry. A considerable fraction of his levies 
failed to reach him, the cohorts breaking up on the way. 
Some further bodies deserted to Caesar while on the march to 
Pompey; but there assembled at Brundisium a motley crowd 
of politicians and soldiers intermixed, numbering some 
twenty-five thousand men. Pompey sent Metellus Scipio to 
Syria to recruit. He dispatched the consuls to Dyrrachium 
in Epirus with a van of thirty cohorts in January, 49 b. €., 
promising soon to follow with the balance of the army. But 


CAESAR ASKS INTERVIEW. 


428 


the effect of his mistaken policy was still apparent; deser¬ 
tions continued. His two praetors, Manlius and Rutilus, went 
over to Caesar with nine cohorts. 

Caesar, in all his communications to Pompey, and repeat¬ 
edly, had asked for a personal interview, with the feeling 
that matters could be amicably adjusted. He again made 
overtures here through Magius, Pompey’s chief engineer, 
whom he had captured. He was wise enough to see that if 
Pompey escaped to Greece there was a long, tedious and 
very uncertain war thrust upon him, and was not so blinded 
by political passion as not to allow this fact to weigh for all 
it was worth in his calculations. But his efforts were vain; 
Pompey sedulously avoided a meeting, personal or tactical. 

Caesar, having been delayed but seven days before Cor- 
finium, marched on Brundisium via Anxanum and Teanum, 
Arpi, Canusium and Barium. He reached the place Febru¬ 
ary 9, after a march of seventeen days at the rate of nearly 
seventeen miles a day. He had now six legions, the Eighth, 
Twelfth and Thirteenth veteran, the rest made up of what 
he had raised and what had voluntarily joined his ranks, in 
all, at least twenty-five thousand legionaries. Domitius’ 
cohorts he had sent to Sicily. 

Brundisium was one of the best of the old-world harbors. 
The town was well defended from the land side by a towered 
wall. It was a rich city and the principal port on the 
Adriatic. 

Caesar ascertained that the consuls had gone to Dyrra- 
chium with thirty cohorts, while Pompey remained at Brun¬ 
disium with twenty. These fifty cohorts numbered some 
thirty thousand men. Pompey had not had enough vessels 
to transport all the troops, and non-combatants as well, at 
one trip. Csesar grasped immediately at the advantage of 
cutting Pompey off from joining them. This he could do 


424 


BLOCKADE OF BRUNDISIUM. 


only by depriving Pompey of tbe use of tbe harbor of Brun¬ 
disium, which commanded the Adriatic, and in which Pom¬ 
pey was awaiting the return of his fleet. 

Caesar went to work. He blockaded the town from the 
land side by a circle of works, placing his legions in three 
camps joined by contravallation walls, and proceeded to build 
out into the harbor, from opposite sides and near its mouth, 



Brundisium. 


where he had located two camps and where it was narrowest 
and shallow, two moles some twenty feet wide, extending 
towards each other. These moles were constructed of rough 
stone, wood or other material near at hand. After building 
out from each shore a distance of some two hundred and fifty 
feet, the depth of the water made the work too difficult for 
speedy completion, and in order to join these moles, yet over 


POMPEY'S CLEVER FLIGHT. 


425 


five hundred feet apart, Caesar devised a number of floating- 
rafts, thirty feet square, which he joined together, anchored 
at each corner, covered with earth and protected with a 
parapet of wicker-work. On every fourth one he built a 
tower of two stories, to get an effective cross-fire. To offset 
this proceeding, Pompey on his side fitted out a number of 
merchantmen with three-story towers, and sent them out to 
interrupt and break through Caesar’s works. Skirmishing 
between these rival naval forces was of daily occurrence, with 
heavy interchanges of fire from bowmen and slingers. 

For the third time Caesar now sought a personal interview, 
through Scribonius Libo, to whom he sent a messenger. 
But Pompey evaded it on the pretext that without the advice 
and consent of the consuls he could take no action, and they 
were in Dyrrachium. This subterfuge determined Caesar to 
push the war with vigor. 

When Caesar’s works were about half finished, — on the 
ninth day of the blockade, February 17, —the fleet that had 
conveyed the forces of the consuls to Dyrrachium returned 
and made its way into the harbor. Pompey determined at 
once to leave Brundisium with the balance of his force. He 
strengthened the city walls and barricaded the streets, lest 
Caesar should enter the town from the land side while he was 
embarking. The citizens were distinctly in favor of Caesar, 
and gave him notice of Pompey’s designs. But owing to the 
defenses erected by Pompey, consisting of entanglements of 
various kinds and excellent intrenchments, and to a rear¬ 
guard of chosen men that he left on the walls while he was 
embarking, which he did at night, Caesar was entirely de¬ 
ceived as to Pompey’s actual movements, and was prepared 
to do nothing to harass his retreat. This, though the citizens, 
irritated at the high-handedness of Pompey’s soldiers, sought 
to give Caesar notice of what Pompey was doing. The 


426 


POMPEY’S ESCAPE. 


manner in which Pompey managed the retreat was markedly 
good. He got embarked before Caesar reached the walls 
with his scaling ladders, and as the notice of the entangle¬ 
ments within had made the latter overcautious, Pompey 
sailed out of the port before Caesar could get to it. The 
only mishap which befell Pompey was that two of his ships 
laden with soldiers became entangled in the harbor chain 
and at the mole, and were captured. 

Pompey thus escaped, despite Caesar’s efforts to bring him 
to battle in Italy; and as he had taken possession of all the 
ships on the coast, and Caesar could procure none from 
nearer than Gaul and Spain, the latter was, as he says, com¬ 
pelled to give over all present idea of following his enemy. 
Had he shut Pompey up in Brundisium, he might have 
ended the war there, instead of having to spend more than 
four additional years in pursuing Pompey’s partisans all 
around the Mediterranean basin. It is certain that Caesar 
began to appreciate the difference between fighting barbari¬ 
ans and Romans. Still he had good cause to be satisfied 
with what he had accomplished. He had been waging war 
against Pompey the Great, — the idol of the Roman people. 
Yet in sixty days from crossing the Rubicon, he had put 
himself in possession of all Italy. He must have been 
keenly alive to his own superiority in all that breeds mili¬ 
tary success. His decision, energy and speed stand out in 
strange contrast to the weakness, the vacillation of Pompey. 

Caesar had unquestionably gained by getting possession of 
Italy. But his responsibilities and risks had increased in 
equal measure. A very considerable part of his entire force 
must now go to garrison the peninsula, which would reduce 
his military power correspondingly. As he had no fleet, 
Italy was largely at Pompey’s mercy, who could cut it off 
from its grain supplies in Sicily, Sardinia and Egypt. The 


CHANGE OF CAESAR'S PLAN. 


427 


revenues of the East would no longer flow into Roman 
coffers; they would all be stopped midway by Pompey; and 
yet Italy had grave need of these contributions, for every¬ 
thing had been organized on a spendthrift scale. Moreover, 
Caesar was not at first looked on, even by the people whose 
champion he was, with a feeling of security. Many of his 
adherents in power were dissolute, irresponsible men, deeply 
in debt and reckless. People had seriously feared a return 
of the Marius-Sulla horrors. But it was not long before 
Caesar succeeded in reassuring people on this head. Italy 
became tranquil. Though Caesar was practically monarch, 
every one saw that the change of masters was for the 
better. 

Caesar now changed his plans to accord with Pompey’s 
escape to Greece. He commanded the coast towns to procure 
ships from whatever source, and send them to Brundisium. 
He ordered the construction of two new fleets, one on the 
Adriatic, one in Etruria, which Dolabella and Hortensius 
should respectively command. Valerius the legate he sent to 
Sardinia with one legion; Curio the propraetor he ordered to 
Sicily — which was of the highest importance as a granary 
— with three legions made up of cohorts captured at Cor- 
finium and one of new levies, and instructed him, after secur¬ 
ing the island, to proceed to Africa, where the government 
was in dispute by rival Pompeian factions and could perhaps 
be brought over to his side. On their arrival, these lieu¬ 
tenants found both Sardinia and Sicily hastily abandoned by 
their respective governors, M. Cotta and M. Cato (who, like 
the rest, seemed to have taken fright at Caesar’s approach), 
and the population fallen from Pompey’s and favorably 
disposed towards Caesar’s cause. The Cavalitans in Sardi¬ 
nia drove out Cotta; Cato, who was energetically equipping 
vessels and recruiting for Pompey, feeling that he was unable 


428 


POMPEY’S STRATEGIC PLAN. 


to hold the island for his chief, took ship for Epirus to join 
him. Here was a large and easily gotten advantage. 

The province of Africa had fallen by lot to Tubero; but 
when he reached his province the new governor found Attius 
Varus in control. This officer, it will be remembered, had 
lost his army at Auximum, had fled to Africa, which seemed 
to be a limitless refuge for all the aristocrats, and finding no 
governor on hand had assumed the reins, and raised two 
legions. Having formerly been praetor in Africa, he had 
been able to do this without much opposition. As the days 
of law and order seemed past, Varus did not propose to give 
up his power, resisted the attempt of Tubero to land at Utica, 
and drove him from the coast. 

Pompey had been misled by his calculation on the influence 
of the aristocratic party in Italy. It had proved unequal 
to facing the democrats headed by Caesar. This was one 
of the facts which had determined him to leave Italy and to 
make Greece his battle-ground. He had abandoned the best 
part of the national prize to Caesar, and it was now Caesar’s 
part to hold it. 

There were seven legions of Pompey’s in Spain. These 
were, say the Commentaries, a constant and serious threat to 
Gaul; or they might indeed be brought to Italy. Caesar 
deemed these legions more immediately dangerous than 
Pompey. While, therefore, Pompey was flying from Caesar 
to Hellas, Caesar saw that he might be compelled to turn 
from Pompey to Iberia. 

It is probable that Pompey had formulated a broad strategic 
plan. We are not told what it was, but an occasional state¬ 
ment in the Commentaries and elsewhere helps us to guess. 
Not anticipating Caesar’s sudden irruption into Italy, 
Pompey had expected to quietly finish his preparations and 
then carry the war against Caesar into Gaul, from Spain and 


POMPETS LOST CHANCE. 


429 


Italy at the same moment. With time in his favor he could 
have thus marched into Gaul with from fifteen to twenty 
legions, and have utilized Massilia, whose favor he had won, 
as his base. When this plan was frustrated by Caesar’s 
active campaign, Pompey himself might have done well to 
go to Spain, where his legions and lieutenants were both 
efficient, and to make that country his theatre of war, leaving 
Greece under a legate. But Pompey was tied down to his 
political associates, and his Oriental resources were the 
greater. He could not look at the matter coolly as a mere 
military problem. His vacillation persuaded him to ship to 
Greece and abandon Italy to the democratic party, headed 
, by Caesar. 

There is no question that Pompey, with half the mental 
activity of Caesar, could have held himself in the Italian 
peninsula instead of decamping from it. But the keystone 
of war is preparation, and Pompey had not made any. His 
temperament and actions were always of a laissez alter 
nature. If he had begun his levies^Italian and Eastern, in 
season; if he had brought half his Spanish legions to Italy, 
Caesar’s task could have been made all but impossible on the 
lines he had chosen. As it was, Pompey’s personal presence 
in Picenum might have turned the scale. For Pompey, at 
his best, could exercise an influence few men could equal. 
If he could not hold Rome, he might have held some point 
on the coast, every rood of which he controlled with his fleet; 
and having summoned forces from all the provinces he would 
have vastly outnumbered Caesar. It stands to reason that to 
sit still while your opponent is actively pursuing his advan¬ 
tages can result but in disaster. We shall see that Caesar, 
in his contests with Roman troops and third-rate generals, 
was wont to exhibit great caution. "Y\ ould he not have been 
less apt to make rapid progress had he known, so soon as he 




CESAR'S ARGUMENT. 


481 


reached Ancona, that Pompey the Great stood personally at 
the head of even the fresh levies which lay athwart his path ? 
For Caesar had not then as fully gauged his opponent as he 
later did. Pompey’s first great error lay in entering on with¬ 
out preparing for war; this he followed up by a greater one 
in deserting Italy without a struggle. 

As to Caesar, it is by no means clear that he acted wisely 
in undertaking a campaign to Spain, instead of at once 
following up Pompey. Every month he gave Pompey 
enabled the latter to collect more men and material and made 
him a more dangerous opponent. Though Spain was rich 
and a valuable acquisition, though Caesar must prevent the 
Spanish forces from operating on his rear, it would seem that 
to leave Italy, not to follow Pompey but to go to Spain 
directly away from Pompey, threatened to lose him a part 
of the moral strength which he had acquired by his own 
boldness in pushing into Italy and by Pompey’s hebetude in 
crossing to Greece. Caesar had to march overland to Spain; 
why not march through Illyricum to Greece, and following up 
Pompey push him to the wall? It may be said that Caesar 
counted on Pompey’s character, which he well knew, and 
concluded that Pompey would not attempt to return to Italy. 
But was this not reckoning without his host? How could 
Caesar believe that Pompey would behave with such unmili¬ 
tary laxness? Was he not underrating his opponent? His 
reasons given in the Commentaries are, taken alone, quite 
insufficient to account for his movement to Spain instead of 
on Pompey, in Greece. And Caesar’s dangerous campaign 
and narrow escape from disaster in Epirus, after Pompey had 
raised his Eastern army, show that he was giving his oppo¬ 
nent a manifest advantage by not attacking him before he 
collected his forces. 

We may assume that Caesar argued that if he left for 


432 


CESAR'S GENERAL PLAN. 


Greece, his absence might give rise to partisan movements 
in Italy, which the presence of the seven Pompeian legions, 
easily transferred from Spain to Rome, might turn to his 
disfavor; that Pompey might draw him away from his 
natural base, which was Italy backed by Gaul; that he 
hoped that by eliminating the Spanish question he would be 
more able to attack Pompey to advantage. In other words, 
he felt that Italy was not his so long as Pompey had seven 
legions in Spain, and he was unwilling to move on Pompey, 
with Italy for a base, unless this base was secure beyond 
a peradventure. This was well enough. But could he not 
have neutralized the seven Pompeian legions quoad Gaul by 
a lesser force of his veterans at the Pyrenees, and still be 
strategically stronger by moving on Pompey through Illy- 
ricum before the latter had concentrated all his forces, or 
raised more? The time to strike Pompey was when he most 
feared to be struck. And was not Pompey in Greece, with 
his limitless resources, a far graver threat than the seven 
legions in Spain? How could Caesar safely reckon on 
Pompey’s not returning to Italy so soon as himself had left? 
It will always remain a question whether Caesar could not 
have moved on Pompey, through Illyricuin, — most of his 
legions were easily available for such a march, — and have 
defeated him, or driven him into flight with a hearty dread 
of his enemy, before any serious danger would happen from 
the activity of the Spanish legions. And Caesar’s Gallic 
lieutenants were better men than Pompey’s Spanish legates, 
and might be fairly relied on to hold the Pyrenean country 
against them. 

All these arguments are based on assumptions.. Little is 
told us by the Commentaries about Caesar’s reasons for his 
actions. “I am setting forth to fight an army without a 
leader,” said he, “so as by and by to fight a leader without 


CJESAR IN ROME. 433 

an army.” Aphorisms do not explain. All we are told is 
that Caesar determined to go to Spain. 

After quartering his legions for rest in the chief municipal 
towns, Caesar went to Rome, had the tribunes call together 
on the 3d of March what remained of the Senate and 
stated his grievances. He claimed that Pompey should be 
made to obey the law as he himself was willing to do, and 
demanded that ambassadors should be sent to Pompey to 
effect a reconciliation between them. But no one was 
found who cared to act as envoy, for Pompey had declared 
that those who remained in Rome were as much his enemies 
as those who were in Caesar’s camp. 

Caesar was able to accomplish little. His secret enemies 
were still numerous in Rome. Before he left the city, he 
appropriated from the treasury the fund deposited there to 
defend the city against the Gauls, alleging that, as he had 
conquered them, there was no further use for it. The tri¬ 
bune Metellus attempted to prevent him from go doing, but 
Caesar drew his sword upon him, exclaiming: “Young man, 
it is as easy to do this as to say it! ” The money was soon 
expended, and Caesar, not long after, was obliged to borrow 
money from his officers to pay his legions. It must have 
been a strange spectacle to Roman citizens to see the trea¬ 
sury thus despoiled; but they were powerless. Caesar was 
sole master. 

Caesar had his legions strung out from Gaul to Sicily. 
He was not well concentrated and had to make many changes 
to accord with his new plans. His fresh troops he stationed 
in Apulia and along the Adriatic Sea, garrisoned the coast 
towns having good harbors, ordered the Eighth, Twelfth 
and Thirteenth legions back towards Gaul, whence he had 
already drawn Trebonius with his three legions, and concen¬ 
trated these and Fabius’ three in the Narbonese. Then he 


434 


MASSILIA. 


placed his Roman interests in the hands of Marcus Lepidus, 
gave the military command in Italy to Mark Antony, and 
put Illyricum under Caius Antonius and Cisalpine Gaul 
under Licinius Crassus. He released Aristobulus, king of 
the Jews, who was captive in Rome, hoping he would on his 
return home oppose the recruiting of Pompey’s lieutenant, * 
Scipio, in Syria. After completing these preparations he left 
Rome March 9, and went to the province of Transalpine 
Gaul, thence over the Corniche towards Massilia, the vicinity 
of which he reached in about twelve days. 

Meanwhile Vibullius Rufus, whom Caesar set at liberty at 
Corfinium, had gone to Spain to act for Pompey. Domitius, 
who, we remember, was Caesar’s successor as governor of 
Gaul, on the appointment of the Senate, had got friends 
at Igilium and Cosa to fit out seven rowing galleys for him, 
and had sailed for Massilia. As Caesar marched along the 
coast he heard that Massilia had collected all the corn from 
the vicinity and fortified the town, and that Pompey’s ad¬ 
herents had roused the citizens in his favor. They had also 
procured the aid of the Albici, near-by mountain tribes of the 
Western Alps, between the modern Durance and Yerdon 
rivers. So soon as he reached the place Caesar invited some 
of the principal citizens of Massilia to come to him, and 
endeavored to talk them over to his cause. But for once his 
eloquence proved vain. The magistrates claimed that they 
had received equal favors from Pompey as from Caesar, and 
could in good faith give allegiance to neither, nor admit the 
forces of either to their town or harbor. Domitius, during 
the parley, arrived with his fleet, was admitted to the harbor, 
and made governor of the place. Caesar, without ships, had 
no means of stopping him. 

Domitius at once set to fitting out a fleet. He seized on 
all the merchantmen which were in the harbor or in the 


MATTERS IN SPAIN. 


435 


vicinity, and confiscated their cargoes, mostly corn, which 
was laid up for a siege. Caesar, incensed that a town in the 
Province should thus turn against him, as well as all hut 
compromised by its treachery — for Massilia, with the aid of 
the Albici, might cut at Aquae Sextiae the road from Italy 
to Spain — began to provide means for besieging the place. 
He could not leave it in his rear without at least a blockade, 

for it was one of the most important towns on the Mediter- 

• 

ranean, and its example might prove disastrous. He built 
and equipped twelve vessels in the short space of thirty days, 
at Arelas near by, placed these under Decimus Brutus, the 
skillful victor of the Yeneti, and left Trebonius with the three 
legions he was marching towards Narbo to invest the place. 
He himself began the construction of a line of contravalla- 
tion. 

Fabius ’ three legions had, we remember, been wintering 
in Narbo. Cresar sent word to Antony to hurry up the 
Eighth, Twelfth and Thirteenth, already on the march, and 
diverted them from Gaul towards Spain. Meanwhile he dis¬ 
patched Fabius into Spain, with the three legions at Narbo, 
to occupy the passes in the Pyrenees, in advance of his own 
coming. Fabius marched with speed enough to dislodge a 
small party of Pompey’s adherents (part of the forces under 
L. Afranius) from the passes in the Pyrenees, and descended 
into Spain. It had been the purpose of Afranius and 
Petreius to occupy the Pyrenees, but Fabius anticipated 
them. 

Vibullius Rufus had recently arrived with instructions to 
assume supervisory charge on behalf of Pompey of all His- 
pania. But the several generals remained in command of 
their respective armies. The lieutenants who had been there 
before, L. Afranius, M. Petreius and M. Yarro, with seven 
legions, divided the peninsula between them, each practically 


436 


POMPEIANS IN SPAIN. 


independent. Afranius, who had served under Pompey 
against Sertorius and Mithridates, had three legions in 
Hither Spain, i. e., Catalonia and the territory south and 
west; Petreius had two near the river Anas; and Yarro had 
two between the Anas and the west coast. On getting news 
of the happenings in Italy and at Massilia, Petreius marched 
towards Afranius, and joined forces near Ilerda (Lerida), on 
the Sicoris (Segre), early in April, while Yarro was left to 



hold the western part of the peninsula. The five legions of 
Afranius and Petreius were increased by a large force of 
auxiliaries and horse recruited by these legates. In all Spain 
there were the seven legions mentioned, six being old Italian 
legions and one Spanish; eighty cohorts of auxiliaries, those 
from Hither Spain with shields, those from Farther Spain 
with round leather targets; and five thousand Spanish horse. 

It is difficult to estimate these forces. At normal 




RAISING MONEY. 


437 


strength they would number eighty-seven thousand men. 
But if they were of good average field strength alone, say 
four hundred men to a cohort, they would count but sixty- 
five thousand, with cavalry some seventy thousand men. 
Csesar counted Fabius with three legions on the ground, 
the three to arrive by and by from Italy, five thousand 
Gallic foot-auxiliaries, three thousand horse of old German 
and Gallic troops, and the same number of new foot and 
horse recruited of the best material, of whom those of most 
repute were from the Aquitani and neighboring mountain¬ 
eers. The total of these forces is equally hard to estimate. 
Probably the Caesarian cohorts fell below those of Pompey’s 
lieutenants, which had not been ground down by the attrition 
of war. If his cohort numbered three hundred and sixty 
men, as we formerly called them, the total under the eagles 
would have been thirty-seven thousand six hundred. It was 
no doubt under forty thousand men; but the army was vet¬ 
eran and included many of the best of the Gallic chiefs. 
Stoffel estimates that Fabius had twenty-five thousand men, 
or with the three legions yet to arrive thirty-six thousand 
men. These are, as estimates, close enough. 

Caesar had used up all his moneys, including the large 
sum which he took from the Roman treasury, to pay his 
legions. He now adopted a novel course of conduct to raise 
more. He borrowed various sums from his tribunes and 
centurions and distributed the money among the private 
soldiers. He thus secured the good will of the latter by his 
gifts and the adherence of the former on account of the loan. 
This certainly original proceeding was perhaps justifiable in 
view of the fact that Roman legionaries were now for the first 
time in this war to meet Romans in hostile array, and a 
double hold on the fidelity of his men was a further bond to 
fortune. 


XXVIII. 


ILERDA. APRIL TO JUNE, 49 B. C. 

Afranius and Petreius held Ilerda. Caesar sent Fabius ahead with his army, 
leaving- the fleet at Massilia. When he himself came up he at once advanced 
on the Pompeians, who declined battle. Caesar camped near by and shortly 
essayed to capture a hill which lay between the Pompeian camp and the city. 
In this he was checked by his veterans becoming- demoralized, but in a fight 
under the walls of Ilerda got the better of the enemy. For a long while the 
contention of each army was confined to foraging and seeking to disturb its 
rival in foraging. But shortly a serious storm and flood cut Caesar off from his 
base, by destroying his bridges over the Sicoris ; the enemy kept theirs which 
was a solid one of stone. In Caesar’s camp there was great distress, and a con¬ 
voy coming to him from Gaul was almost captured by the Pompeians. Caesar 
contrived a bridge of boats by which he saved the convoy and again victualed 
his army. The Pompeians began to lose energy. 

From the Iberus to the vicinity of Ilerda the country is 
mountainous and in Caesar’s day was in part heavily wooded. 
North of Ilerda the country was level, and it is well com¬ 
manded by the city, which stands on a bold, prominent rock 
on the bank of the Sicoris. While Ilerda was an excellent 
place for tactical defensive purposes, it was not a strategic 
point from which central Spain could be controlled or even 
protected. The river Ebro was the true line of defense, 
but the Pompeian lieutenants not only did not hold this, but 
did not even have secure communications with the river and 
the interior beyond. Having by delay forfeited the Pyre¬ 
nees, they were short-sighted in relying solely on Ilerda to 
protect Spain. They took up the position “on account of 
the advantages of the situation.” 

On reaching Ilerda, about April 20, which he had done 


OPERATIONS AT ILERDA 


439 


U 


by hasty marches” from the Pyrenees, Fabius found 
Afranius strongly camped, some eight hundred paces south 





Ilerda and Vicinity. 


of the town, on an isolated hill on the right bank of the 
river Sicoris. The cavalry lay between this camp and 
the river, in the plain. The situation of the town made it 




440 


FABIUS AT HERD A. 


inexpugnable. Between camp and town lay another piece 
of slightly elevated ground, the south part of it nearer the 
camp than the town. In this location Afranius and Petre- 
ius had determined to keep on the defensive till Pompey 
could arrive, for their chief was reported to be on his way 
through Mauretania to join them. How the rumor originated 
it is hard to say. There was no foundation whatsoever for 
it. The Pompeians had accumulated goodly supplies of 
food in Ilerda, but still not enough to last through a long 
campaign. They imagined, however, that they could here 
hold the road into the interior of Spain against Caesar’s 
forces. 

Fabius went into camp and intrenched on the right bank 
of the Sicoris, about three miles upstream from Afranius, 
on the slope of a hill, between two brooks discharging into 
the river. Here he “sounded the inclinations of the neigh¬ 
boring states by letters and messengers.” He was joined not 
far from the middle of May by the three legions from Italy. 
He had made two bridges over the Sicoris, one near the left 
flank of his camp, the other four miles upstream. Afranius 
had control of the stone bridge at the town. 

Each army used to send across their own bridges on for¬ 
aging expeditions, because the corn supply on the right bank 
was exhausted, and constant skirmishing resulted. On the 
21st of May, when Fabius had sent his foragers, under cover 
of his cavalry and two legions, across the lower of the bridges, 
the weight of the train and troops, and the high water, broke 
it down before the horse could cross, and cut the infantry off 
from that in camp. The party none the less kept on its way, 
anticipating no danger. Seeing the debris of the bridge 
floating down the stream, Afranius guessed the reason and, 
marching four legions and all his cavalry from Ilerda over 
his own bridge, attacked the two legions thus left without 


CAESAR ARRIVES. 


441 


support. L. Plancus, the legate who was in command of 
the Caesarian party, “took post on a rising ground and drew 
up his army with two fronts,” — perhaps meaning a square, 
perhaps that each legion backed on the other with a cohort 
drawn up across the flanks,—so as to resist the enemy’s 
cavalry. This was a formation later used by Caesar at 
Ruspina, and may have been more or less in use. Here 
Plancus bravely held head against a furious attack by Afra- 
nius. His defense succeeded. Before the enemy had 
inflicted any serious injury on him, Fabius was seen to be 
approaching with a reinforcement of two legions. He had 
made the circuit over the upper bridge by a forced march in 
light order. This put an end to the combat, as Afranius 
deemed it wise to withdraw. The broken bridge was speedily 
repaired. 

Two days after this encounter, Csesar arrived with a body¬ 
guard of nine hundred horse. After thoroughly reconnoi¬ 
tring the topography of the region, he at once began active 
operations. He felt that he had no time to waste. Every 
week was adding to the potential strength of Pompey in 
Greece. One of the most noticeable features of all Caesar’s 
campaigns is the restless, unceasing activity of the man. 
He never sits down to await events. He puts his hand to 
working out the problem so soon as he encounters it. His 
speed in planning is as remarkable as the rapidity of his 
execution. He never waits for the enemy to initiate opera¬ 
tions. This prerogative he reserves to himself. He now 
left six cohorts — one from each legion — to guard the camp, 
bridges and baggage, and “with all his forces drawn up in 
three lines ” in battle order, and then faced to the right into 
column of march, he moved to Ilerda, marshaled his legions 
opposite the Pompeian camp, and offered Afranius battle on 
equal terms. But Afranius, though he drew out his forces 


442 


DANGEROUS CAMP. 


with a show of resolution, finally declined it. He was well 
enough off as he was, and wished to wait for Pompey’s 
arrival. Caesar, after remaining in line all day, though 
barely half a mile from the enemy’s camp and at the foot of 
the hill on which it lay, determined to remain where he was, 
instead of giving the enemy the moral gain of seeing him 
retire; kept out his two first lines for protection, and with 
his third line unobserved began to fortify the front line of 
a camp with a trench some two thousand feet from the foot 
of the hill. No rampart was at first added, lest Afranius 
should attack during the inception of the work, which he 
would be able to see from the greater prominence of the 
rampart. He could not see the ditch, hidden in rear of the 
two first lines. An additional reason for omitting the ram¬ 
part may have been that the legionaries were not provided 
with palisades; there were none to be obtained close at hand, 
and it would have been dangerous to send to a distance for 
them. 

This camping in the open plain in the close vicinity of 
the enemy was a bold thing to do, if it was not a wise one. 
It reminds one of old Friedrich camping in the very teeth 
of the Austrians before the battle of Hochkirch. Caesar 
does not sufficiently explain what he purposed to accomplish 
by this proceeding, quite un-Foman and without precedent. 
The troops lay on their arms all night behind the ditch. 
Having thus made a beginning, for a day or two Caesar 
continued to intrench the other fronts of the camp, keeping 
at all times a large force behind the front ditch for protec¬ 
tion, and paid no heed to Afranius and Petreius, who each 
day drew up as for battle not far off but on their slope. 
When the ditch was finished, on the third day, Caesar added 
a rampart to the camp; and after the whole thing was 
completed, on the same day drew in the baggage and cohorts 


CjESAR’S first attack. 


443 


from the first camp up the river. The location of the camp 
was in every sense unfavorable; but it enabled Caesar to cut 
the Pompeians off from foraging on the right bank of the 
river. 

Afranius and Petreius were, as stated, encamped upon a 
hill. Between them and Ilerda was a plain some five hun¬ 
dred yards broad, with the slight eminence in the middle, 
already mentioned, which had abrupt sides about fifty feet 
high on the south. It occurred to Caesar that he would try 
to take this eminence, which Afranius had neglected to 
fortify, because its possession would cut the Pompeian camp 
off from the town where were the supplies, and from safe 
access to the bridge by the use of which alone they could 
contrive to forage on the left bank. This was of itself an 
admirable diversion, but it was not expertly managed. The 
hill was nearer the enemy than to Caesar, so that the latter 
must employ ruse to seize it, as the Pompeians were always 
on the watch. Instead of sending a party thither by night, 
which would seem to have been his better plan, Caesar drew 
up three legions of his army as if again to offer battle, 
extending them from opposite the Pompeian camp to opposite 
Ilerda. The Ninth and Fourteenth legions were respectively 
in the centre and on the left. The duty of the latter was at 
the proper moment to advance and take the hill. It is prob¬ 
able that only the first two ranks, or the antesignani, of the 
Fourteenth were thrown upon the hill. At all events the 
attack was not perfectly planned, nor delivered with suffi¬ 
cient vim or speed. Afranius was on the watch. He had no 
intention of accepting an offer of battle by Caesar, but divin¬ 
ing his purpose from some of his movements, he proved too 
quick for his opponent. He could not permit himself to be 
thus cut off. He threw forward those of his cohorts which 
happened to be on guard on the north of his camp to antici- 


444 


ODD TACTICS. 


pate the movement. These cohorts, having “a nearer way’ 
to the hill, as Csesar alleges, though this is not borne out by 
the topography, reached it first and drove back Caesar’s men. 



Even a reinforcement did not suffice to carry the hill. 
“They were obliged to turn their backs, and retreat to the 
standard of the legions.” 

The method of fighting of Afranius’ men, and they were 
war-hardened veterans, was peculiar. They had learned it in 
combats with the Lusitanians and other barbarians of Spain. 
Instead of fighting in close order in the usual legionary 
manner, they scattered in small parties, and taking advan¬ 
tage of the accidents of the ground advanced or retired, fight- 



CJESAR CHECKED . 


445 


ing in loose order. “If hard pressed they thought it no 
disgrace to retire and give up the post.” It seems to have 
been a sort of loose order in groups, which advanced by short 
rushes from one cover to another much like the system which 
has obtained in recent days against the decimation of the 
arms of precision. Unused to this method and fearing that 
the rushes of some of these small groups from hiding would 
jeopardize their exposed (right) flank, Caesar’s legionaries 
were at first considerably unsettled, and when its “advanced 
guard,” i. e ., antesignani, fell back from the eminence, the 
Fourteenth legion also gave way, and retreating to the next 
hill in its rear, not only weakened the entire line, but 
imparted a feeling of insecurity to all the legionaries. 

The effect of this loss of confidence Caesar saw that he 
must immediately overcome. He seized on and headed the 
Ninth legion, which was in line on the right of the Four¬ 
teenth, and while covering the retirement of his beaten men, 
by a bold onslaught drove the enemy back in confusion. 
Part retreated over the hill in dispute, as far as the walls of 
Ilerda, where they stopped and drew up; part appear to have 
retired to their camp. 

Ilerda was built on a rock which stands up boldly five 
hundred feet above the plain, with a plateau of some one 
hundred and fifty acres on the top. Every side of this rock 
is practically inaccessible to assault except that on the south. 
Here, in a sort of ravine, is a slope, up which ran the road to 
the town, some six hundred yards long from the plain. Near 
the plain the mouth of the ravine is some three hundred and 
fifty yards wide; at the town, about a third that width. 

It was between the two walls of the ravine that the enemy 
turned, and backing against the fortifications of the town 
awaited Caesar’s Ninth legion. Emboldened by their 
success, and advancing too far in their eagerness to efface 


446 


SEVERE CONTEST. 


their comrades’ defeat, this legion got engaged on an up-slope 
where it had difficulty in disengaging itself. Its situation 
was critical. It had advanced well up the rocky hillside, and 
there met the enemy’s line, which it could not destroy; when 
it essayed to retire the enemy fell upon it from fhe higher 
ground. The approach to the town on which they stood was 
flanked with craggy sides. There was but one way down, — 



Ilerda, from the Northeast. 

the way they had come. The enemy’s men not only stood 
where they could use their weapons to excellent effect, but no 
aid could be put in on the flanks of the Ninth, nor the 
cavalry be of the slightest service. Meanwhile the enemy 
was fighting with his back to the town, and felt confidence 
accordingly. There was room along the approach for but a 
front of three cohorts, and though Caesar had had no idea of 
coming to close quarters on such bad ground, he was con¬ 
strained to send in, from time to time, out of the troops he 
could not use, fresh forces to relieve the weary. And this the 
enemy likewise did. “Cohorts were frequently sent to their 
aid by a circuit from the camp through the town,” which 
seems to argue that there was access to the plateau from the 
river side, at least for friends. 

The contest raged on this narrow slope for five hours. 
Neither line gave way, and Caesar could not well extricate 





































DRAWN COMBAT. 447 

his men without danger of demoralization. He had appar¬ 
ently sent in as many successive cohorts as could fight on 
the narrow front, and kept on putting in fresh ones. This 
it was which enabled the three cohorts front to continue 
to fight five hours without loss of heart. Finally Caesar’s 
legionaries exhausted their javelins. At the sight of this 
the enemy renewed their efforts, resolved to hold their own. 
Caesar was threatened with disaster; but under the inspira¬ 
tion of his personal appeals the men persuaded themselves to 
make one last effort, drew their swords, and charging up the 
hill on the enemy’s cohorts, drove them in disorder to the 
very walls of Ilerda. Under cover of this charge they with¬ 
drew down to a point where the cavalry was able to file in 
on the flanks, “which though stationed on sloping or low 
ground, yet bravely struggled to the top of the hill and 
riding between the two armies made our retreat more easy 
and secure.” Cavalry here was enacting one of its chief 
roles to great advantage. This, added to the smart attack 
of the foot, prevented the enemy from following. 

The combat was drawn. Retiring to camp, Caesar found 
that he had lost in all one centurion and seventy men killed 
and six hundred wounded. The enemy’s loss in killed 
alone, as the Commentaries claim, was two hundred, with 
five centurions. The wounded are not given. Considering 
that the combat had been hotly contested for five hours, this 
was not so serious a loss. It shows how safe the Roman 
legionary was with his excellent armor and broad and skill¬ 
fully handled shield, so long as he did not break his ranks. 

It is to be observed in a general way that while the losses 
of a thoroughly defeated enemy were often in olden times 
awful beyond anything we know to-day, the losses of the 
victors were usually by no means heavy; and the casualties 
of ordinary campaign work, — outpost and picket fighting, 


448 


WHOSE VICTORY? 


— such as we are familiar with and which are frequently 
far more numerous than those of pitched battles, were small 
compared to those of modern days. The percentage of loss 
by wounds in one of Caesar’s campaigns was as a rule low. 

Each party claimed the victory in the fight at Ilerda; 
Caesar’s men because, though they had at first fallen back, 
they had forced the enemy to his gates and held him there, 
and had moreover driven him uphill with the sword, — an 
unusual feat; Afranius’ men because they had kept and 
were able to fortify the eminence in dispute. This they did 
with strong works and put a garrison in them. 

Caesar’s operation so far had for result that his cavalry — 
which was far superior to Afranius’—could hold the sur¬ 
rounding territory, and by watching the bridges could pre¬ 
vent Afranius from foraging at large on the farther side of 
the Sicoris. He foresaw that want of bread would sooner or 
later drive Afranius from his position. Still Caesar must 
have keenly felt the fact that he had in his first combat with 
Roman troops quite failed to accomplish what he set out to 
do. His luck had for the moment turned on him, and this 
in a contest with an officer of minor rank and ability. 
No doubt here, too, his persuasive words were employed to 
advantage in satisfying his soldiers that they had really won 
the fight. But to construe the Commentaries as we often 
have to do in the Gallic War, this affair at Ilerda looks more 
like a defeat for Caesar than a drawn battle. Nor can it be 
said that the attempt to seize the hill in question was bril¬ 
liantly conceived or executed. Rather is Afranius’ defense 
to be commended. 

Two days after the battle a serious disaster happened. A 
severe storm arose. The melting snows poured down from 
the mountains in a vast flood, and the waters of the river 
overflowed their banks — “it was agreed that there had 


SERIOUS DISASTER. 


449 


never been seen higher floods in those countries” — and 
swept away both of Caesar’s bridges, which were of but tem¬ 
porary construction. The camp was flooded by the brook 
which ran through it. Caesar found himself cut oft’ from his 
communications with Gaul, and shut in between the two 
rivers Cinga and Sicoris, over the latter of which Afranius 
still had a bridge, and Caesar now had none. No fords were 
within thirty miles. Afranius had previously gathered all 
the corn of the immediate vicinity, so that foraging was 
difficult, and the light troops attached to the army of 
Afranius kept up a harassing small-war. His Lusitanians 
and targeteers of Hither Spain could easily swim the river, 
“because it is the custom of all those people not to join the 
army without bladders,” and Caesar was no longer able to 
interfere with the foraging of Afranius on the left bank. 

Worse than all, Caesar’s convoys could not reach him. A 
large force of foragers had been prevented from returning to 
camp. The friendly states could not get to him with corn, 
and the new crops were*not yet ripe. All the cattle had 
been removed to a great distance. There were no boats to 
be had, for Afranius had secured these long ago. Caesar’s 
rations grew short. Afranius, on the contrary, was well 
supplied, and his own bridge was still intact, which enabled 
him to cross the Sicoris, not only to forage, but to receive 
supplies from the interior of Spain. The tables were turned. 
The height of water, the rough banks and the enemy’s oppo¬ 
sition prevented Caesar from repairing the bridges, — “ it 
was no easy matter at one and the same time to execute a 
work in a very rapid flood and to avoid the darts,” — and 
any attempt to cross small parties was headed off by the 
cohorts of the enemy, which lined the banks. 

A still more fatal matter was that a large convojr from 
Gaul — including slaves and freedmen, some six thousand 


450 


SCARCITY. 


souls all told — was near at hand, and Afranius knew the 
fact, and had set out with three legions and all his cavalry to 
attack it. In this convoy “there was no order or regular 
discipline, as every one followed his own humor, and all 
traveled without apprehension,” knowing nothing of the 
disaster to Caesar’s bridges. Reaching the convoy, Afranius 
summarily fell upon it, and but for the courage of the Gallic 
horse —which now as always behaved with consummate 
gallantry — might have corralled the whole body, in which 
“there were several young noblemen, sons of senators and of 
equestrian rank; there were ambassadors from several states; 
there were lieutenants of Caesar’s.” But to the aid of the 
skill and daring of the Gallic horse came the faultiness of 
Afranius’ dispositions, which lacked both vigor and ability. 
These men held Afranius’ forces at a distance by skirmishing 
about his legions in their own peculiar manner, and thus 
enabled the convoy to retreat to the uplands. The loss was 
two hundred bowmen, some horse and non-combatants, and 
a little baggage. 

All these disasters made provisions scarce and high. 

Corn reached fifty denarii a bushel. “The want of corn had 

diminished the strength of the soldiers.” Cattle were got, 

but by great efforts only. Caesar was obliged to forage at a 

considerable distance. This series of misadventures tended 

to encourage the enemy, and, reported at Rome, as they were 

very circumstantially by Afranius, began to lead people to 

believe that Caesar’s fortunes were at an end. Had Pompey 

actually come to Spain at this moment, — as he should have 

done, — Caesar might well have been in bad case. But 

Pompey did not deem it essential to come. He was waiting 

& 

for Caesar in Greece. 

Caesar’s resources in corn were small; but in intelligence 
and audacity they had as yet scarcely been taxed. He deter- 


A NOVEL BRIDGE. 


451 


mined to cross the Sicoris, whatever the difficulty or danger, 
reestablish his communications with Gaul, and rescue his 
convoy. He built a lot of boats whose keels and ribs were 
of light timber, covered with wickerwork and hides, — a 



trick he had learned in Britain. These he now transported 
on wagons in one night, twenty-two miles from camp, up the 
river to a place already selected, near the modern village of 
San Llorens. Here he sent a body of men across, who seized 
upon and fortified unperceived a hill on the opposite shore; 
and to this place he soon transported a legion. Then, by 
beginning a bridge at both ends under cover of this force, he 
finished it in two days and safely brought his convoy and 
foragers across to camp (June 11). At the same time he put 



452 


FIGHT AT MASSILIA. 


over a large body of horse, and sending it out at an oppor¬ 
tune moment, he surrounded the enemy dispersed as foragers, 
and captured a great store of men and provisions; and when 
some Spanish light-armed cohorts came to the rescue, a part 
of the horse protected the plunder, while another advanced 
against the enemy, cut off one cohort, put it to the sword, 
drove off the rest in disorder, and returned to camp, across 
the bridge, with much booty. The question of provisions 
was thus settled, and the superiority of Afranius and Petreius 
at once vanished into thin air. 

During this time, there was a naval engagement at 
Massilia between the forces of Domitius and Brutus, near an 
island (modern Rattonneaux), opposite the town, where Cae¬ 
sar’s fleet was stationed. The enemy was largely superior in 
the number of his vessels. He had seventeen war-galleys, 
eleven decked and many smaller ones, well manned by archers 
and the auxiliary Albici, and was the attacking party. Brutus 
bravely sallied out to meet the enemy. The Romans, though 
their rowers were new, had aboard antesignani and centu¬ 
rions, all veterans of stanch courage, who for its honor had 
requested this service. For a while the skillful manoeuvring 
of the Massilians threatened disaster. “The Massilians 
themselves, confiding in the quickness of their ships and the 
skill of their pilots, eluded ours, and evaded the shock, and 
as long as they were permitted by clear space, lengthening 
their line they endeavored to surround us, or to attack single 
ships with several of theirs, or to run across our ships and 
carry away our oars, if possible; but when necessity obliged 
them to come nearer, they had recourse, from the skill and 
art of the pilots, to the valor of the mountaineers. But our 
men, not having such expert seamen, or skillful pilots, for 
they had been hastily drafted from the merchant ships, and 
were not yet acquainted even with the names of the rigging, 


NAVAL VICTORY. 


453 


were, moreover, impeded by the heaviness and slowness of 
our vessels, which having been built in a hurry and of green 
timber, were not so easily manoeuvred. Therefore, when 
Caesar's men had an opportunity of a close engagement, they 
cheerfully opposed two of the enemy’s ships with one of 
theirs. And throwing in the grappling irons, and holding 
both ships fast, they fought on both sides of the deck, and 
boarded the enemy’s; and having killed numbers of the Albici 
and shepherds, they sank some of their ships, took others 
with the men on board, and drove the rest into the harbor. 
That day the Massilians lost nine ships, including those that 
were taken.” 

The news of this victory tended much to encourage the 
forces at Ilerda. Caesar purposely exaggerated the success, 
and as a result a number of towns and native tribes tendered 
fealty and corn, — Osca, Calagurris, Tarraco, the Jacetani 
at the mouth of the Iberus, the Illurgari south of them, and 
the Ausitani on the sea near the eastern end of the Pyrenees. 
Even a cohort of Illurgari, in the enemy’s camp, deserted to 
Caesar in a body. 



Signum. 






XXIX. 


GOOD MANOEUVRING. JUNE, 49 B. C. 

Cesar’s desire was to capture the Pompeian army instead of destroying it in 
battle. His new bridge was many miles up river. The stream was too full to 
build one farther down. In order to have a means of crossing near Ilerda, he 
cut a number of canals in a low island in the middle of the river to divert the 
stream into many channels, thus lower the water and make an artificial ford. 
The plan succeeded well. The Pompeians determined to retire to the Ebro. 
They crossed the Sicoris on their bridge ; Caesar followed by way of his ford. 
The enemy sought to escape to the mountain-passes; Caesar anticipated them 
and thus cut off their retreat. They then tried to return to Ilerda ; Caesar fol¬ 
lowed, harassed and finally surrounded them. The legions demanded battle; 
Caesar, anxious to spare Roman lives, refused. Finally, cut off from water, the 
entire Pompeian army surrendered, on agreement that they should be dis¬ 
charged. Caesar had thus neutralized Pompey’s whole force in Spain without a 
general engagement. It is one of his finest feats of manoeuvring. The Ilerda 
campaign had lasted but six weeks. 

Thus Fortune took a turn. Soon the vigor of Caesar’s 
Gallic horse intimidated Afranius’ foragers. “The enemy, 
daunted by the courage of our horse, did not scour the 
country as freely or as boldly as before; but sometimes 
advancing a small distance from the camp, that they might 
have a ready retreat, they foraged within narrower bounds; 
at other times, they took a longer circuit to avoid our 
outposts and parties of horse; or having sustained some loss, 
or descried our horse at a distance, they fled in the midst 
of their expedition, leaving their baggage behind them; at 
length they resolved to leave off foraging for several days 
and, contrary to the practice of all nations, to go out at 
night.” The neighboring tribes, too, and many distant ones, 


CLEVER ENGINEERING. 


455 


so soon as Caesar’s success was demonstrated, began to send 
in their allegiance and desert Afranius; and furnished the 
army with plenty of corn and cattle. More than this, the 
rumors of Pompey approaching through Mauretania died 
away, which still more encouraged the adherents of Caesar. 

In order to provide a nearer means of crossing the Sicoris 
than the bridge lately built, and one less liable to interrup¬ 
tion than those which the floods had carried away, Caesar, 
with his restless ingenuity, devised 
an artificial ford. Why he did not 
rebuild the bridges which had been 
destroyed by the high water, or 
construct others, it is hard to say. 

A new flood was improbable. Un¬ 
less the water was too high and 
rapid, or unless the enemy was 
more than usually active in oppos¬ 
ing the construction of bridges, the 
labor involved in building several 
bridges would have been small com¬ 
pared to that he undertook. Wood 
was not near by, but it could be 
floated down from the mountains. 

There have been numberless constructions of the passage 
in the Commentaries which narrates this engineering feat; 
and many clever designs have been made to show how Caesar 
produced this celebrated ford. What he really did — and 
there can be no doubt that it was what is now to be explained 
— is as remarkable by its simplicity as by its ingenuity. 

The Sicoris, a mile or more above Ilerda, has a wide bed, 
in which, in Caesar’s day as now, it flowed in three channels, 
leaving broad, sandy islands between them. The island 
nearest the right bank is half a mile long. Here, out of 



Artificial Ford. 


456 


THE POMPEIANS TROUBLED. 


dart-throwing distance from the enemy, by sinking a number 
of drains thirty feet wide, he managed to draw off part of 
the current of the Sicoris into the beds of these drains, and 
by thus giving the volume of water more channel room, low¬ 
ered the depth of the river so as to make it fordable in 
places. The plan succeeded well. The horse needed no 
longer to make the long detour by the San Llorens bridge. 

This energetic and clever piece of engineering discouraged 
Afranius and Petreius, as much as the fact that Caesar’s 
horse had proved so much the stronger, and had annoyed 
them so sorely. Here, as in the Gallic campaigns, these 
gallant fellows were one of his mainstays. The Roman or 
native cavalry of Afranius and Petreius could by no means 
cope with them. 

With Caesar in possession of the right bank of the Sicoris, 
and able to scour the country on the left bank, the Pompeians 
threatened to be in evil case. They must take decided action, 
and that at once. After long consultation, the legates re¬ 
solved to retire across the Iberus into Celtiberia, where Pom- 
pey was well liked by many and feared by others, and where 
his influence consequently predominated. This was partly 
because he had been the Roman general who had got the 
credit of putting down Sertorius. This sentiment led the 
Pompeians to believe that they could there prolong the war 
till winter, whose snows in the Pyrenees would weaken Cae¬ 
sar’s communications with Gaul; and Caesar, being unknown 
in that region, could not readily make adherents or victual his 
army. They therefore collected all the vessels they could in 
the Iberus at Octogesa (modern Mequinensa), at its confluence 
with the Sicoris, and ordered a bridge of boats to be there built. 

The nearest and easiest road to Octogesa was along the 
right bank of the Sicoris; but an easy road meant easy pur¬ 
suit by Caesar’s cavalry, and this the Pompeians dreaded. 


THEY MOVE AWAY. 


457 


They decided on the more rugged road on the farther bank, 
which had the advantage of yielding many places of ready 
defense; but the country had the very objectionable feature 
of being all but waterless. Only rain-water is there used 
to-day, and the inhabitants store this up in reservoirs. 

The Pompeians accordingly transported two legions over 
the Sicoris,— they still retained the stone bridge,— and about 
June 21 fortified a camp and bridgehead with a rampart 
twelve feet high on the left bank. All their preparations 
had been some time completed; but Afranius and Petreius, 
with the slowness bred of lax purpose, had delayed their 
retirement too long. What they had done, moreover, had 
betrayed their intentions. Caesar, by severe toil day and 
night, had so far completed his ford as to be able — though 
with some danger — to get his mounted troops across, but 
“the foot had only their shoulders and the upper part of 
their breast above the water.” The enemy recognized the 
mistake they had made in their delay, and saw that they 
must speedily move away or forfeit their chance of doing so 
unmolested. Afranius and Petreius were growing morally 
weaker. Though their success had been fair in their several 
encounters with the Caesarians, they did not care to face 
Caesar in a pitched battle in the open. This looks as if, 
though Caesar had not won a success in the late engagement, 
he had impressed himself strongly on his enemies. At all 
events, the Pompeians had concluded to abandon his front 
and retreat to a safer country. Leaving two auxiliary 
cohorts in garrison at Ilerda to cover the withdrawal, they 
moved their whole army on the night of June 23 to the new 
camp across the river. “The legionaries had been ordered” 
to carry “ sufficient corn to last twenty-two days.” 

The country from Ilerda to the Iberus, on the left bank of 
the Sicoris, was at first rolling and fertile, then strongly 



Theatre of Operations near Ilerda, 



CHOICE OF ROUTES. 


459 


accentuated, and within five miles or so of the Iberus became 
much cut up by rocky and mountainous country, difficult to 
traverse. The march of Afranius and Petreius, if speedy 
and well conducted, might be free from pursuit. If they 
could get beyond the level and into the mountains, they were 
safe. 

Caesar saw with regret that his prey was escaping. His 
only chance now lay in harassing the enemy’s rear with a 
view of bringing them to terms. He sent his cavalry across 
the Sicoris to do this, and the nimble Gauls performed the 
duty efficiently. “ When Afranius and Petreius had 
broken up their camp about the third watch, they suddenly 
appeared on their rear, and, spreading round them in great 
numbers, began to retard and impede their march.” Caesar 
had given up the idea of forcing battle on the Pompeians. 
He saw that it would be better, if it was possible, to conquer 
Afranius and Petreius without destroying the Roman legions 
opposed to him. His hope was to bring these legions, or at 
least many of the men, over to his cause. What would have 
been vacillation in many of his movements may really be 
ascribed to a sound military motive. He wished to win by 
manoeuvring rather than by fighting. Let us see how he 
did it. 

On the left bank of the Sicoris, Afranius and Petreius 
had choice of two routes: one close to the river and through 
rather flat country, one by a circuit inland over the cut up 
country. This latter they chose for the same reason as they 
chose the left rather than the right bank. But it is evident 
that they had not carefully reconnoitred their ground, for 
even the latter route was not so cut up as to prevent the 
cavalry from keeping on their heels. 

From the eminences on the right bank of the Sicoris 
Caesar’s army could watch the operations of the horse, and 


460 


THE BRIDGEHEAD. 


see how greatly they interfered with the movements of 
Afranius and Petreius. The squadrons swept around the 
enemy’s flanks and rear, thus demoralizing the legionaries, 
but retired when smartly attacked. The Caesarians were in 
the forks of the two rivers, Cinga and Sicoris, with their one 
bridge twenty-two miles upstream. A circuit would be too 
long to enable them to take part in the action; and the stone 
bridge being, as we must assume, well held, they could not join 
their comrades except by the ford, which was up to their necks. 
But with the eye of veterans they at once perceived that the 
enemy was about to escape them; and they understood that 
this meant a long pursuit and a tedious campaign in an 
unknown territory. “They applied to their tribunes and 
centurions, and entreated them to inform Caesar that he need 
not spare their labor or consider their danger; that they were 
ready and able and would venture to ford the river where the 
horse had crossed.” Caesar took advantage of this enthu¬ 
siasm, and determined to try the experiment. It is neither 
stated in the Commentaries that Afranius and Petreius had 
broken down the stone bridge, nor that they had left a 
garrison to hold it; but one or the other must be the fact, or 
Caesar would certainly have used it at the present moment to 
cross. If broken down, he could not do so; unless held by 
many cohorts, it would seem as if Caesar might have brushed 
away the force at the bridgehead, and have thus frayed him¬ 
self a passage across the river. The habit of the day, to be 
sure, was to avoid assaulting breastworks even when held by 
a handful of men, and anything but an immediate assault 
would have consumed too much time. But it appears 
curious, when so much was at stake, and the odds were so 
greatly in his favor, that Caesar should have hesitated to 
assault and capture the bridge. Roman legions during the 
Punic Wars, and at other times, stormed breastworks held 


SPEEDY PURSUIT. 


461 


by large bodies of regular troops; Caesar’s legionaries bad 
before now stormed town walls, and did so later; the defenses 
of the stone bridge could not have been other than the usual 
ditch and rampart. However it may have been, Caesar 
preferred the risk of the ford to attacking the bridge, if 
still standing. The only explanation lies in the probability, 
either that the ford was easier than assumed by the Com¬ 
mentaries, or that the Pompeian generals had left behind, 
out of their Spanish cohorts, a goodly body to hold the bridge 
defenses. In Ilerda, the two cohorts were probably enough 
as a garrison. 

Leaving the weaker soldiers and one legion to guard the 
camp, taking no baggage and stationing horse obliquely 
across, above to break the current and below to catch those 
who might be swept away, the legions were marched down 
to the ford and across the river. Though a number were 
carried off their feet, they were all caught by the horsemen, 
and not a man was lost. 

Caesar ployed his legionaries into three columns, — the 
usual three-line order of battle forward by wings, — and ad¬ 
vanced. The good will of the men was such that they 
speedily gained the rear of the enemy, whose advance had 
been much retarded by the cavalry. “So great was the 
ardor of the soldiers that, notwithstanding the addition of 
a circuit of six miles and a considerable delay in fording the 
river, before the ninth hour of the day — three P. M. — they 
came up with those who had set out at the third watch,” — 
midnight. The cavalry had so cleverly harassed the march 
of Afranius that his column had been unable to advance 
any considerable stretch, — not more than six miles. 

The appearance of Caesar’s legions in his rear constrained 
Afranius to pause in his retreat and to draw up his army 
on a rising ground, probably 1 on the chart. The Com men- 


462 


COMPROMISE OF LEGATES. 


taries give certain hints as to time and distances which have 
helped to locate the operations of the coining days with fair 
accuracy. Caesar also called a halt and gave his men time 
to rest and refresh themselves, for they had marched more 
than twenty miles. He was loath to attack in earnest; but 
whenever Afranius resumed his retreat, Caesar advanced 
again upon him. In this manner both armies, in a sort of 
skirmishing fight, drifted six miles farther to the southwest. 
Both finally camped, Afranius on some hills which enabled 
him to avoid Caesar’s cavalry (2), and Caesar on an adjoining 
height (3). 

The original purpose of Afranius had been to continue his 
route nearly west over the hills to Octogesa; but Caesar’s 
proximity led him to fear the effects of further interference 
by his cavalry. Some five miles to the south was a range 
too rough for the operations of horse; and through it ran a 
defile. If, by a sudden march, he could reach the mouth of 
the defile, he would be safe from pursuit, and could perhaps 
cross the Iberus farther down than Octogesa, or follow up its 
bank to that place. At all events the defile, at less than half 
the distance of Octogesa, was a temporary refuge, and the 
Pompeian clutched at a straw. It was a vacillating thing to 
do, and a useless; for Caesar, by marching straight on Octo¬ 
gesa, could head him off from that place; but any port in a 
storm. 

The position of Afranius and Petreius was highly delicate; 
they had been marching and fending off Caesar’s cavalry some 
sixteen hours. Their men were broken up with fatigue and 
the leaders were equally unsettled. Out of sheer dread of 
the cavalry it was determined not to push for Octogesa by 
the straight road, but to make a dash for the Iberus river by 
way of the defile; and with a view to this manoeuvre they 
reconnoitred the ground. Caesar, always active, did the like. 



DIFFICULT RETREAT. 


463 


Having come to this conclusion, it was the height of folly 
for the Pompeians not to push for the defile, at all hazards, 
before Caesar could seriously attack; but, “fatigued by the 
skirmishes all day and by the labor of their march, they 

4 

deferred it till the following day.” They should have sacri¬ 
ficed part of their army and all their baggage to save the 
rest. Some generals never know when affairs need a desper¬ 
ate remedy. 

After dark it occurred to Afranius that he might steal a 
march on Csesar. The Gallic cavalry, which continued 
scouting all night, discovered from some prisoners whom they 
took at midnight that the enemy was making an effort to 
retire under cover of the darkness. When this fact was 
reported to him, Caesar ordered the signal for packing 
baggage — a certain note on the horns accompanied by a 
shout — to be given in his own camp. Hearing this signal, 
and assuming that Caesar was about to break camp, — lest 
his march should be disturbed by Caesar’s legionaries as well 
as his cavalry, — Afranius decided not to move. A night 
attack with his large train would be apt to be disastrous. 

,Next day (June 26), both generals again reconnoitred the 
country, and Afranius and Petreius held a council of war. 
Some advised to move by night, hoping to escape the more 
easily in the darkness. Others argued that as Caesar’s 
horse was patrolling all night, it would be sure to discover 
them, and that the soldiers in the dark would not fight by 
any means as well as under the eye of their commanders. 
Daylight, said they, raised a strong sense of shame and duty 
in the soldiers which they lost in the darkness. After 
weighing the pros and cons, it was decided to move at day¬ 
light on the succeeding morning, and to risk whatever losses 
they must. This they prepared to do; but it was too late. 

Csesar had divined the change of plan and decided to make 


464 


CESAR’S RUSE. 


an effort to cut the enemy off from the defile. He set out 
considerably earlier, “the moment the sky began to grow 
white,” by a long circuit around the enemy’s right flank, — 
to the east of them, — for the mountains. He could not take 

a 

the main road, for Afranius and Petreius lay across it. He 
resorted to a clever ruse. He ordered his legions to leave 
camp by the west gate in the direction opposite to the defile. 
The movement was perceived by the Pompeians, but it was 
their opinion that Caesar was retiring. So soon as he could 
move his legions under cover, Caesar bore to the east and 
south. The road ahead of him was rough and cut up. “ His 
soldiers were obliged to cross extensive and difficult valleys. 
In several places craggy cliffs interrupted their march, inso¬ 
much that their arms had to be handed to one another, and 
the soldiers were forced to perform a great part of their 
march unarmed, and were lifted up the rocks by each other. 
But not a man murmured at the fatigue, because they im¬ 
agined that there would be a period to all their toils if they 
could cut off the enemy from the Ebro and intercept their 
convoys.” 

The idea that Caesar was retiring emboldened Afranius v 
and Petreius to take their time. “Afranius’ soldiers ran 
in high spirits from their camp to look at us, and in con¬ 
tumelious language upbraided us, ‘that we were forced, for 
want of necessary subsistence, to run away, and return to 
Ilerda. ’ E or our route was different from what we proposed, 
and we appeared to be going a contrary way.” But by and 
by it was perceived that Caesar’s head of column had filed to 
the right, and that his van had passed the line of their camp. 
This at once showed the enemy their error, and urged them 
on to dispatch. If Caesar should cut them off from the 
defile, their game was lost. Afranius detailed a guard for 
the camp, and set out at a rapid pace with the bulk of his 


RACE FOR SAFETY. 


465 


forces, without baggage, for the defile. The enemy’s move¬ 
ments were somewhat hasty and irregular, and Caesar’s 
horse managed seriously to impede their march. “The 
affair was necessarily reduced to this point, with respect to 
Afranius’ men, that if they first gained the mountains, which 
they desired, they would themselves avoid all danger, but 
could not save the baggage of their whole army, nor the 
cohorts which they had left behind in the camps, to which, 
being intercepted by Caesar’s army, by no means could 
assistance be given.” 

As above stated, Afranius and Petreius had decided, 
because the road was more rugged and they thought would 
better preserve them from the stinging pursuit of the Gallic 
horse, to head directly south for the defile of modern Riva- 
roja. Caesar had divined their purpose and had pushed for 
the same point. 

Though the circuit he was compelled to make lay through 
a very broken country, where there were no roads, such was 
the eagerness of his men and the enforced slowness of 
Afranius’ party, that Caesar first reached the point where 
he could hold the mouth of the defile. Here he drew up his 
army athwart Afranius’ path, “in a plain behind large rocks ” 
(5). Afranius was strategically beaten. The men rested, 
elated with their success and more than ever confident of the 
ability of their chief. The horse continued to sweep around 
Afranius’ flanks and rear. It was one of those cases where 
the problem was plain and every man could see success or 
failure. 

Afranius, seeing the miscarriage of his plan, again changed 
his mind, and determined to push for the road he had origi¬ 
nally chosen, due west over the mountains. He sent out four 
cohorts of Spanish foot to take possession of one of the 
eminences (6), which seemed from its position to afford a 


466 


CjESAR manceuvres. 


probable opportunity of holding Caesar in check until he 
could pass in its rear with the main column. But Caesar’s 
horse was on the alert, and smartly attacked these cohorts; 
“nor were they able to withstand the charge of the cavalry 
even for a moment, but were all surrounded and cut to pieces 
in the sight of the two armies.” 

The occasion was now so plainly excellent for an attack in 
force on the enemy, purposeless and held in place by the 
horse, that Caesar’s legates, centurions and tribunes crowded 
round him begging him to engage battle, for the men were 
most eager for it, especially as all could see that the enemy 
was demoralized and pressing in irregular groups around 
their standards as if uncertain what to do. Or if not at the 
moment, battle should be prepared for, as the enemy must 
soon come down from the hill for lack of water. Caesar 
plainly saw that a battle at this moment meant fearful 
slaughter of the enemy, and was not only anxious to spare 
Roman blood, but to keep these legions intact if possible, for 
his own use. He had the utmost faith in his ability to bring 
Afranius and Petreius to a surrender without decimation of 
either his own legions or the Pompeian. This decision 
excited great opposition and discontent among the soldiers, 
many of whom openly declared to each other that if Caesar 
would not fight when he was so advantageously placed, 
perhaps they themselves would not fight when Caesar called 
on them. But Caesar was not the man to change. He paid 
not the least heed to this exhibition of temper, which he knew 
really proceeded from soldierly motives. He had other more 
important things to consider. He allowed the enemy to 
retire to their camp ; and having placed strong outposts on 
all the avenues to the mountains so as to cut off every road 
to the Iberus, he fortified his camps close to Afranius and 
Petreius, the better to observe their movements (7). 


FRIENDLY INTERCHANGE. 


467 


There were but two places to which these officers could 
now retire, Ilerda or Tarraco (Tarragona) on the coast. The 
latter was too far to attempt to reach it. 

Not satisfied with merely observing them, Caesar now 
made an effort to cut the Pompeians off from water, and sent 
out his horse to attack the watering parties, which had to go 
some distance from camp to find reservoirs which were full. 
This new and serious danger obliged Afranius and Petreius 
to put out a line of posts to protect the march of the water¬ 
ing parties, and later determined them to throw up a ram¬ 
part (8) from their camp to the water, a work of some 
magnitude and one necessitating the absence of both the gen¬ 
erals from camp. “Petreius and Afranius divided the task 
between themselves and went in person to some distance 
from their camp for the purpose of seeing it accomplished.” 
“The soldiers, having obtained by their absence a free 
opportunity of conversing with each other,” which they 
eagerly embraced, — for among the soldiers of both armies 
there were naturally many old friends, — it was soon ascer¬ 
tained by the Caesarians that there was grave disaffection in 
the enemy’s camp. Many of the tribunes and centurions 
came over to see Caesar, and the intercourse between the 
camps quickly became universal. The Pompeian soldiers 
openly expressed their regrets that they were not in Caesar’s 
army. The fraternizing even went so far that the legion¬ 
aries deputed some centurions of the first rank to visit Caesar 
and state that they were ready to surrender their generals 
and join Caesar if the latter would spare the lives of Afranius 
and Petreius. They keenly felt that Caesar had spared them 
the day before, when they were so open to attack., “Every 
place was filled with mirth and congratulations; in the one 
army, because they thought they had escaped so impending 
danger; in the other, because they thought they had com- 


468 


PETR El US INTERFERES. 


pleted so important a matter without blows; and Caesar, in 
every man’s judgment, reaped the advantage of his former 
lenity, and his conduct was applauded by all.” 

The Pompeian generals soon heard this news. Afranius 
was disposed not to resist the inclinations of the soldiers, but 
was ready to accept the situation. Petreius, who had been 
at a greater distance, on learning of what was going on, 
either distrustful of Caesar, or from greater native combative¬ 
ness, decided on action, armed his domestics and a few per¬ 
sonal followers, and with the Spanish praetorian cohort and 
a few foreign horse flew to the camp, seized and put to 
death a number of Caesar’s men who were still in his lines, 
and forced the rest to hide or flee. The latter “wrapped 
their left arms in their cloaks, drew their swords and 
defended themselves against the Spaniards and the horse.” 
He then by threats, entreaties and tears brought the legions 
back to a sense of their duty, and having administered an 
oath to Afranius and all the officers,—he himself joining 
in it, — under no circumstances to desert the cause of Pom- 
pey, he obliged them to surrender all Caesarians who could 
be found, many of whom were still within the camp. These 
he put publicly to death in the praetorium. Many, however, 
were kept concealed by the men and allowed to depart at 
night over the ramparts. Caesar was too wise to indulge in 
such slaughter. After searching out all the enemy’s soldiers 
in his own camp, he allowed them to depart unharmed, with 
a friendly word to each. A number of officers concluded to 
remain with him. These he “treated with great respect. 
The centurions he promoted to higher ranks” (a very unus¬ 
ual step), “and conferred on the Roman knights the honor 
of tribunes.” Matters reverted to a war footing; but Caesar 
had certainly gained ground with his enemy’s legions. 

Afranius and Petreius had made a series of blunders. 


RENEWED PURSUIT. 


469 


Their management was extremely weak. Each error bred a 
new one. Csesar’s energy and skill stand out in contrast. 
His constant watchfulness made both foraging and watering 
difficult to the enemy. The Pompeian legionaries had some 
corn, having started with a larger than usual supply; but the 
Spaniards and auxiliaries had none, being unused to carrying 
burdens, and many daily deserted to Caesar. Afranius and 
Petreius finally decided to make an effort to retire to Ilerda, 
— where they had left much victual, — and by the nearest 
road, which led north to the river and thence along the left 
bank. Their old camp there seemed the only harbor of 
refuge. To do this, they set out at daybreak, took their 
march along the high ground, to avoid as much as possible 
Caesar’s cavalry, which harassed their rear as sharply as it 
could. “Not a moment passed in which their rear was not 
engaged with our horse.” Their own cavalry proved to be 
useless, owing to the demoralization bred of the late combats. 
They could not be got to face the Gallic squadrons, and to 
prevent their breaking up had finally to be put in the middle 
of the legions. 

On the march the Pompeian foot would turn at every piece 
of rising ground from which they could cast their darts, and 
engage Csesar’s cavalry to advantage, the cohorts which first 
reached it turning and defending those which followed; but 
at every descent, where the pursuing horse was on higher 
ground, they were obliged to make a violent attack to drive 
it back a distance and enable them to retire at a run to the 
plain and beyond to the next high ground, where they could 
again place themselves on a fighting equality with it. These 
rearguard combats became so dangerous and unsettling to 
the enemy that they were finally driven to halt and camp on 
an eminence, having retired but four miles. Csesar also 
camped (9) and sent out to forage. But the Pompeians had 


470 


THE POMPEIANS CORRALLED. 


only gone into camp as a ruse and had fortified nothing but 
the front line. Caesar fell into the trap and allowed his 
foragers to disperse. The same day at noon, when they saw 
Caesar’s horse was at a distance, the Pompeians endeavored to 
escape; but Caesar, on perceiving their withdrawal, leaving 
a few cohorts to guard the camp and pack the baggage, 
followed them sharply up with his legions in light marching 
order, instructed the foragers to come in at four o’clock, and 
the horse to follow as soon as may be. On the return of the 
troopers they made their way to the front, and again began 
to harass the march of Afranius and Petreius. Caesar kept 
on their heels, incessantly edging in on their left and forcing 
them farther from the Sicoris, whose banks he patrolled with 
his cavalry. By skillful manoeuvring he finally forced them 
to camp at a distance from water, and in a highly disadvan¬ 
tageous place (10). He had completed a good day’s work. 

Caesar did not attack them. He ordered his men to lie on 
their arms instead of camping, and waited for the still better 
chance he could see approaching. But he took measures to 
confine the Pompeians to this place, as well as to protect his 
own legions from sudden assault, by a wall and trench which 
he extended about them on all sides. In the course of a day 
or two, having no fodder, Afranius and Petreius were obliged 
to kill all their baggage cattle. They perhaps contemplated 
making a sudden push for freedom. On the third day, July 
1, at two p. M., they drew out their army in battle front to 
interrupt the completion of Caesar’s works. Caesar did the 
like, but awaited their attack. Neither army seemed willing 
to take the initiative. Caesar did not care to do so; the 
Pompeians dreaded the conflict. They had lost morale since 
the fight at Ilerda. The camps, say the Commentaries, were 
not distant from each other above two thousand feet, — a space 
that gave small room for so many men to manoeuvre or to 


THE POMPEIANS SURRENDER. 


471 


follow up a victory, for each army had five legions. 
Aframus’ five legions were in two lines, and the auxiliary 
cohorts in a third line, in reserve. Caesar had three lines in 
the following formation: “four cohorts out of each of the 
five legions formed the first line; three more from each legion 
followed them as reserves, and three others were behind 
those; the slingers and archers were stationed in the centre 
of the line, and the cavalry closed the flanks.” The battle 
was not engaged; both parties at sunset retired to camp. 
The next day, while Caesar was continuing the construction of 
his works, the Pompeians made a move as if to fray them¬ 
selves a path and cross the Sicoris by a ford near by, — if 
perchance they might reach Ilerda. Caesar headed them off 
with his cavalry, which he ordered to occupy all the fords and 
patrol the river banks on the other side. 

Beset on all sides, having no fodder, water, wood or corn, 
seeing no chance of exit, and lacking resolution to cut their 
way out, Afranius and Petreius asked for a private confer¬ 
ence on July 2. This Caesar refused, but granted the 
Pompeians a public conference to be held in the presence of 
both armies. The latter took place. Afranius spoke humbly 
and asked for easy terms; Caesar spoke in his usual persua¬ 
sive manner, complimenting Afranius and Petreius and their 
legions for avoiding battle to save Roman life, though 
reproaching them for massacring his soldiers in their camp; 
paying a tribute to the high qualities of the troops and 
promising his good offices to all, but yet with a clear hint 
that the terms stated were his ultimatum. He knew full 
well when to be diplomatically generous. As a result of the 
meeting it was agreed that the legions of the enemy should 
be discharged from service and sent back to their homes, and 
that Afranius and Petreius should evacuate Spain and Gaul. 

Csesar might have obliged the legions to join his cause, and 


472 


CAESAR GENEROUS. 


he was anxious to have them do so. But he was too politic 
to use force. He accepted only voluntary enlistments. How 
many of these there were we do not know. He disbanded the 
legions and furnished corn to all. The Spanish troops were 
discharged at once, and the Romans were to be discharged at 
the river Yarus on the confines of Italy. Whatever each man 
had lost, which was found in the possession of Caesar’s troops, 
was returned to him, the soldier having captured it being 
compensated at a just valuation. The Pompeian soldiers 
marched to the Yarus in charge of four of Caisar’s legions, 
under Calenus, two in the van, two as rearguard, and there 
they were disbanded. The four escorting legions were sub¬ 
sequently ordered to join the Italian army against Pompey. 
Thus ended a series of blunders on the part of Afranius and 
Petreius, — by which Pompey not only lost Spain, but his 
oldest and best legions, — and a series of brilliant manoeuvres 
on the part of Caesar. 

Caesar retained the other two legions, giving command of 
them to Cassius, for the purpose of completing the conquest 
of Farther Spain. 

The rapidity of these brilliant campaigns has scarce a par¬ 
allel. Caesar crossed the Rubicon December 17, b. c. 50, 
by the Julian calendar. In two months he victoriously 
traversed the length of the Italian peninsula, and Pompey, 
declining a battle, sailed from Brundisium for Epirus. 
Caesar then moved his army to Massilia and Spain. On 
the 23d of May he reached Ilerda. After a manoeuvring 
campaign of six weeks, Afranius and Petreius surrendered, 
July 2. In a period so short as scarcely to afford more 
time than was needed to make the marches through the coun- 
tries named, he had reduced Italy and neutralized Pompey’s 
forces in Spain. 

Italy had succumbed so soon as Ca 3 sar trod her soil. No 


RESUME . 


473 


one had dared fight for her possession against the conqueror 
of Gaul. While Caesar had turned to Spain, Pompey had 
lifted no hand against him. Caesar had not counted on his 
good fortune in vain; but it was as fitting that fortune 
should attend so able and vigorous a conduct as that it 
should forsake the weakness and lack of enterprise of Pom¬ 
pey. In this instance, Caesar had made good use of the 
smiles of Fortune; he had labored when she was willing to 
lend her aid ; he had avoided her displeasure on the rare 
occasions when her back was turned. 

On the other hand, Pompey’s inactivity lay at the root of 
the forfeiture by his lieutenants in Spain of their seven fine 
legions and the entire peninsula; and of this weakness and 
loss of moral courage Caesar made the utmost use. Pom¬ 
pey’s weakness was reflected upon his lieutenants. His lack 
of initiative was such that one can scarcely hold them to 
blame for not putting to good use Caesar’s really grave dan¬ 
ger after the flood in Ilerda. Like master, like man. 

Caesar’s complete accomplishment of his object by manoeu¬ 
vring instead of fighting is one of the best examples of its 
kind in antiquity. It stands alone as a sample of successful 
avoidance of battle. 

The creation of a ford at the Sicoris has always been con¬ 
sidered a noteworthy engineering feat. It certainly was 
bold and ingenious. 

The Italian and Ilerda campaigns have few parallels except 
in other campaigns by Csesar himself. 


XXX. 


MASSILIA, GADES, AFRICA. APRIL TO SEPTEMBER, 

49 B. C. 

The siege of Massilia, begun by Caesar, had been pushed by Trebonius while 
his chief was in Spain. The city resisted well, and the garrison made gallant 
sorties, but its fleet, despite reinforcements, was twice beaten by Caesar’s, and 
the siege works gradually compelled an inevitable surrender. After the Ilerda 
campaign Caesar had subdued the rest of Spain as far as Gades, and had then 
returned to Massilia, where he received its surrender and spared it a sack; but 
heavy penalties were imposed. Pompey’s original plan had been to advance on 
Caesar in Gaul from both Italy and Spain ; but Caesar by his speed and ability 
had anticipated him, driven him out of Italy and captured Spain. Pompey was 
still engrossed in raising additional forces in Greece. Caesar’s luck for once 
failed him. He sent Curio to reduce Sicily and Africa. In Sicily Curio suc¬ 
ceeded in restoring to Rome its usual and necessary grain traffic; in Africa 
he was defeated by the Pompeians and his army destroyed. This enabled the 
aristocrats to make their holding in Africa secure. Caesar’s means of reaching 
Greece were limited; Pompey controlled the sea. Pompey’s land forces were 
likewise more than double Caesar’s. But the moral force was all on the side of 
Caesar and his legions. He now prepared to attack his enemy in Greece. 

While Caesar was settling matters in northern Spain, 
Trebonius, with his three legions, had been active in collect¬ 
ing material and building ships for besieging Massilia. 

Massilia was founded 600 years b. c., by Phocean 
refugees, and had grown, owing to its unusual position and 
advantages, to great prosperity. It had spread Greek civil¬ 
ization in southern Gaul, and taught the barbarians agricul¬ 
ture, learning and art. It had numerous colonies, and an 
enormous commerce. The port of Massilia was naturally 
excellent; the town was built to the north of it on a point of 
land crowned by three hills. Two ravines, each of which 


TREBONIUS ’ MOUND. 


475 


ran down to the sea, separated the point from the mainland; 
the south of the harbor was covered with factories, arsenals 
and works; the eastern wall was at the edge of the ravines. 
It was solid, and boasted many towers. Several gates pierced 
it; the principal one, near the middle, opened on the Via 
Aurelia, the main road from Gaul to Spain. The town was 



fortified by nature as well as by art, and was difficult of 
approach. The habits of the people were honest and 
simple, and their houses plain; but their public buildings 
and temples were noteworthy. Trebonius established his 
camp opposite the centre of the eastern wall, on modern 
St. Charles hill, which was somewhat higher than any of the 
city hills and looked down on the ravines which served as a 
ditch, — about one third of a mile from the city wall. As 






476 


A NAVAL BATTLE. 


the Massilians commanded the sea, Trebonius could only 
invest the place by land. The point he chose for his main 
attack (a) was just south of the junction of the two ravines 
near the main gate. Deeming one insufficient, Trebonius 
opened a second point of attack (b), which was nearer the 
harbor, four hundred yards from the first one. 

To reach the wall across the ravine at the main point of 
attack Trebonius had been forced to build a mound, which 
in one place was eighty feet high, and sixty feet wide every¬ 
where. There was such abundance of war engines of great 
strength in the town that the ordinary material for making 
vinese was useless. Some of these engines shot iron-tipped 
poles twelve feet long, which penetrated even four rows of 
hurdles and went into the ground some depth. The roofs 
of the vinese had to be constructed of twelve-inch lumber, 
and in their front was a testudo sixty feet long, very stoutly 
made and covered against fire to protect the men who leveled 
the ground in front of the approaches. Under such cover 
alone could the men work with safety. The frequent sallies 
from the town were uniformly beaten back, but owing to 
these and the vastness of the works, progress was slow at 
both points. 

Caesar had remained at Massilia, superintending the 
opening of the siege up to about the 6th of May, when he 
found it necessary to go to Spain. 

Late in the same month there took place the naval battle 
mentioned in the last chapter; and about a month after this 
event, L. Nasidius reached Tauroentum, near Massilia, with 
a fleet of sixteen brass-prowed galleys sent by Pompey. He 
had passed the straits of Sicily without the knowledge of 
Curio, Csesar’s legate there, had put into Messana and 
carried off a ship, and had made his way to the vicinity of 
Massilia. Here he got word to Domitius in the town, 


HAPPY VICTORY. 


477 


advising him to risk another sea-fight against Brutus, in 
which he, Nasidius, would join, and do his share. The 
Massiliots had a large supply of seamen and pilots, — the 
very best of their kind. They had covered some fishing 



smacks with decks and arranged them to carry archers and 
engines; had again repaired their war-galleys and built an 
equal number of other ships. They at once acted on 
Nasidius’ suggestion, and sailed out to join him at one of the 
forts named Taurois. “With a fleet thus appointed, encour¬ 
aged by the entreaties and tears of all the old men, matrons, 
and virgins to succor the state in this hour of distress, they 
went on board with no less spirit and confidence than they 
had fought before.” The Massiliots were to have the right 
of the line, Nasidius the left. It was the 30th of June. 

Brutus, with courage always uppermost, was not loath to 
meet them. He had the ships built by Caesar at Arelas 
(Arles) and six taken from the Massiliots. “Accordingly, 
having encouraged his men to despise a vanquished people, 







478 


A BRICK TOWER. 


whom they had conquered when yet unbroken, he advanced 
against them full of confidence and spirit.” Collected on 
the city walls, all the population of Massilia watched the 
boats which contained the flower of their youth and manhood; 
from Trebonius’ high pitched camp, the Romans were equally 
intent. The combat was not lacking in spirit. The Mas- 
siliots fought with great courage. Brutus’ line was the more 
open, which allowed better manoeuvring on the part of the 
Massiliots. The ships came to close quarters and, grappling 
to each other, boarded and fought with desperation. Brutus’ 
ship was all but run down in the melee, and escaped only by 
a hair’s breadth. But Roman valor again prevailed. The 
ships of Nasidius, proved to be of little use despite his boast¬ 
ing, soon gave up the fight and fled; of the Massilian ships 
five were sunk and four captured, one sailed away with 
Nasidius, and but one got back to the town. Those which 
escaped made for Hither Spain. This happy victory shut 
the port and reduced Massilia to a condition of siege. 

Taught by the frequent sallies from the main gate that 
their wooden siege works were insufficient, the Roman 
legionaries built, on the right side of their terrace, near the 
gate, a thirty-foot square tower of brick or slate, with walls 
five feet thick, instead of one of wood. Soon this grew in 
height to six stories. It had an overhanging roof, and this 
was gradually raised by screws so as to build the walls of the 
tower underneath it higher and higher. The outside was 
protected by heavy rope mats, hanging loose upon the walls. 
These Trebonius found best resisted the missiles. From this 
tower the Caesarians built a musculus to the enemy’s wall. 
This consisted of a roof sixty feet long but not very wide, 
and built of much heavier timbers than usual. It was 
covered with tiles laid in mortar, to save it from fire thrown 
down by the besieged; the tiles were covered with hides, to 


A TRUCE. 


479 


protect them against water which the besieged poured down 
in spouts to dissolve the mortar; and the whole was topped 
by mattresses, to protect it against heavy stones and the iron- 
tipped missiles. This musculus, when completed, was run on 
rollers from the brick tower up to the city wall close to the 
tower selected for breaching, and under cover of the musculus 
the wall began to be undermined. The musculus resisted the 


city 




Works at Massilia. 


heaviest stones; fire barrels rolled off it, and were then 
pushed away by poles from within. From this tower the 
soldiers kept up a fire of darts to protect the musculus. It 
was intended to guard the flank of the terrace from sudden 
sallies from the main gate. As matters eventuated, the 
terrace never was completed. 

It was not long before the wall of the city, undermined at 
more than thirty places, began to topple, despite the fact that 
the citizens had flooded the Roman mines by placing reser¬ 
voirs of water where the mines would tap them; had counter¬ 
mined and had resorted to every known method to arrest the 
approaching crisis. Fearing then the capture and sack of 
the city, the inhabitants crowded to the gates, and begged 




































480 


SUCCESSFUL SALLY. 


the soldiers for a truce till the arrival of Caesar, who, in fact, 
had ordered Trebonius not to suffer the storming of the city, 
lest the infuriated soldiers should, as they had threatened to 
do, put to the sword all the men, which out of policy he 
desired to avoid. It is evident from many such items, — 
and the Commentaries are full of them, — that Caesar had 
not the best of control over his legionaries; and if he himself 
could not hold them in hand, his lieutenants could scarcely 
expect to do so. They were not the old burgess soldiers, 
who obeyed orders because they had, in their intelligent 
patriotism, the true instinct of discipline; they were profes¬ 
sionals, of a far from high grade, who were held down only 
by the strong hand, and often with difficulty, who broke from 
restraint whenever a chance occurred. The truce begged by 
the Massiliots was granted, though the soldiers were hard 
to restrain from plunder and revenge. 

The Massiliots proved treacherous. One day at noon, 
towards the end of July, when there was a high wind, —the 
mistral from the northwest, — and the legionaries were off 
their guard, the inhabitants sallied forth with incendiary 
utensils, and in an instant set all the works of the Romans 
on fire. A short hour consumed the labor of months. Next 
day again the towns-people made a sally, but the Romans 
were prepared for it, gave them due chastisement, and drove 
them back within the walls. 

The soldiers then set to work, with renewed vigor, to make 
good the loss occasioned by the sally. The new agger was 
constructed with brick walls floored with timbers, which 
were shored up at intervals so as to sustain great weight. It 
was much less liable to be set on fire. In a few days the 
Caesarians had replaced what had been destroyed, much to 
the amazement of the citizens, who saw their engines made 
ineffective by the solidity of the Roman works, their soldiers 



VARRO. 


481 

driven off the walls by the Romans from their equally high 
towers, and no safety in any course but surrender. 

Time-serving Varro, in Farther Spain (Andalusia), had 
been wavering in his allegiance to Pompey until he heard 
rumors of Caesar’s troubles before Ilerda and at Massilia, 
when he began to act with more vigor for his chief. Whereas 
he had theretofore deemed it prudent to praise Caesar, he 
now loudly denounced him. He was active in raising money, 



corn and troops, — some of the corn for Ilerda, some for 
Massilia, — and in preparing for war. He added thirty 
auxiliary cohorts to his force of two legions. As the whole 
province was somewhat pronounced for Caesar, Varro pro¬ 
posed to carry on the war from Gades (Cadiz), which lay near 
the coast on an island, and, being a prosperous city with a 
fine harbor, was most suitable as a base. Here he had built 
ten ships, and here, too, he accumulated large materials and 





482 


END OF WAR IN SPAIN. 


stores. He constructed a number of vessels in Ilispalis, on 
the Bsetis. He despoiled the temple of Hercules, carried 
the riches into the city of Gades, and sent six cohorts there 
to guard them under C. Gallonius. He laid heavy taxes on 
the states, and by representing that Caesar was being defeated 
at Ilerda, got from the Roman citizens of the province eigh¬ 
teen millions of sestercii, twenty thousand pounds of silver 
and one hundred and twenty thousand bushels of wheat to 
be used in the war. He persecuted Caesar’s friends and 
confiscated much private property. He made himself many 
enemies and generally blustered about, instead of taking real 
steps to meet Caesar, who was rapidly approaching, though 
with only two legions. 

Caesar, although, after the surrender of Afranius and 
Petreius, he felt called to Italy by the pressure of the war 
and public affairs, yet did not feel as if he ought to leave 
Spain without finishing its subjection. From Ilerda, there¬ 
fore, about July 9, he sent Q. Cassius, the tribune of the 
people, with two legions against Varro, —the four others had 
gone to Italy under Calenus as a guard for the captured 
Pompeian legions,— and, rather than leave the Iberian ques¬ 
tion unsettled, preceded them himself. He relied on his 
knowledge of Pompey’s character, believing that he would 
lie quiet till Spain was finally disposed of. Caesar was lucky 
in his opponent. At the head of an escort of six hundred 
horse he marched to Baetica, and notified all the states to 
send embassies to meet him at Corduba early in August. 

The response was unequivocal. Every town and state 
sent representatives to Corduba, and many towns turned out 
Varro’s cohorts or shut their gates on them. Gades, when 
the citizens had heard of all that had happened, ejected Gal¬ 
lonius, Varro’s lieutenant, and declared for Caesar. When 
this news reached Varro’s camp, even one of his Spanish 




SURRENDER OF MASSILIA. 


483 


legions mutinied in Caesar’s favor and marched to Hispalis. 
Varro withdrew to Italica, but this, too, declared against 
him, and he was reduced to surrender with his other legion. 
He gave up all the military stores, money collected and other 
booty. Caesar thanked the towns and inhabitants for their 
fealty, conferred honors on the principal citizens, remitted 
the taxes Varro had raised, and returned property he had 
taken. Then about August 20 he visited Gades, where he 
restored the moneys taken from the temple of Hercules, 
and left Cassius in command with Varro’s two legions, prom¬ 
ising him two more of new levies. Thence he sailed with 
his two old legions, on the ships Varro had constructed, to 
Tarraco, where he arrived the end of the month, and was 
received with acclamations. Here, also, he conferred honors 
on those who had sustained his cause. From Tarraco he 
marched by land to Massilia, where he received word that, in 
accordance with his own proposition, he had been created 
dictator, under a new law, at the nomination of M. Lepidus. 
From henceforth he was legally acting for the Roman state. 

Massilia had surrendered to Trebonius September 6, 
after a five months’ siege, but Domitius managed to escape 
by sea, and, though pursued, could not be taken. The Mas- 
siliots, greatly against the wishes of the enraged soldiery, 
who desired to sack the town, were spared on account of 
their ancient reputation; but they were disarmed, th^ir 
treasure and fleet taken, and a garrison of two legions left in 
the place. The rest of the troops proceeded to Italy. Caesar 
himself set out for Rome. 

Thus was finally thwarted Pompey’s first general plan of 
advancing on Caesar in his old province of Gaul, from Spain 
and Italy at once. Originally Pompey had intended to 
anticipate Caesar in the offensive. When Caesar’s remark¬ 
able activity resulted in his losing Italy, Pompey had con- 


484 


CURIO IN SPAIN. 


ceived the idea of operating offensively from Macedonia as 
a diversion to aid his lieutenants in Spain, never doubting 
that Caesar would consume a year or more in his operations 
there. But Pompey was never rapid in preparation or 
action; in comparison with his present opponent he was pro¬ 
crastination itself. Before he had fairly begun the organiza¬ 
tion of his new levies in Macedonia, Caesar had finished the 
Spanish campaign and had robbed him of an entire province 
and seven fine legions. Pompey had been permanently 
reduced to a defensive strategic role. He took the offensive 
tactically at Dyrrachium, but he never recovered his stra¬ 
tegic initiative. 

A misfortune now befell Caesar’s arms. His legate Curio, 
after regaining Sicily, had been sent from there into Africa 
early in July, to reclaim that land from Pompey’s cause. 
Curio, a young but able officer, vigorous and enterprising, 
was unwise enough to underrate the army of Attius Yarns, 
the Pompeian legate in Africa, and took with him but two 
out of his four legions and five hundred horse. The legions 
he selected were the ones which had belonged to Pompey, but 
had come over to Caesar at Corfinium, and were not quite 
trustworthy. Curio crossed, landed and marched to Utica, 
where Yarns lay. At the inception of his campaign he acted 
with good judgment, and in a pitched battle with Yarus, near 
Ufica, inflicted upon the latter a bitter defeat with loss of 
six hundred killed and one thousand wounded. The popu¬ 
lation was largely favorable to Csesar, but shortly after the 
defeat of Yarus, king Juba, who was friendly to Pompey and 
a personal enemy of Curio’s, came to Yarus’ assistance with 
an overwhelming force. 

Curio retired to the Cornelian camp (Scipio’s old and 
excellent position of the Second Punic War), and should have 
remained there on the defensive until he had sent for his 


JUBA'S RUSE. 


485 


other legions; for he had supplies, water and timber at hand, 
and everything could come to him by sea. But being 
informed that the reinforcing army was only a small one, 
under command of Sabura, and not Juba’s entire force, and 
elated with his recent successes, Curio was tempted out to 
risk another battle without sufficient reconnoitring. Other¬ 
wise intelligent, he was here lacking in discretion. He 
acted on partial information without testing its accuracy, 



and Rebilus, whom Caesar had given him as “chief of staff,” 
or adviser, did not hold him back. Sabura did, m fact, com¬ 
mand Juba’s vanguard, but Juba was not far behind with his 

whole army. 

So soon as Curio put in an appearance, Sabura feigned 
retreat, but only to lure the Roman into disadvantageous 
ground where the king’s force lay in wait to surround him. 
And this, indeed, took place. Curio followed up Sabura’s 
retreat to a distance of over twenty miles from his camp, in 


486 


POM PETS PLAN FRUSTRATED. 


full confidence of another easy victory. He reached the place 
in careless order, with tired troops and anticipating no 
danger, and fell heedlessly into Juba’s ambuscade. The 
king debouched from cover on all hands and took him 
unawares. His entire army was destroyed. He himself 
refused to fly, and died in the midst of his men (July 24). 
The forces left in the Cornelian camp attempted to escape 
by sea, but, owing to fear and careless loading of the vessels, 
few got away. King Juba put most of them to the sword. 

This disaster, traceable to Curio’s errors of judgment and 
over-eagerness to fight, was a serious blow to Caesar, and 
enabled the Pompeian party to gain enough ground in 
Africa to overawe the entire population .of the continent. 
But Curio had previously taken possession of Sicily, and this 
had relieved the threatened scarcity of corn in Italy. Pom- 
pey’s plan of starving out the peninsula was frustrated. 

Mark Antony had been in command of the army of Italy, 
as propraetor. The ports of Sipus, Brundisium and 
Tarentum had been held by three legions to forestall a 
descent by Pompey’s fleet. M. Crassus was in charge of 
Cisalpine Gaul. Two small fleets lay in the Tyrrhenian and 
Adriatic waters. Caius Antonius was in northern Illyricum, 
on the island of Curicta, with two legions. Dolabella, with 
forty galleys, was in the straits. 

To Pompey’s admirals the situation at Curicta afforded a 
good chance of action. Octavius and Scribonius Libo, with 
a much larger fleet, attacked Dolabella, defeated him, and 
cooped up Antonius on the island. Despite some reinforce¬ 
ments sent from Italy and the aid of the Tyrrhenian fleet, the 
superior numbers and skill of Pompey’s vessels prevented 
any rescue. Antonius’ legions had to be abandoned to their 
fate. The cohorts were finally captured, taken to Macedonia 
and incorporated with the Pompeian army. Octavius 


CJESAR CONSUL. 


487 


continued liis efforts to reduce Illyricum. Issa joined his 
cause; but Caesar’s adherents held Lissus, and at Salonae 
severely defeated Octavius, who retired to Dyrrachium. 

Caesar found no difficulty in causing himself to be elected 
consul the next year, B. c. 48. His associate was Publius 
Servilius. This gave him a power equal to that of dictator 
and one which sounded more satisfactorily in Roman ears. He 
resigned the dictatorship, and after eleven days spent in 
passing some essential laws, celebrating the Feriae Latinae 
and holding all the elections, began preparations to move on 
Pompey. Inasmuch as Pompey controlled the sea, Caesar 
was compelled to look forward to crossing the Adriatic by 
ruse. Pompey, he knew, would not suppose that he was 
about to expose his army to the dangers of a winter passage, 
or to the difficulties of subsisting it in Epirus during this 
season. His opponent would believe him too busy with 
affairs of state, and especially the consulship, to leave Italy so 
soon. For these very reasons, Caesar determined to steal a 
passage of the Adriatic in midwinter. 

Caesar had ordered to Brundisium all his cavalry, several 
thousand in number, and the twelve legions — nine old, three 
new — which he now had under the eagles. Of these, four 
had marched to the Yarns under Calenus, escorting Pompey’s 
disbanded legions; two had gone to Baetica under Cassius; 
three had besieged Massilia under Trebonius. Calenus’ 
legions had become available in mid-August; those of 
Cassius towards the end of August; those of Trebonius a 
month later. All had successively been headed for Brun¬ 
disium, but they had shown signs of discontent and had been 
marching slowly. 

At Placentia occurred the mutiny of the Ninth legion, 
which Caesar suppressed by sharp action added to his own 
personal influence. He ordered the legions decimated; but 


488 


CJESAR AT BRUNDISIUM. 


after a while commuted the punishment to beheading twelve 
of the ringleaders. 

What Caesar’s army numbered, it is impossible to say. 
Two of the new legions no doubt had somewhere near the 
normal complement, which has been stated at some forty- 
eight hundred men. The ten old ones, however, had been 
much depleted, and while no mention is made of recruiting 
them up to normal standard, probably something of the kind 
had been done. If they averaged thirty-three hundred men, 
— as is not improbable,—Caesar’s forces, with light troops 
and cavalry, must still have been under fifty thousand men, 
all told. 

Caesar reached Brundisium the 17th of November. His 
means of transportation were very limited,— twelve galleys 
and about one hundred transports. Barely fifteen thousand 
men and five hundred horse out of his twelve legions and 
ten thousand cavalry could, according to the Commentaries, 
be embarked on what bottoms he had at command. Why 
this was so is not very clear. Nearly a year had elapsed 
since he ordered vessels to be built in the Italian, Sicilian 
and Gallic ports and collected at Brundisium; and Caesar was 
wont to look well to the logistics of the future. Some of 
the ships had been destroyed in Illyricum, but this accounted 
for but a part of the proposed fleet. Hortensius and Dola- 
bella had carried out their orders, and had built and brought 
together a goodly number of vessels; but the disaster at 
Curicta, and the necessity of protecting Sicily and Sardinia, 
had reduced the quota to this limit. 

The size of the seven legions selected by Caesar to be car¬ 
ried over to Epirus — the six old ones of Calenus and 
Cassius and one new one — must have been much smaller 
than the above given estimate. The authorities, as well as 
the Commentaries themselves, are contradictory on this point. 


POMPETS INACTIVITY . 


489 


“Even these troops embarked very short of their number, 
because many had fallen in the wars in Gaul, and the long 
march from Spain had lessened their number very much, and 
a severe autumn in Apulia and the district about Brun- 
disium, after the very wholesome countries of Spain and Gaul, 
had impaired the health of the whole army.” The seven 
legions probably numbered twenty thousand men; and six 
hundred horse went along. 

Pompey had spent a year in inactivity, so far as meeting 
Caesar was concerned. But he had been industrious in gath¬ 
ering a fleet, “from Asia and the Oyelades, from Corcyra, 
Athens, Pontus, Bithynia, Syria, Cilicia, Phoenicia and 
Egypt, and had given directions that a great number should 
be built in every other place. He had exacted a large sum 
of money from Asia, Syria and all the kings, dynasts, 
tertarchs and free states of Achaia; and had obliged the cor¬ 
porations of these provinces, of which he himself had the gov¬ 
ernment, to count down to him a large sum.” He had reached 
Epirus from Italy with five partial legions; he now had nine 
full ones of Roman citizens from Italy or resident in the 
provinces; a veteran one from Cilicia (called Gemella, 
because consolidated out of two others); one from Crete and 
Macedonia, of veterans settled in that province after their 
discharge; two from Asia. “Besides, he had distributed 
among his legions a considerable number, by way of recruits, 
from Thessaly, Boeotia, Achaia and Epirus; with his legions 
he also intermixed the soldiers taken from Caius Antonius, 
at Curicta.” He expected two more legions from Syria, 
making eleven in all. He had a large number of Greek and 
other auxiliary bowmen and slingers,— probably not less 
than six thousand, many of distinguished valor,— two thou¬ 
sand volunteers and seven thousand horse, all chosen men. 
These latter comprised Celts from the Alexandria garrison, 


490 


POMPEY’S ARMY AND FLEET. 


Thracians, Cappadocians, Galatians, Armenians, Numidians 
and mounted archers from Commagene. Some authorities 
figure Pompey’s force as high as ninety thousand men; in 
fact, it was not more than fifty thousand strong. He had 
laid in a vast amount of corn from his various tributary 
provinces, and by holding Dyrrachium, Apollonia and other 
seaports, imagined that he could prevent Caesar from cross¬ 
ing the Adriatic. His fleet was “ stationed along the 
seacoast.” 

Whatever the actual force of each, Pompey certainly 
outnumbered Caesar in*land troops, while at sea he was far 
superior. The number of the vessels he had collected was 
five hundred, of which one hundred were Roman and the rest 
furnished by clients.' Unwilling to trust M. Cato, he had 
placed this fleet under the orders of Marcus Bibulus, who 
with one hundred and ten large ships lay near Corcyra. 
Under him the younger Pompey commanded the Egyptian 
contingent; Dec. Laelius and C. Triarius the Asiatic; C. 
Cassius the Syrian; C. Marcellus and C. Coponius the 
Rhodian; Scribonius Libo and M. Octavius the Liburnian 
and Achaian. It would seem that this enormous fleet, used 
with any kind of energy, must have seriously interfered with 
Caesar’s campaigns in 49 B. c.; have all but starved out 
Italy, and in many ways have manoeuvred to advantage. 
But barring the small operation on the Illyrian coast, it had 
practically accomplished nothing. Under Cato, it would 
have shown a better record. 

At the outset Pompey had lacked nothing with which to 
carry on the war. All that Caesar wanted Pompey had 
possessed. But the energy, never splendid to be sure, still 
such that in former days it had enabled him to triumph 
over all enemies,— such, says Plutarch, as to have made him 
conqueror of three continents,— was now on the wane. From 


POMPEY DRILLS HIS LEGIONS. 


491 


youth up, Pompey had been used to a life of self-indulgence. 
At periods he had been capable of successful exertion, and 
aided largely by what others had done before him, and 
unexampled good fortune, had accomplished much; he had 
no inconsiderable native ability, and had in a measure earned 
the reputation he possessed. But for the past year he had 
seemed incapable of exertion. His moral force appeared 
to have shrunk into nothing before the superior energy and 
character of his wonderful opponent, and as he had refused to 
meet Caesar in the cabinet, so now he seemed unwilling to 
face him in the field. In the case of each man the moral 
qualities stood in inverse ratio to the material. 

Not that Pompey had been absolutely inactive. He had 
kept busy in drilling and disciplining his troops and in 
making his forces compact and pliable. Despite his fifty- 
eight years he had daily taken personal share in the work of 
organization, and had given his own countenance and example 
to his troops in their drill and mancBuvring at the camp at 
Beroea, on the Haliacmon. But this was not war. It was not 
even preparation for war. While Pompey had been review¬ 
ing his legions, Caesar had obtained complete control of Italy 
and had riven Spain from his dominions. Caesar was work¬ 
ing with a perfect army, instinct with a perfect purpose. 
Pompey was creating a perfect outward military body, but 
was doing nothing to breathe that soul into it, without which 
an army is but a well-drilled mob. Caesar had a definite 
object and was working towards it by direct means. Pompey 
was taking his time, in the belief that when Caesar finally 
confronted him, he would be able to demolish him by mere 
weight of mass. He imagined that in this civil war a simple 
defensive would enable him to win. This was a thoroughly 
false conception of the problem. He had as yet not dared to 
encounter Caesar. He put off the fatal day. This of itself 


492 


CAESAR’S GAIN AND LOSS. 


weakened him, as well as his troops and his adherents, more 
and more. 

Caesar on the contrary looked at the matter squarely. He 
no doubt felt, and he certainly so held out to the world, that 
he only drew the sword to right the wrongs of the Roman 
people. And in his course he made no pause, he asked no 
rest, but carried through his intelligently conceived plan with 
consummate skill and untiring energy. He had now secured 
his rear by the subjection of Spain; his base was Italy, with 
Gaul and Spain, and all their resources behind it, and he was 
ready to undertake an active offensive against the army under 
Pompey’s personal command. He felt that he was superior 
to his opponent in all that makes war successful, except 
numbers, and Caesar was not one of those who believed that 
the gods were on the side of the heaviest battalions. His 
faith in his own star was almost blind, and he was willing and 
anxious to risk his own smaller army in a contest with his 
bulky but inactive opponent. 

Since the opening of the civil war, Pompey had made no 
offensive movement; Caesar, on the contrary, had operated 
offensively against Spain, Sardinia, Sicily and Africa. In 
Spain he had been fully successful; Sardinia had been 
recovered; in Sicily Curio had succeeded to the extent of 
effecting a relief in the threatened famine in Italy; in Africa 
he had failed. Pompey had been checked in all his plans, 
save only in the success of his ally, Juba, in Africa, and the 
capture of Antonius’ legions in Illyricum. So deliberate had 
he been in his preparations, that, despite the Spanish inter¬ 
lude, Ciesar was still able to take the offensive against him 
in Greece. These facts are a fair measure of the men. 



XXXI. 


EPIRUS. NOVEMBER, 49, TO FEBRUARY, 48 B. C. 

C.32SAR had transports enough for hut seven small legions and six hundred 
horse. He set sail, reached Epirus in safety, and landed at an uninhabited 
roadstead. He ran grave risk in thus moving against Pompey with so small a 
force. He would have done better to march with his entire army by way of 
Illyricum, his own province. On reaching Epirus, Csesar renewed his offers 
of peace to Pompey, but was again refused. He then made a bold demonstration 
on Dyrrachium, but Pompey returned to this valuable port in season to save it. 
There was some manoeuvring between the rival armies, but nothing defini¬ 
tive. Caesar had brought over but half his army; the other half was still in 
Brundisium, watched by Pompey’s fleet. Only after many weeks could Mark 
Antony venture to sea. When finally he reached the Epirotic coast he found 
himself on the north of Pompey’s army, as Caesar was on its south ; but by 
clever marching on their side and want of energy on Pompey’s the Caesarians 
joined hands. Caesar then made some detachments of troops to various prov¬ 
inces of Greece to secure corn and allies. By a bold manoeuvre shortly after, 
he cut Pompey off from Dyrrachium, and though he could not capture the 
town, he established himself south and east of the city, between it and Pompey. 

“When Caesar came to Brundisium he made a speech to 
the soldiers: ‘ That since they were now almost arrived at the 
termination of their toils and dangers, they should patiently 
submit to leave their slaves and baggage in Italy, and to 
embark without luggage, that a greater number of men might 
be put on board; that they might expect everything from 
victory and his liberality. ’ They cried out with one voice, 
‘he might give what orders he pleased, that they would cheer¬ 
fully fulfill them. ’ ” Caesar’s small force was largely veteran, 
tried in the campaigns of Gaul and Spain, hardened by 
work and accustomed to victory. They believed absolutely 
in their chief and blindly followed and obeyed him. Caesar 


494 


CHANCES DELIBERATELY TAKEN. 


could rely on them as on himself. There had been some 
symptoms of dissatisfaction in the legions, specially exempli¬ 
fied by the mutiny of the Ninth at Placentia, on its way to 
Brundisium. But Caesar had put this down by his superior 
moral weight. So far as field work was concerned, the 
legions left nothing to be desired. Those which had lately 
mutinied were anxious to rehabilitate themselves. 

On the 28th of November, 49 b. C., Caesar, after waiting 
many days for a north wind, set sail with his seven legions 
and six hundred horse, but without baggage, on some one 
hundred transports convoyed by twelve galleys, only four of 
which had decks. After a lucky passage towards the south¬ 
east the army landed next day on the Epirotic coast north of 
Coreyra, at a place known as Palaeste (Paljassa), in an unin¬ 
habited roadway. He had run considerable risk, but had 
succeeded in avoiding an encounter with any part of Pom- 
pey’s fleet. 

Caesar had no doubt carefully studied his chances of 
encountering storms and enemy, and had deliberately taken 
them. But his thus risking his entire cause, by shipping half 
his army to encounter Pompey’s threefold forces on the 
latter’s territory, savors more of foolhardiness than the well- 
pondered courage of the great captain. It again suggests 
itself, that to march his entire army through Illyria, and thus 
base on his ancient province, was preferable to shipping half 
of it by sea, with a base to create, the chance of capture of 
his first convoy, and the serious question as to whether the 
second would ever reach him. Illyria had, to be sure, no 
great resources; but Caesar’s line of communications would 
have been free from danger. 

Still Caesar’s venture succeeded, so far as the first convoy 
went. Such of Pompey’s ships as were near at hand — one 
hundred and ten at Corcyra, thirty-six at Oricum — had not 


CROSSING TO EPIRUS. 


495 


known of the sailing. Tliey had kept to the eastern coast of 
the Adriatic and had not sought to discover Caesar’s move¬ 
ments. They imagined that he was wintering at Brundisium. 
There was not even a squad of men at any point along the 
coast, except in the harbors and towns. This argues as much 
carelessness on the part of Bibulus as Pompey had exhibited 
listlessness. But it was well in keeping with all which had 
so far been done, or failed to be done, by all the Pompeian 
generals. Pompey was confident that Caesar would not seek 
to open the campaign before spring. When, therefore, his 
army had been collected, drilled and organized so as to be 
fit for service, he leisurely broke up his camp of instruction 
at Beroea and began to move his legions by the Via Egnatia 
to the Adriatic, where he proposed to put them in winter- 
quarters, in Dyrrachium, Apollonia and other coast towns, 
while Caesar was still at Brundisium. He relied so absolutely 
on the strength of his numbers that, even if he expected it, 
which is doubtful, he seemed to care little whether or not 
Caesar advanced against him. He imagined that a single 
overwhelming victory — which he never doubted he should 
win — would recover for him all the power, all the influence 
which for months he had been losing. As Caesar alleges, 
his arrival was unexpected; no preparation had been made 
to receive him. 

No sooner had he landed than Caesar sent back his ships 
under Calenus for the rest of his legions. But though for 
greater security they sailed by night, his fortune no longer 
attended them; the vessels were delayed by adverse winds, 
and some thirty, which were driven back, were caught and 
barbarously burned by Bibulus,— who was watching at Cor- 
cyra,— with all the crews on board. The Pompeian admiral 
hoped “by the severity of the punishment to deter the rest.” 
He also hoped thus to atone for his lack of care in permit- 


496 


POMPEY STARTLED. 


ting Caesar’s fleet to pass him with half the army. Now 
that Caesar had effected a landing, it occurred to Bibulus that 
he had better close the ports of Illyricum and Epirus and 
watch the coast,— which he did, from Salonae to Orieum. It 
had not been lack of courage on his part, but the fact that 
no one expected Caesar at this season; for now, “having 
disposed his guard with great care, he lay on board himself 
in the depth of winter, declining no fatigue or duty, and not 
waiting for reinforcements, in hopes that he might come 
within Caesar’s reach.” 

Pompey had posted his fleet on the coast of Epirus as a 
curtain behind which to organize and assemble his army. 
The latter had been strung out from the Haliacmon to Thes- 
salonica, with two legions still in Syria, recently raised by 
Metellus Scipio. To his headquarters not only came his 
levies, but his friends and his defeated generals,— Domitius 
from Massilia, Cato from Sicily, numberless refugees from 
Pome, men of means and standing. A senate of two hun¬ 
dred members began its sessions at Thessalonica. All this 
by no means strengthened Pompey’s army. Unlike Alex¬ 
ander, he could not control a court and camp in one body. 
Nor did his presence near Pella, the ancient capital of Mace- 
don, infuse into his conduct aught of the glowing energy of 
Philip or his splendid son. 

Having reached Epirus, where he must absolutely and at 
once either make terms with Pompey or fight him, Caesar 
again sent proposals to his opponent to treat for peace and 
a disbandment of all forces, agreeing to leave the questions 
between them to the decision of the Senate and people. He 
certainly showed every appearance of honestly desiring an 
accommodation; and as, indeed, the chances were by no 
means in his favor, he may have been sincere. The bearer 
of these proposals was Pompey’s legate, Vibullius Pufus, 


CJESAR MAKES ADVANCES 


497 


whom Caesar had captured, for the second time, in Spain, 
and had freely forgiven. Yibullius found Pompey in distant 
Macedonia and gave him the proposals, which, however, met 


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Epirus and Macedonia. 


with the same fate as previous ones. Pompey had but just 
received the first news of Caesar’s landing. Already on the 
march, so soon as he heard of Caesar’s advance, he hurried 
to the coast towards Apollonia. He had until now been so 



498 


CJZSAR PUSHES ON. 


slow that Caesar, despite the Spanish campaign and the siege 
of Massilia, could still take the offensive. Startled out of 
his security, not only by Caesar’s landing but by his activity, 
Pompey now conceived the fear that Caesar might get posses¬ 
sion of the whole seaboard, and was spurred on to unusual 
exertions. 

Caesar had, the same day he landed, November 29, 
marched over the difficult mountain paths from Palaeste, on 
Oricum, which, after some show of resistance by Pompey’s 
lieutenant, L. Torquatus, the citizens surrendered to him; 
following which the garrison did the like with the citadel. 
The fleet there stationed escaped to Corcyra. Thence, not¬ 
withstanding the fatigues of the previous night’s march, 
Caesar pushed on to Apollonia, a rich town on a branch of 
the Via Egnatia, leaving his new legion under Acilius and 
Marcus in Oricum. He reached Apollonia next day. 
Straberius, the governor, tried to hold the place for Pompey, 
watching the citadel and striving to control the citizens. 
But Apollonia likewise gave Caesar admittance, refusing to 
do otherwise than as the Roman people and Senate had done 
in electing Caesar consul. Straberius fled. Caesar headed, 
December 2, for Dyrrachium. Many distant and more 
neighboring states and towns, among them Bullis, Amantia 
and substantially all Epirus, followed suit. 

Pompey, meanwhile, thoroughly frightened at the unex¬ 
pected turn given to matters by Caesar’s arrival, forged 
ahead by stout marching, day and night, for Apollonia and 
Dyrrachium. Plis speed tired, as his evident nervousness 
demoralized, his men. They were not campaign - seasoned, 
like the Gallic veterans; they had received but the super¬ 
ficial training of the drill-ground. It is said that the fear 
of Caesar was such in Pompey’s army that many Epirotic 
soldiers threw down their arms and deserted so soon as they 


DYRRA CHIUM NEARLY LOST . 


499 


learned of his arrival. So strong was this sentiment that 
Labienus, Caesar’s old lieutenant and now Pompey’s right- 
hand man, was obliged, when they reached Dyrrachium, 
December 3, to subject the men to a new oath not to desert 
Pornpey whatever might happen. 

Though Pornpey hastened his march with the utmost 
endeavor, he barely reached Dyrrachium in time to save it 
from capture. His head of column just anticipated Csesar, 
who was already on the road towards this to him essential 
city. Pornpey went into an intrenched camp south of 
Dyrrachium, and, learning that his opponent had secured 
possession of the town, Caesar, no doubt disappointed, but 
scarcely expecting uninterrupted success, and in any event 
too weak to attack his adversary, moved backward and 
camped in the territory of Apollonia, on the south side of 
the river Apsus. Pornpey, so soon as his army had recovered 
its tone, thinking to defend the line of this river and thus 
hold the Dyrrachium territory intact, shortly came and 
camped opposite Caesar and began to call in all his troops 
to this place. He made his cohorts comfortable, intending, 
if necessary, to winter here. Each army thus lay somewhat 
back from the river, facing the other across the Apsus. 
Caesar was waiting for his other legions. He protected by 
his position his new allies in the country south of where he 
lay. He was midway between the two harbors of Dyrra¬ 
chium and Oricum, where alone Pompey’s fleet, his chief 
danger, could find suitable anchorage. 

Pornpey had won the rank of a great soldier without the 
herculean labors usually incident thereto; and at this period, 
age or luxury had robbed him of whatever moral energy he 
had once boasted. He had never possessed the mental 
activity of Napoleon, but like the latter at Waterloo he had 
lost his old-time bodily activity. Nothing demonstrates the 


500 


CALENUS TRIES TO SAIL: 


weakness of his present condition more than the fact that 
he remained in this position in front of Caesar two whole 
months, vastly Caesar’s superior in numbers, and without 
taking any step to attack him. A bold offensive at this 
moment might well have been fatal to Caesar. He had but 
half Pompey’s forces. The rest were still at Brundisium, 
and might indefinitely be kept there by weather and Pom¬ 
pey’s fleet; for the latter was well equipped and by good 
management ought to control the Adriatic. Now was the 
time, if ever, for Pompey to crush his adversary. A lucky 
circumstance might any day enable Calenus to bring over 
Caesar’s other legions. Nor were opportunities wanting. 
Holding as he did the entire coast, Pompey by a simple for¬ 
ward movement of his right, with reasonable precautions, 
could scarcely have failed to force Caesar into the interior of 
Epirus, thus dividing his forces beyond a chance of junction, 
and putting his enemy, if it could be done at all, at his 
mercy. Moreover, Caesar was placed where victualing his 
army was already a serious task and might be made all but 
impossible. For he had no fleet. 

Calenus, in the port of Brundisium, having been joined 
by the Massilia legions, had already put the cohorts and 
cavalry on board the vessels which had returned from Epirus 
and had actually set sail, when he received notice from Caesar 
to exercise the greatest caution, as Bibulus commanded the 
entire coast and was awake to everything that went on. Thus 
admonished, Calenus recalled the fleet and disembarked, 
rather than run the risk of capture. It was as well that lie 
did. Bibulus had left Corcyra and come to Oricum, keenly 
on the watch for him, and seizing one ship which, on start¬ 
ing, had strayed from the rest and been driven out to sea, 
put the entire crew to death. 

In this position in the roadway at Oricum, while Bibulus 


DEATH OF BIB ULUS. 


501 


kept Caesar from the sea, so likewise Caesar’s lieutenants 
kept Bibulus from the land, and cut him off from wood and 
water, reducing him to great straits. All his supplies and 
even water had to he brought from Corcyra. On one occa¬ 
sion his men were reduced to the dew which they could col¬ 
lect on wool-hides laid upon the decks. Though Bibulus’ 
men bore their deprivations with fortitude, these hardships 
were the occasion of a stratagem, taking the form of a 
request by Bibulus for a truce and conference with Caesar. 
Caesar had gone with a legion to Buthrotum, opposite Cor¬ 
cyra, to forage and gain allies. But he personally returned 
on hearing from Acilius and Marcus that Bibulus had asked 

for a truce. The conference was granted, as Caesar had 

• 

always been anxious to come to terms with Pompey, but the 
truce was refused. Caesar saw through the ruse,— that the 
Pompeian admiral only sought to revictual and water his 
vessels. Bibulus did not come to the conference, but sent 
Libo in his stead. This officer, however, offered to bear 
Caesar’s message to Pompey, and renewed the request for a 
truce meanwhile. This Caesar naturally declined, as he saw 
that he was harassing the fleet more than the fleet was annoy¬ 
ing him, and could not afford to give it the opportunity it 
was seeking. 

About this time Bibulus died from the exposures of a 
command he would not desert, and the several fleets were 
permitted by Pompey to remain under their respective com¬ 
manders without any one head. This was fortunate for 
Caesar, as Pompey’s naval management thus lacked unity of 
action, which was worse than even a half-competent leader. 

Caesar’s latest messages to Pompey evoked, it is said, no 
other reply than that “even life or Rome were not worth 
holding by the grace of Caesar.” Still he persevered in 
efforts to bring about a conference. The Apsus — which is 


502 


A CONFERENCE INTERRUPTED . 


a narrow river — alone lay between the camps. There was 
a general understanding among the soldiers that no darts 
should be hurled across, or arrows shot, whenever either party 
approached the banks, and they freely conversed at frequent 
intervals, assembling in groups on the river shore. This sus¬ 
pension of hostilities was similar to what occurred on the 
Peninsula, at Petersburg, and other places during our civil 
war. It is not an unusual species of truce, which has always 
obtained between armies in immediate contact, especially if 
speaking the same language. To this meeting-place Caesar, 
who was still sincerely anxious for a personal interview, and 
who no doubt felt his superiority over Pompey in council as 
well as in war, sent P. Yatinius to solicit, by a publicly pro¬ 
claimed request, “ the right — granted even to fugitives from 
justice and to robbers — for Roman citizens to send deputies 
to Roman citizens to treat for peace.” Thus a conference 
was arranged between Yatinius and Aulus Yarro; but when 
this was being held, and Labienus, who was present, was 
conversing with Yatinius, it was interrupted by a shower of 
darts from the Pompeian side, by which many, including 
three centurions, were wounded. Labienus is said to have 
exclaimed, “There can be no thought of peace unless we 
carryback with us Ctesar’s head!” — apparently seeing in 
the temper of some of the troops the impossibility of a set¬ 
tlement. Thus again were Caesar’s pacific intentions 
defeated and the heated feelings of Pompey’s chief adher¬ 
ents demonstrated. These are the statements of the Com¬ 
mentaries. There is no special reason for doubting them, 
and they are lent color by other authorities. Caesar was 
always careful to keep the appearance of right and reason on 
his side, and even if he did not desire the peace he asked, 
he would have been likely, knowing that Pompey would 
decline all his advances, to continue to make them. 


ACTIVE ANTONY . 


503 


Libo, after Bibulus’ death, sailed over from Oricum to 
Brundisium about the middle of January, and blockaded that 
port, which was the only exit to sea for Caesar’s forces still 
in Italy. He occupied the small island at its mouth. 
Arriving suddenly, he caught and fired some of Caesar’s trans¬ 
ports and carried off one laden with corn. Landing, he 
drove in a party of Antony’s men; whereupon he boastingly 
wrote that Pompey might haul up for repairs the rest of 
his fleet, for he could with his own force, unaided, keep 
Caesar’s reinforcements from joining him. 

Antony was at the time in the town. To oppose Libo, he 
patrolled the shores and prevented his watering. And in 
order to come to a combat with him, which he could not well 
do at sea, he covered with pent-houses a number of the long 
boats belonging to war-galleys, armed them with veterans, 
and hid them along the harbor shores. Then sending two 
three-banked galleys out to the mouth of the port to manoeu¬ 
vre, he induced Libo to put five four-banked galleys out to 
intercept them. Antony’s galleys retired within the harbor, 
as if flying, and induced Libo’s to follow. So soon as they 
came within the harbor, the long boats advanced, inclosed 
the galleys of the enemy, attacked them, captured one and 
drove the others away. Libo, seeing that he was unable to 
accomplish anything by lying off the place, and starved for 
water, which Antony prevented his getting by stationing 
cavalry posts along the coast, finally gave over the blockade. 

Caesar was becoming anxious about his other legions. He 
had waited nearly three months for them, winter was coming 
to an end, and he felt that he must run some risk in order to 
get them. He was, in fact, almost without news of their 
condition and that of Italy; for he had few ships he could 
use as couriers. He wrote to his lieutenants at Brundisium 
that the troops must be sent at all hazards by the first fair 


504 


CuESAREM VEHIS! 


wind, even if some vessels were lost. “I need soldiers, not 
vessels,” lie wrote. Indeed, he attempted himself to go 
across on a small twelve-oared boat. It was on this occasion 
that he is said to have exclaimed to the boatman, who feared 
to put to sea owing to high running water, “What dreadest 
thou? Thou earnest Caesar and his fortunes !” But he was 
unable, for all that, to cross. The voyage was too danger¬ 
ous, beset by the perils of the sea and the enemy alike. 

Antony, Calenus, and especially the rank and file, were all 
as fretful to join their chief as Caesar was to have them do so. 
The old soldiers could hardly be held in hand, so anxious 
were they to be beside their general. On the blowing of 
the first south wind, —February 15, —they weighed anchor 
and set sail at nightfall. They were carried past Apollonia 
and Dyrrachium, were seen by the enemy, and, being caught 
in a lull of wind, were chased by his fleet, under Q. Co- 
ponius, who emerged from the latter place. Just as these 
war-vessels had all but reached Caesar’s transports, the south 
wind again sprang up and enabled them to make Nymphaeum, 
above Lissus. This port, with the sailing vessels of that day, 
could be entered by a south but not a southwest wind, and 
after Antony’s transports had made the roadway, Caesar’s 
luck came in, the wind veered to southwest and not only pre¬ 
vented the enemy from entering, but drove a part of their 
fleet upon the rocks and lost them sixteen out of twenty 
ships and many men. Caesar liberated those who were 
captured. Only one of Caesar’s vessels was taken by the 
enemy, and though the crew of two hundred and twenty 
recruits, unsuspicious of the enemy’s treachery, surrendered on 
promise of being spared, they were every one put to death. 
One other ship went ashore, but the veteran legionaries 
aboard of her declined terms and happily made their way to 
shore and joined the army. 


ANTONY THREATENED. 


505 


On landing, the near-by town of Lissus, which Caesar had 
fortified while Illyria was one of his provinces, received 
Antony and his men and gave them all assistance. Otacil- 
ius, Pompey’s lieutenant, took to flight. From here Antony 
notified Caesar of his safe arrival by native couriers. He had 
brought the three veteran Massilia legions and one new one, 
the Twenty-seventh, about eight hundred horse, and some 
convalescents belonging to the legions already in Epirus, — 
something under twenty thousand men. The ships were sent 
back to Italy for the rest of Caesar’s army, save thirty trans¬ 
ports, kept on the chance of their being needed. 

Caesar and Pompey received the news of Antony’s landing 
about the same time, —perhaps February 18. The ships had 
been sighted from both Apollonia and Dyrrachium, but had 
then been lost to view. The immediate duty of each leader 
was clear. Caesar instantly but openly broke camp February 
19, and set out to join Antony, who was at least four days’ 
march away; Pompey had secretly marched the night before, 
via Dyrrachium, on Tirana, to cut him off from moving 
towards Caesar and if possible fall on him from ambush. 
Pompey had the easier task. He could hold the line of the 
Apsus against Caesar, as well as move directly upon the new¬ 
comers. Caesar was obliged to go some distance up the 
Apsus to find a ford and perhaps to force a crossing. 

Pompey was not rapid in his march, but nevertheless 
reached the vicinity of Antony one day the sooner,—Feb¬ 
ruary 21, —and camped in ambush near the road to which 
Antony was limited in marching toward Caesar, hoping to 
catch him unawares. He camped without fires and kept his 
men close in hiding. News of this proceeding luckily 
reached Antony through friendly Greeks. He remained in 
camp, where he was entirely safe, and sent word of his 
whereabouts to Caesar. This chief, meanwhile, had passed 


506 POMPEY DECAMPS. 

the Apsus, twenty miles above his camp, reached Scampa, 
and on the 22d was reconnoitring to ascertain his lieutenant’s 
location. Here he was found by Antony’s messengers. On 



Pompey had no idea of being caught between the two armies, 
and decamped, lest he should be forced into immediate battle. 
That Pompey should have allowed this junction to be made is 
as much a reproach to him as a credit to Caesar. But it was 








POMPEY'S MISCONCEPTIONS. 


507 


of a part with his phlegmatic character. The ability or 
rather the nerve of the two men is well shown in this, as in 
other minor operations. Pompey’s every step was marked 
by hesitating, not to say timorous, conduct; Caesar’s every 
step by good fortune, to be sure, but good fortune well 
utilized. All the luck in the world could not have helped 
Pompey accomplish his ends when he would not put his hand 
to the work to be done, under even the most favorable condi¬ 
tions. 

Up to this moment, Pompey had been acting on a miscon¬ 
ception of what was the proper plan of campaign. He had 
deemed it wise to seek to confine Caesar to a given territory 
by his largely superior cavalry, and thus starve him out, —a 
very questionable possibility; whereas when he had outnum¬ 
bered him three to one, his manifest duty was to attack 
him. If Pompey had hitherto avoided battle, now that 
Caesar had been reinforced, he had a double reason for so 
doing. Though it is clear that Pompey showed distinct lack 
of enterprise during this period of his great superiority, his 
plan of starving out Caesar may have been a good one after 
the latter’s junction with Antony. 

During this time, Scipio, Pompey’s lieutenant in Syria, 
had, on Caesar’s crossing to Epirus, been ordered by Pompey 
to return to Macedonia and join him there. He apparently 
did not feel strong enough to cope with Caesar single-handed, 
however much he might outnumber him. 

Caesar held his army well in hand. He had joined Antony 
and had drawn in most of his garrisons. He had a total of 
thirty-five thousand men, and circumstances, if not forces, 
were in his favor. He was entirely ready to come to a 
decisive struggle with Pompey. Thessaly and ^Etolia had 
sent ambassadors to him, agreeing to support his cause if he 
would send them troops. Though he could ill afford to make 


508 


CAESAR'S FORCES. 


details from liis meagre force, Caesar answered these appeals 
by dispatching a young legion, the Twenty-seventh, and two 
hundred horse to Thessaly, under L. Cassius Longinus, and 
five cohorts from Oricum and some cavalry into HCtolia, 
under C. Calvisius Sabinus. Each of these lieutenants had 
instructions, in addition to protecting and gaining the friendly 
cooperation of the several provinces, to adopt measures to 
provide Caesar with corn. Into Macedonia by the Egnatian 
highway he sent the Eleventh and Twelfth legions and five 
hundred horse, under Domitius Calvinus, to head off the corps 
of Scipio, which would soon approach from Thessalonica. 

When these detachments were all made, Caesar had but 
seven legions,—the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth, —say twenty-two thousand men, 
but his situation was vastly improved. He undertook to try 
conclusions with Pompey and determined to hold him on the 
seacoast near Dyrracliium, and thus cut him off from Greece. 
It was Caesar, though far weaker, who began to force the 
fighting. He saw through Pompey’s intentions, and, like a 
bold player, met his adversary, though with but half his 
strength, on his own ground. 

Calvisius was well received in iEtolia, “dislodged the 
enemy from Calydon and Naupactus, and made himself 
master of the whole country.” Cassius found two factions 
in Thessaly, — Hegasaretus in power and favoring Pompey, 
Petreius favoring Caesar. This made his work more difficult. 

While Domitius was marching on Macedonia from the 
west, Scipio was moving on the same province from the east. 
When the latter came within twenty miles of Domitius’ 
army, instead of manoeuvring against it he suddenly filed off 
southerly towards Longinus in Thessaly, hoping to catch this 
general napping, and to interfere with his reduction of the 
country. In order to do this the better, he started in light 


THE LIEUTENANTS CROSS SWORDS. 


509 


marching order, having left his baggage with eight cohorts, 
under M. Favonius, south of the Haliacmon, ordering him to 
strongly fortify himself there. He sent Cotus’ cavalry ahead, 
to fall on Longings’ camp. 

Longinus, whose force was fresh and weak, at once retired 
towards the foothills, intending to cross to Ambracia, and 
was vigorously followed up by Scipio’s cavalry. Domitius, 
however, was expert enough to make an immediate demon¬ 
stration against Favonius. The rumor of this danger obliged 
Scipio to return to his lieutenant and baggage-camp, which 
he only reached in season to head off Domitius, whose van 
was already in sight. “The dust raised by Domitius’ army 
and Scipio’s advance-guard were observed at the same in¬ 
stant.” Domitius was still north of the river. Scipio shortly 
crossed by a ford above him and camped. 

There was a plain six miles wide between the camps. 
Scipio drew up in front of his camp. Domitius advanced 
towards him and invited battle. After some skirmishing and 
an advance and show of battle, Scipio, though he had crossed 
the Haliacmon to close with his enemy, concluded it to be 
best to decline the engagement with Domitius’ legions, which 
were very eager for the fray, and to retire across the river 
to his first camp. In two cavalry combats which supervened 
in their mutual reconnoitring, Scipio was worsted. Each 
officer endeavored to lure the other into some stratagem, but 
neither succeeded. Domitius apparently had the best of the 
interchanges. Both remained in situ. 

Caesar, wishing to concentrate, left but three cohorts at 
Oricum, under Acilius, to protect the shipping which was 
in the bay, and drew in the rest of his garrisons to the main 
army. Acilius blocked up the harbor by sinking a mer¬ 
chantman in the mouth and anchoring a war-vessel near by. 
But he was not fortunate. Pompey’s son, Cnaeus, whom 


510 


POMPEY AVOIDS CONFLICT . 


we shall later meet in Spain, and who commanded the Egyp¬ 
tian contingent, anxious to distinguish himself, sailed for 
the place, captured the man-of-war, raised the sunken ship, 
and made his way into the harbor. He$e he burned the 
main part of Caesar’s fleet, and leaving Decimus Laelius to 
blockade the port and hinder the entering of corn, he sailed 
to Nymphaeum and up the river to Lissus, where he also 
burned the thirty transports Antony had kept there. These 
losses were highly disadvantageous to Caesar, for they took 
all the vessels he had on the east of the Adriatic. In land¬ 
ing at Lissus, young Pompey had, however, less fortune, 
being foiled in his effort to capture the place. But it would 
appear that Cnaeus possessed the spirit of enterprise, which at 
this time seemed to have deserted his father. 

After the failure of his ambuscade at Tirana, Pompey had 
retired on Dyrrachium. In pursuance of his plan of avoid¬ 
ing armed conflict, he then determined to defend the line of 
the Genusus, just south of Dyrrachium, and moved to 
Asparagium, a town whose location is variously stated, but 
which, to accord with the operations detailed in the Commen¬ 
taries, must have lain some ten miles up from the mouth of 
that river and on the south bank. After joining Antony, 
Caesar had returned to Scampa, had conducted a raid up 
the Genusus, for the sake of capturing the capital of the 
Parthenians (a place which cannot be identified at this day) 
with its Pompeian garrison, and had then followed Pompey 
to Asparagium. In three days’ march he reached a position 
opposite Pompey and camped. Next day he moved out of 
camp, drew up in order and offered battle. Pompey declined 
to accept Caesar’s challenge, emerging, to be sure, from camp, 
but remaining on his heights, where he could not be attacked 
without much danger. 

Caesar, never at a loss for a plan, and determined to leave 


A QUICK MARCH. 


511 


Pompey no rest, conceived and executed one of those bold 
operations which show the head and hand of the master. He 
determined to cut Pompey off from Dyrrachium. By a long 
and secret circuit over a rugged road, he set out, March 3, 
to move about Pompey’s flank straight on his base of sup¬ 
plies. His route lay over a difficult wooded country, proba¬ 
bly with but the barest roads, up the Genusus to Clodiana 
(modern Pelium), and across the mountains which separated 
the Genusus from the modern Arzen, whose mouth is north 
of Dyrrachium, thence down the latter river. From river 



to river he must ascend and descend the affluents of either, 
by a circuit of some forty-five miles, which distance, with 
the route so badly cut up, could not be made at a greater rate 
than two miles an hour, if that. At the same time, speed 
was imperative. Success depended on Caesar’s keeping 
Pompey in ignorance of his intentions during a whole day, 




512 


POMPEY HEADED OFF. 


and on his making the march in not much over twenty-four 
hours; for Pompey’s road to Dyrrachium was straight and 
easy and less than twenty-five miles long. 

Pompey had no idea that Caesar was heading for his com¬ 
munications; he thought he was moving camp for lack of 
corn. When, by his cavalry scouts reporting Caesar’s direc¬ 
tion, he awoke to the fact, though he was on a shorter line, 
which he at once took, it was too late. Caesar, by vigorous 
efforts and by stopping but for a short rest at night, reached 



the Arzen, followed it down to where it turns northwesterly 
along the coast, and thence pushing rapidly towards the sea¬ 
shore, seized the adjoining heights, “when the van of Pom¬ 
pey’s army was visible at a distance,” and shut Pompey off 
from approach to Dyrrachium, where the latter had stored 










DYRRACHIUM. 


513 


all his war material and much provision. Caesar camped 
north of the Arzen, on slightly rolling ground. He had con¬ 
ducted an operation of remarkable boldness and brilliancy. 

Cut off from Dyrrachium, though his garrison still held 
the place, Pompey, much aggrieved, camped and intrenched 
on rising ground at Petra, south of the Arzen, where was a 
harbor for small ships, by the use of which he could still 
victual at Dyrrachium. 

The bay of Dyrrachium describes a bow whose chord runs 
northwest and southeast. As you approach the coast from 
the sea you have a perfect coup d'oeil of the entire theatre; 
but the details you must study on the ground. Back of this 
bow, in an irregular semicircle, runs the watershed of the 
streams which feed the Arzen or descend to the sea. This 
bow is threefold. The outer curve is of lofty hills, which 
make a rugged frame for the scene of the coming operations; 
the next inner one consists of irregular chalk-hills, rough and 
difficult; the inmost curve is one of rolling upland, well cov¬ 
ered by verdure and occasional bunches of trees. The entire 
country is more or less accentuated. The population of 
Epirus to-day is smaller than in Caesar’s time. This terrain 
was probably much then as now. The bolder hills of this 
watershed, from three hundred to twelve hundred feet in 
height, advance to the sea about the centre of the bow, and 
form a defile of over one third of a mile in length between 
the water and the cliffs, which latter are in places almost 
erect, but are wooded at the summits. At the south of the 
bow the hills slope down into the plain of modern Cavaia. 
The ground contained within the bow of the watershed is 
cut up, rocky, full of ravines and gorges at the back; wooded 
in parts and with a fair show of cultivation in the centre; 
rolling and fertile near the sea, with a long, wide beach. 

Dyrrachium lies on a point of land at the northwest end 


514 


FABIAN GENERALS. 


of the bow, confined by lagunes to a long triangular stretch 
of ground, bold and rocky at the seashore on the west. It can 
be besieged only by sea, for a force attempting to besiege it 
by land could itself be shut into the triangular foreland by 
fortifying the narrow land approaches at either end of the 
lagunes. 

Now all the more confirmed in his plan of starving Caesar 
in Epirus, and not of fighting him, Pompey ordered to Petra 
new provisions from Asia and other tributary countries. To 
get these was comparatively easy, as Pompey had plenty of 
ships. Caesar, on the contrary, experienced difficulty in 
providing corn for a protracted campaign, for Illyricum was * 
not a grain-bearing country, Epirus had little beyond its 
scant needs, and Pompey had already used up all there was 
on hand by foraging or devastation. Nor could Caesar get 
any supplies from Italy, for Pompey ruled the sea. 

In view of all these factors in his j)roblem, it may be said 
that Pompey was not entirely short-sighted in his present 
method of gauging the probabilities of the war. It is only 
in contrasting his slowness and lack of initiative to the rest¬ 
less energy of Caesar, that we feel like denying him his cog¬ 
nomen of Great. Still, the Fabian generals of the world are 
not without their justly earned laurels; nor must we under¬ 
rate the ability of Pompey. But even if we esteem his 
present plan of starving out Caesar to be a proper one, it is 
by no means to be admitted that Pompey was otherwise than 
lax in not forcing a decisive battle on Caesar when the lat¬ 
ter lay opposite him with but a third his force. 


XXXII. 


DYRRACHIUM. MARCH TO MAY. 48 B. C. 

CiESAR lay between Pompey and Dyrrachium ; but Pompey could reach the 
town from his camp by sea. Caesar began to inclose Pompey in siege lines, — 
a hazardous task, as he was much the weaker. Pompey seized many hills 
around his camp to inclose as much ground as possible. Many skirmishes re¬ 
sulted. Pompey could victual plentifully from the sea; Caesar had diffi¬ 
culty in gathering com from the poor country in his rear. But he had good 
water and better forage for his animals, while able to cut off much of Pom- 
pey’s water-supply by diverting streams which ran through his lines to the sea. 
In the fighting during the erection of the siege works, neither side won any 
marked advantage. Caesar’s veterans rather surprise us by not proving superior 
to Pompey’s newer cohorts. During an absence of Caesar’s, Pompey attacked 
his lines, but after a long and heavy struggle the Caesarians won a decided 
advantage. Caesar’s left reached the sea, but it was not strong. 

If Pompey lacked boldness in his conception and execu¬ 
tion, Caesar may be said to have been overbold. No sooner 
had he succeeded in thus cutting Pompey off from Dyrra¬ 
chium than he undertook measures for blockading him in the 
position he had taken up. About Pompey’s camp lay the 
threefold chain of hills already described; but his outlying 
parties had occupied no part of the watershed proper. As 
many of the hills of the outer curve as were available, Caesar 
took, and on them built redoubts, — twenty-six in all were 
eventually constructed,—and these he began to join by a 
chain of earthworks more or less elaborate, according as the 
nature of the ground dictated. In inaccessible places this 
work was easy; in places less well defended by nature, art 
was called into play. Each end of the line was intended to 
lean on the seacoast; the north end at his camp east of 


516 


CAESAR’S LINES. 


Dyrracliium; the south end at any place he could, in the 
course of the operations, most conveniently reach. Pompey 
at once perceived Caesar’s intention, but instead of resorting 
to active measures, he adopted the policy of one already 
besieged and endeavored to crowd Caesar outward as much as 
practicable; and as Pompey still sought to avoid a general 
engagement, Caesar was able to establish a fairly good line; 
not one, however, which prevented Pompey from holding, on 
the surrounding hills, an all but as good interior line. 

Caesar’s object in this proceeding was to prevent Pompey, 
who was strong in cavalry, from cutting out his convoys of 
corn from Epirus or from devastating the country, for he 
needed the corn himself; and he desired to reduce Pompey’s 
horse by want of forage. Again, he felt sure he should gain 
in reputation and Pompey correspondingly lose, if he hemmed 
him in, and thus showed that Pompey had not the vim to 
fight him. 

Caesar had for some time prescribed to his legions a set 
order of battle or encampment; and they now took up posi¬ 
tion accordingly. The Tenth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
legions formed the right wing; the Sixth and Seventh, the 
centre; the Eighth and Ninth, the left wing. 

The line thus traced by Caesar was nearly sixteen miles 
long, a vast stretch for twenty-two thousand men to defend. 
Pompey was anxious enough to regain Dyrrachium, for all 
his material was there; but he could not bring himself to 
hazard the battle which was necessary to arrest the comple¬ 
tion of Caesar’s works. He likewise seized on as many hills 
as he could, and fortified them in such a way as to oblige 
Caesar to divide his forces. He thus managed, by his own 
inner lines facing Caesar’s, to inclose a space of about four¬ 
teen miles in circuit, in which he was able to get quite an 
amount of forage for his cavalry. This inclosed line he for- 


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518 


POMPEY’S LINES. 


tified by twenty-four redoubts and a line of ramparts. Pom- 
pey first completed bis works, having a greater force and 
somewhat less extent to fortify. He made no organized 
sallies, but used his slingers and archers, of whom he had 
an efficient body, in a very harassing manner; and the 
Roman soldiers made themselves u coats or coverings of 
haircloth, tarpaulins and rawhide” to resist the darts. “In 
seizing the posts, each exerted his utmost power: Caesar, to 
confine Pompey within as narrow a compass as possible; 
Pompey, to occupy as many hills as he could in as large a 
circuit as possible.” Pompey had inclosed something like 
sixteen square miles; Caesar twenty. It was on the terrain 
thus inclosed that there were constructed the most remark¬ 
able fortifications in antiquity. 

It is not to be supposed that Pompey exhibited want of 
skill. On the contrary, whenever he put his hand to the 
work he showed it at every turn. With an ordinary oppo¬ 
nent, with even an able one, he might have proved himself 
the general of old, who had conquered half the world. But 
Caesar’s matchless energy and-skill overrode all his efforts; 
Pompey’s morale was so much less than Caesar’s that he 
could not show to advantage. Pompey and Caesar had long 
known each other, and though he had for many years held 
the stronger hand, Pompey no doubt recognized his superior, 
and was cautious accordingly. He simply remained inert. 

Pompey’s situation was markedly better than Caesar’s. 
He outnumbered him to a dangerous degree. He had much 
more cavalry. His ships brought him corn and material 
with ease and regularity from Dyrrachium and elsewhere. 
His position was central, each flank and all points being 
easily approached from the others by radial lines. And 
yet Pompey dared not make a determined attack upon his 
foe, even while the intrenchments were but half done. 


THE NINTH IN TROUBLE. 


519 


During the erection of Caesar’s line of contravallation, 
skirmishing was constant. The Ninth legion occupied the 
then left of the works which Caesar was gradually stretching 
out towards the sea. On one occasion when it had been 
ordered to take a certain hill that Caesar desired to inclose, 
and had begun works (A on the chart), Pompey’s men seized 
the adjoining heights to the west, set up a number of engines, 
and seriously annoyed Caesar’s men with their missiles and 
with archery. Their light troops could advance across the 
connecting hills to near the position of the Ninth. The 
reason for disputing Caesar this height was that its possession 
would afford him a chance of cutting Pompey off from ac¬ 
cess to one of the streams most essential to his water sup¬ 
ply (B), and confine the Pompeians within too narrow bounds. 
Caesar’s manifest purpose was to extend his left to the sea 
along this stream. He found it necessary to retire the 
Ninth legion from the place, and Pompey followed up Cae¬ 
sar’s legionaries vigorously and inflicted some losses on 
them. The retreat was down the rugged slope to the east, 
and gradually became difficult. It is reported that Pompey 
said that day in triumph to his friends about him, “that 
he would consent to be accounted a general of no expe¬ 
rience, if Caesar’s legions effected a retreat without con¬ 
siderable loss from that ground into which they had rashly 
advanced,” — an utterance which sounds as if Pompey still 
possessed something of the old spirit. 

At this backset Caesar became uneasy, for his veterans 
were exhibiting unusual lack of nerve. Hurdles were 
brought, and under their cover a trench was dug and the ends 
fortified with redoubts. This is one of the earliest recorded 
examples of field-fortifications made under fire for the pur¬ 
pose of temporarily holding a position, or of covering a 
retreat. The stand thus made was maintained for a period, 


520 


GALLANTRY OF THE NINTH. 


and later slingers and archers were thrown out so as to cover 
a further retreat. The legionary cohorts were then ordered 
to file off, but Pompey’s men “boldly and tauntingly pursued 
and chased” Caesar’s, leveling the hurdles and passing the 
trench. Fearing that this might be the cause of serious 



demoralization in the army, and that retreat might degen¬ 
erate into stampede, Caesar ordered Antony, who was in 
command, when in his withdrawal he reached a given place, 
to turn and charge. This was gallantly done. At the 
trumpet signal, the Ninth legion came to a right-about, 
closed their files, — they were evidently still well in hand, — 
paused but to cast their javelins, and then rushed upon the 
enemy with the sword. Though as at Ilerda they were 
charging up a steep incline, they drove everything before 
them, and Pompey’s men “turned their backs,” retired in 
confusion, and with no little loss, for the hurdles and trench 
lay in the path of their retreat and tripped up many. Five 
legionaries of Caesar’s were killed; of Pompey’s, say the 



EFFECT OF THE COMBAT. 


521 

Commentaries, many more. Another hill (C) was selected 
and fortified, Pompey retaining the one from which he had 
driven Caesar. The loss of this hill was the first step in the 
disaster which was bound to result from Caesar’s over-confi¬ 
dent undertaking in thus inclosing Pompey in siege lines. 
It enabled Pompey to occupy a larger extent of ground than 
Caesar had hoped to confine him to, and obliged Caesar to 
make his own the greater by nearly a half; and moreover it 
compelled him to close his left by a long line across an 
extended plain (D), where later Pompey found his weak spot. 
Had Caesar been able to close his lines along the brook which 
has its sources at the hill just lost, there would have been 
more chance of success. But the operation was, from its in¬ 
ception, doomed to failure. Across the plain, when it was 
reached, Caesar erected works, — a ditch fifteen feet wide 
and a parapet ten feet high and wide,— and garrisoned it with 
the Ninth legion. 

The small loss in the late combat does not bespeak a very 
tenacious fight; but the retreat was as well managed on 
Caesar’s part as the attack had been smart on Pompey’s. 
The number of the light troops killed or wounded is very 
rarely given. Only the legionaries killed are counted; so 
that a very small figure may sometimes express a material 
total loss. In this case the cohorts probably lost in killed 
and wounded fifty men; the light troops perhaps as many, 
making one hundred casualties in a force of not over four 
thousand men, say two and a half per cent., showing fairly 
smart fighting. 

There was not what we should call picket-fighting between 
the two camps, but Pompey’s men would often go out to 
a place where they saw camp-fires at night, and suddenly 
discharge at random a flight of arrows and stones towards it. 
Caesar’s soldiers were obliged to light fires in a place apart 


522 


HARDSHIPS OF CAESAR'S MEN. 


from where they mounted guard, to rid themselves of this 
dangerous annoyance. Petty war was constant. 

This entire Dyrrachium proceeding, on Caesar’s part, was 
novel. Blockades are usually for the purpose of cutting off 
supplies, and are always conducted by larger forces than 
those inclosed or against an enemy demoralized by defeat. 
But here was Caesar, with an army one half the size of 
Pompey’s, and himself in need of supplies, blockading by 
exterior lines Pompey, who had supplies of everything 
brought to him by sea. The lines were long, and the Caesa¬ 
rians had to work constantly to perform the guard-duty 
required of them. They stood their deprivations well. 
They lived on barley, pulse, and on rare occasions beef, and 
on a certain root named char a, of which they made mush and 
bread, and remembering the scarcity at Ilerda and Alesia 
and Avaricum, which had preceded great and important 
victories, lost not heart. The soldiers said to the Pompeians 
when they exchanged salutations on picket, that “they would 
rather live on the bark of the trees than let Pompey escape 
from their hands.” The corn was beginning to ripen, and 
there was promise soon of plenty. And while the Pompeians 
had provisions in greater abundance, they were in serious want 
of water, for Caesar had turned or dammed up all the springs 
and brooks which he could reach, and had obliged them to 
sink wells or rely on the brackish water of low, marshy 
pools. Pompey’s men were not used to work, and it told on 
them. The health of Caesar’s men was perfect, owing to the 
large space they had for camping; that of Pompey’s, cooped 
up in a small area and overworked, was questionable. 

So short for forage was Pompey that he was constrained 
to send his cavalry to Dyrrachium by sea. Here it could 
be readily fed, and could, moreover, sally out in rear of 
Caesar’s lines and interfere with his foraging parties. 


CAESAR TRICKED. 


523 


Caesar was now called away from his army for a short 
time. At this point in the narrative of the Commentaries 
there is a gap, which we are compelled to supply by a hint or 
two in Appian and Dion Cassius, and by construing what 
is said in a fashion little short of guess-work. It is more 
than probable that Caesar was on a diversion against Dyrra- 
chium, to which he was led to believe that he would be given 
access if he essayed an attack out of hand. At the head of 



a sufficient body of troops he advanced on the city, crossed 
the narrows at the south end of the lagunes, left his troops 
in hiding, and advanced with a small escort towards the walls. 
But his hopes were not realized. Instead of meeting a friendly 
reception from the party that had agreed to act with him, 
the Dyrrachium garrison issued from the gates suddenly and 
with hostile intent. A part took ship and sailed around to 
the narrows to cut him off. Another party moved around 
his right to prevent his making his way up to the north end 
of the lagunes. A third party attacked him in front. Caesar 
quickly rallied his men, met these three attacks with three 
detachments from his forces, and a smart combat began with 


524 


POMPEY'S ATTACK. 


each body. The coinbat was without result. Fighting in 
his rear compelled Caesar to retreat, which he did without 
meeting any particular difficulty. 

Caesar had left Publius Sylla in command of the big camp. 
Antony, though senior, was too far off on the‘left to exercise 
general control. Pompey, apparently soon made aware of 
the situation, seized the occasion as a good one to break 
through Caesar’s lines, reach Dyrrachium, and perhaps catch 
Caesar near the city and shut him up with his small force in 
the Dyrrachium penihsula. Having a much larger army 
and interior lines, this attack on the legions left under Sylla 
was a comparatively easy matter. Pompey’s plans were 
well conceived. Whenever he went at a tactical problem he 
did good work. He organized three attacks on Caesar’s 
siege lines. These were so nearly simultaneous to the ones 
opposite Dyrrachium that it looks as if Pompey purposely 
led Caesar into an ambush, by himself dictating the false 
promise of opening the gates of that city. 

The attacks were all against redoubts, and were so managed 
as to time, numbers and localities, as to make it probable 
that no reinforcements would be sent from one part of the 
line to the others. They were at points which lay east of 
Pompey’s camp. There were two columns, of four legions 
in all. One column advanced up the ravine E, the other up 
by way of those marked F and G. Arrived on the high 
ground near H, the legions divided into three columns. By 
two of these columns attacks were only partially delivered. 
In one of the assaults, three of Caesar’s cohorts under Volca- 
tius Tullus easily beat back a legion which formed one col¬ 
umn ; and in another, the German auxiliaries made a sally from 
the lines, defeated another legion with much loss, and retired 
safely. These were but demonstrations on Pompey’s part. 

The third or main assault was severe. Pompey’s third 


HANDSOME VICTORY. 525 

column of two legions had attacked in force at one of the 
forts which was held by the second cohort of the Sixth legion — 
— three hundred men under the centurion Minucius. The 
legionaries resisted the assault with great stubbornness. 
Pompey’s cohorts had scaling ladders, mural hooks and a 



ram. They assaulted the towers of the castellum, tried to 
set fire to the hurdles, filled up the trench, and exhibited the 
utmost determination to break down the defenses. But the 
Caesarians held on so stubbornly and for so long a time that 
Sylla was enabled to gather from adjoining works and to 
lead up two legions to drive back the Pompeians. The lat¬ 
ter, exhausted by their efforts, did not stand the charge, but 
so soon as the front line was struck yielded ground. Sylla 
had an excellent chance to bring on a general engagement 
under auspicious conditions, and was loudly criticised in the 
army for not having done so. But he deemed that he had 



526 


FIGHTING UPHILL. 


no right to deliver battle in Caesar’s absence, and was sus¬ 
tained by his chief. 

The Pompeians, beaten back, had difficulty in making 
good their retreat. They were passing over a ridge (I); 
Pompey halted on the top, not daring to retire down it on 
the other side, lest he should be overwhelmed on the slope 
by Caesar’s men. He prolonged the combat till nightfall, 
and then seized an eminence out of engine-range from Mi- 
nucius’ redoubt (N) and fortified it. Caesar’s men remained 
in his front, hoping to have him at a disadvantage when 
he should retreat. During the night and following days 
Pompey built turi’ets and carried the works up fifteen feet, 
facing the exposed side with mantelets, so as to retire under 
their protection. On the fifth night, a cloudy one, at the 
third watch, he stole a march on Caesar’s cohorts which were 
in his front, and regained his old camp. 

Defenses played a great role in those days. A general 
who wished to avoid battle had only to shut himself up in 
his camp, where, so long as provisions lasted, he was safe. 
But if his rival came forward and offered battle by marshal¬ 
ing his legions, it was considered as wanting in the nicest 
sense of honor to do less than accept it, by emerging from 
camp and drawing up in line, — unless, indeed, there were 
preponderating and sufficient reasons for not so doing. If, 
therefore, a general had camped in a plain, he might have 
battle forced on him on terms in which his only advantage 
lay in the proximity to his camp, to which he could retire 
at will. He was better placed if encamped on a height, 
with a slope down from the praetorian gate, so that when he 
drew up, the enemy, if he attacked, must do so uphill. The 
heavy-armed legionary did not like to fight uphill, as he got 
out of breath by the ascent, had to cast his missiles up at 
his enemy, who, meanwhile, hurled his own down to better 


RETREATING DOWNHILL. 


527 


effect, and being fresli, could at the proper moment rush in 
a counter-charge down upon him with perhaps fatal effect. 

This action of Pompey’s is another proof of the extreme 
difficulty experienced by the ancients in holding their men 
in hand when retiring from an enemy pursuing them down 
a slope. In attacking uphill the elan was helpful in over¬ 
coming the difficulty; in retiring downhill the equal loss of 
confidence bred a disastrous condition. To avoid being 
attacked on a descent was as important then as to avoid 
being enfiladed by the enemy’s batteries is to-day. The 
position which afforded the soldier the chance to cast javelins 
downwards at the enemy was one not to be readily forfeited. 
The bulk of all fighting was at javelin range. In theory, 
after casting their javelins the two first ranks fell to with the 
sword; but practically the lines faced each other and sub¬ 
stantially remained in place for hours, with swayings to and 
fro as one or other side won a temporary advantage, or the 
rear ranks and lines moved to the front to relieve the weary. 
Although there were many duels among the more enterpris¬ 
ing in each line, it was as a last resort that the sword was 
drawn by all. A charge with the gladius was then much 
more frequent than charges are to-day with the bayonet; but 
it was the last act in the drama. If this failed, it was hard 
to restore the confidence of the men, and it was not lightly 
undertaken. If the second or third line was still fresh, they 
could be called on; but if these, sword in hand, were driven 
back, the battle was not easily redeemed, and as troops of 
olden days were quite as much subject to demoralization as 
our own modern soldiers, if not more so, a retreat down a 
slope was one of those critical movements which had to be 
conducted with scrupulous care. 

The Caesarians had gained a marked advantage. Pompey 
had lost nearly two thousand men, many emeriti and centu- 


528 KILLED AND WOUNDED. 

rions, and six standards, while only twenty Caesarians were 
missing, if the Commentaries are to be believed. But in 
Minucius’ redoubt, not a soldier escaped a wound. In one 
cohort four centurions lost their eyes, — a curious coincidence. 
The centurion Scaeva, who had been largely instrumental 
in saving the fort, produced to Caesar his shield, which had 
two hundred and thirty holes in it. Caesar presented Scaeva 
with two hundred thousand pieces of copper money, — about 
thirty-six hundred dollars,— and promoted him from eighth 
to first centurion ( primipilus) as a reward for his exceptional 
gallantry. There were counted thirty thousand arrows 
thrown into the fort. The soldiers who had defended it 
were rewarded with double pay, clothing and rations, and 
with military honors. 

Here is a curious discrepancy in the proportion of wounded 
to killed. Among the Greeks there was something approach¬ 
ing a general ratio — ten or twelve to one; among the Romans 
there was scarcely any regularity. In a late instance in the 
Commentaries, —Curio’s battle in Africa, —the losses were 
given as six hundred killed and one thousand wounded. In 
this one we have a loss of only twenty legionaries killed 
along the whole line, and yet every man wounded in the fort 
which was most stoutly assailed. Such statistics make it 
difficult to compare ancient losses with modern. In old 
times wounds must often have been as slight as missiles 
lacked in power. In those days of hand weapons and good 
armor, lines could fight at casting or shooting distance for 
a long while with but small loss. Had Scaeva’s shield been 
struck by two hundred and thirty bullets he would scarcely 
have lived to enjoy his munificent reward. 


XXXIII. 


CiESAR’S DEFEAT. MAY, 48 B. C. 

Pompey was not abashed by his late defeat. He learned through certain 
deserters that the left of Caesar’s line was not yet completed, and was in any 
event weak. With excellent skill and by night he prepared an assault at this 
quarter. He sent a large force of cohorts to attack the front of Caesar’s lines, 
and auxiliaries and light troops to attack the rear. The assault was stoutly 
given, and owing partly to accident, partly to poor preparation, partly to an 
unexpected demoralization among the legions, Caesar suffered a galling defeat, 
with loss of one thousand killed. He had rashly ventured on the impossible, 
and met the necessary consequence. Pompey considered the war at an end. 
Not so Caesar, whom disaster never abashed ; not so his men, who drank in his 
unconquerable spirit. 

During the weeks occupied by these operations at Dyr- 
rachium, iEtolia, Acarnania and Amphilocliis had been 
reduced by Longinus and Sahinus. Caesar, desiring to gain 
a foothold in the Peloponnesus, sent these officers under the 
orders of Calenus to take possession of Achaia. To meet 
this threat Rutilius Rufus, Pompey’s lieutenant, began to 
fortify the Isthmus to prevent Calenus from entering Achaia, 
for Caesar had no fleet to cross the Corinthian Bav. Calenus 
recovered Delphi, Thebes and Orchomenus by voluntary 
submission. A large part of Hellas was under Caesar’s 
control. 

In order to leave no part of the responsibility for civil 
bloodshed upon himself, Caesar had still again made pro¬ 
posals to Pompey for an adjustment through their mutual 
friend Scipio, when the latter reached Macedonia. He sent 
Clodius, who was also an intimate of Pompey’s, to Scipio. 


530 


CAESAR'S PROPOSAL. 


But like the others, this effort at accommodation remained 
without effect. Whether these approaches were made he- 
cause Caesar knew they would not be accepted, as has been 
alleged by his detractors, or from a sincere desire for peace, 
will never be known. But the fact remains that Caesar did 
make the proposals and that Pompey refused them. Nothing 
but the sword was left him. 

Every day after the defeat of Pompey’s late attack, Caesar 
drew up his army on the level ground between the camps (K) 
and offered battle. He even led his lines up almost to the 
Pompeian ramparts, — at least to the edge of the zone of 
the engine-missiles. Though Pompey, to save his credit, 
would lead out his men, he would post them with the third 
line close against his camp, and under protection of the fire 
of the light troops from the ramparts. This precluded an 
attack by Caesar. 

As above related, the bulk of Pompey’s horse had been 
sent to Dyrrachium. “Caesar, that he might the more easily 
keep Pompey’s horse inclosed within Dyrrachium and prevent 
them from foraging, fortified the two narrow passes already 
mentioned, i. e., the narrows at the ends of the lagunes on 
the east and the northwest of Dyrrachium (L and M), with 
strong works and erected forts at them.” This was about 
May 20. But when fodder thus became particularly hard to 
get and Pompey derived no advantage from his cavalry, he 
brought a large part of it back to his camp by sea. While 
shut off from Dyrrachium by land, his vessels allowed him 
a free access to it by sea, which Caesar could not prevent. 
Within his lines, too, where even the young wheat had been 
eaten by the horses, it was difficult to keep them, and they 
were fed largely on leaves and plants. Barley and fodder 
were brought from Corcyra and Acarnania, but not in 
sufficient quantities. When even this supply gave out, 


FATAL DESERTIONS. 


531 


Pompey was left with no resource but a sally. To this he 
saw that he must sooner or later come. 

About this time, though Pompey’s men daily deserted to 
Caesar, the first noteworthy desertions from Caesar’s camp 
to Pompey’s occurred. But these were fatal ones. Two 
Allobrogians, commanders of cavalry, who had been of 
great service to Caesar in Gaul and were men of birth, in¬ 
telligence and courage, but, as it happened, had not been 
careful in their accounts of pay to their men, on being held 
to task by Caesar, though mildly, for Caesar preferred, he 
says, to make no scandal of the matter, deserted to Pompey, 
partly from shame and partly from fear, and conveyed to him 
detailed information about Caesar’s works. Such a desertion 
being rare (the very first, says Caesar), Pompey made much 
of these men and took pains to exhibit them in every part of 
his lines. 

Acting on the information obtained from these men, which 
was exact and thorough, Pompey gathered together a large 
amount of material for assaulting works, and at night trans¬ 
ported his light troops and the material by sea to that part 
of Caesar’s works — on the extreme left — which was nearest 
the coast and farthest from Caesar’s greater camp. On the 
same night, after the third watch, sixty cohorts drafted from 
the north camp and the lines were marched to the same 
point, and the war-galleys were sent down the coast to anchor 
opposite. The foot soldiers were ordered to make ozier- 
shields to wear on their helmets. Stationed here was the 
Ninth legion under Lentulus Marcellinus, the quaestor, with 
Fulvius Posthumus second in command. Antony had 
general charge of the left wing. The contravallation works 
consisted of a rampart ten feet high and ten feet wide covered 
by a trench fifteen feet wide “fronting the enemy,” i. e ., 
towards the north. Some six hundred feet back were similar 


532 


POMPEY SKILLFULLY ATTACKS . 


but less strong defenses backing on tlie others — the usual 
circumvallation line. C<esar had anticipated an attack from 
the side of the sea and had recently erected these latter 
defenses. The works which were to connect these two ram¬ 
parts and defend the left of the line, i. e., those facing the 
sea, were not yet finished, and this fact Pompey had ascer¬ 
tained from the Allobrogians. 

Pompey’s attack was prepared at night and delivered at 
daybreak on the weakest part of Caesar’s lines, was excel¬ 
lently planned, stoutly given, and was a complete surprise. 
The archers and slingers who attacked from the south were 
very active, and poured a galling fire upon the unprepared 
defenders, whom they outnumbered six or eight to one. At 



Battle of Dyrrachium. Pompey’s Attack. 


the same moment the sixty legionary cohorts made a des¬ 
perate onslaught from the north, using their weapons and 
engines to great advantage; and began to set up their scaling 
ladders after filling the ditch with fascines. The danger was 
imminent enough, owing to the front and rear attack; but to 






ANTONY TO THE RESCUE. 


533 


make the situation hopeless, a party of light troops discovered 
the unfinished defenses on Caesar’s extreme left, and making 
a gallant dash in between the two lines, took the legionaries 
of the Ninth absolutely in flank. The Caesarians appear to 
have been slenderly supplied with missiles, for their chief 
defense, thus taken unawares, was stones; and the ozier 
headgear of the Pompeians saved them from the effect of 
these. There appears clearly, from the Commentaries, to 
have been a lack of readiness, against which, after the deser¬ 
tion of the Allobrogians, one would have supposed that 
Csesar would have provided. He knew his own weakest 
spot, he knew that the deserters knew it, and he might have 
guessed that an attack would be made here. Csesar had 
grown to believe that Pompey was loath to fight, and perhaps 
was careless in consequence. In any event, Pompey’s well- 
conceived attack was fully successful. His men came on 
with such a determined rush that the Caesarians broke and 
could not be rallied, and such cohorts as were sent to then- 
relief by Marcellinus, whose camp was near the left, also 
caught the infection and retired in confusion. The Pom¬ 
peians pressed on; the Caesarians were suffering serious 
losses, all the centurions but one of the leading cohort being 
killed. He happily was the primipilus, and managed to 
save the legionary eagle. The Pompeians did not stop until 
they reached the camp of the Ninth legion. There Antony 
was met debouching from the line of hills where had been 
erected the circuit of castella, with a bold front of twelve 
cohorts, and his brave stand on the enemy’s flank checked 
the latter’s onslaught, drove back the enemy, rallied the run¬ 
aways, and put an end to the present danger. 

Csesar, hearing of the disaster by the signals, which were 
columns of smoke, usual in such emergencies, also came 
speedily to the ground from the main camp with several 


534 POMPEY INTRENCHES. 

cohorts collected from the castella on the way. But it was 
too late to save the day or the tactical loss. Pompey had 
o-ot a foothold from which he could not be ousted and from 

O 

which he could move in and out at will to forage, or to 
attack Caesar’s rear. The work of months was rendered 
nugatory. The blockade was practically broken. 

At the end of Caesar’s late lines, Pompey at once in¬ 
trenched a new and strong camp, utilizing for the purpose 
part of the works Caesar had erected. Its location was not 
far from the seashore and somewhat over a mile south of the 
river along which lay the right of his line. Opposite this 
camp, Caesar, nothing daunted and with the hope to neutral¬ 
ize the defeat by a success yet won before the day should 
close, sat down and intrenched near Pompey. He had with 
Antony’s force and what he could safely and quickly draw 
from the neighboring forts some thirty-five cohorts. He 
placed his men between the two lines of circumvallation and 
contravallation, the former on his right, the latter on his 
left, and threw up a line between and perpendicular to them 
within five hundred yards of the enemy. 

Pompey’s attack had been made at daylight and his initial 
victory had been quickly won. It was yet early in the day. 
There were many hours to retrieve the disaster. Pompey 
had no doubt that the battle was over for that day; not so 
thought Caesar. Like Sheridan at Winchester, he deter¬ 
mined to recover the field. Each of the armies was now 
divided into two parts. One of each confronted the other at 
the main camps on the north; one of each lay in fighting 
contact with the other at the lines on the south plain. 

There was near by this place an old encampment which 
had an inner work. The latter had been a smaller in¬ 
trenched camp of Caesar’s during the operation of the Ninth 
legion a week or two back (A), and the outer wall had been 


CjESAR tries again. 


535 


added by Pompey when Caesar in changing his lines had 
been compelled to abandon it and Pompey had occupied it 
with a larger force. Later again Pompey had himself given 



up this double camp. “This camp joined a certain wood 
and was not above four hundred paces distant from the sea.” 
When Pompey occupied the place, he “carried an intrench- 
ment from the left angle of the camp to the river about four 
hundred paces, that his soldiers might have more liberty 
and less danger in fetching water,” while Caesar’s men and 
his were daily skirmishing over the ground each sought to 
occupy in constructing their lines. It was now a sort of 
redoubt, and was half a mile distant from Pompey’s camp. 
This general threw the legion commanded by L. Torquatus 
into this camp as a convenient link between his north and 
south camps, to make a wider front and to save his men the 
labor of constructing a new one. Torquatus marched to the 
place back of the wood in question. 

Caesar, who learned of this movement from his scouts, 
thought he might attack this post with a good chance of sue- 










536 


SHARP ATTACK. 


cess, and by a brilliant stroke repair the effect of the disaster 
of the morning. His men had finished their works, but 
Pompey’s had not, and it would take them some time to drop 
their tools, make ready for battle, and reach the camp. 
Speed might serve him to crush Torquatus. He headed for 
this camp with thirty-three cohorts, some ten thousand men, 
among them the Ninth legion, much reduced by the recent 
fight. He left two cohorts in the trenches, which made 
enough of an appearance of working actively at the rampart 
to quiet Pompey’s apprehensions, and, marching quickly but 
cautiously, reached the fort before Pompey could have notice 
of an advance. 

Caesar marshaled his men in two wings, each in two lines. 
The left wing was opposite the camp to be attacked; the 
right wing opposite the intrenchment which ran to the river. 
Attacking with the left wing, which he commanded in person, 
Caesar carried the outer works with a rush, and pushing in, 
though the entrances were well barricaded by an ericius , or 
gate full of sharp spikes, forced the Pompeians from the 
front rampart of the inner one. So far the attack had 
succeeded. The right wing, however, in search of a gate 
by which to enter what they supposed to be part of the wall 
of the redoubt, and misled by following the new rampart 
which ran from the fort down to the river and was ten feet 
high, got separated from the left so far as to produce a serious 
gap in the line and make mutual support impossible. After 
following this river rampart a small distance, they climbed 
or broke through it, followed by the cavalry. This placed 
them no nearer the redoubt than they had been when in its 
front, and separated them from the left wing. 

Pompey had soon learned of the attack on Torquatus, and 
recalling his five legions from their work of intrenching he 
marched to the rescue of his lieutenant. The garrison, now 


SUDDEN PANIC. 


537 


sure of the support of Pompey, made a stout resistance to 
Caesar’s left wing at the decuman gate and charged on the 
Caesarians with a will, while Pompey’s cavalry advanced 
against Caesar’s cavalry and his right wing. Caesar’s right- 
wing soldiers by some strange fatality, or else seeing them¬ 
selves cut off from their leader, were seized with a sudden 
panic. They had not had time to recover from the morning’s 
disaster and their work was not crisply cut out. The cavalry 
first caught the infection and fell hack through a breach in 
the river rampart which they had made and entered at. This 
left the infantry of the right wing unsupported by the horse, 
and it, too, drifted to the rear even before it had come within 
sight of the enemy’s line, and in retiring over the river ram¬ 
part in disorder lost a vast number of men by being trodden 
underfoot in the trenches. “Most of them, lest they should 
he engaged in the narrow passes, threw themselves down a 
rampart ten feet high into the trenches; and the first being 
trodden to death, the rest procured their safety and escaped 
over their bodies.” Others, with no better result, tried to get 
round the north end of the river rampart. It was clearly a 
stampede. The men of the left wing, made aware that the 
right wing and the cavalry were melting away, thus leaving 
their own flank naked while they themselves had the garrison 
to contend with, perceiving from the wall the advance of 
Pompey in line of battle with bold and steady front, and 
fearing to be inclosed between the outer and inner ramparts, 
were seized with like terror and fell back in like confusion 
before the enemy had hurled a single spear. Not even when 
Caesar laid hold of an eagle and personally called upon his 
men to follow him could the panic-stricken troops be rallied. 
One man, on whom Caesar laid hands to restore him to a 
sense of duty, is even said to have lifted his sword against 
him in the violence of his fright. The men “continued to 


588 


LOSS OF EIGHT PER CENT. 


run in the same manner; others, through fear, even threw 
away their colors, nor did a single man face about. At the 
praetorian gate of the outer redoubt the same scene of confu¬ 
sion and disaster was repeated. But as good luck would have 
it, Pompey suspected an ambuscade and did not rapidly 
advance. So sudden a success from so sudden a defeat con¬ 
strained him to caution. His cavalry, eager to pursue, could 
not push through the breaches of the river rampart or the 
camp gates, which were all choked up with dead and wounded 
men. Caesar was enabled to get the rest of his troops out of 
action without incurring the penalty of a pursuit, though he 
saved his cohorts from the enemy’s cavalry, which finally 
came up, only just in time behind the contravallation wall. 

In the two actions of this day Caesar’s losses were nine 
hundred and sixty men, several Roman knights, thirty-two 
military tribunes and centurions, and thirty-two maniple 
ensigns. Most of the men had been crushed to death in the 
ditch. All the prisoners who fell into Pompey’s hands were 
put to death by Labienus with cruel taunts. Such was 
the hatred of the man whom Caesar had delighted to honor. 
This heavy list of casualties, about eight per cent, in killed, 
cannot be counted as a battle loss in comparison with other 
general engagements. The men had scarcely fought. They 
had been cut down or perished in their flight. 

The description of these two actions is somewhat lacking 
in clearness in the Commentaries. The terrain explains the 
story, however, and the few items given enable us to sketch 
out the scene of the combat very distinctly. This much is 
certain, — Caesar was badly beaten, worse than he had ever 
been before. He himself came near losing his life. His 
troops had become utterly demoralized and could not be 
rallied, and as he is himself reported to have said, had 
Pompey known how to win a victory, he would have been 


DEM ORA LIZA TION. 


539 


fatally defeated. There is not even an attempt in the 
Commentaries to gloss over the matter. The two battles of 
this day had been reverses which had been saved from 
becoming irretrievable disasters solely by Pompey’s lack of 
enterprise. Excuse enough for the defeat existed in the 
disparity of forces; there was no excuse for the demoraliza¬ 
tion of the troops. 

All old soldiers know how irrational is the conduct of a 
niass of fleeing soldiery; how each man seeks his own safety, 
and all idea of discipline is for the moment lost. Caesar’s 
descriptions give one a picture of an army very badly demor¬ 
alized. There is a tendency in all old writers to make the 
light and shade of their sketches very marked. The 
gallantry displayed in unimportant affairs is brilliant; the 
fear in slight reverses is excessive. Whether this habit of 
statement overdraws the matter or not is doubtful. Disci¬ 
plined and seasoned troops have been much the same in all 
eras. Caesar’s men unquestionably lost heart at times in a 
discreditable way. But Caesar was always able to hold them 
in hand and to shame their defeat into an encouragement for 
the future. What the troops lose in honor, Caesar gains in 
courage and skill. 

By his temerity in attempting a task, the impossibility of 
which he should earlier have recognized, Caesar had lost three 
good months and all power of offense at this place. He was 
back at his starting point, and with his communications with 
Italy severed. He had failed in every sense, strategically 
and tactically, and with Pompey’s large force of cavalry 
released he might be logistically compromised. His oppo¬ 
nent’s all but blameworthy deliberation had proven success¬ 
ful. Time did not work against him as against Csesar. His 
troops had behaved well; he had every reason to believe they 
would do so again; and he could now credit Labienus’ asser- 


540 


CAESAR’S SITUATION. 


tion that Caesar’s Gallic veterans had disappeared. If Pom- 
pey should rouse himself for once and push home, Caesar 
might be fatally struck. But Pompey did not do so. For¬ 
tune stood by Caesar as she never has by any one; and the 
character of the two men now plainly appeared. 



Aquilifer. 













XXXIY. 


RETREAT FROM DYRRACHIUM. MAY, 48 B. C. 

0 jESAR retired from Dyrrachium with great skill. He so markedly impressed 
his own bearing on his soldiers as to shame them into the desire again to meet 
the enemy and retrieve their unsoldierly conduct. Pompey sought to pursue, 
but was not rapid enough. Caesar picked up his detachments and headed 
towards Thessaly to concentrate all his legions and try conclusions afresh. 
Heretofore-friendly Greece now turned against him ; and he was forced to cap¬ 
ture Gomphi by assault. Other cities opened their gates. After some manoeu¬ 
vring between the rival lieutenants of either, Pompey and Caesar both concen¬ 
trated their forces and reached the neighborhood of Pharsalus. Caesar had 
some thirty-five thousand men all told; Pompey, at least twice as many; while 
his cavalry was seven thousand to Caesar’s one thousand. Despite this superi¬ 
ority, Pompey waited for Caesar to move upon him. Some manoeuvring super¬ 
vened for position near Pharsalus. Caesar endeavored to bring Pompey to 
battle, but could not do so on even terms. He was about to shift his ground, 
when Pompey showed a disposition to fight. Caesar at once accepted the 
challenge. 

This double victory so elated Pompey and bis party that 
be imagined the war already over. He was saluted as Im- 
perator. He did not consider the difference in forces or the 
attendant circumstances. Caesar, on the contrary, with the 
elasticity of the great soldier, rose to the occasion. By no 
means disheartened, he determined to change his plan, and 
at once. He was not slow to recognize that he had failed in 
his object. He was afraid to risk another battle here, lest 
from the recollection of the prior defeats his men should again 
grow demoralized. Even his hardened legionaries had shown 
that they were not above disgraceful panics. He concluded 
to give over what, after all, was practically an impossibility, 


542 


PUNISHMENT OF COWARDS. 


— the task with a much smaller force of shutting Pompey up 
in his lines; to move away and to lure him out into the plain 
country where he might out-manoeuvre him as he could not 
on the intrenched hills. In the open field he felt a superi¬ 
ority he had been unable to show at Dyrrachium, where lines 
and redoubts of such vast extent limited his movements and 
his capacity to develop his resources. 

Caesar could not overlook all the acts of cowardice which 
had been at the root of the Dyrrachium defeat. He selected 
those on whom reliance was wont to be placed, but who in 
this instance had failed in their duty, and punished sev¬ 
eral of the standard-bearers by reducing them to the ranks. 
This sufficed as an example. He then addressed his men in 
such wise as to rob them of the sting of defeat and inspire 
them with fresh confidence. Indeed, so soon as Caesar’s 
legionaries had recovered from their first demoralization, 
they became themselves and eager for a battle. They begged 
Caesar to lead them against the enemy instead of leaving 
Dyrrachium, promising to give a good account of them¬ 
selves. But Caesar mistrusted not their good will but their 
steadiness; he deemed his own plan wiser and adhered to it, 
promising his men a victory the next time they struck the 
enemy. The question of victualing was, moreover, becom¬ 
ing difficult, and it was time to move away. 

After taking only such few hours as were necessary to col¬ 
lect and care for the wounded, Caesar quietly massed on his 
left all his men and material, and sent forward at nightfall 
on the day of the battle all his baggage and the wounded and 
sick, in conduct of one legion, to Apollonia, ordering them 
to make the distance in one march. Then keeping two 
legions under his own orders as rearguard in the camp, he 
started the other seven on several roads, before daylight of 
the next day, in the same direction, without signals or sound 


CLEVER RETREAT. 


543 


of any kind. When they had got well on the way, he gave 
the usual signal for decamping, broke up with his two legions 
and rapidly followed the column. This sensitiveness as to 
the point of honor involved in giving the signal for the march 
is interesting. Caesar was unwilling to slink away; but he 
came very close to doing so. It was the only wise thing 
to do. 

Caesar had a perilous task before him, — to retire from a 
victorious enemy over two bridgeless rivers, the Genusus and 
Apsus, both with rapid flow and steep banks. lie reached 
the Genusus after about a five hours’ march. Pompey sent 
his cavalry in pursuit, and followed with the entire army. 
The horse reached Caesar’s rear of column near the Genusus. 
But it accomplished nothing. Caesar detached his own horse, 
intermixed with some four hundred legionaries, against Pom¬ 
pey’s cavalry and threw it back with loss. He then put his 
legions across the Genusus, which was done without too much 
difficulty. This was the day’s march he had planned, and 
he was now safe from Pompey’s immediate pursuit, whose 
cavalry could not readily cross, as Caesar had collected all the 
boats and the banks were very steep. He took up his post 
opposite Asparagium, in the old camp, whose wall and ditch 
still stood, with unusual precautions. He must steal another 
march on Pompey if he was to elude him. To induce Pom¬ 
pey to believe that he would stay where he was for a day or 
two, his horse was allowed to go out to forage; but it was 
soon quietly ordered in again. The infantry had been kept 
in camp ready to march. Pompey, who had followed Caesar 
across the river, and had likewise camped in his old defenses 
at Asparagium, was deceived in effect. About midday, 
when Pompey’s men were resting, and many of them had 
strayed back towards the old camp to collect their hastily 
left chattels, and were generally dispersed, owing to laxness 


544 


POMPEY’S CHANCE. 


of discipline, Caesar stole his march on the enemy, and, mak¬ 
ing some eight miles before dark, got that much start. 4 hen 
after a brief rest, at the opening of the night Caesar sent for¬ 
ward his baggage, and followed by daylight with his legions. 
And this he did on the third day also, “by which means he was 
enabled to effect his march over the deepest rivers and 
through the most intricate roads without any loss.” On the 
fourth day, Pompey gave over the pursuit, Caesar having 
steadily out-marched him, and returned to Asparagium. 

Immediately after the battle, Pompey had the choice of 
several plans by which to make use of his victory. He might 
cross to Italy, where he could count on a better reception now 
that Caesar was defeated. He might sharply pursue Caesar’s 
army and perhaps destroy it before it could recruit, or, fail¬ 
ing to reach it, might follow it inland and bring it to battle 
before it had recovered its tone. Having begun by pursu¬ 
ing Caesar, though to no good effect, Pompey kept to the 
plan of a campaign in Greece. But he deemed it wise to 
reassemble his forces, which the pursuit had much scattered. 

Caesar had stopped at Apollonia only to leave his wounded 
under a suitable garrison and arrange for an indefinite 
absence. He left there June 1. He had determined to 
join Domitius, who, with the Eleventh and Twelfth legions, 
had succeeded in recovering all Macedonia, — a conquest 
Caesar hoped not to forfeit, as its possession would enable 
him to concentrate his forces in a friendly country. 

Domitius was on the Haliacmon, where he had towards the 
end of April been anticipating the arrival of Scipio from 
Syria with two legions and cavalry which the latter was 
bringing to Pompey. Scipio, about May 1, had reached the 
vicinity of Domitius, and had then turned south to surprise 
Longinus, who was in command of only a legion of recruits 
in Thessaly. He left his baggage under Favonius on the 


CjESAR'S chance. 


545 


Haliacmon, near Servia. Longinus, catching the alarm, 
retired across the Pindus Mountains to Ambracia. Scipio, 
sure of his prey, was about to follow, when Favonius called 
him back to present resistance to Domitius, who was threat¬ 
ening him. Returning thither, Scipio and Domitius indulged 
in several slight passages of arms, in which Domitius showed 
himself the more ready for combat; but nothing came of 
these exchanges. This was about the time when Caesar had 
reached Apollonia. 

So far as the general strategic scheme went, Caesar’s duty 
* was plain. If Pompey pursued him, he would be cut off 
from his fleet and his depot at Dyrrachium, —from corn and 
war material, — and be thereby placed on equal terms with 
Caesar. If Pompey crossed to Italy, Domitius and Caesar 
would be forced to follow him through Illyricum to defend 
Italy, however difficult the task. If Pompey attempted to 
take Apollonia and Oricum, Caesar would attack Scipio and 
compel Pompey to come to his relief. No other alternatives 
were apt to complicate the problem. 

Caesar left four cohorts at Apollonia, one at Lissus, and 
three at Oricum, not counting the wounded. This left him 
seven old legions, one of which had had three cohorts taken 
from it, — say eighteen thousand men. He expected two 
more legions from Italy; but these were intended to guard 
Illy ricum under Cornuficius. 

Pompey, on June 2, ascertained Caesar’s movements and 
elected to join Scipio. He feared that Caesar had designs 
against his lieutenant and proposed himself to cut off 
Domitius if he could reach him before Caesar. Many of his 
lieutenants strongly advised crossing the Adriatic and recon¬ 
quering Italy, which they said would be the death-blow to 
Caesar; but Pompey felt that he could not abandon Scipio 
and the many persons of note adhering to his cause who were 


546 


ODD SITUATION. 


still in Thessaly and Macedonia. The majority approved his 
course. 

Accordingly, leaving Cato with fifteen cohorts and three 
hundred vessels to guard the seashore and Dyrrachium, 
Pompey started from Asparagium June 3, towards Mace¬ 
donia. Caesar’s prompt action had forced Pompey to follow 



him. It was he still, who, despite defeat, imposed the time 
and place of future manoeuvres. Pompey’s was the weaker 
will. 

The situation about June 6 was curious. Pompey was 
marching along the Egnatian highway to join Scipio. Caesar 
was marching up the river Aous by a difficult road to join 






CAESAR'S ROUTE. 


547 

Domitius. The latter, in search of victual and ignorant of 
the recent events at Dyrrachium, was on the point of falling 
into Pompey’s clutches by a march on Heraclea. 

The exaggerated rumors of Caesar’s defeat had weakened 
the allegiance of many states in Greece. His messengers 
had been seized, and it had been impossible for him to com¬ 
municate with Domitius. Pompey, marching on the direct 
road, reached Heraclea on June 8. As we have seen, Domitius 
had been facing Scipio on the Haliacmon. When the latter 
declined to come to battle, Domitius, pressed for rations, had 
headed for Heraclea, where he thought he could revictual. 
On the 9th of June he was close to the place. But just as 
he was about to blunder into Pompey’s column, some of the 
Allobroges who had recently deserted to Pompey, and who 
were with the latter’s scouting parties, were captured by 
Domitius’ vanguard and revealed to him all the facts. Do¬ 
mitius quickly changed his course and filed south towards 
Thessaly. 

Caesar had marched with clear purpose and corresponding 
rapidity. His route was somewhat the same as that pursued 
by Alexander when marching on Thebes. He reached the 
watershed of the Aous and Peneus, and descended to iEgi- 
nium in Thessaly, June 7. Here Domitius joined him June 
18. Pompey had followed with for him unusual speed. 
Fortune was kind to both. The threatened lieutenant of 
neither was compromised. The situation had cleared itself. 

Having joined his lieutenant, Caesar had nine legions, of 
which one was short three cohorts, — in all some twenty-four 
thousand men. He had a few light troops and one thousand 
horse. He decided to remain in Thessaly to recruit the 
physique and morale of his army. He was where at need he 
could rally his legates under Calenus, who had fifteen cohorts. 

The alluvial plain of Thessaly was broad and well watered 


548 


A BOLD ASSAULT. 


by the Peneus and its affluents, was fertile and well-fitted for 
the operations of armies. The towns were active in partisan¬ 
ship of either Pompey or Caesar, and as Scipio, on learning 
the movements of the rival generals, had marched to Larissa, 
Caesar could scarcely count on much support after his late 
defeat. On debouching from the mountains he was con¬ 
fronted with four strong places lying on the foothills of 
Thessaly athwart his path, — Pelinaeum, Trieca, Gomphi, 
Metropolis, — a quadrilateral of importance, but less then 
than it would assume to-day. 

Caesar left .ZEginium June 15 and marched to Gomphi, 
twenty miles distant. Here he found the gates shut on him, 
the news from Dyrrachium having in fact changed the minds 
of many of the Thessalians, who previously had been his 
allies. The inhabitants had sent for help to Scipio and 
Pompey; but Scipio had marched to Larissa, and Pompey 
had not yet reached the border of Thessaly. 

Caesar camped. His men had made a longer march than 
usual that day and had intrenched the camp; but he deter¬ 
mined to assault Gomphi without delay. The men showed 
great alacrity. They were anxious to prove that the late 
defeat came not from lack of stomach. They prepared pent¬ 
houses, scaling-ladders and hurdles, and were ready by four 
o’clock. After exhorting his cohorts to retrieve themselves, 
and win reputation and the provisions they needed at the 
same moment, Caesar commanded an assault of the town, 
though it was protected by very high walls; and in the three 
remaining hours of the afternoon captured it. Then, as an 
example, and as encouragement to his men, he gave it up to 
plunder. 

Next day he marched to Metropolis. Here, too, the 
inhabitants at first shut their gates, but on hearing of the 
fate of Gomphi, were wise enough to change their minds. 


CAESAR CHEERED. 


549 

Caesar scrupulously spared the place, and thereafter all towns 
in Thessaly, except those near Larissa, where Scipio was 
quartered, awed and persuaded by the examples of Gomphi 
and Metropolis, opened their gates on his approach. 



Caesar was cheered by the conduct of his men, and felt 
that he might again trust to their steady bravery. He made 
up his mind to await Pompey’s arrival, while resting his 
troops. He headed to the east, crossed the Apidanus at 
Pyrgo, moved on farther into the level country and camped 






550 


CAESAR DICTATES MANOEUVRES. 


north of Pharsalus in the plain on the left hank of the Eni- 
peus. The camp appears to us to have been illy chosen, but 
Caesar’s reasons for placing it where he did are not given. 

Pompey, when he found that Domitius had escaped him 
and that Scipio was safe, kept on his course with slow 
marches, southeast towards Larissa. It is hardly probable 
that he marched by way of Pella, as has been assumed. He 
at least knew that Scipio had been on the Haliacmon, and had 
probably heard that he had marched towards Larissa. 

The event proved that Pompey would have been wiser to 
move into Italy. But he not unnaturally looked upon an¬ 
other victory as the certain consequence of his last, and we 
can but commend his purpose in following up an enemy 
whom every indication warranted him in believing he could 
overwhelm. 

Again we see that the plan and sequence of the campaign 
were dictated by Caesar’s movements. Pompey might, by 
a diversion on Italy, have had things his own way, but he 
was too lax and indecisive. Even now he was divine: his 
opponent too much time to recruit. 

Pompey joined Scipio June 21, at Larissa, and assumed 
command of both the armies. Why Caesar had not attacked 
Scipio before Pompey’s arrival has been frequently asked. 
But such an act was not in accordance with ancient practice. 
Larissa was too strong a town to assault, and a siege was 
not possible at the moment when speed was of the essence. 
There may have been political grounds which we do not 
know. To attack a divided enemy, as we understand the 
phrase, is rather a device of the modern art of war than a 
habit of Caesar s days. It had been done by Hannibal and 
by Alexander, but more often such an opportunity was 
neglected than improved. Moreover, Caesar was reluctant 
to assault a well-defended city. Larissa, with Scipio’s two 


LABIENUS ’ COUNSELS. 551 

legions, was a different task from Gomphi with its native 
population. 

At all events, Caesar remained in situ and awaited his 
enemy. Larissa was hut twenty miles distant. The harvest 
was near at hand. His supplies were now certain and he 
was in open country where he could manoeuvre at will. On 
the other hand, Pompey was in command of fifty thousand 
legionaries, seven thousand horse, and many light troops, 

a force large enough to justify his belief that Caesar was 
at his mercy. So certain was every one in Pompey’s 
camp of victory, that already they saw their chief at the head 
of the Roman state, and quarreled about the disposal of 
honors, offices and spoils. The estates of the rich men in 
Caesar’s camp were cut up and divided, —on paper. Much 
wrangling was the result, and the cries to be led against 
Caesar grew among soldiers, politicians and courtiers alike. 

Labienus appears to have been the very worst of counsel¬ 
ors for Pompey. Whatever his motives for his present 
hatred of Caesar, the feeling was pronounced. He could 
scarcely himself believe, but he certainly led Pompey to 
believe, that Caesar’s troops were not of the best; that there 
were few Gallic veterans in the ranks; and that his young 
soldiers — teste Dyrrachium — would not stand fire. He 
dwelt on the fact that Pompey’s cavalry was undoubtedly 
superior to Caesar’s; and alleged that with the preponderance 
of numbers there could be no doubt whatever of victory so 
soon as Caesar was attacked. It is certain that Pompey was 
firmly convinced that he must now win. And there existed 
abundant reason for his conviction. There was but one weak 
premise in his argument. He forgot that he had Caesar in 
his front, and that the personal factor is always the strongest 
in war. He took no steps to counterbalance the weight 
Caesar’s personality would have in the coming fray. The 


552 


THE FORCES OF EACH. 


defect in Pompey’s army was the lack of one head, one pur¬ 
pose to control and direct events. 

Caesar, on the other hand, was his army. The whole 
body was instinct with his purpose. From low to high all 
worked on his own method. He controlled its every mood 
and act. He was the mainspring and balance-wheel alike. 
And as he now felt that he could again rely upon his legions, 
— perhaps better than before their late defeat, — he proposed 
to bring Pompey to battle even though he had but half the 
force of his opponent. 

Both armies had as by mutual consent approached each 
other and lay in the vicinity of Pharsalus. Caesar, as we 
have seen, had first moved to this place and been followed at 
an interval of a few days by Pompey. 

The forces of each can be fairly estimated. Some authori¬ 
ties claim that between three and four hundred thousand men 
faced each other on this field. This is absurd. Nearly all 
the ancient historians agree that Pompey had one hundred 
and ten cohorts, Caesar, eighty-two cohorts, and that each had 
some auxiliaries. Pompey, whose cohorts were nearer the 
normal strength than Caesar’s, had not far from fifty thou¬ 
sand legionaries (the Commentaries state them at forty-five 
thousand men), some four thousand bowmen, seven thousand 
cavalry, and a host of auxiliaries, — a total certainly exceed¬ 
ing sixty thousand men. Caesar’s cohorts were small, scarcely 
more than three hundred men each. They had been much 
depleted and he had not been able to recruit them up to 
normal strength. He numbered in all not over twenty-five 
thousand legionaries (the Commentaries say twenty-two thou¬ 
sand), had but one thousand mounted men, and fewer auxil¬ 
iaries than Pompey, — a total of some thirty thousand. All 
authorities are agreed that Pompey outnumbered Caesar sub¬ 
stantially two to one. 


THE PLACE OF BATTLE. 


553 


There is again, as so frequently occurs in ancient battles, 
some dispute as to which bank of the river the battle of 
Pharsalus was fought on. A study of the topography of the 
country and the field makes the matter perfectly clear. 
Ponrpey had come from Larissa, which lay north from Phar¬ 
salus; Caesar had come from Metropolis, which lay to the 
west. These facts must be borne in mind; as also that the 
Enipeus, according to Strabo, springs from Mount Othrys and 
flows past Pharsalus; that the battle, according to Appian, 
was between Pharsalus and the Enipeus; and that according 
to the Commentaries Pompey’s right and Caesar’s left flanks 
leaned on the river. We must find a site on which Pompey 
could suitably camp his large army and build certain castella 
we are told about, and a battle-ground between the rival 
camps which fits the relations which have come down to us. 
Unless we satisfy these points, as well as military probabili¬ 
ties, we are all at sea. The following theory of the battle is 
consistent with all these facts, and no other is. It has been 
the custom to throw aside one or other of these statements as 
inconsistent with the rest; but that theory which agrees with 
all of them is manifestly the best; especially when it accords 
with the terrain. As in the case of Cannae, there is no need 
to discard any fact given by any reliable authority. 

The Enipeus flows from its source through deep ravines 
until it emerges into the plain of Pharsalus. Here it turns 
to the west and incloses heights to-day known as Karadja 
Ahmet, some six hundred feet above the river-bed. On all 
sides, except on the west towards the plain, rises a heavy net¬ 
work of mountains. West of Karadja Ahmet there projects 
from this network the hill of Krindir, and between the two 
hills, bounded on the south by the mountains and on the 
north by the river, is a smaller plain, four miles long by two 
miles wide. 


554 


PHARSALUS. 


The Cynocephalse Mountains — a range of gray, serrated 
peaks — lie to the north. On his way from Larissa Pompey 
had come across the plateau, leaving the Cynocephalse hills 
on his left. He could not have camped here, with a view to 
battle, as alleged by Mommsen; it was far too rugged for 
operations. Pompey needed a battle-ground on which he 
could use his large body of cavalry. He sought a place 
whose slope was such that he could induce Csesar to attack 
him, which on the rough and cut-up heights of Cynocephalse 
Csesar would certainly not have done. His enemy was al¬ 
ready encamped in the narrows between the Enipeus and 
Krindir, with the citadel of Pharsalus — perhaps Homer’s 
Phthia, dwelling of Achilles — frowning, with heroic memo¬ 
ries, from its two-peaked hill five hundred feet above his 
camp. Pompey did what it was natural to do; he moved 
down and across the Enipeus, and pitched his camp on Iva- 
radja Ahmet, where he had in his front a suitable slope, with 
his flanks protected by the river on one side and the hills on 
the other, and with a good ford across the Enipeus at his 
back. On the flanking hills to the left of his camp he threw 
up a number of redoubts. 

Csesar faced east, Pompey west. The camps were five miles 
apart. Csesar was intent on bringing Pompey to battle. He 
had kept his touch on the pulse of his army, and found that 
its beat was again strong and regular. This capacity to test 
the tone of an army’s system is distinctly a proof of the great 
captain. Despite his late defeat, Csesar was not misled in 
his estimate of his soldiers; despite his victory, Pompey’s 
confidence in his cohorts was misplaced. 

To bring Pompey to an issue, Csesar each day led out his 
men and set them in array, at first on their own ground not 
far distant from Pompey’s camp, but on succeeding days 
advancing up to the foot of the slope on which lay his power- 


POMPEY INVITES BATTLE. 


555 


ful antagonist. His liorse, of which he had hut a handful 
compared to Pompey, he mixed with the most active of the 
light troops, and habituated them to this species of combat 
by daily skirmishes. The cavalry, thus sustained, though 
numerically weaker, felt confidence in its conduct, and in 



one of its outpost combats defeated the enemy, killing one of 
the Allobrogian deserter-chiefs. Caesar’s men thus gained 
in self-poise from day to day. 

Pompey did not leave the hill his camp lay on, but 
uniformly drew up on the lower slope, hoping that Caesar 
would attack him at this disadvantage; but from his much 
greater strength, Caesar was far too wary to do so. Nothing 
better shows Pompey’s weaker morale than his indecision 
here though every element was in his favor. Nor can it be 
said that Pompey was still acting on his old theory of tiring 
out Caesar by non-action. For, whether of his own free will 
or yielding to the importunities of his friends, he had come 
hither especially to give Caesar, sore hit in the late disaster, 
the coup de grace. 

Unsuccessful in his attempt to bring Pompey to battle on 





556 


CAESAR ACCEPTS. 


equal terms, Caesar was about to change bis tactics. He 
determined to shift his ground from day to day, and thus 
endeavor to catch Pompey under adverse conditions on the 
march. For Pompey’s men were not used to hard marching, 
as were Caesar’s, and would be harassed by a series of forced 
manoeuvres. And moreover, Caesar, by keeping in motion, 
could more readily supply himself with corn without detailing 
a heavy force from camp each day. On the very morning 
when Caesar proposed to put his new plan into execution he 
noticed that Pompey had advanced farther than usual from 
his camp and down the slope, as if willing finally to test the 
issue. This was actually the case, for Pompey’s friends had 
unanimously demanded battle. 

Pompey, though giving way to pressure, in his inner con¬ 
sciousness still clung to the value of his defensive views. 
This came partly from lack of initiative, partly from the fact 
that he was a good enough soldier to see that the victory at 
Dyrrachium had not been wholly without accident, that 
Caesar’s troops were really better than his own, and that to 
keep up a Fabian policy was safe, and more apt to win in 
the end, even if less commendable on the score of enterprise. 
This was a healthy view; but his lieutenants combated it, 
and Pompey’s vanity yielded to their insistence. 

Seeing Pompey’s advance, Caesar deferred his march to 
test the intention of the enemy and drew up over against 
them. It was the 29th of June, 48 b. c. 



Coin with Civic Crown. 


XXXV. 


PHARSALUS. JUNE 29, 48 B. C. 

The Pompeians felt confident of- victory. They were two to one, and had 
won the last fight. Pompey believed that by throwing his cavalry upon Cae¬ 
sar’s flank, he could rout his legions before they were able to close for battle. 
Pompey’s right rested on the Enipeus, Caesar’s left; the cavalry was on the 
outer flanks. Each army had three lines, but Caesar made a fourth line, perhaps 
a sort of a column of chosen troops, and posted it back of his right to hold head 
against Pompey’s cavalry. Pompey allowed Caesar to attack. The legions 
soon closed in fierce struggle. Meanwhile Pompey’s cavalry rode round Cae¬ 
sar’s right, defeated his small body of horse, and, confident of victory, pushed 
in on the flank of the legions. But they were unexpectedly met by Caesar’s 
fourth line and checked ; and, lacking cohesion, dispersed. The legions were 
alone left. Caesar ordered in his third line. Its charge was stout, and the 
Pompeians gave way. Pompey fled. Following up his victory, Caesar captured 
or dispersed the entire force. Pompey made his way first to Asia Minor, 
thence to Egypt, where he was assassinated. Caesar followed him. 

Pompey had vauntingly declared to his men that he would 
make Caesar’s legions fly before their infantry came to 
action, and was unwise enough to explain to them how he 
proposed to do it. His plan was to place his heavy body of 
cavalry in one column on his own left wing and have it sally 
out and envelop Caesar’s right and rear, and charge in on the 
uncovered side, — of which all Romans had a dread, — be¬ 
fore Caesar’s legions could reach his line of foot. It was his 
cavalry in which he particularly gloried. Nor did this seem 
an idle boast, for his horse was seven to one of Caesar’s and 
much of it was supposed to be and was indeed of high quality. 
Had he been an Alexander, and had he handled the cavalry 
himself as the Macedonian did at the Hydaspes, his theory 


558 


CJESAR RECONNOITRES. 


would have been carried out in practice. Labienus, too, 
addressed the soldiers and told them that not only had the 
fight at Dyrrachium robbed Caesar of all his best men, but 
that none of his old legionaries had come back with him from 
Gaul. Pompey and he and all the officers took an oath to 
return from the battle victorious or to perish. The Pom¬ 
peians were in the highest elation and confidence. 

Caesar carefully reconnoitred Pompey’s position. Pompey, 
instead of remaining on his inexpugnable heights, had 
descended to the plain and left his camp over a mile in his 
rear. Caesar saw that Pompey’s right wing leaned on the , 
river where were steep banks which, with a force of six 
hundred cavalry from Pontus, abundantly protected it. This 
wing under Lentulus was composed of the Cilician and 
Spanish cohorts; these latter Afranius had brought from 
those discharged at the river Varus. Pompey considered 
these his steadiest troops. His left wing, under Domitius 
Ahenobarbus, contained the two legions sent him in the 
previous year by Caesar, numbered the First and Third, and 
was accompanied by Pompey in person. The left flank was 
near the rising ground. Scipio held the centre with the two 
Syrian legions. Seven cohorts guarded the camp, which, as 
stated, was flanked by some redoubts. Many auxiliary and 
volunteer cohorts, including two thousand veterani, were in¬ 
terspersed in the line. Pompey’s cavalry, under Labienus, 
and his archers and slingers, were on the left wing, which 
was in the air, for the hills were too easy to be any partic¬ 
ular protection. The entire force comprised one hundred 
and ten complete cohorts of heavy troops numbering, ac¬ 
cording to Caesar, forty-five thousand men in line, and stood 
in the usual three lines and ten-deep formation. The cav- 
a h*y, light troops and auxiliaries swelled this number by one 
half. “Hercules Invictus” was the password. 




560 


CJZSAR IN LINE. 


Caesar, as was his wont, drew up his legions in three lines 
of cohorts, four in the first line, three in the second and 
third lines. The men may have stood eight deep. At all 
events, Caesar must have deployed his cohorts so as to extend 
his front to equal that of Pompey. Had he not done so, the 
Commentaries would have stated the fact, as it would have 
had a marked effect on the tactics of the battle. It is to be 
regretted that we do not know how Caesar covered so much 
front, Pompey so little, for the force each had in line. 
Caesar placed the Tenth legion, despite its heavy losses, on the 
right, and the Ninth legion on the left. The depletion of the 
latter had been so severe that he placed the Eighth close by 
to support it and make up, as it were, one legion. Two 
cohorts — or as some think two thousand men, say six or 
seven cohorts — guarded the camp. Antony commanded 
the left; Sylla the right; Domitius the centre. Caesar him¬ 
self took post opposite Pompey, with the Tenth. He had 
eighty-two cohorts, including those in camp. Those in line 
numbered twenty - two thousand men, as he states in the 
Commentaries. With his cavalry, light troops and a few 
auxiliaries, he may have had thirty thousand men facing 
the enemy. The two lines stood within some three hundred 
paces of each other. Caesar was outnumbered two to one. 
His situation and purpose recalls vividly to mind the iron 
will of Frederick who so constantly faced these and yet 
greater odds, and by unmatched determination wrested vic¬ 
tory from the very jaws of disaster. 

Caesar foresaw that the main danger would come to his 
right flank from Pompey’s cavalry force, for his left leaned 
on the steep river banks and was safe from such attack. 
Pompey at all events should not take him unawares. Recog¬ 
nizing the danger, he quickly made up a fourth line by draw¬ 
ing a choice cohort from the third line of each legion except 



AT THE MOMENT OF CONTACT 



« 



















562 


A CORPS D’JSLITE. 


the Eighth and Ninth, and placed this fourth line of six 
cohorts in support of his small body of horse on his right, — 
“opposed them to Pompey’s cavalry, and acquainted them 
with his wishes.” He gave this corps d?elite to understand 
that on their steadiness, courage and rapid action would 
depend the result of the day. He also distinctly required 
of his main lines that they should not charge until ordered; 
and especially so the third line, which he proposed to hold 
strictly in reserve, lest he should have need of it to repair 
an unexpected disaster. He then, as was usual, addressed 
his army, exhorting them to display their ancient courage, 
which had won on so many hotly contested fields, and called 
on them to witness that it was not he who spilled Roman 
blood, but Pompey, who persistently refused his overtures of 
peace. We have no record of his words, but the enthusiasm 
of the legionaries was marked. It was well typified by one 
Crastinus, a volunteer who had been primipilus of the Tenth, 
who, stepping from the ranks, voiced the ardent spirit of the 
rest: “I will so act, Caesar, that thou shalt be grateful to 
me, living or dead,” — which promise he redeemed with his 
life. The trumpet signal for battle was then sounded. The 
battle-cry was “Venus Victrix.” 

There was space enough between the armies for each to 
advance part way upon the other, as was the usual manner 
in ancient battles. But Pompey had ordered his legions to 
await Caesar’s onset and to strike when the enemy should 
reach them tired with the rapid charge and with ranks pre¬ 
sumably disordered. Pompey thought “that the javelins 
would fall with less force if the soldiers were kept on their 
ground, than if they met them in their course; at the same 
time he trusted that Caesar’s soldiers, after running over 
double the usual ground, would become weary and exhausted 
by the fatigue.’ But Caesar knew well the value, moral and 




I 


THE INITIAL CHARGE. 


563 


physical, of impetus. “There is a certain impetuosity of 
spirit and an alacrity implanted by nature in the hearts of 
all men, which is inflamed by a desire to meet the foe. This 
a general should endeavor not to repress, but to increase; 
nor was it a vain institution of our ancestors, that the trum¬ 
pets should sound on all sides, and a general shout be raised, 
by which they imagined that the enemy were struck with 
terror, and their own army inspired with courage.” Every 
great general has understood this. Caesar knew that his men 
could endure the fatigue and that they would be the more 
inspired by Pompey’s line awaiting their attack, as if from 
fear. 

The Caesarians rushed forth with great bravery. It was 
Crastinus, with one hundred and twenty chosen volunteers 
on the right, who charged first. This was the place of 
honor, given to such men as, having discharged to the state 
all their military obligations, still preferred the career of 
arms. The Caesarians, perceiving that Pompey’s men did 
not advance of their own accord, and with the experience 
bred of many battles, paused as with one consent midway, 
lest they should reach the enemy out of breath. “After a 
short respite ” they again advanced. When within distance 
they paused to let the front rank men cast their javelins, 
“instantly drew their swords, as Caesar had ordered them,” 
again sent their battle-cry resounding to the clouds and 
rushed upon their foemen with the cold steel. Pompey’s 
legions received them manfully and with unbroken ranks, 
hurling their pila and quickly drawing swords. The battle 
was engaged with stanchness on either side. The two lines 
mixed in one, e&ch intent on breaking down the other’s 
guard, and swayed to and fro in the deadly struggle, neither 
able to wrest from the other an advantage which foretold 


success. 


564 


POMPEY’S HORSE FLEES. 


At the instant of the crash of meeting legions, the cavalry 
was launched from Pompey’s left upon Caesar’s small body 
of horse, followed by his whole host of archers and slingers. 
The effect of the impact was never doubtful. Weight was 
superior to courage. Caesar’s cavalry was borne back, slowly 
but surely. It fought well, remembering the many fields on 
which it had held its own; but it soon began to lose forma¬ 
tion, to melt into a disorganized mass, and finally broke up. 
The enemy, believing success within their grasp, commenced 
to file off in small troops to get into the rear of the army. 
The moment was critical. Was it a battle lost or won? 

The foresight of Caesar now proved his salvation. His 
fourth line of six cohorts, hitherto held behind the other three, 
came into play. We must presume them to have been either 
deployed, or so disposed that they could readily deploy, to face 
the probable direction of the charge of Pompey’s horse. 
And cohorts such as they were had no dread of mounted men, 
in whatever number. Rushing forward at Caesar’s command 
when the Pompeian cavalry approached, this splendid body 
of men, who knew not fear nor ever doubted victory, charged 
with desperate purpose upon the front of the Pompeian cav¬ 
alry, which, unsuspecting and in loose order, were wheeling in 
on the flank of the Tenth as if they believed the battle won. 
The Pompeian horse, startled at the unexpected sight of this 
firm array, at once drew rein. They were made up of many 
bodies from countries scarce knowing each other’s names; 
and however effective as separate columns, they were bound 
together by no common purpose. Their speed once checked, 
their momentum was gone. There was no one again to 
launch them on the foe. Each squadron loiked at the bold 
front of Caesar’s advancing men, paused, balanced. Who 
hesitates is lost. Caesar’s bold cohorts kept on until they 
reached the line of horse, and then, instead of hurling their 


RESERVES INTO ACTION. 


565 


pila, they closed with the enemy and, using them as spears, 
struck at the horses’ breasts and the men’s legs and faces. 
Not a man of all the seven thousand stood. Discounte¬ 
nanced, the squadrons, losing their heads, turned and fled 
towards the hills. Pompey’s right arm was paralyzed. What 
a contrast to the cavalry at the Hydaspes, which, under Al¬ 
exander’s tremendous impulse, charged, and charged, and 
charged, and yet again charged home, until they pounded 
the flank of Porus’ huge army to a jelly! 

The cavalry disposed of, the six cohorts immediately 
advanced upon the slingers and archers, who, deprived of 
their mainstay, could offer no resistance, fell savagely on 
them and cut them to pieces where they stood. Then once 
more wheeling about upon the Pompeians’ left wing, while 
the main lines were still locked in their bloody struggle, this 
gallant body furiously attacked the enemy’s foot on the left 
and rear. The tables were turned. 

Caesar’s plans had been welcomed by the smile of For¬ 
tune. The Pompeians, astonished beyond measure at the 
defeat of the horse, were visibly wavering under the blows 
of the flank attack. The second lines had already advanced 
into the fighting front. The moment had arrived for the 
home-thrust. Caesar, who had until this moment directed 
his corps (T elite, now galloped over to his reserve third line 
and ordered it into action. Advancing with steady stride 
and perfect front upon the enemy, while the first and second 
lines fell back through the intervals and sustained them from 
the rear, these fresh and undaunted veterans deployed into 
battle order, and with one charge, delivered only as veterans 
can do it, broke through the Pompeian line as if it were but 
lace work, and tore it into shreds. It has been said that 
Caesar’s orders to his third line were to cut at the faces of 
the Pompeians, many of whom were young Roman fashion- 


566 


A LUXURIOUS CAMP. 


ables, who dreaded a visible scar worse than a deadly wound. 
This lacks the semblance of truth; but true or false, no 
further resistance was attempted. Every man fled towards 
the camp. Nor was this all. When Pompey “saw his cav¬ 
alry routed and that part of the army on which he reposed 
his greatest hopes thrown into confusion, despairing of the 
rest, he quitted the field and retreated straightway on horse¬ 
back to his camp,” ordered the gates closed and retired to 
his tent in apathy and despair. 

The battle was won. Pompey was not only beaten but 
incapable of further action. But the camp must still be 
taken. Exhorting his men not to pause midway, Caesar led 
them to attack its intrenchments. Though wearied by the 
heat, for they had fought from morn to midday, the legion¬ 
aries obeyed with their wonted cheerfulness. The cohorts 
left in Pompey’s camp fought well, but the best defense was 
made by the Thracians and auxiliaries, for the Pompeians 
who had taken refuge in it had mostly thrown away their 
weapons and standards, intent on further flight. The camp 
was captured, the foe fleeing to the hills beyond Ivaradja 
Ahmet. 

The camp was full of the evidences of security and luxury. 
Tables loaded with plate and viands, tents covered with ivy 
and floored with fresh sods, testified to their false estimate 
of Caesar’s men, “distressed and suffering troops, who had 
always been in want of common necessaries.” Pompey, so 
soon as the Caesarians had forced the trenches, throwing aside 
his dress of general, mounted and fled to Larissa and thence 
to the coast, which he reached with but thirty horse, and 
embarked. He felt that his men had betrayed him. 

Caesar once again urged his legions not to pause for plun¬ 
der, but to make an end of the whole war by capturing those 
who had fled to the mountain. In the persistency of his pur- 


VIGOROUS PURSUIT. 


567 


suit upon this field lie resembles Alexander. Pursuit was 
not as a rule liis strong point. The men were most amenable 
to discipline. They left Pompey’s camp unplundered and 
followed Caesar, who set about drawing a line of works at the 
foot of the hill where the runaways had taken refuge. Fore¬ 
seeing their danger, as Caesar’s men threatened to surround 



them and were advancing on three sides, there being no water 
on the hills, the Pompeians sought to retreat by a circuit to 
the river where it makes a bend. Here they hoped to cross 
and get on the road to Larissa, in which place they might un¬ 
dertake renewed defense under another leader, or failing this, 
might better plead for terms. But Caesar, leaving a force in 
Pompey’s camp and another in his own, took four legions, 





568 


LOSSES AND PRISONERS . 


made a smart march up the river along the plain, and at a 
distance of six miles from his camp cut the fugitives off also 
from this retreat. The mass took refuge on still another part 
of the same hill. Though Caesar’s men were greatly ex¬ 
hausted, having fought and marched all day, he encouraged 
them to draw a work between the river and hill at the only 
available approach, to prevent the enemy from getting water 
during the night. This brought the Pompeians to immediate 
terms. They sent to treat for surrender. A few leading- 
men of senatorial rank escaped. 

Next morning all were ordered down from the hill and bid 
to pile their arms. Expecting retribution, they found clem¬ 
ency. Caesar pardoned all, and forbade the soldiers to harm 
a man or take from them anything they had. Then, sending 
his weary troops to camp, and taking fresher ones, he pushed 
forward to Larissa. 

In this noted battle Caesar lost but thirty centurions and 
two hundred men killed, — a noteworthy proportion of officers, 
— while of Pompey’s army there fell fifteen thousand men; 
twenty-four thousand prisoners were made; one hundred and 
eighty standards and nine eagles were taken. Domitius 
Ahenobarbus was killed while fleeing. The prisoners were 
sent to Asia and organized into new legions by Domitius 
Calvinus. 

This splendid victory was won by Caesar’s admirable dispo¬ 
sitions, the lack of vigor of Pompey’s soldiers, and the want 
of steadfastness of Pompey’s cavalry. Had this body done 
its duty the victory would have been more dearly purchased. 
Caesar’s quick detection of the weak point of his line; his 
disposal of the six chosen cohorts to resist the cavalry; and 
upon their overthrowing this body, his hurling them on 
Pompey’s left flank, was a superb exhibition of grand tactics. 
It was entirely unexpected by Pompey, who believed his left 


CjESAR pursues pompey. 


569 


flank to be his winning one, and upset all his calculations. 
It shows how a small body of determined men, well handled 
and thrown upon the foe at the critical instant, can change 
the tide of battle. 

During this time at sea, Brundisium had been blockaded 
by Decimus Laelius, one of Pompey’s admirals; and another 
of them, Cassius, had captured the harbor of Messana in 
Sicily, had destroyed by fire Pomponius’ fleet and had later 
captured Yibo in Italy and in like manner damaged the fleet 
of Sulpicius. All these places would have fallen to the 
Pompeians but for the news of the victory of Caesar at 
Pharsalus, upon receiving which Lselius and Cassius speedily 
decamped with their respective fleets. 

Calenus, meanwhile, reduced much of Phocis and Boeotia; 
and after Pharsalus, Calenus and Cornuficius remained to 
complete the conquest of Greece and Illyria. 

From Larissa Csesar pursued Pompey with his cavalry to 
Amphipolis. Here he saw that Pompey had escaped him. 
The Sixth legion having come up, he kept on along the shore 
of Thrace; reached the Hellespont July 24; stopped to 
collect means of crossing; and finally put over in frail barks, 
— a most foolhardy operation. On the passage hazard 
threw in his way one of Pompey’s minor fleets of ten galleys 
under L. Cassius. By good rights Caesar should have suc¬ 
cumbed ; but the news of Pharsalus so utterly stupefied the 
Pompeian that Caesar, with his matchless audacity, took 
the whole squadron prisoners. This windfall facilitated his 
progress to a degree. 

Pompey had fled to points in the iEgean and Asia Minor, 
hoping in each place to run across friends and help. He 
dreaded to encounter Cato and his other lieutenants, after his 
disgraceful flight from Pharsalus. Caesar felt that he must 
pursue him whithersoever he might fly, and finish the war 


¥ 



570 DEATH OF POMPEY. 

without allowing him the opportunity to collect a fresh army. 
He marched on his track as fast as he was able, but was 
hampered by being tied down to an infantry column. He 
left Mark Antony behind to command the army, with orders 
to cross to Italy so soon as the enemy’s fleet would permit it, 
and hold the peninsula. Csesar took with him only the Sixth 
legion, and ordered Calenus to send him while en route 
another legion of young troops. He had a few hundred 
horse. 

In his flight Pompey stayed one day, July 2, at Amphi- 
polis, where he issued a proclamation calling all men to arms; 
and collecting moneys from the tax-farmers there, set sail 
for Mitylene, and thence to Pamphylia, Cilicia and Cyprus. 
Antioch having refused to receive him, he gave up a lialf- 
conceived design of going to Syria and thence to the Par- 
thians; but collecting in Cyprus more money, and brass for 
military use, and raising two thousand troops, he sailed to 
Pelusium in Egypt, which he reached toward the end of 
September. Here he found the ten-year old Ptolemy, son of 
Ptolemy Auletes, engaged in war with his sister Cleopatra, 
who was seventeen, for the sole possession of the Egyptian 
throne. Cleopatra' had taken refuge in Syria, and Ptolemy 
was at Pelusium holding the approaches to Egypt against 
her. Their respective armies now lay near the desert. To 
Ptolemy, Pompey applied for a refuge in Alexandria. 
Ptolemy received his application with openly expressed 
kindness, but fearing to associate with misfortune, he, or 
rather his tutor, the eunuch Photinus, caused Pompey to be 
put to death by Achillas, captain of the king’s guard. L. 
Lentulus was likewise assassinated. 

Thus miserably died in his fifty-ninth year, Pompey, 
surnamed the Great when but twenty-six years old. He had 
been the popular hero of the Romans. He had conducted 


POMPEY’S CHARACTER. 


571 


seventeen successful campaigns. He had thrice entered 
Rome in triumph. He had thrice been consul. With Cae- 
sar he could have divided the world. To what a pass had 
he come, indeed! 

“A good officer,” says Mommsen, “but otherwise of 
mediocre gifts of intellect and heart, fate had with super¬ 
human constancy for thirty years allowed him to solve all 
brilliant and toilless tasks; had permitted him to pluck all 
laurels planted and fostered by others; had presented to him 
all the conditions requisite for obtaining the supreme power, 
— only in order to exhibit in his person an example of spu¬ 
rious greatness to which history knows no parallel.” 

This contest for sovereignty between Caesar and Pom- 
pey shows marked characteristics of the men themselves. 
Whether right or wrong, Caesar made great efforts to keep 
the appearance of right on his side, and succeeded in so doing. 
In this sense were made his reiterated appeals to Pornpey for 
a personal interview. He may, soon after the refusal of the 
first one, have seen that his appeals would be fruitless, but 
he nevertheless persevered, and no doubt his persistency, 
coupled to success, gave him the shadow of right in the eyes 
of many who had previously opposed Mm. For the same 
purpose of persuading people to his cause Caesar was generous 
towards all Roman citizens who came under his control, as 
prisoners or otherwise, even when they had been active foes. 
Caesar was not less inhuman than other Romans, but he was 
wont to be politic in his actions, and he knew when and 
how to be generous. 

In warlike qualities the two generals are distinctly con¬ 
trasted. Caesar’s broad and solid views, foresight and power 
of reasoning out his course of action, were as marked as his 
persistency, his wisdom and his strength. During much of 
his Gallic campaign he had foreseen and been preparing for 


572 


CAESAR’S rapid work. 


this final struggle between Pompey and himself. And he 
had not reckoned in vain on the splendid legions he had 
created, nor on Gaul, which had afforded him his base for 
operations in Italy. Even Caesar’s foolhardy exploits never 
carried him out of the generally wise scope of his original 
plan. Pompey, on the contrary, while anticipating the com¬ 
ing struggle with equal certainty, had done absolutely no¬ 
thing to enable him to cope with Caesar. He had apparently 
not comprehended that he must undertake to hold Italy or 
forfeit the first and most important innings of the game. 
He had made preparations elsewhere for resistance, while he 
had failed to do so at the centre of the empire. He did not 
make use of his resources when collected. Instead of facing 
Caesar and forcing him to pay dearly for success, he allowed 
him to snatch Spain from his lieutenants with apparently no 
effort to check him. One can scarcely imagine conduct 
more impotent than this. One can scarcely recognize the 
Pompey who conducted the war against the pirates. 

Caesar’s directness of purpose in contrast to this is won¬ 
derful. In sixty days from crossing the Rubicon, he had 
conquered Italy. Then, shielding himself by a curtain of 
forces on the Adriatic, he turned to Spain in order to protect 
his rear and base from Pompey’s legions in the peninsula. 
In six weeks more after reaching Iberia, this gigantic labor 
was also accomplished, and his course against Pompey was 
made clear. Then followed a period during which his hands 
were tied by Pompey’s control of the sea. It was many 
months before he could cross both his detachments to Epirus, 
join them and stand face to face with his foe in command 
of such a force as would warrant him in fighting. 

Caesar knew his enemy. Though he was justified in rely¬ 
ing on his inertia, he was unquestionably rash in moving 
with half his force, as he did, across the sea and running the 


CJESAR’S FAULTS. 


573 


chance of being beaten in detail. For if Pompey had but 
put forth his strength in a creditable manner, he could have 
crushed Caesar and all his hopes. The position of Caesar at 
Dyrrachium was a false one, brought on by conduct rash 
rather than judicious; and though its outcome was the vic¬ 
tory of Pharsalus, it must be distinctly condemned as 
unsound military policy. This can scarcely be called the 
art of a great general, whose province is to play a bold but 
not rash part. Nor did Caesar accomplish any substantial 
good by his haste in seeking Pompey in Epirus. The same 
time spent in Italy would have enabled him to prepare means 
of shipping his entire force at once to Greece, and thus have 
saved the grave risk he ran. Or better still, in much less 
time, he could have marched through Illyricum. The legions 
he needed all came from Spain and Gaul; they concentrated 
in the Padane country; it was not much farther from there 
to Epirus than to Brundisium. He would, indeed, have 
saved time if from this latter place he had made the overland 
march through Illyricum. This was his true road, for Illyri¬ 
cum was committed to his interests while Pompey held the 
Adriatic. There was no real danger of Pompey’s crossing 
to Italy when he knew Caesar was advancing to meet him in 
Greece. It was not his way. Good fortune alone saved 
Caesar from the disaster which all but followed on his rash¬ 
ness in crossing to Greece by sea. 

Caesar’s boldness in endeavoring, with his small force, to 
blockade Pompey near Dyrrachium, while it compels our 
admiration for its unwonted audacity, was none the less a 
reckless undertaking which of necessity sooner or later 
must and actually did come to grief. It entailed the loss of 
a large part of the flower of his army, not to mention the 
demoralization which it took no less than Caesar’s fluent 
tongue and able discipline to overcome. To undertake such 


574 


PICK AND SHOVEL. 


an operation shows rather an excess of animal than a well- 
balanced moral courage, — or else an inexpertness in gauging 
his task which we know Caesar was not subject to. In this 
operation, Caesar was conducting war more on the physical 
than on the intellectual plan. It was not a case of necessity, 
which always excuses a desperate act, for he afterwards suc¬ 
cessfully tried another and better scheme, that of luring 
Pompey into the open country. His allowing his valor to 
override his discretion met with its proper check. Nothing 
but his luck saved him from fatal disaster. It was well that 
he was released from his false situation by a defeat which 
was not a final one. 

An interesting circumstance in the campaigns of Caesar, 
which cannot but impress itself on every American soldier, 
is the handiness exhibited by Caesar’s legionaries in the use 
of pick and shovel. Every Roman soldier knew how to use 
a spade. But Caesar’s men were even more expert. These 
intrenching tools, quite apart from the daily camping-work, 
seemed to be as important to the legions as their weapons or 
their shields. They dug their way to victory on more than 
one occasion. 

The best illustration of Caesar’s character in the campaign 
against Pompey is his determination to fight at Pharsalus. 
Not every general is called upon or is ready to fight a deci¬ 
sive battle, which must make or mar his cause, against an 
army of twice his strength. In this determination one must 
recognize character sustained by intelligence of the first 
order. Caesar had taken post at Metropolis, expecting to 
manoeuvre with Pompey until he could place him at a disad¬ 
vantage. Pompey, however, moved on him, and Caesar with¬ 
out hesitation determined to take the initiative. This he 
boldly did; his men backed his courage by their gallantry, 
and leader and legions won. Pompey, on the contrary, 


CLEMENCY AND CRUELTY. 


575 


while his plan of battle was good, showed in its execution 
that there was no stamina in his men, no such esprit cle coips 
as emanates from contact with the great commander. His 
cavalry lacked the first elements of stanchness or discipline. 
It had no unity of action in the absence of a proper com¬ 
mander; and this was Pompey’s fault. Orientals could not 
have behaved worse. And there appears to have been no 
mutual confidence which might be called on to resist disaster 
on the field. So soon as the first contrary incident occurred, 
there was neither head nor heart to stem the tide of defeat. 
Pompey beaten showed himself incapable of further exertion, 
mental or moral; his adherents decamped like a terror- 
stricken herd. Caesar’s loss in killed measures the fighting 
of the Pompeian army, and this measures the loss of morale 
of the great general. 

In eighteen months from taking up arms Caesar had made 
himself master of the world by defeating the only man who 
claimed to dispute this title with him. The battle of Phar- 
salus was fought just seven months from the landing in 
Epirus. 

It must be said in Caesar’s honor that few conquerors of 
the ancient world made use of clemency after victory as did 
he. He knew its value, no doubt, but we must believe that 
with victory disappeared all feelings of animosity. This side 
of his character stands in curious contrast to that which urged 
him unnecessarily and by treachery to slay four hundred 
and thirty thousand defenseless Germans in one day. 

The most marked result of the victory of Pharsalus was 
the transfer of allegiance by the provinces from the van¬ 
quished to the victor. These all recalled their military and 
naval contingents and refused to receive the refugees. Juba 
was the only man of consequence who stood to his guns. 
Most of the leading men escaped from Pharsalus and made 


576 


THE ARISTOCRATS. 


their way to Cato at Corcyra, — part of them by sea, part 
over the mountains. Here was held a conference at winch 
Scipio, Labienus, Afranius, Cnaeus Pompey and others 
were present. Greece manifestly was lost. Pompey’s 
whereabouts were unknown; large parts of the fleet had been 
recalled by their respective provinces. On the other hand, 
Spain was largely favorable to Pompey. In Africa Juba 
was a strong centre-point; the Pompeian fleet was still larger 
than Caesar’s. There was no chance in surrender,—there 
was one chance left in a partisan war. But the Pompeians 
no longer existed. It was the aristocrats who continued the 
war. 



Ancient Helmet. 






XXXYI. 


ALEXANDRIA. AUGUST, 48, TO MARCH, 47 B. C. 

Caesar now committed another of those foolhardy acts of which his career is 
full. He followed Pompey to Alexandria with hut four thousand men, and 
attempted to dictate the succession to the throne of Ptolemy, about which Cleo¬ 
patra and her brother were disputing. He was resisted by an Egyptian army 
of five times his force, and found himself beleaguered in Alexandria. He had 
great difficulty in holding himself. He sent for reinforcements, and managed 
to keep the eastern harbor and the Pharos tower. He burned the Egyptian 
fleet, and utilized his own fleet to great advantage. In a naval battle he 
defeated the Egyptians. These then essayed to cut off his water supply by 
pumping sea-water into the canals which supplied him; but Caesar saved him¬ 
self by digging wells. One legion soon reached him, and some vessels from 
Rhodes. In a second naval battle.he was again successful; and he then cap¬ 
tured the entire island of Pharos. But in a fight ou the mole between the 
island and city Ciesar was defeated, as also in a third naval battle. Finally, 
Mithridates of Pergamos, with an army of relief, came to the Nile; Caesar 
marched up the Delta, joined him, and, in a battle of considerable difficulty, 
decisively defeated the Egyptians, and recovered all the ground he had so nearly 
lost. But he had wasted the better part of a year by his carelessness in moving 
to Alexandria with so insufficient a force. 

CiESAR, in pursuit of Pompey, whom he thought to find in 
Ephesus, had crossed to Asia Minor. Here he heard that 
Pompey had been in Cyprus, and divined that he had gone 
to Egypt. He had with him the Sixth legion, and the one 
Calenus had been ordered to send him joined him August 
8, at Rhodes. With these and eight hundred horse, he 
set out for Alexandria. He had ten ships of war from 
Rhodes and a few from Asia. The foot amounted to about 
thirty-two hundred men; the rest of the legionaries, “dis¬ 
abled by wounds received in various battles, by fatigue and 


578 


CAESAR, IN ALEXANDRIA. 


the length of their march, could not follow him.” W ith the 
eight hundred horse he boasted a bare four thousand men. 



“ Relying on the fame of his exploits, he did not hesitate to 
set out with a feeble force, and thought he would be secure 
in any place.” 

Reaching Alexandria about August 20, he was informed 







CAESAR IN DANGER. 


579 


of the death of Pompey. This was less than two months 
after the battle of Pliarsalus. He anchored in the Great or 
eastern harbor, and took possession of the royal palace, which 
was half a fortress, situated near Cape Lochias, to the east of 
the artificial mole which divided the old and new harbors, 
and likewise of the arsenal, which was close by. Caesar had 
supposed that to the conqueror of Pompey many troops would 
be unnecessary, but he was speedily and rudely undeceived. 
The tumult of the populace caused by the troubles raging in 
the land made even Caesar unsafe. His entry into the place, 
preceded by the consular fasces, had in fact almost bred a riot, 
as the populace deemed such a display an infraction of their 
king’s prerogative. Caesar was called on to send immediately 
to Asia Minor for more legions, which he ordered collected 
by Domitius from some of the disbanded levies of Pompey. 

Meanwhile Caesar found himself in a most embarrassing 
situation. The troops he had sent for might be a long time 
reaching him. He himself had been detained by the period¬ 
ical winds. But he was not the man to look back when his 
hand had been put to the plow. With the scanty means at 
his disposal, he determined to hold his ground. He could 
have at once retired before allowing a quarrel to breed. But 
Caesar always settled all civil questions which came under his 
hand, pari passu with the military. He had undertaken to 
dictate a settlement of the troubles between young Ptolemy 
and Cleopatra. The late king had left his kingdom jointly 
to Ptolemy and Cleopatra, as king and queen, and had made 
the Roman people executors of his will. On this ground 
Caesar, as consul representing the Roman people, deemed that 
he had the right to order these princely claimants to plead 
their cause before him and to disband their armies until he 
decided between them. Alexandria was a large, independent, 
turbulent city, full of able men. The population at once 


580 


EGYPTIAN IMBROGLIO 


took alarm. It is possible that Caesar might not have been 
able to get away had he been so inclined; he had run some 
personal danger from the populace in landing; and the Alex¬ 



andrians had a large fleet, while he had next to none. Other 
motives than the Ptolemy-Cleopatra quarrel, or than the 
desire to gain his point, may have been the prevailing ones. 







CJESAR SEIZES PTOLEMY. 


581 


Cleopatra shortly arrived from Syria, and Caesar’s mandate 
was at first accepted; but Ptolemy and tlie eunuch. Pothinus, 
his tutor and regent during his minority, soon adopted a less 
peaceful policy, secretly appointed Achillas, the captain of 
the guards and intimate friend of the king, commander of 
the army at Pelusium, and ordered it to advance on Alex¬ 
andria. While the succession was being pleaded before 
Caesar, news came that the king’s army and all the cavalry 
were marching on the city. 

Achillas had a motley force of eighteen to twenty thousand 
foot and two thousand horse, largely made up of freebooters, 
slaves and runaways, but among these were many of Pom- 
pey’s disbanded legionaries. The Roman army of occupa¬ 
tion had been largely Pompeian, and easily sided against 
Caesar. “Caesar’s forces were by no means so strong that 
he could trust to them if he had occasion to hazard a battle 
outside the city. His only resource was to keep within the 
town in the most convenient places.” So soon as Caesar 
learned of the approach of Achillas he caused the king to 
send envoys to him. On these being assassinated by 
Achillas without even a hearing, Caesar saw through the plot 
and seized on the persons of both Ptolemy and Pothinus, who 
had not left Alexandria, and held them as hostages, “both 
supposing that the king’s name would have great influence 
with his subjects and to give the war the appearance of a 
scheme of a few desperate men, rather than of having been 
begun by the king’s command.” Pothinus was later exe¬ 
cuted by Caesar. 

Achillas had five times Caesar’s force, but the material of 
his army was poor. The old legionaries even, by long resi¬ 
dence in Egypt, and many intermarriages with the native 
women, had lost all ideas of Roman discipline. Still Achil¬ 
las was able to take possession of the larger part of the city 


582 


ALEXANDRIAN LIBRARY. 


of Alexandria, all except that small section which Caesar 
had occupied on his arrival, and which was as much as his 
handful of men could defend. The part he occupied Caesar 
at once put in a state of defense. He saw that his situation 
was questionable. However illy disciplined the Egyptian 
army, it was formidable in more than one way, and it was 
backed up by public sentiment. 

Achillas’ first effort was to force the palace, but he was 
unable to do so. Caesar had occupied and barricaded all the 
streets leading to it. At the same time there was a desultory 
and obstinate combat at the port side of the town, fought in 
many streets at once and along the wharves, and difficult to 
manage. Achillas attempted to get possession of the Alex¬ 
andrian war - galleys in the harbor, of which there were 
seventy-two, including many triremes and quinquiremes, but 
was foiled in his efforts. For fear they should fall into the 
enemy’s hands, as he could not well guard the vessels, Caesar 
put the torch to the entire fleet. It was in the conflagra¬ 
tion thus begun that the Alexandrian library perished, to¬ 
gether with many other public buildings and treasures. Had 
Achillas succeeded in getting hold of the ships, he could have 
closed the harbor and cut Caesar off from receiving reinforce¬ 
ments or victualing the palace. Cesar’s act, however disas¬ 
trous in its results, was a necessary method of protecting his 
position. 

The action at this point was fraught with grave danger. 
“Accordingly that spirit was displayed which ought to be 
shown when the one party saw that a speedy victory depended 
on the issue, and the other their safety.” Caesar held his 
own, and took early occasion to occupy the Pharos tower. 
At that time, the Pharos was “a tower on an island, of pro¬ 
digious height,” claimed by a later historian to have been 
four hundred ells, or nearly six hundred feet, “built with 


THE PHAROS. 


583 


amazing works and taking its name from the island. This 
island, lying over against Alexandria, forms a harbor; but 
on the upper side it is connected with the town by a narrow 
way eight hundred paces in length, made by piles sunk in 
the sea, and by a bridge. In this island some of the Egyp¬ 
tians have houses and a village as large as a town; and what¬ 
ever ships from any quarter, either through mistaking the 
channel or by the storm, have been driven from their course 
upon the coast, they constantly plunder like pirates. And 
without the consent of those who are masters of the Pharos, 
no vessels can enter the harbor, on account of its narrowness. 
Caesar being greatly alarmed on this account, whilst the 
enemy were engaged in battle, landed his soldiers, seized the 
Pharos, and placed a garrison in it. By this means he 
gained this point, that he could be supplied without danger 
with corn and auxiliaries; for he sent to all the neighboring 
countries to demand supplies.” By holding the Pharos tower 
Caesar commanded the entrance to the harbor, which secured 
his rear. 

But though Caesar had gained a footing in the harbor, he 
could gain nothing in the town. Here Achillas had a more 
than equal holding, Caesar merely keeping what he had got, 
and fortifying the most necessary posts. Achillas, who, 
through the inhabitants, held all the Pharos island except 
the tower, as well as the Heptastadium, or mole, continued 
to push the attack on Caesar by whatever means he could 
devise. Caesar strongly fortified the theatre as a citadel, 
and the adjoining wing of the royal palace, so as to com¬ 
mand the avenues to the port and docks. 

Meanwhile Ptolemy’s youngest daughter, Arsinoe, fled to 
Achillas in the camp, hoping herself to control the succes¬ 
sion. But Achillas and she soon quarreled, which bred 
dissension in the native army, much to Caesar’s advantage. 


584 


CAESAR'S coolness. 


Caesar saw that he was in a perilous case, and that he must 
speedily gather more troops, or he could not rescue himself. 
By his utter lack of caution he had again blundered into a 
dilemma similar to the one he had barely escaped from at 
Dyrrachium. But Caesar had one singular quality, — a 
certain test of the great captain. He was capable of the 
most reprehensible recklessness. But when, from the results 
of such conduct, he had forfeited almost every chance of 
success, he always rose to the occasion with a force, an intel¬ 
ligence which commanded the situation. When we have all 
but lost patience with his heedlessness, Caesar compels our 
admiration by his energy, his courage, his resources. He 
was indomitable. When another man would have considered 
the question of surrender, Caesar began to exert his splendid 
force, his absolute reliance on himself. Doubt as to even¬ 
tual success never found rest in his unflinching soul. 

So now. At the head of the Roman state, he had at his 
disposal the forces of the world; yet he was cooped up with 
four thousand men in one of the client-cities of Rome. But 
Caesar was not for a moment doubtful ot his ability to cope 
with the Egyptians. In how great soever danger he actually 
was, he gave no sign of it to his troops. His demeanor was 
at all times calm and self-poised, and no one Could have read 
in his countenance or actions the least doubt as to the issue 
of the matter. He sent to Rhodes, Syria and Cilicia for all 
his fleet; to Crete for archers, and into Arabia Petraea, to 
Malchus, king of the Nabatheans for cavalry. Domitius, 
from whom he expected two legions from Asia Minor, was to 
send at the same time victual, material of war and military 
engines. Caesar called on Mithridates, king of Pergamos, 
to march an army by way of Syria to his aid. He himself 
set to work to make ballistic machines and to collect from 
every source corn and soldiers. In Alexandria he took 


ENERGY OF ALEXANDRIANS. 585 

means to hold himself until relief should come. He razed 
many houses to the ground in order to gain elbow-room, and 
fortified the streets leading to the arsenal and palace, or 
wherever his line seemed weak, with sheds and mantelets, 
thus inclosing the entire smaller part of the town he had 
occupied. The walls were perforated for rams and mis¬ 
siles. The town, being built of houses whose floors were all 
vaulted, without wood of any kind, was peculiarly adapted 
to creating a good scheme of defense. 

The smaller part occupied by Caesar was “separated from 
the rest by a morass towards the south.” This was a low 
and narrow piece of meadow land running north and south 
from the sea to Lake Mareotis, between the low hills on which 
the city is mainly situated. This lowland could be made to 
furnish the army both water and forage if it could be con¬ 
trolled. By dint of pushing forward works on either side of 
it from his own position southerly, Caesar gradually gained a 
hold on a part of this lowland. Its possession in entirety 
would result in his being in a central position between the 
two wings of the enemy. 

The Alexandrians, thoroughly roused by the seizure of 
their young prince, were equally active in collecting troops 
and material of war. From every part of Egypt which they 
could control, they levied troops. They accumulated and 
manufactured vast quantities of darts and engines in their 
part of the town, and increased their forces by a great multi¬ 
tude, including peasants and slaves. The ,raw levies they 
stationed'in the least dangerous parts of the inclosing line; 
the veteran cohorts in the open squares. They shut up all 
the avenues and passes by a triple wall of hewn stones forty 
feet high, and built a number of ten-story towers in the lower 
part of the town. Some equally tall ones were made to move 
on wheels along the flat Alexandrian streets by horse-power. 


586 


ACHILLAS AND ARSINOE 


The people were very ingenious, and not only imitated the 
Romans in all they did, but devised many new things them¬ 
selves. The old art of the days when Archimedes studied 
here was far from having died Out. They had resolved to be 
rid, for once and all, of the Romans, who they felt were 
trying to reduce Egypt to a mere province, as they had so 
many other lands. And their chiefs led them to believe that 
Caesar would soon be starved into surrender, because the 
stormy season prevented him from getting supplies by sea. 
Caesar made an attempt to conciliate the Alexandrians 
through the mediation of the young king; but the Alexan¬ 
drians believed that what Ptolemy said was at Caesar’s 
dictation, and would not listen to him. 

Achillas was now murdered by the machinations of Arsinoe, 
assisted by the eunuch Ganymed, her governor, whom she 
raised to the command of the army. Ganymed was a man 
of fertile invention. He determined to cut off Caesar’s water- 
supply. A good-sized canal or branch from the Nile Delta 
ran into the quarter of the city held by the Alexandrians, 
and yielded them abundance of water, though rather thick 
and muddy. The supply of Caesar’s part of the town was 
stored up in cisterns which were filled through aqueducts, 
likewise leading from the Nile. The water was allowed to 
settle and clarify in the cisterns. Caesar’s narrow system of 
defense had cut him off from the canal and reduced him to 
use the cisterns alone. Ganymed went to work on a large 
scale. He diverted the river water from these aqueducts and 
reservoirs, by which he also cut off his own cistern supply, 
and was forced to rely on the canal water. But this was not 
a grievous hardship. Then, by water-wheels and other 
engines, he raised sea water in large quantities and poured it 
in a steady stream into the aqueducts leading to Caesar’s 
cisterns. By this clever means all the cisterns in the upper 


A WATER FAMINE. 


587 


town became gradually tainted and unfit for use. The water 
in that part of the lower town which was occupied by Caesar 
was not reached by the salt water, but became brackish and 
unhealthful. 

The impending danger of a water famine came close to 
occasioning a panic among the troops, which Caesar had some 
difficulty in allaying. He could not safely retreat, for his 
small force, so soon as he left his defenses to embark, would 
be at the mercy of the Alexandrians, whose multitude could 
easily crush the retiring Caesarians. 

“Caesar labored to remove his soldiers’ fears by encourag¬ 
ing and reasoning with them. For, he affirmed, ‘that they 
might easily find fresh water by digging wells, as all sea- 
coasts naturally abounded with fresh springs; that if Egypt 
was singular in this respect and differed from every other 
soil, yet still, as the sea was open and the enemy without a 
fleet, there was nothing to hinder their fetching it at pleasure 
in their ships, either from Parsetonium on the left, or the 
island, Pharos, on the right, and as their two voyages were in 
different directions, they could not be prevented by adverse 
winds at the same time; that a retreat was on no account to 
be thought of, not only by those who had a concern for their 
honor, but even by such as regarded nothing but life; that 
it was with the utmost difficulty they could defend themselves 
behind their works; but if they once quitted that advantage, 
neither in number or situation would they be a match for the 
enemy; that to embark would require much time, and be 
attended with great danger, especially where it must be 
managed by little boats; that the Alexandrians, on the con¬ 
trary, were nimble and active, and thoroughly acquainted 
with the streets and buildings; that, moreover, when flushed 
with victory, they would not fail to run before, seize all the 
advantageous posts, possess themselves of the tops of the 


588 


REIN FOR CEMENTS. 


houses, and, by annoying them in their retreat, effectually 
prevent their getting on board; that they must, therefore, 
think no more of retreating, but place all their hopes of 
safety in victory.’ ” The wonderful confidence of the troops 
in their leader put an end to fear. Caesar’s promise was 
redeemed by setting all hands which could be spared to dig¬ 
ging wells. These he knew would be an effective means, and 
in fact, during the very first night, the wells yielded plenty 
of fresh, good water. “The mighty projects and painful 
attempts of the Alexandrians were, with no great labor, 
entirely frustrated. ’ ’ 

The Thirty-seventh legion, part of Pompey’s forces which 
had surrendered to Caesar, and were sent by Domitius Cal- 
vinus with full equipment of victuals, arms and enginery, 
now arrived off the coast from Rhodes; but adverse east 
winds kept it from making the harbor. It got blown west¬ 
erly from the mouth. The ships could, however, safely ride 
at anchor, and the commander sent a rowing galley to notify 
Caesar that they had arrived, but were in want of water. The 
winds made no great odds to the rowing galleys. The trans¬ 
ports, which relied upon sails, were at their mercy. Caesar 
determined to go to the fleet to take proper measures to bring 
it into port. He left all the land forces at their posts, 
unwilling to deplete the garrison. He embarked, and set out 
with such galleys as he had ready, in search of his transports. 

Sending some men on shore for water, as he was cruising 
along the coast near Point Chersonesus, some seven leagues 
west of Alexandria, these were captured, and the Alexan¬ 
drians learned that Caesar was on board the squadron, and 
without legionaries. Here was too good a chance to miss. 
Ganymed collected all the available ships and sallied out 
from the Eunostos or western harbor, which the Alexandrians 
had always held, to attack and haply capture him. Caesar 


A NAVAL BATTLE. 


589 


would much have preferred not to fight, as he was intent on 
other things. When, on his return towards Alexandria 
with his fleet, he encountered the enemy, he at first declined 
the combat, as it was towards nightfall, and the enemy knew 
the coast better than he did. He, moreover, felt that he 
could get better work out of his men by daylight, and he had 
no soldiers on his war-galleys. The Thirty-seventh legion 
was in the transports. He drew in towards the shore. 

But circumstances forced him to do battle. One Rhodian 
galley rashly separated from the fleet, and was attacked by 
several of the enemy’s ships. Caesar was forced to go to her 
relief, “that he might not suffer the disgrace of seeing one 
of his galleys sunk before his eyes.” The Rhodians, always 
noted for naval pluck, here outvied each other in their gal¬ 
lantry. The Alexandrians could hold no head against them. 
The victory, largely by the good conduct of Eupliranor, the 
Rhodian admiral, was complete. The enemy suffered griev¬ 
ous loss. Caesar would have destroyed the enemy’s entire 
fleet but for the approach of night. The adverse winds hav¬ 
ing happily abated, the transports, under convoy of Caesar’s 
galleys, reached their moorings in the Great harbor of 
Alexandria without mishap. Caesar had now nearly doubled 
his force both on land and at sea. 

* At first this disaster to the Alexandrians appeared irreme¬ 
diable. They had lost one hundred and ten vessels since 
Caesar came to Alexandria. They were peculiarly disheart¬ 
ened, because their defeat was not by soldiers but by seamen, 
and they prided themselves on their skill at sea. They 
“retired to the tops of their houses, and blocked up the 
entrances of their streets as if they feared the Caesarian 
fleet might attack them on land.” But this people was nat¬ 
urally a maritime race, and with great zeal, under the cheer¬ 
ing words of Ganymed, they set to creating a new navy. 


590 


ALEXANDRIAN PLUCK . 


They saw that to blockade Caesar by sea was their only sure 
means of reducing him. They brought together all the old 
vessels which could be refitted and made seaworthy, all those 
used as custom-house ships in the mouths of the Nile, and 
from whatever source they could gather craft, and equipped 
them as best they might, putting into use everything which 
could float in the harbor. To find material for oars they 
unroofed the porticoes, academies and public buildings, and 
made use of the plank thus obtained. They expected to 
fight in the port, where craft useless at sea would do well 
enough. In a few days they had fitted out twenty - two 
quadriremes, five quinquiremes and a vast number of small 
craft. These were manned by excellent seamen and the 
proper complement of soldiers. Caesar had but ten quad¬ 
riremes, five quinquiremes and, counting smaller ones with¬ 
out decks, thirty-four sail in all. Of these, nine were the 
Rhodian (one had been wrecked), eight from Pontus, five 
from Lycia, twelve from Asia. 

Caesar carefully made ready for a fresh naval engagement; 
for he saw that the Alexandrians, unless their fleet was 
dispersed, might succeed in blockading him in the harbor. 
He represented to all his troops the necessity of conquering. 
In case of defeat he showed them that each and every man 
was unquestionably lost. After due preparation, he sailed 
round Pharos and drew up in line facing the enemy opposite 
the Eunostos harbor. The Rhodians had the right, the 
Pontus galleys the left. Between these wings he left a dis¬ 
tance of about four hundred paces for manoeuvring, and 
marshaled the rest of his vessels in reserve, appointing to 
each ship in the fighting line another in the reserve for 
succor. The Alexandrians brought up their fleet, greatly 
more numerous, with abundant confidence. The twenty-two 
quadriremes were in front; the rest were in a second line. 


A SECOND NAVAL BATTLE. 


591 


A vast number of small craft accompanied the fleet. They 
had prepared a supply of flaming darts and combustibles on 
board the small craft to set Caesar’s vessels on fire. 

Between the fleets lay certain shallows through which were 



crooked channels. They are the same to-day. Each side 
waited for the other to pass these shallows, as each deemed it 
to be dangerous to fight with them in their rear. The fleet 
of Caesar was commanded by Euphranor the Rhodian, who 
had been so useful in the late naval contest, and who was a 
man of no little ability and courage. After some hesitation, 
Caesar, at Euphranor’s suggestion, resolved to attack, and 
allowed the Rhodian galleys to lead the way through the 
shallows. The rest of the fleet followed hard upon. When 
the lines came into action, there was so little space to 
manoeuvre that it became a question of bravery alone. This 
was an advantage for the Romans. The fight was witnessed 
from the housetops of Alexandria by Romans and Egyptians, 
people and soldiers alike. The Romans were really fighting 
for existence. If they lost this battle they would surely be 
shut off from the sea. This knowledge spurred them on to 



592 


THE PHAROS CAPTURED. 


exceed even tlieir accustomed valor. After a long and rather 
irregular battle, the Egyptians, despite their well-earned 
reputation for gallantry at sea, and their far greater number 
of ships, were signally defeated. A quinquireme and a 
bireme were taken with all on board, and three were sunk, 
without loss of a ship to the Romans. Measured by the 
loss, the battle does not appear to have been as severe as 
one is apt to infer from the wording of the Commentaries. 
The rest of the Egyptian craft were driven into their port, 
where they took shelter under the protection of the bowmen 
on the mole and ramparts. 

To deprive the enemy of this resource in the future, Caesar 
determined to make himself master of the entire island of 
Pharos, and of the Heptastadium, which connected it with 
the mainland. He already had the Pharos tower. He had 
so far finished his works in the town as to think himself 
able to hold his position there, and the mole and island as 
well. He embarked in small vessels ten cohorts, a chosen 
body of light troops, and some Gallic horse especially fit for 
the work, and sent them against the south side of the island, 
while with a few of the vessels of his fleet he attacked the 
north side, promising rich rewards to those who should first 
make themselves masters of it. The bulk of the ships had 
to watch the Alexandrian fleet and keep it in the western 
harbor. The defense at the Pharos village was stout, sling- 
ers and bowmen being stationed on the tops of the houses 
along the shore, and it was difficult for the cohorts to land. 
The coast was rocky, and every crag and inlet was defended 
by boats and men, while five galleys patrolled the shore. 
But at last a footing was secured, and the Pharians driven 
to the town. On the harbor side of the island they had also 
resisted the landing parties with some success; but Caesar’s 
men pushed on vigorously, and though the town walls were 


A NEW PLAN. 


593 


fairly strong and flanked by many towers, and the legionaries 
had no ladders or fascines, a panic ensued among the inhab¬ 
itants and they yielded up the town, with considerable loss in 
killed and six hundred taken. Caesar gave over the town 
to plunder, and ordered it to be razed. 

There was a fort on the island next the mole. This Caesar 
took and garrisoned. But the fort on the mainland at the 



south end of the mole was held by the Alexandrians. It was 
stronger than the other and situated in a large open place 
outside the city proper. This he felt that he must have, for 
by holding both ends of the mole he would substantially 








594 


FIGHT ON THE MOLE. 


control both the harbors. Next day he attacked it. At first 
by a heavy fire of missiles he drove the garrison out of the 
fort and towards the town and landed three cohorts to occupy 
the mole and intrench, leaving the rest of his force in the 
boats. There was not room on the mole for a larger force 
to operate to advantage. The mole had near each end a 
bridge built over an arch, through which the vessels could 
pass to and from one harbor to the other, by which means 
the Alexandrians could keep the Great port in a constant 
state of uneasiness. Caesar threw up a work below the 
south bridge and set the men at filling up the arch, so as to 
cut off this communication. 

While this was being done, the Alexandrians sallied out, 
deployed in an open space opposite the end of the bridge, 
and attacked the working party and force protecting it at 
the bridgehead they had made. At the same time they sent 
the ships which they had in the west harbor alongside the 
mole to attack the Romans on it, and seek to set fire to the 
fleet on the other side. The Caesarians held the mole and 
bridge; the Alexandrians attacked from the open space 
facing the bridgehead and the ships. 

While Caesar’s affairs were thus working to his advantage, 
some additional men — rowers and mariners — landed from 
the Roman galleys on the mole, unordered. This diversion 
at first materially aided the enterprise, for the men drove off 
the enemy’s ships, but being after a while taken in flank by 
some enterprising Alexandrians who seized a footing on the 
mole from small boats, this party, not under control, made a 
hurried escape to their ships. Seeing the success of this 
flank attack, more Alexandrians landed on the mole and took 
Caesar’s three cohorts at the bridge in the rear. The soldiers 
in the galleys, seeing the Alexandrians in force on the mole, 
and fearful that they might board the galleys, withdrew the 


BETWEEN TWO FIRES. 


595 


ladders and put off from shore. The unusual commotion in 
their rear of necessity produced among the three cohorts at 
the bridge a flurry of which the Alexandrians were not slow 
to take advantage; and pushing in heartily they forced 
Caesar's men back in marked disorder. 

They now had Caesar and his small force between two fires, 
and though Caesar himself was with them, the old spirit of 
panic came up. Perceiving that the ships were shoving off 
from the mole, and fearing that they would be left to their 
fate, the cohorts began to fall back. Retreat soon became 
flight, each man endeavoring to reach a vessel. Some made 
for such galleys as were still alongside the mole and crowded 
into them in such numbers as to sink them. Some swam out 
to the galleys at anchor, buoying themselves upon their 
shields. Some cast away their arms and swam out to the 
fleet. Caesar did his best to hold them in hand, but their 
demoralization was as complete as at Dyrrachium. He could 
not arrest the panic. It was another sciuve qui pent. 
Reaching his own galley, he found that so many had crowded 
aboard her that she could not be got off the shore, and after¬ 
wards in effect she went down with all on board. Caesar was 
himself obliged to dive from the mole and swim for his life 
out into the harbor to another ship. It was this occasion on 
which he is said to have swum with one hand, holding aloft 
a manuscript in the other lest he should lose it. Reach¬ 
ing a galley, he sent small boats to the rescue of those who 
were floating in the water. Many were cut to pieces on the 
mole; more were drowned. In all the loss was four hundred 
legionaries, twice as many as had bit the dust at the great 
victory of Pliarsalus. More than that number of sailors 
perished. This was the usual fate of the defeated in ancient 
times, whether in a combat or a pitched battle. This victory 
enabled the Alexandrians to retake and thenceforth to hold 


596 


SERIOUS DEFEAT. 


the fort at the south end of the mole, the defenses of which 
they made too strong with enginery and works to again 
assault. They then reopened the bridge so as to have access 
through it to the east harbor. 

The Roman soldiers appear to have been more ashamed 
than disheartened by this untoward defeat and anxious to 
wipe out their disgrace. They became so bent on fighting 
the Alexandrians, whom they assaulted on every possible 
occasion by sallies and cut off whenever they ventured 
beyond their works, that Caesar was compelled to restrain 
rather than encourage them. For this quality of quick re¬ 
covery from the demoralization of a defeat, Caesar’s legion¬ 
aries were always distinguished. They had jshown it mark¬ 
edly before Dyrrachium. They had caught the recuperative 
spirit of Caesar. 

In the peculiar elasticity which enables troops to recover 
their equipoise after a repulse, no soldier has ever equaled 
the American volunteer. All veterans of our civil war will 
remember occasions where, after being driven back from a 
position or an assault, in a disorder apparently fatal, the line, 
having reached shelter, would of its own accord recover, and 
in a few minutes be ready to renew the charge or retake the 
position, in better spirits than before the repulse. Nor was 
this so much due to the efforts of the officers as to the natural 
character of the men. So, in a lesser degree, with Caesar’s 
legionaries. They did get demoralized; but they speedily 
recovered their tone. 

Seeing, then, that defeat neither weakened the enemy nor 
success threw him off his guard, some of the Alexandrians 
sent a secret deputation to Caesar to ask that their young king 
be restored to them, for they were weary at the government 
of a woman and the tyrant Ganymed, promising that if they 
could have Ptolemy back they would shortly place them- 


PTOLEMY RELEASED . 


597 


selves in a position to make terms with Caesar. To tliis they 
solemnly bound themselves. 

Caesar had little faith in these promises, but thought that 
if the king were returned to the Alexandrians these would 
probably be less well led than they now were by Ganymed, 
in case they continued the war. He could not see in what 
manner he profited by Ptolemy’s retention. Moreover, he 
had fully espoused the cause of Cleopatra, and with the young 
king well off his hands, he could the better place her in 
authority when he should have reduced the Egyptians to 
reason, —as he never for a moment doubted that he could 
do. Many thought that Caesar had been overreached in these 
negotiations, but he probably saw through the matter with 
clean-cut purpose. He gave Ptolemy his freedom, and the 
young king left him with tears and vows to be grateful and 
friendly. But no sooner had he returned to his people than 
he in reality became more bitter than any one of the Alexan¬ 
drian chiefs. As the courage of the Alexandrians was by 
no means raised by the recovery of their king, nor that of 
the Romans lowered, the surrender bore no part in the events 
which ensued. 

The Alexandrians heard about this time a true rumor of 
an army marching overland to Caesar’s assistance, and a 
false rumor that a convoy of troops and victuals was on its 
way to him by sea. They took steps to intercept the latter. 
They ordered their fleet to cruise before the Canopic branch 
of the Nile, where they thought it could best watch its move¬ 
ments. Hearing of their expedition, Caesar sent out his fleet 
to fall upon the Egyptian squadron, placing Tiberius Nero in 
command. Aboard the Rhodian galleys, which were with the 
fleet, was also Euphranor, who had rendered such exceptional 
services in the last naval battles. But fortune was unkind. 
In an action ensuing upon the fleets coming into each other's 


598 


MITHRIDA TES ARRIVES. 


vicinity, Euphranor behaved witli conspicuous gallantry and 
handled his own vessel to advantage; but for some reason 
not clearly set forth, he was not efficiently aided by the rest 
of the fleet. He was surrounded by the Alexandrian vessels 
and went down with his galley. The action had no partic¬ 
ular result in affecting the war. 

In January, 47, after Caesar had for four months been 
carrying on this luckless war, which had been thrust upon 
him against his will, but as a result of his carelessness, 
Mitliridates of Pergamos arrived across the desert from Syria 
with reinforcements for the Romans. This man, who had 
taken his name from Mitliridates, king of Pontus, whose son 
he claimed to be, had warmly embraced Caesar’s cause in the 
Civil War, and enjoyed the consul’s confidence. He had 
raised his army in Syria and Cilicia. Among the soldiers 
was a large body of Jews under Antipater. Mitliridates 
began his campaign by assaulting and capturing Pelusium, 
where the Alexandrians had a small force, and leaving a 
garrison there, marched up the right bank of the Pelusian 
Branch towards Memphis, which was the nearest point where 
he could to advantage cross the Nile on his way to Alexan¬ 
dria, conciliating the regions he traversed, and gaining their 
allegiance to Caesar “by that authority which always accom¬ 
panies a conqueror.” He soon approached the head of the 
Delta. King Ptolemy, on learning of his coming, dispatched 
a force from Alexandria, partly by boats up the Nile, partly 
up the left bank, to check Mitliridates, whose advent threat¬ 
ened to transfer the balance of power into Caesar’s hands. 
This force crossed to the right bank, fell upon Mitliridates 
in his camp, which he had fortified according to the Roman 
method, some thirty miles below Memphis. After repulsing 
them, Mitliridates sallied out and inflicted on them a crush¬ 
ing defeat. But for their knowledge of the country and their 


CAESAR JOINS HIM. 


599 


vessels, none would have escaped. Mithridates was then 
enabled to get word to Caesar of what had happened. This 
was near the end of January. 

Caesar and Ptolemy, on receipt of this news, both set out, 
Caesar to aid, Ptolemy to 
destroy, the new arrival. 

Mithridates, meanwhile, 
marched to the head of the 
Delta and crossed the 
Nile. The king had sent 
his fleet up the Nile with 
the bulk of his army. 

Caesar could not well 
march that way. Leaving 
a suitable garrison in his 
works at Alexandria, his 
fleet conveyed him along 
the shore to the west, 
where, disembarking at a 
convenient place on the 
coast, he marched around 
the south of Lake Mareo- 
tis, across the desert, and 
joined Mithridates on the 
fourth day, before the king 
could attack him, or was, 
indeed, aware of Caesar’s Battle of the Nile (Terrain), 

whereabouts. How considerable an army he now commanded 
we cannot tell. 

Ptolemy had encamped on a hill protected by the Nile on 
one side, by a morass on the other, and steep access on a 
third. Such a place is found near modern Alcarn. Between 
this camp and the road upon which Caesar was marching was 








600 C2ESAR MARCHES ON PTOLEMY. 

“a narrow river with very steep banks,” probably one of the 
numerous canals into which the Nile channel is constantly 
overflowing. To this river, seven miles from his camp, Ptol¬ 
emy sent his cavalry and some choice light infantry to oppose 
Caesar’s crossing and annoy him from the opposite bank. 
This force “maintained an unequal fight from the banks, 
where courage had no chance to exert itself and cowardice 
ran no risk.” Caesar found it an annoying undertaking to 
cross in the face of these troops, but he speedily sent some 
German cavalry upstream to make their way by swimming 
to the other shore and to take the enemy in reverse, and the 
legionaries, at the same time, felled some trees across the 
stream and forced the passage. The enemy’s cavalry fled in 
confusion, but were overtaken and mostly killed. The light 
troops were cut to pieces. 

Caesar followed them up and at first blush thought he might 
assault their camp, as they seemed too much demoralized to 
defend it stanchly; but on arrival he found it so strongly 
intrenched, and the troops so alert, that he declined to risk 
the operation for the moment. He camped. There was a 
village and fort near by communicating with Ptolemy’s camp 
by a line of works. Caesar next day made a demonstration 
here and forced an entrance to the village. In the confusion 
resulting in the Alexandrian camp from this unexpected 
manoeuvre, he ordered a general assault upon the latter. 
The camp had but two approaches, one in front from the 
plain and a narrower one facing the Nile. The former 
approach was held in great force, as it was here the attack 
was anticipated; the latter was exposed to darts from the hill 
and from the ships in the river, on which the Alexandrians 
had stationed a large number of bowmen and slingers. 
When the troops made no headway, despite their utmost 
ardor, Caesar, noticing that that side of the camp which had 


ATTACKS HIS CAMP. 


601 


rugged sides — the southerly one — was illy protected, “for 
the enemy had all crowded to the other attacks, partly to 
have a share in the action, partly to be spectators of the 
issue,” ordered a select force under Carfulenus, a soldier of 



ability and experience, to scale the rocks in that place, where 
an attack would be apt to fall on the defenders quite unpre¬ 
pared. With the greatest effort the men were able to make 
the ascent at all, but they succeeded in doing it in secrecy. 
Taking the Alexandrian camp in reverse, they produced a 






















602 


MARCH ON ALEXANDRIA. 


panic that enabled the legionaries who were delivering the 
front attack to succeed beyond expectation. The enemy 
fled in marked disorder, and in rushing over the ramparts 
towards the river, where they hoped to escape to their fleet, 
the trench was filled by men who fell and were trampled to 
death. There was fearful slaughter of the fugitives before 
they reached the river, and in the attempted escape to their 
ships a yet greater number perished by drowning. Among 
these was the king, whose ship was loaded down by terror- 
stricken men and sunk. 

No sooner was the battle over than Caesar advanced 
straight overland with his cavalry to Alexandria. Here the 
garrison and inhabitants, on hearing of the king’s defeat, 
opened the gates of that part of the city which they had 
held and humbly sued for pardon. Caesar placed the 
younger son and Cleopatra on the throne, as Ptolemy the 
late king had by will requested should be done, banishing 
Arsinoe. After remaining two months longer than neces¬ 
sary,— held, according to many ancient authors, by the 
blandishments of Cleopatra, — Caesar departed by sea for 
Syria with the Sixth legion. He left the two legions which 
had been with him, and a third one from Syria, under Rufio, 
to sustain the new government of Egypt, for the young mon- 
archs were unfavorably regarded by the people. 

The Alexandrian war lasted six months. During the first 
five months Caesar had been forced to hold himself on the 
defensive. This method he had largely transformed into 
offensive-defensive by his activity at sea. In the sixth 
month, on the arrival of reinforcements, he had assumed the 
offensive and ended the war by the battle of the Nile. He 
had not, on leaving for Egypt, anticipated being caught in 
the toils of a war; but from its inception he had foreseen 
that, with his mere handful of men, he would be cooped up 


THE ALEXANDRIAN CAMPAIGN. 


603 


I 

until lie could receive reinforcements. He made liis plans 
accordingly, first to defend himself and then to carry on such 
an offensive as would forestall the offensive of the Alexan¬ 
drians. As usual, he himself was the moving spring of 
action of both parties. 

The six months thus spent, owing to Caesar’s lack of 
caution, and the two additional months given perhaps to 
Cleopatra, perhaps to political demands we do not know, 
afforded the Pompeian party a breathing spell, and the 
opportunity of taking firm root in Africa. This necessitated 
two additional campaigns, one in Africa and one in Spain. 
Had Caesar, immediately after Pharsalus, turned sharply 
upon Pompey’s adherents; or had he taken four or five 
legions with him — as he should have done in any event — 
to Alexandria; or had he for the moment put aside the 
question of the rule of Egypt by a temporizing policy and 
turned to the more important questions pressing upon him> 
he would have saved himself much future trouble. 

The force he carried with him was so inadequate as to 
savor of foolhardiness. By crass good fortune alone was he 
able to seize the citadel and arsenal, and the tower on the 
Pharos, and save himself from utter ruin. It was a month 
after he arrived before the Egyptian army came from 
Pelusium and sat down before Alexandria. His own first 
reinforcements reached him shortly after. There seems to 
be nothing marvelous about the campaign, says Napoleon. 
And in view of the two months of unworthy dalliance, after 
the long and uncalled-for campaign had been ended, and other 
campaigns had become imperatively necessary, Egypt might 
well have become, but for Caesar’s wonderful good fortune, 
the very grave of his reputation. 


XXXVII. 


VENI, VIDI, VICI. MAY AND JUNE, 47 B. C. 

Pharnaces, king of Bosphorus, taking advantage of the civil broils of 
Rome, had seized territory not his own. Caesar’s lieutenant had advanced 
against him and been defeated. Caesar sailed from Egypt with a mere hand¬ 
ful of men along the coast of Syria and through Cilicia to Pontus. With such 
troops as he collected on the way, he had but a few cohorts, of which all but 
one thousand men were raw levies. With this corporal’s guard he set out to 
subdue the rebel, — another of his foolhardy operations, doubly so, because 
unnecessary. But Caesar’s luck did not desert him. In the battle of Zela, at 
great risk and with splendid courage, he snatched a victory and settled the 
Pontus question. Once on the ground, it had taken but four days. When he 
reached Rome, he found matters in Italy in much confusion. He suppressed a 
mutiny of the legions, who, deeming themselves the masters, had become unrea¬ 
sonable in their demands. He was then called to Africa, where the Pompeian 
chiefs had rendezvoused, and, owing to the defeat of Curio, had full sway. 
There was here a gigantic problem to solve. 

Pharnaces, son of the great Mithridates, king of Pontus, 
had some years before risen against and made war upon his 
father, and on surrendering himself to Pompey had been 
made king of Bosphorus. On the outbreak of the Civil War, 
Pharnaces deemed the occasion suitable for acquiring further 
dominion, and had taken to threatening Armenia and Cap¬ 
padocia. He had already made considerable headway with 
his conquests, when Pompey was defeated at Pharsalus, on 
which he became still more hardy, and laid his hands on 
everything within his reach. Deiotarus, king of Armenia 
and tetrarch of Galatia, and Ariobarzanes, king of Cappa¬ 
docia, appealed for help to Domitius Calvinus, whom, from 
Epirus, Caesar had sent to Asia, after the great victory. 



PHARNACES. 


605 

Domitius, who had detached two of his three legions to Caesar 
and was correspondingly weakened, sent a deputation to 
Pharnaces, commanding him to withdraw from Armenia and 
Cappadocia; and, knowing full well that the command alone 



Asia Minor. 

would be ineffectual, he at once backed up the embassy by 

arms. He rendezvoused, the end of October, 48 b. c., at 

Comana in Pontus, with the Thirty-sixth legion and two 

others which Deiotarus had drilled in the Roman fashion; he 

* 

sent P. Sextus to C. Plaetorius, the quaestor, for a legion 
which had been raised in Pontus, and Quinctius Particius in 
quest of auxiliaries in Cilicia. He had but two hundred 








606 


A NEAT RUSE. 


horse. To Domitius’ message Pharnaces returned answer 
that he had quitted Cappadocia, hut that he claimed Armenia 
as his inheritance; and that he would submit to Caesar’s 
decision when he should personally arrive. Domitius gave no 
credit to these protestations. He saw that Pharnaces had 
merely vacated Cappadocia the better to concentrate his 
forces on ground in Armenia, which was more easily defended. 
He sent the monarch word that he would wait only when 
matters were put on their old status, and at once marched on 
Armenia. This was in the winter of b. c. 48-47. 

The route lay along the very rugged mountain chain which 
from Comana runs east and west, parallel to and south of the 
river Lycus, and is a spur of Anti-Taurus. Domitius chose 
this route because he would be less apt to be surprised on 
the road and could the more readily victual from Cappa¬ 
docia. Pharnaces sought to conciliate him by various flat¬ 
tering and costly presents, but Domitius kept on his way and 
in due time reached a point west of Nicopolis, in Lesser 
Armenia, and camped seven miles from the town. Nicopolis 
lay in a plain flanked by mountains. 

Between the Roman camp and Nicopolis lay a dangerous 
defile. Here Pharnaces placed his cavalry and best foot in 
ambush, but kept the flocks and herds in sight, so that if 
Domitius “entered the defile as a friend, he might have no 
suspicion of an ambuscade,” “or if he should come as an 
enemy, that the soldiers, quitting their ranks to pillage, 
might be cut to pieces when dispersed ” — a neat ruse quite in 
the style of Hannibal. Meanwhile he sent repeated messen¬ 
gers to Domitius to allay his suspicions. Domitius kept to 
his camp, fancying that negotiations might avail, and Phar¬ 
naces’ clever design to entrap him failed. In a few days 
Domitius advanced on Nicopolis and intrenched a camp near 
by. Pharnaces drew up his army in line in front of the camp, 


FIELD INTRENCHMENTS. 


607 


“forming his front into one line, according to the custom 
of the country, and securing his wings with a triple body of 
reserves,” rather a curious order of battle for that day. No 
action supervened. 

Rumors now arrived from Alexandria that Caesar was in a 



strait and had recalled Domitius to his aid, ordering him to 
move via Syria to Egypt. Pharnaces, who had learned the 
news from captured couriers, thought to embarrass Domitius 
by deferring battle, for delay would compromise him as well 
as Caesar. He intrenched his position near the town with 
two ditches four feet deep, and between them daily drew up 
his foot in one long phalanx sustained by three bodies of 
reserves, with his cavalry on his flanks beyond the ditches, 
where they could charge to advantage. This was a clever 
defensive scheme and lacked not originality. 

Domitius, more concerned for Caesar than for himself, felt 
that he could not retreat without forcing and winning a battle 
against Pharnaces, equally as a measure of reputation and 


























































































608 


DOMITIUS DEFEATED. 


security. He accordingly drew up in front of his camp. 
The Thirty-sixth legion was posted on the right, that of 
Pontus on the left and Deiotarus in deep order in the centre. 
His front was narrow and his wings were protected with the 
cavalry and the cohorts not belonging to the legions named. 
Battle engaged. The Thirty-sixth seems to have been a fine 
body of men. Rushing upon the enemy, they entirely 
demolished Pharnaces’ cavalry, —as Caesar’s fourth line had 
done Pompey’s at Pharsalus, — and drove it back to the 
very walls of the town; then, turning, struck the foot in the 
rear. The Pontus legion, on the left, was of no such stuff. 
Its first line quickly gave way, and the second line, advancing 
to its support and making a circuit around the enemy’s flank, 
was, though at first successful, finally overwhelmed by the 
multitude of darts. Deiotarus’ legions offered scarcely a re¬ 
spectable resistance. Pharnaces’ victorious right wing then 
swung round on the flank of the Thirty-sixth. Thus aban¬ 
doned, this gallant body, undismayed, drew up in a circle, 
and, though with great loss, successfully retired from the field 
and retreated to the slope of a neighboring mountain, where 
Pharnaces, abashed by its firm aspect, did not see fit to 
pursue. It had lost two hundred and fifty killed and many 
Roman knights. The legion of Pontus was cut off and for 
the most part destroyed, as well as the bulk of the men of 
Deiotarus. Amid great hardships, Domitius retreated to 
Roman Asia. 

In this battle, the difference between stanch and poor 
troops was made apparent. Pharnaces, expecting that Caesar 
would be destroyed in Egypt, now marched into Pontus, in¬ 
flicted cruelties and mutilations of the most galling atrocity 
on the Romans and leading Pontic citizens, and reestablished 
in his own name the ancient limits of his father’s kingdom. 

The defeat of Pompey at Pharsalus by no means broke up 


TROUBLE IN ILLYRICUM. 


609 


the combinations of the Pompeian party, — or rather of the 
aristocrats. While Caesar was still working out the Egyptian 
problem in Alexandria, the Roman arms all but received a 
fatal check in Illyricum. Q. Cornuficius, with two legions, 
had established himself strongly and prudently in that 
region, where hordes of runaways from the beaten army at 
Pharsalus threatened trouble. Gabinius was sent from Italy 
by Caesar to join him with two additional legions, newly 
raised. But Gabinius, undertaking an ill-advised winter 
campaign, was so harassed by the small-war of the Illyrian 



auxiliaries of Pomjfby, that he was brought to battle and 
defeated with a loss of two thousand men and many officers, 
and was happy to make good his retreat to Salona with the 
relics of an army. Here he was shut in while Octavius, 
Pompey’s lieutenant, overran half Illyricum. The situation 





610 


CjESAR moves to pontus. 


was, however, retrieved by the vigor of Vatinius, then at 
Brundisium. This officer collected boats, made his way, 
despite the fleet of Octavius, to Illyricum with a small force 
of convalescent veterans from the hospitals, and obliged 
Octavius to raise the siege of Epidaurus. Then, near the 
Isle of Tauris, though much weaker in numbers and vessels, 
he inflicted on his opponent a stinging naval defeat, — a very 
noteworthy act, as he had only a few hastily fitted mer¬ 
chantmen to oppose to Octavius’ war-vessels. Thus having 
cleared the coast, Octavius retiring with a few vessels to 
Greece and thence to Africa, Vatinius turned over the 
province to Cornuficius and returned to Brundisium. Illyr¬ 
icum was saved to Caesar. 

From Alexandria, as already stated, Caesar had taken ship 
to Syria. He arrived at Antioch May 23. Here was not 
much to do except to settle sundry political disputes and 

encourage the states in their dependence on the democratic • 

/ 

party, — i. e ., on himself. He paused only when he must, 
for his presence was not only urgently needed in Pontus, but 
the affairs in Rome demanded his coming; and he must 
dispose of the Pontus question before he could return to the 
capital. Leaving Sextus Caesar in command of the legions 
in Syria, he sailed to Cilicia on the fleet he had brought 
from Egypt. Summoning the states to meet him at Tarsus, 
he transacted the necessary business of the province and 
started at once for Pontus, via Mazaca in Cappadocia. 
Turning aside to Cappadocian Com ana, he appointed a new 
priest for the temple of Bellona, pardoned and received again 
into favor Deiotarus, who had been seduced to join the cause 
of Pompey. Cresar required him to join the army with all 
his cavalry and the two legions he had drilled in the Roman 
manner, but which had behaved with so little courasre at 

o 

Nicopolis. The relics of these had been collected and a Grain 


POOR PREPARATION. 


611 


recruited up to standard. With the Sixth and Thirty-sixth, 
this made a force of four legions, — two thirds of question¬ 
able stuff. 

Of Caesar’s few men only the Sixth legion, which had 
been reduced to one thousand men by the drain of its cam¬ 
paigns, were veterans. Pharnaces, nevertheless, fearing a 
terrible retribution, at once sent in his submission and begged 
hard for forgiveness. This Caesar granted upon certain 
promises of good behavior and restitution. But Pharnaces, 
foreseeing that Caesar must soon leave for Rome, felt that he 
could afford to be slack in his performance, for he intended 
to keep none of his promises. Caesar, well understanding 
his treachery, determined summarily to punish him, despite 
the fact that he had only the one thousand reliable men of 
the Sixth legion as a leaven to a small force of other troops 
to oppose to Pharnaces’ considerable numbers. This was 
quite in Caesar’s style; it accords well with his bold disposi¬ 
tion. When he had anything to do he felt that he could do 
it with the means at hand, — a marked characteristic of the 
great captain. When the able leader can readily concentrate 
larger numbers, he prudently does so. When he has but a 
limited force and work which must be done, he supplements 
his numerical weakness by his moral intelligence and strength 
instead of waiting for impossible reinforcements. But Caesar 
was much at fault in entering into this campaign so illy 
equipped. It was not necessary, and to this extent he is 
blamable. No feature in his life is more peculiar than this 
habit of insufficient preparation. 

Pharnaces lay encamped in a strong position, some miles 
north of the town of Zela. Here was the field on which his 
father, Mithridates, had vanquished Triarius, the lieutenant 
of Lucullus. Zela, fifty miles westerly of Comana, was a 
town of great natural and artificial strength, in a plain among 


612 


THE PROBLEM ATTACKED. 


PHARNACES 


the mountains, but with walls built upon a natural eminence. 
Caesar approached, and camping, June 11, five miles from 
Pharnaces, and south of 
Zela, reconnoitred the 
ground. He ascertained 
that near the height forti¬ 
fied by Pharnaces was a hill 
separated from it by a steep 
ravine, and very suitable 
for defense. He was im¬ 
pressed by its natural tacti¬ 
cal advantages, as well as 
felt that its possession 
would yield him a certain 
moral advantage over Phar¬ 
naces; for the latter’s fa¬ 
ther, Mithridates, in his 
victorious battle against 
Triarius, had held this lat¬ 
ter hill; but Pharnaces had 
neglected to occupy it. 

Caesar quietly caused 
everything to be prepared 
for quickly intrenching a 
camp, and then by a night 
march passed over the Zela 
plain and, approaching the 
debouches on the other side, seized the height in question, 
unknown to Pharnaces. The material was speedily carried 
over to the new location by the camp-followers, while the 
legionaries to a man worked on the fortifications. Caesar’s 
idea was probably to prepare a thoroughly strong camp, from 
which as usual he could develop his plans and seek to wrest 





Theatre of Zela. 



PHARNACES ASSAULTS. 


613 


an advantage from the enemy. Pharnaces, seeing the non- 
combatants carrying material, thought it was the legion¬ 
aries who were thus engaged, and deemed the occasion good 
to surprise the enemy. 

Secure in his preponderating strength, and anxious to at¬ 
tack before Caesar could complete his intrenchments, he drew 
up in four lines and advanced down his own slope and up the 
one on which Caesar was at work, expecting to overwhelm 
him, though the position was strong (June 12). He felt 
that the fortune of his father would run in his favor; he re¬ 
membered his own late victory, and he had had good omens 
in his sacrifices. Still the act was a foolhardy one. 

At first Caesar declined to believe that the attack was 
intended. He considered it a mere threat to interrupt his 
intrenching, and made the very natural mistake of only 
ordering out his first line. The Romans were almost unpre¬ 
pared when the shock came. They had really allowed them¬ 
selves to be surprised. 

The enemy’s scythed chariots opened the action, but their 
advance was partially arrested by a heavy fire of darts. 
Caesar’s new troops were much alarmed at the suddenness of 
the attack, and threatened to become unmanageable. Phar¬ 
naces’ infantry line soon closed in. The men came on with 
the utmost impetuosity, shouting their war-cry, as if victory 
was already secure. The impact was severe. The Sixth 
legion, on the right, stood like a stone wall, and the enemy 
recoiled from it; but in the centre the shock of the chariots 
had immediately broken through Csesar’s first line and, 
followed up by the infantry, the rush placed the Romans in 
the gravest danger; it required all Csesar’s presence of mind 
and skill to keep the troops on the left flank at work, and 
to fill the gap thus made in the centre. After a long and 
obstinate contest, the discipline of the Sixth legion — though 


614 


PHARNACES’ DEFEAT. 


but one thousand strong — prevailed over all odds; these 
brave men clung to their ground with a tenacity beyond 
words to praise, and by their example held the rest of the 
line to its work. Pharnaces, despite the splendid energy of 



his cohorts, could no longer maintain his ground, and was 
driven down the hill with great slaughter. The steadiness of 
this mere apology for a legion shows what a handful of good 
men may accomplish in the face of almost certain disaster. The 
Roman troops pursued the enemy to the camp, which, despite 
its strong location, they captured out of hand. Pharnaces 
escaped with a small troop of horse. His army was annihi¬ 
lated. Caesar gave the enemy’s camp up to plunder and the 
men found considerable spoil in it. The defeat was complete. 


CAESAR’S journeys. 


615 


The king’s army was quite broken up. Some months later, 
Pharnaces lost his life in battle against his brother-in-law, 
Asander, who had risen in opposition to his rule. 

Having thus by the intervention of rare good fortune put 
an end to what promised to breed serious complications, 
Caesar left two legions under Caelius to guard Pontus; sent 
the Sixth legion to Rome as a reward for its distinguished 
services; disbanded the cohorts of Deiotarus, and started the 
day after the battle with a cavalry escort for Rome. He 
paused only so long on the way as was essential to leave 
matters well settled in the several states through which he 
passed. Among other executive acts, he appointed Mithri- 
dates, who had served him so well in Egypt, king of Bos¬ 
phorus and tetrarch of Gallograecia, practically investing him 
with the dignities of Pharnaces. 

It was with reference to the Pontus campaign that Caesar, 
in a letter to his friend Amantius in Rome, made use of the 
words, “ Fern, vidi, mci /” “Happy Pompey !” exclaimed 
he, “these are the enemies, for overcoming whom thou wast 
surnamed The Great!” 

Caesar always made great speed in his journeys. In going 
from Italy to Gaul and back, when in haste, he had the habit 
of traveling in a chariot or litter, and, alternating with rid¬ 
ing or walking, moved day and night at the average speed of 
four miles an hour, or one hundred miles a day. Probably 
he did the same thing elsewhere. In the East he could get 
over still more ground. No doubt litter-bearers were then, 
as now, good travelers. His route was via Nicea (June 30), 
Athens (July 18), Tarentum (July 30), and Brundisium 
(August 2). He arrived in Rome August 11, much sooner 
than he was expected. 

It was nearly two years since Caesar had been in Rome 
when he again trod the sacred soil. It was time he should 

O 


616 MUTINY. 

return. The Senate was his tool. He had been made dicta¬ 
tor, and Antony was his magister equitum , so that the latter 
during his absence had exercised full sway. But Antony, 
though officially a good servant, had subjected himself to 
grave reproach for many breaches of decorum, legal, social 
and political, and there was widespread discontent. The 
legions which had fought in Gaul and Greece had not been 
paid. To be sure they had all agreed to trust Caesar for 
their largesses until the end of the war, but there was no 
doubt cause for complaint. The Second legion refused to 
march to Sicily; others followed its example. Caesar arrived 
in the midst of all this tumult. He at once took measures 
to settle the difficulties. For a time his presence sufficed to 
restore quiet, but shortly a still graver trouble broke forth. 
The legions which were stationed near Borne mutinied, mur¬ 
dered a number of their officers, who had tried to appease 
them, seized their eagles and marched on Rome. They had 
conceived the notion that Caesar could not continue in power 
without them; that they really were the fountain of author¬ 
ity; perhaps they flattered themselves that they could gain 
greater rewards and more speedy payment by their threats. 
The old legions which had placed Caesar on the pinnacle of 
fame and power felt that they were, in a fashion, masters of 
the earth. Under Caesar’s sole charge they were tractable 
and ready; under his lieutenants they had grown self-opinion¬ 
ated and overbearing. Their officers grew to fear them, and 
acts of violence even against these had become common. 
The luxury of Campania had done them more injury than all 
their campaigns, more than Livy alleges that sensuous Capua 
did to Hannibal’s veterans. Grave danger was imminent. 
A spark might light the fire in this body of combustible sol¬ 
diers and inaugurate a reign of terror. 

Csesar, on learning of their approach, caused the gates of 


CJESAR PUTS IT DOWN. 


617 


the city to be shut upon them and guarded by some cohorts 
Antony had at hand; but when the legionaries asked leave to 
assemble on Mars’ field they were allowed to enter without 
helmets, breastplates or shields, but wearing each his sword. 
Disregarding the advice of his friends and scorning personal 
danger, Caesar at once went out to them, and, facing the tur¬ 
bulent, seething mass, asked their leaders sternly what it was 
they desired. “We are covered with wounds,” cried they, 
“we have been long enough dragged about the world, and 
have spilt sufficient of our blood. We ask our discharge.” 
“ I give it you,” replied Caesar, with chilly deliberateness. 
He then added that in a few weeks he was going on a new 
campaign, that he would defeat the enemy with new legions, 
and that when he returned and triumphed with a new army, 
they, the old ones, should have the presents which had been 
promised them “on his triumph,” and unpromised land 
beside. Expecting nothing less than that they would actu¬ 
ally be discharged, and thus forfeit participation in the glo¬ 
ries of Caesar’s triumph, —the one thing to which every Ro¬ 
man soldier looked cravingly forward, — and awed by the cold 
demeanor of their great commander, the legionaries at once 
showed signs of weakening. As Caesar was about to go, the 
legates begged him to say a few kind words to his veterans, 
who had shared so many dangers with him. Caesar turned 
to them again, and quietly addressed them as “Citizens! ” 
( quirites ) instead, as usual, as “Comrades ! ” ( commilitones ). 
“We are not citizens,” they exclaimed, interrupting Caesar, 
“ we are soldiers! ” Their ancient devotion to the splendid 
chieftain who had so often led them to victory came welling 
up; the cutting word of quirites, to them who were soldiers 
first of all, and who had lost all pride in being burgesses of 
the Roman republic, in an instant changed the current of 
their purpose. A single word had conquered them whom arms 


618 


RINGLEADERS PUNISHED. 


could not; Caesar’s indifference was tlieir punishment. They 
could not bear that he should go forth to war with other troops 
They crowded round him, and begged forgiveness and per¬ 
mission to continue in service and to accompany him whith¬ 
ersoever he might go. Caesar, it is said, forgave all but the 
Tenth legion, his old favorite, whose mutiny he could not 
condone. All the ringleaders had a third docked from their 
largesses, and he threatened to muster out the Tenth. But 
later the Tenth followed him to Africa, and there did its ser¬ 
vice as of yore. Still one sees in after days that it was no 
more the Old Tenth of the times of the Gallic War. 

The accounts of the suppression of this mutiny do not 
strike one as being so dramatic as Arrian’s story of Alexan¬ 
der’s suppression of the mutiny of his Macedonians, which 
threatened to be of even graver danger. But as both are 
but embellished statements of an actual fact, they can 
scarcely be compared as a measure of the men themselves. 
And each case was characteristic. It was certainly a great 
role for one man to appear before and control scores of thou¬ 
sands by the mere force of his disdain and his iron will. 



Triumphal Car. 






XXXVIII. 


RUSPINA. OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER, 47 B. C. 

C. 25 SAR commanded the resources of the world ; yet he entered on the Afri¬ 
can campaign with his usual reckless disregard of suitable means. The Pom¬ 
peians had assembled their forces in Africa, had accumulated a huge army and 
had been joined by King Juba as ally. Csesar got together his legions in Sicily 
and set sail for Africa without giving his fleet any place as rendezvous. A 
storm dispersed his vessels, and he landed on the coast at Ruspina with but 
three thousand men, the rest having been blown he knew not whither. For 
weeks he lay on the seashore awaiting the rest of his forces, and, but for the 
hebetude of his enemies, in a state of greatest peril. Despite this blameworthy 
negligence, we are forced to admire the remarkable manner in which he im¬ 
posed on his enemies and saved himself harmless from attack. From his camp 
near Ruspina he sent in all directions for victual and troops, and by and by — 
with Csesar’s own luck — the scattered fleet turned up, and ended the sus¬ 
pense. A battle shortly supervened, in which Caesar ably rescued himself from 
a grave peril coming from too distant an advance inconsiderately undertaken. 
Scipio soon after came up with the bulk of the Pompeian forces. More serious 
work then supervened. 

At this time the northern part of the African continent, 
which alone was known to the Romans, was divided into 
Mauretania (Morocco), Numidia (Algiers), Gaetulia (the 
Great Desert) and so-called “Africa” (Tunis). Libya was 
sometimes used as a name for all Africa, Egypt and Ethiopia. 
“Africa” was now a Roman province, ruled by a praetor in 
Utica. The country was in the hands of Pompey’s adher¬ 
ents. The sovereign of Numidia, King Juba, was committed 
to the interests of the Pompeian party and held a large place 
in its councils. 

Because Pompey was dead there was no reason why his 
followers should not assert the rights which he had repre- 


620 


ARISTOCRATS IN AFRICA. 


sented. Whatever their dissensions among themselves, they 
were a unit in opposing Caesar. The chiefs of the party, 
now a coalition of aristocrats rather than Pompeians, had 
severally fled to Africa. What they had lost in strength they 
gained in fanaticism. They could expect to make no terms 
with Caesar. After Pharsalus, Metellus Scipio had collected 



the relics of the Pompeian army and shipped them to Africa; 
and Cato, Labienus, Cnaeus and Sextus Pompey, Afranius, 
Petreius, Octavius and others had joined him there. In 
Leptis, which they reached after great privations, these Pom¬ 
peians spent the winter. Cato became praetor and took up 
his quarters in Utica. He unwisely declined the command 
in chief, luckily for Caesar; for though Cato was not a soldier, 
he was a man of exceptional strength. Scipio was made com¬ 
mander of the armies. A new senate of “three hundred” 
was elected and convened. Juba was independent, but lent 


SCIPIO’S CHANCES. 


621 


friendly assistance. This coalition of the aristocrats sum¬ 
marily called for Caesar’s presence in Africa. 

The Pompeian army, as Caesar was informed, consisted of 
a vast cavalry force; four legions, armed and drilled Roman 
fashion, under Juba, and a great number of light-armed 
troops; ten legions under Scipio, eight of which were from 
refugees and conscripts; one hundred and twenty elephants ; 
and a numerous fleet* which under Octavius, Varus and 

Nasidius controlled the African and Sicilian shores and con- 

♦ 

tained fifty-five war-galleys. This force* both on land and 
sea, was capable of immense mischief. Caesar had thus far paid 
so little heed to the gathering danger that his enemies in Rome 
had feared that Scipio would invade Italy. This would have 
been practicable had Scipio worthily borne his name, — if 
his opponent had not been Caesar. While Caesar was in 
Alexandria and Asia Minor, what might not these legions, 
well led, have accomplished in Sicily and Italy ? By a descent 
on Sicily and the occupation of its waters, Scipio could have 
practically nullified Caesar’s attempt to cross to Africa. 

But boldness was no part of Scipio’s programme. He 
contented himself with a mere holding of the African pro¬ 
vince. For this purpose his plan was to gather all obtainable 
victual in his cities, so as to rob Caesar of the power to feed 
his troops, and to fortify all the coast towns. He was, how¬ 
ever, unable to carry through his plan. Many of the towns 
were distinctly in Caesar’s favor* and Scipio’s measures 
lacked both decision and efficacy. 

With his main army, Scipio lay near Utica, protecting his 
magazines. Afranius, Petreius and other old Pompeian 
generals were stationed on the coast within concentrating 
distance. The cavalry scouted the seashore for many scores 
of miles. The fleet was cruising partly on the African and 
partly on the Sicilian coast. Apparently these precautions 


622 


C.ESAR SAILS TO AFRICA . 


were well taken. But neither the fleet nor the cavalry were 
sufficiently alert to fend off Caesar’s attack. It was not 
numbers they lacked; it was discipline and proper command. 
There was not that push from headquarters which alone 
keeps subordinates to their work. 

Before leaving Rome, Caesar divided up the provinces. 
Allienus received charge of Sicily, Sulpicius of Achaia, 
Sextus Caesar and Dec. Brutus of Syria and Transalpine. 
Gaul, and M. Brutus of Cisalpine. After collecting all the 
transports he could lay his hands on, towards the end of Oc¬ 
tober, b. c. 47, Caesar gave a rendezvous to them and to his 
army at Lilybaeum. He had at the time but one legion of 
raw levies and six hundred horse at this port. He expected 
four legions to come to Africa from Spain, to work in con¬ 
nection with Bogud, king of west Mauretania. The wind 
was contrary, but such was his anxiety to reach Africa that 
he kept his men in the ships ready to sail, and himself 
watched them from his tent pitched on the seashore. After 
some days of impatient waiting, his levies and ships gradually 
began to come in. He soon had assembled six legions and 
two thousand horse, among the legions the Fifth, a veteran 
body. Leaving Allienus, the praetor, strict orders to forward 
more troops without delay, and having rendezvoused his 
vessels at Aponiana, he set sail, October 30, for the prom¬ 
ontory of Mercury (Cape Bon), hoping to land well south of 
Scipio, whom he knew to be at Utica. The troops were 
embarked in light order, without servants or camp-kits, the 
foot in galleys, the horse in transports. 

The irregular winds of the season — they blow to-day as 
they did then — separated his fleet. He had failed to give 
orders to his captains where to assemble in such a case, — a 
very reprehensible oversight. He was, says the author of 
“The African War,” in the Commentaries, unaware of the 


HIS FLEET DISPERSED. 


623 


location of the enemy’s forces, and could not give a rendez¬ 
vous. “Some blamed his conduct on this occasion, and 
charged him with a considerable oversight, in not appointing 
a place of meeting to the pilots and captains of the fleet, or 
delivering them sealed instructions, according to his usual 
custom; which being opened at a certain time, might have 
directed them to assemble at a specified place. But in this 
Caesar acted not without design; for as he knew of no port in 
Africa that was clear of the enemy’s forces, and where the 
fleet might rendezvous in security, he chose to rely entirely 
upon fortune, and land where occasion offered.” This is a 
lame excuse, which Caesar himself would never have made. 
While he could not perhaps have assigned a very definite 
rallying point, he knew where lay the bulk of the enemy’s 
forces, and, therefore, what ports to avoid; and in any case 
he might have given better instructions than none at all. 
He himself, after four days of tossing on the treacherous 
waters of the Mediterranean, came in sight of land, attended 
by a few galleys, sailed south along the coast past Clupea, 
— where he saw the cavalry of the Pompeians and about 
three thousand Moors scouting the shore,—past Neapolis, 
and anchored near Hadrumetum (modern Sousa), Novem¬ 
ber 3. Here was a Pompeian garrison of two legions and 
seven hundred horse, under C. Considius. Having recon¬ 
noitred the coast and seen no enemy, though he had in his 
company but three thousand men and one hundred and fifty 
horse, the rest having been blown he knew not whither, he 
concluded to land. 

It was here that, in leaping on shore, Caesar accidentally 
fell, and lest the omen should dispirit the legions, he arose 
with the cry, “Africa, I have embraced thee!”- He 
encamped where he had landed (a). He then made a recon- 
noissance, in person, of Hadrumetum, whose inhabitants at 



? 

liACltLA' 


Theatre of African Campaign. 

















CAESAR'S DANGER. 


625 


once manned the walls and prepared for defense. Desirous 
not to offend the population, he forbade any plunder to be 
taken by the men. L. Plancus, one of the legates, attempted 
to treat with Considius, by letter, but the advances were 
rejected by the sturdy Pompeian. 

“ The rest of the forces had not yet arrived; his cavalry was 
not considerable; he had not sufficient troops with him to 
invest the place, and these were new levies; neither did he 
think it advisable, upon his first landing, to expose the army 
to wounds and fatigue; more especially as the town was 
strongly fortified, and extremely difficult of access; and a 
great body of horse was said to be upon the point of arrival 
to succor the inhabitants; he therefore thought it advisable 
not to remain and besiege the town, lest, while he pursued 
that design, the enemy’s cavalry should come behind and 
surround him.” After remaining a day and night before the 
town, Caesar retired down the coast to a more suitable place 
to collect his scattered fleet, perhaps thinking that he might 
find some city already committed to his interests, or which 
might be persuaded to join his cause. 

He was in fact in a graver danger than at Alexandria. 
Considius’ legions were ten thousand strong, and this force 
was soon increased by the arrival of Cnaeus Piso with three 
thousand horse. The enemy had happily not attacked Caesar, 
but had adopted means of defense themselves. It was part 
of his good fortune — even Alexander never boasted such — 
that he met so lax opponents on his first landing. 

On Caesar’s retiring, Considius made a sally from the 
town, seized on the camp he had left and followed him up, 
sustained by Juba’s cavalry, which had just come in to draw 
their pay; but Caesar halted, and throwing his small body 
of horse sharply upon the Moors he drove them back to the 
town. “An incredible event occurred, that less than thirty 


626 


MOVES TO LEPTIS. 


Gallic horse repulsed two thousand Moors.” Incredible 
indeed! Mixing some cohorts of infantry with his horse as 
a rearguard, Caesar retired to Ruspina (modern Monastir), 
a well-located and prosperous town on a headland, and 
camped (b). It was the 5tli of November. Thence Caesar, 
invited by its inhabitants, next day removed to Leptis, “a 
free city governed by its own laws,” but far from a good 
place for defense, being situated on a flat part of the sea¬ 
shore. Leptis opened its gates to him. Caesar posted 
guards to protect the town from the soldiery, and camped 
between it and the seashore (c). He kept his cavalry on 
board the transports, to prevent their roaming about and 
plundering the inhabitants, whom he wished to conciliate, — a 
matter which speaks poorly for the discipline under which 
he held them. Many towns came forward, furnished him 
victual, and assured him of their fidelity. Caesar had by 
crass luck escaped the most serious danger. Shortly, a 
part of the fleet came up by the merest accident and reported 
the rest to be probably on the way to Utica, supposing Caesar 
to be in that vicinity. Utica, since the destruction of Car¬ 
thage, was the principal city on the coast, and, it will be 
remembered, was a usual place for a Roman army to disem¬ 
bark, when invading Africa from Sicily. Caesar’s failure 
to give a rendezvous to his ships was sending them into the 
very clutches of the enemy. 

The Moorish horse appeared to keep afoot, and on one 
occasion fell from ambush upon a watering party from 
Caesar’s ships. Otherwise there were no armed exchanges. 

Caesar was compelled to remain near the coast to collect 
his scattered vessels, a fact which prevented his foraging 
largely in the interior, and threatened to cut his victual 
short. But he kept actively at work. He dispatched ten 
vessels in search of the missing fleet. He sent into Sardinia 




RETURN TO RUSPINA. 


627 


and elsewhere for men, corn and stores, with stringent orders 
to comply with his requisition. The vessels in which he had 
come he emptied and sent back to Sicily for a new load of 
troops. He gave strict orders to his men by no means to 
leave camp. He sent out a naval force to take possession 
of the well-filled magazines on the island of Cercina. He 
reconnoitred and informed himself from natives and desert¬ 
ers of the status of Scipio’s army. 

On the 7th of November, finding Leptis less available than 
he had thought it, Caesar left six cohorts there under com¬ 
mand of Saserna, and with some nine thousand men returned 
to Ruspina, “whence he had come the day before.” He took 
steps to make this a depot for corn, of which he collected a 
large supply by using his soldiers and the inhabitants with 
all their wagons and sumpter-animals to forage. He was 
anxious to have an ample supply ready against his fleet 
should be collected. Ruspina was much more suitable for 
his purposes. It was nearer Sicily. It stood well out to 
sea so as to give a free view to a considerable distance. The 
anchorage, then as now, was on the south, and protected 
vessels from the north and west winds, which are those to be 
most dreaded. 

Csesar began to foresee trouble from the non-arrival of his 
vessels. He made up his mind to leave the bulk of his men 
in garrison in Ruspina and Leptis and to go himself in search 
of the missing fleet; failing to find which he would sail for 
Sicily to bring more legions. On the same day, therefore 
(November 7), the ten galleys sent after his fleet not having 
returned, Csesar took seven of his choice cohorts, some of 
those which had behaved so well in the naval actions under 
Sulpicius and Yatinius, and embarked. He fully understood 
the danger in which he had placed himself. He said nothing 
of his destination to liis* army, which consequently felt much 


628 


CJESAIVS LUCK. 


troubled at this proposed absence. For “they saw them¬ 
selves exposed upon a foreign coast to the mighty forces of 
a crafty nation, supported by an innumerable cavalry. Nor 
had they any resource in their present circumstances, or 
expectation of safety in their own conduct; but derived all 
their hope from the alacrity, vigor and wonderful cheerful¬ 
ness that appeared in their general’s countenance; for he 
was of an intrepid spirit, and behaved with undaunted reso¬ 
lution and confidence. On his conduct, therefore, they 
entirely relied, and hoped, to a man, that by his skill and 
talents all difficulties would vanish before them.” 

Just as Caesar was on the point of sailing next morning, 
the fleet appeared unexpectedly in view. This event was a 
fair sample of Caesar’s luck, to which he owed so much 
throughout his life. To whom else did such things ever 
happen? The troops were disembarked and encamped west 
of but close to Ruspina, and near the coast. His situation 
was now improved, having twenty thousand foot and two 
thousand horse; but it was still far from satisfactory. He 
was no longer in grave peril, but it seems inexcusable that 
he, practically the ruler of the world, should, by his own 
default, be so far beneath his opponents in strength. Scipio, 
Caesar knew, was in Utica, nearly one hundred miles distant. 

The whole coast here is flat. From the beach back there 
runs, as a rule, a line of slight hills, fifty or sixty feet high, 
and back of these, a flat country very slightly accentuated. 
The roll of the plain is no greater than the average of prairie 
land. Ruspina stands higher than most places on the coast. 

So soon as the camp had been intrenched, on November 8, 
Caesar, with thirty cohorts, one hundred and fifty archers, 
and four hundred horse in light marching order, set out at 

nine a. m. on another foraging expedition, and “advanced 

0 

into the country.” He could not send small parties, lest 


LABIENUS TURNS UP. 


629 


they should be cut off. Due south from Ruspina runs a line 
of coast hills. West of these hills is a flat plain, once the 
bed of an inlet of the sea. It is to-day just what Caesar 
described it. Easy to march along and leading to a fertile 
section, he chose this plain for his advance. Some three 
miles out from camp a great dust announced the approach of 
an army. The Pompeians had moved up to his vicinity, 
camped, and were now coming out to meet him under com¬ 
mand of Labienus, Petreius and other lieutenants of Scipio. 

Caesar’s scouts and an advanced party of cavalry had but 
just discovered and reported this fact. The scouting service 
was apparently far from being good. It was well for Caesar 
that Scipio had not been able to collect his force and reach 
the field a day or two before, when he was disembarking his 
troops. Scipio’s legions had been occupying an extensive 
territory and had needed time to concentrate. He had heard 
of Caesar’s arrival from Considius, and of his lack of troops. 
He fancied he had an easy prey. He had probably expected 
Caesar to land near Utica, and had only watched the gulf of 
Carthage. 

It was too late to retire. Nor was it Caesar’s way. Order¬ 
ing the horse forward, supported by archers, of whom but a 
few had accompanied the column, Caesar himself rode out to 
reconnoitre, and ordered the legions to follow in line of battle 
(d). He soon saw that he had to do with a very large part 
of the enemy’s force, and instructed the men to prepare for 
battle. His total number present was perhaps twelve 
thousand men. The Pompeians had marched with such 
precaution as not to be discovered, and had surprised Caesar 
with an overwhelming body of men, stated in the Commen¬ 
taries at ten thousand five hundred horse, forty-four thousand 
foot and a large array of light troops which were mixed in 
the line of battle with horse. Labienus was in command. 


630 


CJZSAR IN DANGER. 


He had conducted his march with ability. Despite the defeat 
at Pharsalus, Labienus was full of courage and believed 
that he could crush Caesar by numbers. He proposed to use 
his Numidian cavalry in their own hereditary fashion, by 
skirmishing round Caesar’s foot and tiring it out without 
even coming to combat ; and fight was the very thing the 
legionary must do, if he would succeed. Labienus had trapped 
Caesar on the level, where his work was clear and easy. 

Caesar sent back for the rest of his horse, — sixteen 
hundred in number. The terrain was a perfectly flat, open 
plain somewhat over one and a half miles wide, and growing 
wider in Caesar’s front. On Caesar’s left were the slight 
hills of Ruspina; on his right was marshy ground, the 
relics of the old inlet. The enemy was drawn up in deep 
order, with heavy bodies of cavalry on the wings and Nu¬ 
midian horse interspersed with the light-armed Numidians 
and bowmen in the centre. Labienus intended to put horse 
rather than foot into action. His line was much longer 
than Caesar’s and overshot his flanks. Caesar imagined that 
he would have only infantry to fight in the enemy’s main 
line, but the latter had mixed horse with the foot so cleverly 
that at a distance it looked like an infantry line. To gain 
space, his numbers being small, Caesar was obliged to draw 
up his army in one line. This he did by moving the fifteen 
cohorts of the second line up into the intervals of the first, 
or else by opening intervals between the cohorts, or by order¬ 
ing the men to take open order. His line was covered by 
archers, out as skirmishers, and flanked by Caesar’s few 
horsemen on the wings. These were ordered to be particu¬ 
larly careful not to charge to a distance or to allow them¬ 
selves to be surrounded. His line was probably about a 
mile long. His left wing and Labienus’ right leaned on the 
Ruspina hills, but these were so very slight in elevation that 


NOVEL TACTICS. 


631 


they afforded scant protection. Why Caesar did not send 
back to camp for the balance of his force is not explained. 
It may be of a part with his usual over self-reliance. Or he 
may have thought that in case of disaster he would be better 
off to have in camp a strong force of fresh and undemoralized 
men on which to retire. At all events, he concluded to fight 
it out against the odds before him. 

Caesar, owing to his limited numbers, was unable to take 
the offensive, but waited for the enemy to advance. He saw 
that he must depend more on tactics or stratagem than on 
strength. Presently the Pompeians began to extend their 
line to the right and left to lap Caesar’s flanks and surround 
his horse, which soon had difficulty in holding its ground. 
At the same time the centre of horse, interspersed with foot, 
adopted a new tactics, the horsemen rushing forward and cast¬ 
ing their darts and, so soon as opposed, retiring under cover of 
the infantry through their intervals. When the legionaries 

CAESARS 30 COHORTS 

QgpgggQggggtpQggggggpppL^J 


K— 1 — 



\ 








LABIE.NUS* LINE 
Battle of Ruspina (first phase). 


would advance beyond their line to drive off the horse, they 
would be taken in flank by the Numidian infantry and many 
wounded, while the horsemen easily escaped their darts by 
flight. And when the Caesarians retired, the horse again 
advanced to the attack. This is similar to the tactics by 
which Hannibal’s Numidians so frequently puzzled and de¬ 
feated the legionaries of the Second Punic War. Labienus 
had boasted of this tactical attack by the novelty of which he 
believed he would certainly overwhelm Caesar’s legionaries. 









632 


THREATENED DEMORALIZATION. 


Caesar was obliged to forbid the men to advance more than 
four feet beyond the line of ensigns, — which from this we 
should imagine to be in the first rank. 

Soon Labienus’ force swept so far beyond Caesar’s flanks 
that the cavalry was crowded back upon the foot, many of 
the horses being wounded. The movement continued until 
the entire army of Caesar was surrounded by the Pompeian 
hybrid squadrons. The cohorts “were obliged to form into 



a circle, as if inclosed by barriers.” This they did rapidly 
and in good order. Despite all which, the battle had not yet 
advanced to hand-to-hand fighting; for these operations had 
been accompanied by only a skirmishing contact, and what 
Caesar’s men desired was to get at the enemy with the sword. 
They were placed at a grave disadvantage by this method of 
attack. 

Caesar’s position was difficult and dangerous in the highest 
degree. The young soldiers appeared to be much demoral¬ 
ized, and looked only to him for countenance. Many, no 
doubt, thought of the massacre of Curio’s army. But they 
found that in Caesar’s bearing which gave them confidence 
in him and in themselves. He was omnipresent, cheerful, 
active, full of encouragement. From him and the few old 
soldiers interspersed in the ranks the new levies took heart, 
and bore themselves like men. 

Labienus made himself conspicuous by advancing beyond 







A CLEVER MANOEUVRE. 


633 


the line and taunting Caesar’s men, over whom he imagined 
he was surely to obtain a complete and telling victory. In 
this vainglorious boasting he all but received a fatal check 
from a soldier of the old Tenth legion, who advanced, hurled 
a javelin at him, and wounded his horse. But Labienus was 
slow in attacking his old chief. He probably waited for a 
break in the lines so as to turn defeat into massacre. Caesar 
saw that he must undertake some manoeuvre to extricate his 
cohorts from their dilemma, or that he would soon succumb 
from some unexpected accident. As it was, it was becoming 
a question how long he could hold his new men in hand. 

Caesar’s brain was fertile in expedients. What he did is 
explained at length in the Commentaries, but in such a 
manner as to be susceptible of several readings. In fact, 
many tactical manoeuvres have been constructed to explain 
Caesar’s movement. Riistow and Goler have each made an 
elaborate evolution, savoring, perhaps, a little too much of 
the drill -ground, of what was done. One thing may be as¬ 
sumed as certain. With new troops, Caesar would be apt to 
undertake no very difficult tactical manoeuvre; but to do that 
which was the simplest, and therefore most likely to work 
under the rather demoralizing circumstances. 

The cohorts were huddled together so much that the men 
could not use their weapons to advantage. Caesar saw that 
he must break the circle of the enemy, and was well aware 
that his interior position, so long as the cohorts kept their 
head, was much the stronger. He ordered alternate cohorts 
to face to the rear, and back up each against its neighbor, so 
as to form two fronts. The flank cohorts, presumably, as 
usual, of old troops, pushed their way to right and left, so 
as to give greater intervals to the centre cohorts; and by 
vigorous charges by horse and foot together, the circle of the 
enemy was ruptured at its two extremes. There were now 


634 


A BOLD CHARGE. 


two bodies of the enemy, which could not act together, and 
Caesar could see that they, in their turn, were growing 
uneasy, while his own men, cheered by success, began to 
recover their elasticity. Seizing the proper moment, Caesar 
ordered both fronts to charge the enemy with a will. The 



Battle of Ruspina (third phase). 


result justified the order. The Pompeians turned and fled 
in all directions. Caesar then faced the cohorts of the ori¬ 
ginal front, which he had personally commanded, to the rear, 
and retired towards camp. 

This manoeuvre produced a temporary lull in the battle. 
It looked as if Caesar could extricate himself. Just at this 
juncture a considerable body of foot and a select and fresh 
column of eleven hundred Numidian horse under M. Petreius 
and Cnaeus Piso came up and rehabilitated matters for the 
enemy. Caesar, during the lull, had begun to retire upon 
his camp in order of battle, and with unbroken ranks. The 
enemy’s newly arrived cavalry endeavored to harass his 
retreat and disorganize his line; but Caesar’s men had gained 
confidence in their chief, and in their own fighting capacity. 
Far from being nervous under the stress of their difficult 
situation, they promptly and cheerfully obeyed every order. 
There was no sign left of giving way. At command they 
sharply faced about and made bold to renew the battle in the 
middle of the plain. Labienus pursued the same policy of 
not coming to close quarters, but kept up a sharp skirmish- 









LABIENUS DEFEATED. 


635 


ing attack. Despite his boast, he seemed careful not to get 
within the reach of his old chief’s arm. His presence was, 
however, harassing to a degree. 

Caesar saw that a supreme effort was essential if he would 
keep his forces so well in hand as to permit a retreat to 
camp. His cavalry was all tired out. On a given signal, 
and with a vim which only the true commander could impart, 
the whole force made about face, paused, and moved as one 
man forward at charging pace upon Labienus’ line, which 
was now somewhat carelessly dispersed. Taken by surprise 
at this bold front by an enemy they supposed beaten and 
were waiting to see dissolve its ranks, the Pompeians were 
completely broken, and retired with loss beyond the hills on 
the west of the plain. The Caesarians followed, and, taking 
possession of an eminence, held it until they could retire in 
order of battle. They then returned to camp in good condi¬ 
tion. “The enemy, who in this last attack had been very 
roughly handled, then at length retreated to their fortifica¬ 
tions,” i. e., their camp. The battle had lasted from eleven 
o’clock till sunset. 

Caesar’s tactical manoeuvre has been worked out by Piis- 
tow to be something like this. From his one line of thirty 
cohorts he withdrew the even-numbered ones into a temporary 
second line, thus affording him a more open order which 
could better manoeuvre. These latter cohorts then wheeled 
into two columns, those of the right wing to the right, those 
of the left wing to the left; and so soon as they were ready 
to charge, the horse retired around their flanks to the rear. 
The odd-numbered cohorts, now alone in the first line, also 
wheeled into column right and left, thus making two heavy 
columns facing outwardly to each flank. At the word of 
command these columns charged home right and left upon 
the wings of Labienus which had outflanked Caesar’s line, 


636 


STRENGTHENING THE CAMP. 


driving them well back but not advancing too far. Mean¬ 
while, Caesar collected the cavalry, which had retired behind 
the columns, into two bodies in the centre, and charged 
Labienus’ centre to create a diversion there. The surprise 
of the whole manoeuvre, particularly by troops which Labi¬ 
enus thought were all but defeated, was what gave it its 
success. So soon as the enemy had been thrown back, the 
cohorts again returned to their places in double line, and 
Caesar began to withdraw. It cannot be said that this is 
accurate. It is one plausible explanation of the tactical 
manoeuvre, and fits the description of the Commentaries, — 
as indeed more than one will do. But the manoeuvre first 
given is more probable, as being simpler. 

Many deserters came to Caesar’s camp. These reported 
that Labienus had expected to surprise and demoralize 
Caesar’s new troops by his unusual tactics, and then cut them 
to pieces as Curio had been. He had relied on his numbers 
rather than on discipline and his own ability, and had miscal¬ 
culated Caesar’s resources of intelligence and courage when 
pressed. And yet he knew his old chief full well. 

Caesar had not won a victory, but he had, after being 
surprised, saved his army from possible annihilation by a 
very superior force. “Had Ruspina not been near, the 
Moorish javelin would perhaps have accomplished the same 
result here as the Parthian bow at Carrhae,” says Momm¬ 
sen. But Caesar was not a Crassus. 

Caesar now fortified his camp with great care, inclosing it 
with intrenchments flanked by towers which ran from the 
outer flank of Ruspina and that of the camp down to the 
sea, beside joining the town and camp (e). He could thus 
safely receive victuals and enginery of war and have safe 
access to his fleet. However strong Caesar might make his 
works, the strength of his position lay in the man himself. 


LACK OF VICTUAL. 


637 


His own legions recognized liis confidence and partook it; 
and in the enemy’s camp, it may be presumed, the aristocrats 
equally felt the presence over against them of a great captain. 

Caesar did not deem it expedient just now to risk an attack 
on the enemy in the open field. Needing light troops, he 
armed many of the Gauls, Rhodians and other mariners in 
the fleet as slingers and archers, and drew from the fleet 
many Syrian and Iturean bowmen, who were serving as mar¬ 
iners. Though not very effective, they added a certain value 
to the army. He put up workshops to make engines, darts 
and leaden bullets, and sent to Sicily for corn, hurdles, wood 
for rams and other material of war. He insisted strictly 
on the performance of guard duty, saw to every detail him- 
self, constantly visited the outposts, encouraged his men, and 
looked out for their wants with the utmost energy. 

But Caesar was unfortunate about his victual. Corn in 
Africa was scarce, for all the laboring population was under 
arms. He could not forage in the neighborhood; no corn 
had been left by the enemy. Many of his transports were 
taken by Scipio’s fleet, for, not knowing where Caesar was, 
the transports were uncertain where to land. Caesar had to 
keep part of his fleet hovering along the coast to guide his 
incoming vessels. The question of subsistence taxed him to 
the utmost. The motif of the entire African campaign may 
be said to be the lack of victual in Caesar’s camp. 

Scipio was heard to be on his way to reinforce Labienus 
with eight legions and three thousand horse. Caesar, with 
his late arrivals, had less than thirty thousand men. Scipio 
and Labienus together had thrice the number. After the 
late battle, Labienus had sent his sick and wounded, many 
in number, to Hadrumetum, and made ready for a junction 
with Scipio. He posted cavalry outposts on all the hills 
around Ruspina to prevent victual from reaching Caesar. 


638 


SCIPIO ARRIVES. 


Scipio’s intention had been to attack Caesar before he got 
intrenched at Ruspina, but he was tardy. Caesar’s expedition 
was too great to allow of much delay by Scipio upon the march. 
Scipio had left Utica with a strong garrison and marched 



to Hadrumetum, where he arrived November 13. Thence, 
after a few days, he joined the forces under Labienus and 
Petreius, and all three fortified a camp about three miles 
south of Caesar’s works (X) before Ruspina. Scipio, no 
doubt, reconnoitred, but apparently did not care to attack 
Caesar’s intrenchments. They were too formidable. He 
thought he would try on Caesar the same proceeding Caesar 
had tried on Pompey at Dyrrachium, — blockade. In this 
he had a fair chance of success with his overwhelming odds. 
But he did not carry out his purpose with acumen nor with 
sufficient force. His guard-duties were laxly performed, and 
he had not the eye to seize on the salient topographical 
advantages of his position, though, he established, apparently, 
a cordon about Caesar’s lines. Still, what he did soon began 










YOUNG POMPEY. 


639 


to interfere witli Caesar’s foraging, —a serious matter, as no 
provisions had yet arrived from Sicily or Sardinia, and Caesar 
“did not possess above six miles in each direction” from 
which to get corn. That he kept so much reflects small 
credit on Scipio’s activity. Just what “six miles” may 
mean is subject to question. The circuit of Caesar’s inclos¬ 
ure was about six miles, but that he could forage much 
beyond is improbable in view of Scipio’s great force of cav¬ 
alry. The horses and cattle were largely fed on seaweed 
washed in fresh water, a fact which proves the considerable 
difficulties he was under. Caesar was blockaded in earnest. 

Young Pompey, meanwhile, in Utica, urged by Cato to 
do something worthy of his name, got together thirty sail, 
and, embarking two thousand men, invaded the land of 
King Bogud in Mauretania. Landing near Ascurum, the 
garrison allowed him to approach; then, sallying out, drove 
him back with confusion. Disheartened, he sailed to the 
Balearic Isles. Bogud was merely irritated into giving more 
earnest support to Caesar, who made use of every means to 
which he could put his hand. P. Sitius, a soldier of fortune 
expatriated by the Catalinian fiasco , had collected a force of 
motley legionaries and served various African potentates for 
pay. Him Caesar set to influence King Bogud to invade 
Numidia, whose king, Juba, was on the march to join Scipio. 
In this he succeeded. Sitius and Bogud advanced into Nu¬ 
midia, took Cirta (Constantine), put the citizens to the sword, 
and captured Juba’s stronghold of provisions and war mate¬ 
rial. Juba was summarily called to defend his own territory. 
This defection was a serious blow to Scipio. Juba left but 
thirty elephants with the Pompeian army, out of the large 
number he had brought. Juba’s approach had threatened to 
add the last straw to the load Caesar had to bear; his change 
of mind distinctly modified the danger. 


XXXIX. 


INTRENCHED ADVANCE. DECEMBER, 47 B. C. 

C-3SSAR strongly intrenched himself in Ruspina to await the arrival of the rest 
of his legions. The country towns and people were mostly favorable to him, but 
under the control of the Pompeians. Scipio lay in a large camp three miles 
down the coast, with an outpost in Ucita, a small town in the middle of a plain 
surrounded by rolling hills. Csesar was anxious to bring Scipio to battle, but 
on his own terms. All through this campaign he appeared to avoid a general 
engagement. He moved the bulk of his forces out to the heights east of Ucita, 
and intrenched. Between him and Ucita, in the plain and on the hills on its 
west, a number of skirmishes ensued, but no approach to a battle, though Csesar 
frequently offered it. Csesar determined to capture Ucita, which had been 
made the centre of Scipio’s defensive line. He advanced a series of fieldworks 
from his intrenchments on the hills across the plain towards the town, so that 
he might not be attacked in flank. With a force all but equal, if not quite, to 
Scipio’s, Csesar, for some reason, did not force the fighting, though he restlessly 
manoeuvred against the enemy. 

So soon as the province of Africa was convinced of Caesar’s 
arrival in person, — this had not been believed, owing to the 
allegations of the enemy that only a legate was in command, 
until Caesar communicated with the important towns himself, 
— many persons of rank sent in their offers of allegiance and 
complained bitterly of the cruelty of the Pompeian coalition, 
which had sucked the life-blood out of the land by their 
rapacity. Caesar determined to undertake active operations 
as soon as the season would admit, and sent word to Alienus, 
the praetor in Sicily, that the troops must be forwarded, 
whatever the weather, if he was to preserve Africa from utter 
ruin. “And he himself was so anxious and impatient, that 
from the day the letters were sent he complained without 


CAESAR’S OVERHASTINESS. 


641 


ceasing of the delay of the fleet, and had his eyes night and 
day turned towards the sea.” Meanwhile, the enemy contin¬ 
ued to ravage the country, which Csesar was forced to watch, 
and could not prevent owing to his small force. But he 
increased his works, and made his camp almost impregnable 
with redoubts and defenses, and carried the lines quite to the 
sea. 

Caesar’s constrained position was due to his own overeager 
act in attacking the African problem with insufficient means. 
However justly we may admire Caesar as perhaps the greatest 
man of ancient days, as indisputably one of the world’s great 
captains, we cannot justly overlook his errors. Caesar must 
be tried by his peers. His habit of undertaking operations 
with inadequate forces was a distinct failing from which only 
“Caesar’s fortune” on many occasions saved him. This 
characteristic of his military life cannot but be condemned. 
It is beyond question that all the danger and delay to which 
he had been subjected since sailing from Lilybaeum were attri¬ 
butable to a carelessness which militates as much against his 
character as a captain as his subsequent splendid efforts to 
save himself from ruin and to defeat his enemies redound to 
his credit. His energy and skill in saving himself from self- 
imposed dangers are thoroughly admirable. 

A great captain must face any odds of numbers or condi¬ 
tions when it is essential. But sound preparation is one of 
the corner-stones of his reputation. Foolhardiness may show 
courage; but it shows equal lack of discretion. Overhasti¬ 
ness is still worse. In the mixed caution and boldness of the 
captain, Hannibal far outranks Csesar. But Hannibal had 
not the help of Fortune as Alexander and Csesar always had. 

It would seem clear that Scipio’s best policy was the one 
which Cato urged upon him, — to move into the interior and, 
if possible, lure Csesar away from the coast to a point where 


m 


FRIGHTENED SQUADRONS. 


lie would find it not only harder to victual, but to keep his 
army up to fighting level. But Scipio was not gifted with 
military sense. Instead of this course, he garrisoned Had- 
rumetum and Thapsus, and sought to shut Caesar in. He 
spent much time in drilling his elephants in mock battles so 
as to train them to face the enemy. He knew' that, as a 
rule, elephants in battle had proved as dangerous to one 
army as to another, — but Scipio could not give up his desire 
to put these beasts to use in his line. 

As usual, the cavalry outposts of the two parties continu¬ 
ally skirmished, and the German and Gallic cavalry occa¬ 
sionally exchanged greetings on a prearranged truce. 
Labienus tried on several occasions to surprise Leptis, but 
was beaten off by the three cohorts then in garrison under 
Saserna. The town was strongly fortified and well supplied 
with catapults and ballistas, which made up for its situation 
on the flat seashore where it had no natural defenses. 

On one of these occasions when a strong squadron was 
before the gates, their chief was slain by a shaft from an 
engine which pinned him to his own shield. The whole 
body, terrified, took to flight, “by which means the town was 
delivered from any further attempts,” — a fact which argues 
illy for the cool-headedness of Labienus’ squadrons, and is 
a curious commentary on the value of the nomad cavalry of 
antiquity. When such a man as Hannibal headed it, it was 
alone effective; and then it was an arm of exceptional power. 

When Scipio had finished his preparations and felt strong 
enough to fight Csesar, he began about the 20th of November 
to draw up on successive days some three hundred paces 
from his own camp and to offer battle. This was invariably 
declined. Caesar was awaiting his veterans and supplies, and 
could not be provoked into paying any attention to Scipio’s 
taunts; and his works were impregnable. This “forbear- 


HOW CAESAR GAVE ORDERS. 


643 


ance and tranquillity gave 'im (Scipio) such a contempt of 
Caesar and liis army ” that on one occasion in a boastful 
spirit Scipio advanced with his whole army and towered 
elephants up to Caesar’s very ramparts. But Caesar merely 
ordered in his outposts of horse when the enemy advanced to 
dart-throwing distance, called in his fatigue parties, posted 
his men, ordered his reserve cavalry under arms, and awaited 
the assault if they were foolish enough to make it. 

“These orders were not given by himself in person, or 
after viewing the disposition of the enemy from the rampart; 
. but such was his consummate knowledge of the art of war, 
that he gave all the necessary directions by his officers, he 
himself sitting in his tent and informing himself of the 
motives of the enemy by his scouts.” This is the first 
instance in ancient military books where a commanding 
general is described as managing a battle just as he would 
do to-day. The Roman general was always at the front in 
person. Caesar knew that the enemy would not dare to 
assault his works, for he had cross-bows, engines and other 
missile-throwing devices, besides abatis and trous de loup 
in plenty; but he was ready to receive them should they 
really attempt the storm. He did not desire a battle until 
he could make it a crushing defeat, and to insure this he 
waited for the veterans who were to arrive on the next 
embarkation. Scipio, out of this caution, made loud a claim 
of cowardice against Caesar, exhorted his troops and prom¬ 
ised them speedy victory. Caesar resumed his work on the 
fortifications, and “under pretense of fortifying his camp, 
inured the levies to labor and fatigue.” 

But meanwhile many deserters, Numidians and Gaetulians, 
came to Caesar “ because they understood he was related to 
C. Marius, from whom their ancestors had received consid¬ 
erable favors ” during the Jugurthan wars. Many of these 


644 


CORN ARRIVES. 


returned home and wrought up their friends to favor Caesar's 
cause. Caesar had spies in Scipio’s camp in plenty and kept 
abreast with his purposes. Many tribes sent in offers of 
allegiance. Deputies came from Acilla, which perhaps has 
been identified with El Alia, some twenty miles south of 
Thapsus, and from other towns, requesting garrisons and 
promising supplies. Caesar sent a small force to Acilla 
under C. Messius, who had been aedile. On the way, this 
body was all but intercepted by Considius, who was appar¬ 
ently on a general reconnoissance from his headquarters at 
Hadrumetum, with eight cohorts; but the garrison reached 
the town before him. Considius returned to Hadrumetum, 
whence, securing some horse, he again made his way to 
Acilla and laid siege to it. 

About November 26 there arrived a large supply of corn 
from Cercina on board the fleet of transports which Caesar 
had sent thither; and equally to be desired, the Thirteenth 
and Fourteenth legions, eight hundred Gallic horse, one 
thousand archers and slingers, and a great deal of war mate¬ 
rial from Alienus, the praetor at Lilybaeum. The fleet laden 
with these troops had had a favorable wind and had made 
the passage in four days, — a distance of somewhat less than 
two hundred miles. This double arrival “animated the sol¬ 
diers and delivered them from apprehensions of want.” The 
cohorts, after a proper rest, Caesar distributed on his works. 
He also ascertained that those of his ships which had not yet 
arrived were only detained by adverse winds, and that none 
had been taken by the enemy. 

This failure to move greatly puzzled Scipio, all the more 
from Caesar’s usually all but abnormal activity. He sent 
two Gaetulians as spies in the guise of deserters, and with 
promises of great rewards, into Caesar’s camp to discover 
what they could about the pitfalls and entanglements Caesar 


BREAKING LOOSE. 


645 


had made; in what manner he proposed to meet the elephants, 
and what his dispositions were for battle. This only resulted 
in the men remaining in Caesar’s service and in increasing 
the number of real deserters. Of these there was daily a 
large number. But Cato at Utica supplied these gaps by the 
recruits he sent from there. These were mostly freedmen, 
Africans or slaves. The neighboring towns aided Caesar as 
much as possible. Tysdra (modern El Djem), a town thirty 
miles to the south, pointed out to him a store, of three hun¬ 
dred thousand bushels of corn belonging to Italian mer¬ 
chants, which he was, however, unable to seize. P. Sitius, 
still active, made an incursion into Numidia and captured an 
important castle of King Juba’s, holding much victual and 
war material. 

Caesar now dispatched six of his transports to Sicily for 
the remainder of the troops. Though still far weaker in 
numbers he had enough men to face the enemy, and deter¬ 
mined to manoeuvre for a good chance to bring him to battle. 

South of Caesar’s works at Ruspina lay “a fine plain, 
extending fifteen miles and bordering upon a chain of moun¬ 
tains of moderate height, that formed a kind of theatre.” It 
is the same to-day as Caesar describes it (f). The width of 
the valley is from two to five miles. The hills surrounding 
it vary from three hundred to six hundred feet. The north¬ 
ern outlet leads to a marsh near the sea. Six miles from the 
coast, in the centre of the plain, lay Ucita, a town held by a 
strong garrison of Scipio’s. On the highest of the hills were 
watch-towers, and at various points of the valley Scipio had 
infantry guards and cavalry outposts. Caesar did not propose 
to allow Scipio to inclose him in siege lines; he must break 
the growing circle, and this was a good place to do it. If 
Caesar could gain possession of this plain it would also go 
far towards cutting Scipio off from Leptis, which he could 





Ucita Plain. 









CAESAR MOVES AWAY. 


647 


then reach only by a long circuit and make it easier to hold 
this place. This would secure him two good harbors, Rus- 
pina and Leptis. 

As Caesar’s good fortune would have it, Scipio was hard 
up for water in his camp south of Ruspina, and determined to 
move to a point where there was a better supply. He gave 
up his camp November 27, and made for the hills on the west 
of the Ucita plain (s s). This afforded Caesar his opportu¬ 
nity, and he followed. 

Caesar’s main purpose was probably to feel the enemy and 
by a series of movements seek to put him at a disadvantage 
so as to draw him into battle on terms helpful to himself. 
Accordingly, on the last day of November, leaving a suitable 
force in the Ruspina lines, he broke camp at midnight with 
the rest of the infantry and all the cavalry and marched (t t) 
away from Ruspina along the seashore, left in front, and, 
striking the hills on the eastern side of the plain, he filed to 
the south along them until his head of column neared Scipio’s 
cavalry outposts (g). He was careful to avoid the plain, for 
fear of the Numidian cavalry, of which he had had so serious 
a taste in the last encounter. Here Caesar began to fortify 
the most available line “along the middle of the ridge, from 
the place at which he was arrived to that whence he set out; ” 
that is, he threw up works (u) crowning the slope of the hills 
and facing substantially west. He was so placed as to pre¬ 
vent the enemy from cutting him off from Ruspina. 

The “mountains” Caesar refers to in all these operations 
in the triangular theatre of Hadrumetum, Thysdra, Thapsus, 
do not exist to-day, and from very evident geological condi¬ 
tions never did exist. There has been no change of topo¬ 
graphy since Caesar’s day. The highest point in this theatre 
is six hundred feet; the highest point on which operations 
were conducted is half that height. The ridge Caesar occu- 


648 


SC IP 10 ATTACKS. 


pied is less than one hundred and fifty feet above the Ucita 
valley. Where Caesar drew his lines is half way down the 
ridge, which here is cut up by ravines and is very stony. To 
read the Commentaries without knowledge of the topography 
is very misleading. 

When dawn came on, Scipio and Labienus became aware 
of Caesar’s operations. Scipio’s new camp was to the west 
of the valley, and Labienus appears to have had a supple¬ 
mentary camp near Ucita, between that town and the hills. 
The Ponrpeians at once determined to intercept the work. 
They advanced their troops in two lines, the cavalry in front 



about a mile from their camp opposite Ruspina, the infantry 
one half mile in its rear. Scipio imagined that Caesar's men 
would be exhausted by the night’s work, and would fall an 
easy prey to an attack. Wlien Caesar saw that they had 
come within fifteen hundred paces, — a mile and a half, — a 
distance too small for him safely to continue his work on the 
intrenclnnents, he ordered some of his Spanish cavalry and 





AND GETS DEFEATED. 


649 


archers to attack the party of Nuinidian cavalry which held 
a post on a hill near his own left, but on the enemy’s right. 
This was done in good form and the Numidians were quickly 
driven off. Seeing this, Labienus led all his horse from the 
right wing of his advance line to the assistance of this retir¬ 
ing force. So soon as this last detachment was separated 
from the main army of Scipio, Caesar threw forward his own 
left wing to intercept them, and advanced a body of cavalry 
to the right. 

In the plain east of Ucita was a large villa and grounds 
(v) which lay west of the hills where the cavalry skirmish 
had just taken place. These grounds happened to hide from 
Labienus the view of the movement of Caesar’s cavalry. 
Under cover of this obstacle Caesar’s horse advanced, and 
when Labienus had passed beyond the villa, presenting to 
it his naked left, it wheeled round upon his flank and rear, 
and charged home with a will. The astonished Numidians 
at once broke and fled; but a body of Gallic and German 
cavalry which Labienus had induced to accompany him from 
Gaul, having stood their ground, Caesar’s men fell upon this 
detachment, surrounded and cut it up. The sight of this 
defeat so demoralized Scipio’s legions that they could not be 
held in hand, but retired in disorder from the plain and even 
the hills. His loss had been very large. Caesar did not 
pursue, but retired to his lines and again set to work to com¬ 
plete his intrenclnnents. 

This was an auspicious beginning. Caesar had gained 
possession of a foothold in the plain and a marked moral 
advantage over Scipio. About December 4 he moved his 
entire army, except the Ruspina garrison, into the new 
intrenclnnents, which completely covered Ruspina and prac¬ 
tically Leptis. 

Next day Caesar marched out from the new lines, drew up 


650 


ATTEMPT ON UCITA. 


and offered battle. He was anxious to see what Scipio would 
do. He had gained a strong point the day before and wanted 
to assert it for the influence on his young troops. But the 
Pompeian, discouraged by his defeat, declined the offer. 
Caesar marched along the foot of the hills to within a mile 
of Ucita, hoping he might take it by a coup de main ; for not 
only had Scipio accumulated great stores in the town, but 
here, too, were the wells from which he drew the bulk of his 



Lines of Battle at Ucita. 


supply; and good water was so scarce along the coast that 
it was for this he had left his old camp. 

Perceiving Caesar’s movement, Scipio, fearing to lose the 
place, at once marched out with his entire army to its defense, 
and drew up in four deep lines, “the first of cavalry, sup¬ 
ported by elephants with castles on their backs.” His depth 
made it impossible for him to outflank Caesar. Caesar 
stopped and waited for Scipio’s advance. The latter, how¬ 
ever, keeping Ucita as if it were a fieldwork in his centre, 




























FIDELITY OF C&SAR'S MEN. 


651 


merely advanced his two wings on either side of the town, 
and remained in line. He had none too great confidence in 
his troops. Caesar did not see a good chance of attacking 
both the town and the army on either side of it at the same 
time, and as it was now sunset and his men had fasted since 
morning, he withdrew to the intrenchments. But one good 
result of the last few days’ manoeuvring by Caesar was to 
constrain Considius to abandon the siege of Acilla, ably 
defended by Messius, from which he retired with some loss 
to Hadrumetum by a long circuit “through the kingdom of 
Juba.” 

Nothing exhibits the fidelity of Caesar’s soldiers better than 
the capture about this time of one of his transports and a 
galley with some legionaries on board. These men were sent 
to Scipio, who offered them freedom and rewards if they 
would join his banner. Among them was a centurion of the 
Fourteenth legion. He answered Scipio’s promises by a firm 
refusal to serve against Caesar. He told the Pompeian that 
he quite underrated Caesar’s soldiers, and in proof challenged 
him to pick out the best cohort in his army and give him 
but ten of his comrades, and he would agree to destroy the 
cohort in open fight. The penalty of this faithful boldness 
was the death of all these veterans. Incensed at the capture 
of this transport, Caesar broke the officers whose duty it was 
to patrol the coast to protect the landing of his vessels. 

Caesar’s forces on this campaign, as already stated, were 
unprovided with baggage. So strict had he been in pre¬ 
scribing light order that even officers had been forbidden to 
take slaves or camp-kit. Moreover, he shifted his ground 
every few days, and thus prevented the men from thoroughly 
housing themselves from the weather, as they would have 
done if put into winter - quarters. They were reduced to 
making huts of brush, and to employing clothing or mats or 


652 


KING JUBA ARRIVES. 


rushes as tent covering. One severe hailstorm is mentioned 
in the Commentaries, as occurring early in December, 
which destroyed all the huts, put out the fires, soaked the 
rations, laid the whole camp under water, and obliged the 
soldiers to wander about with their bucklers over their heads 
to protect themselves from the hailstones. It reminds one 
of the great storm which came so near demoralizing the pha¬ 
lanx of Alexander in the Hindoo Ivoosh. 

Despite his numbers, Scipio felt that he was weak, and he 
earnestly urged King Juba to join him. The latter, well 
aware that he ran greater danger from Caesar’s winning in 
Africa than from any efforts of Sitius, left Sabura with part 
of the army to protect his territory against this partisan chief 
and King Bogud, and started with three legions, eight hun¬ 
dred regular and much Numidian horse, thirty elephants and 
a vast number of light troops towards the Pompeian camp. 
His arrival had been heralded with loud boasts which pro¬ 
duced a certain uneasiness in Caesar’s camp, where daily 
deserters spread all the rumors of Scipio’s. But when, about 
December 20, Juba actually arrived, the legionaries, after a 
glimpse at his undisciplined rabble, saw that they might 
despise his numbers. Scipio, however, celebrated this rein¬ 
forcement by drawing up in line with the entire joint forces 
and ostentatiously offering battle to Caesar. The only 
response of the latter was a quiet advancement of his lines 
along the ridge towards the south. Juba camped north of 
Scipio (j). 

Scipio had now received all the reinforcements he could 
expect and Caesar believed that he could be brought to battle. 
He had camped opposite Ucita, between two ravines, each 
of which protected a flank. He “began to advance along 
the ridge with his forces, secure them with redoubts, and 
possess himself of the hills between him and Scipio,” who 


LABIENUS IN AMBUSH. 


653 


still liad outposts on the east slope of the valley, south of 
Caesar. The lattter could gain marked advantages by obtain¬ 
ing possession of this entire range of hills. He would be rid 
of the cavalry outposts of the enemy which interfered with his 



watering parties. He would secure his left flank in case he 
desired to advance against the enemy. He could seriously 
impede the enemy’s offensive movements, and perhaps, out of 
some of the minor encounters, develop a general engagement 
under favorable conditions. This advance of Caesar’s lines 




654 


AMBUSH FAILS. 


Labienus sought to arrest by fortifying one of the hills 
beyond Caesar’s left (h). To reach this hill Caesar had a 
rugged, rocky valley to pass, at the bottom of which was a 
thick grove of old olives. Here Labienus, anticipating 
Caesar’s manoeuvre, about December 24 placed himself, with 
some horse and foot, in an ambuscade under cover of the 
grove, which lay well to the rear of the valley, and sent a 
body of cavalry to lie in hiding south of the fortified hill so 
as to be able to debouch on Caesar’s rear if he advanced so 
far as to attack it. Unaware of either ambush, Caesar sent 
forward his cavalry, but Labienus’ foot soldiers, fearing to 
encounter Caesar’s horsemen in the plain, began too soon to 
break out of cover in the olive wood in order to oppose them 
on the south bank of the ravine, where they had the advan¬ 
tage of height. This utterly upset Labienus’ stratagem. 
Caesar’s horse easily dispersed this body of infantry in its 
scattered formation; the cavalry ambuscade also went wrong, 
and Labienus barely made good his own escape. This 
retreat having drawn from hiding the whole of Labienus’ 
party, the Caesarians captured the hill beyond as they had set 
out to do, and there Caesar at once threw up a work and 
garrisoned it strongly. His camp was now inexpugnable. 

Caesar made up his mind to capture Ueita, a town which 
“stood between him and the enemy,'and was garrisoned by a 
detachment of Scipio’s army.” But Scipio, with his num¬ 
bers, was able to protect the town by such a long line of 
battle, that Caesar’s flanks would be exposed in advancing on 
Ueita across the plain. This led him to undertake another 
of those remarkable feats of field fortification for which the 
time was noted, and in which he especially excelled and 
carried out in all his campaigns. It is curious to see how 
Caesar, who was capable of doing such hazardous things as 
to come to Africa with a mere handful of men, would resort 


CAESAR’S CAUTION . 655 

to such hypercautious means of accomplishing an object, 
when his strength was greater, if properly gauged by 
quality, than the enemy’s. We are not able to weigh all 
the existing conditions; we do not know them. But taking 
the Commentaries as the basis of our information, we are as 
much surprised at Caesar’s caution here as we were at his 
boldness in the operations at Dyrrachium. Still, we under¬ 
stand the situation fairly well; the topography and facts are 
before us, and we can only ascribe Caesar’s caution either to 
mood or to distrust of his newly raised legions. To give 
orders for a battle is as often a matter of inspiration as of 
calculation and preparation. Here Caesar had an easier task 
than at Pharsalus, in luring Scipio into battle on the Ucita 
plain; and Scipio’s troops were no better than his own. In 
Alexander there was but one mood: “de l’audace, encore de 
l’audace, toujours de l’audace!” In Hannibal’s caution, 
when we know the facts, there is always a consistent reason 
and one which appeals to us. Caesar’s caution we are often 
put to it to explain. It was not perhaps so much the capture 
of Ucita at which Caesar was aiming, as the chance in some 
manner of placing Scipio at a disadvantage so as to lead up 
to his defeat in a decisive engagement, — without too much 
risk. 

To carry out his plan, about December 26 Caesar began 
to throw out westward two parallel lines of works, facing 
north and south, from his camp at the foot of the slope across 
the plain in such a direction as to strike the outer corners of 
the town of Ucita. This, say the Commentaries, he did so 
that he might have his flanks amply protected from the 
enemy’s vast force of cavalry in case he should besiege or 
assault the town; or, indeed, from any attempt by Labienus 
to outflank him. The proximity of these works facilitated 
desertion from the enemy to Caesar. Within these lines he 


656 


DIGGING AN ADVANCE. 


could sink wells, the plain being low, and he was in want of 
water at his camp upon the hills, and had to send to a dis¬ 
tance for it. 

The prosecution of the work was protected by a body of 
horse backed by some cohorts, which fended off the Numidian 



cavalry and archers. The intrenchment w T as begun after 
dark, and was so far completed on two successive nights as 
to be occupied by the troops before the succeeding morning. 
During this work his men held frequent intercourse with the 
enemy’s soldiers,—as, indeed, at all times when they could 
safely approach each other, — the result of which was almost 
invariably desertion to Caesar. But of desertions from 
Caesar there may be said to have been none. The Commen¬ 
taries at least acknowledge no desertions, and their number 
was in any event small. A number of cavalry exchanges 
took place, in the majority of which the troops of Caesar had 
the upper hand. Scipio’s horse was much more numerous, 
but far from being as well drilled or steady. Nor had it 





A SMART COMBAT. 657 

that instinct which enables cavalry under a born leader to 
accomplish the wonders it sometimes does. 

One day towards evening, — it may have been December 
29, — as Caesar was drawing off the fatigue parties, Juba, 
Labienus and Scipio, at the head of all their horse and light 
troops, fell upon the cavalry outposts and drove them in. 
But Caesar quickly collected a few cohorts of legionaries, 
who always had their arms at hand, and leading them up to 
the assistance of the horse, reestablished the combat. See¬ 
ing themselves well supported, the cavalry turned with a 
brilliant charge upon the Numidians, who were scattered 
over the plain by the pursuit they had just undertaken, slew 
a large number, and hustled the rest into rapid flight. Juba 
and Labienus barely escaped capture under cover of the dust. 
The result of this handsome interchange was that still more 
numerous deserters from the Fourth and Sixth legions came 
over to Caesar, as well as a large number of Curio’s horse. 

Gsetulia, roused by the leading citizens whom Caesar had 
sent back to their homes for this purpose, now revolted from 
King Juba. This monarch, with three wars at once on his 
hands, was constrained to detach a considerable part of his 
force to protect his own borders. But he himself remained 
in the Pompeian camp with the remainder and made himself 
obnoxious by his insolence, meddling and vanity. 

The Ninth and Tenth legions, on the last day of the year, 
arrived from Sicily, after a narrow escape from capture as 
the result of their own imprudence. The relics of their old 
spirit of mutiny were still evident in their undisciplined con¬ 
duct. One of the military tribunes, C. Avienus, had gone 
so far as to fill one transport exclusively with his own slaves 
and camp-equipage. The legions had too long been on easy 
duty near Kome. In order to bring these men under curb, 
Caesar resorted to sharp and decisive measures, and took the 


658 


CAESAR EQUALS SCIPIO. 


case of Avienus as a pretext. He broke this and one other 
tribune and several centurions, and sent them out of Africa 
under guard. Among the Romans, to be cashiered was all 
but the heaviest penalty which could be inflicted. It was a 
deprivation of all the culprit’s civil rights, honor and charac¬ 
ter. The cohorts of the Ninth and Tenth were put into the 
trenches, with no more equipage or rations than the other 
men. 

Counting in the new arrivals, Caesar’s heavy infantry 
force of five veteran and five new legions was nearly if not 
quite equal to Scipio’s. The latter had more light troops, 
but these were practically worthless in battle. Caesar still 
looked for two more legions from Sicily, and Juba, having 
been obliged to send away part of his army, depleted Scipio’s 
numbers. The new year opened with Caesar’s chances fully 
equal to those of the enemy. 



Ancient Helmet. (Louvre.) 




XL. 


UCITA. JANUARY, 46 B. C. 

Though Caesar’s lines liad reached Ucita, he still waited for more of his 
troops. These shortly arrived, though barely escaping capture. Each of the 
commanders daily drew up for battle, but neither attacked; and meanwhile 
further fortifying was their only activity. It had become difficult for Caesar to 
victual his army. In foraging he was often reduced to fighting his way to and 
fro. Finally, between lack of corn and lack of a chance of battle on favorable 
terms, Caesar gave up his designs on Ucita, and moved down the coast to near 
Leptis. His intrenchments had been made for naught. To all appearances 
Scipio had won the game. In a bold raid on Zeta, in which he ran an excep¬ 
tional risk to procure victual, Caesar had a brisk combat with the enemy ; but 
nothing decisive came of it. He was still aiming to get a certain chance to 
thrust home. Scipio neither gave him an opening nor improved his advantages. 
Finally Caesar determined upon a siege of Thapsus as a means of compelling 
Scipio to battle, and marched thither, reducing several towns on his way. 

In the early clays of January, 46 b. c., having finished 
his works up to a point just beyond dart-throwing distance 
from Ucita, Csesar built a line across the head of the works, 
mounted on the parapet and towers a number of military 
engines, and constantly plied these against the town. He 
brought five legions to the west end of the lines from the 

O O 

large camp at the east. The lines were almost two miles 
long. It speaks well for Caesar’s activity, skill and care 
that he was able to build and man such extensive works 
without affording an opportunity to Scipio to break through 
at any one point while incomplete. But Csesar was the ablest 
engineer of his age, almost of any age. 

When the lines were finished he was secure. It was gen¬ 
erally deemed impossible to capture well-manned intrench- 


660 


NEW TROOPS ARRIVE. 


ments, and Scipio was not the man to try. We have seen 
liow reluctant Caesar was to attempt such an assault, even 
when the defenders were savages. The successful com¬ 
pletion of the lines produced other desertions of men of 
decided consequence to Caesar’s camp, and at the same time 
furnished him with one thousand more horse. Scipio, mean¬ 
while, was not idle. He also undertook to fortify all avail¬ 
able and useful points on his own front, and prepared for a 
vigorous and stout defense when Caesar should attack Ucita. 

The Seventh and Eighth legions now sailed from Sicily, 
and Varus at Utica thought there was a promising oppor¬ 
tunity to intercept them. He weighed anchor with fifty-five 
vessels for this purpose and sailed to Hadrumetum. Caesar 
had sent twenty-seven sail, under L. Cispius, to Thapsus, 
and thirteen sail under Q. Aquila to Hadrumetum with 
orders to anchor, watch for, and protect the convoys. 
Aquila’s part of the fleet being unable to double the cape, 
they took shelter in an inlet near by. The mistral, or west 
wind on the Mediterranean, has always been a fruitful source 
of annoyance. To-day, large steamers often cannot land 
passengers at either Sousa (Hadrumetum) or Monastir (Thap¬ 
sus). The balance of the fleet at Leptis was left riding at 
anchor; but the mariners were mostly ashore, some buying 
provisions, some wandering about, — a matter indicating 
poor discipline. A deserter notified Varus of these facts. 
He left Hadrumetum at night, — the mistral blew in his 
favor,— and next morning, January 9, reaching Leptis, 
came suddenly upon Caesar’s fleet in the same unprotected 
condition, burned all the transports, and carried off two five- 
benched galleys, “in which were none to defend them.” 

Caesar heard of this misfortune while engaged inspecting 
his works at Ucita. Roused at the prospect of losing his 
men and victuals, he summarily took horse and rode to Lep- 


CAESAR AS A PARTISAN. 


661 


tis, happily only six miles distant, went aboard the most 
available galley, ordered his fleet to follow, joined Aquila, 
whom he found much demoralized in his retreat, pursued 
Varus, who, astonished, tacked about and made for Had- 
rumetum, recovered one of his galleys with one hundred and 
thirty of the enemy aboard, took one of the enemy’s triremes, 



which had fallen astern, and drove Varus into Hadrumetum. 
Caesar could not double the cape with the same wind, which 
suddenly shifted; but, riding at anchor during the night, on 
the next day, when the east wind sprang up, he sailed near 
the harbor of Hadrumetum and burned a number of the ene¬ 
my’s transports lying outside. Aboard the captured galley 
was P. Vestrius, a Roman knight, who had been in Spain un¬ 
der Afranius, and after being paroled, had again joined Pom- 
pey in Greece, and later Varus, without exchange or ransom. 
Him Caesar ordered to be executed for breach of his oath. 





662 


SCIPIO OFFERS BATTLE. 


This fact shows that the paroling of prisoners was well 
understood, with at least some of its rights and liabilities. 

This short expedition of Caesar’s exhibits the marvelous 
audacity, decision and skill of the man. Everything he 
undertook in person was carried through with an active intel¬ 
ligence which insured success. Whomever he attacked he 
was sure to defeat. Had he not done just this and done it 
in person, probably his transports, his fleets, his corn, his en¬ 
ginery, his legions would all have been liable to be cut off. 
Some of these minor expeditions of Caesar show that if he 
had not been a great general, he would have made the very 
pattern of a partisan officer. All the more wonder that 
occasionally, as now before Ucita, Caesar was almost a 
McClellan for his want of incisiveness. 

Each commander now essayed to bring the other to battle 
on advantageous terms. Scipio, on a day shortly after the 
completion of Caesar’s lines,—January 7,—marshaled his 
army on a slight elevation running along the west bank of 
the brook which bisected the plain. Caesar did the like on 
a parallel rise in the ground, but awaited the attack. On 
the floor of this valley can now be seen but slight indications 
of these eminences. It is nearly level. But a very little 
slope in the ground was of marked advantage to the Roman 
soldier, and the Commentaries often speak of hills which we 
should scarcely notice. 

The enemy exceeded Caesar in numbers; they had a strong 
garrison in Ucita opposite his right wing, so that if he 
defeated them and pursued beyond Ucita he might be com¬ 
promised by a sally from the town; the ground in front of 
Scipio was rough and thoroughly bad for a charge. The 
valley in places is very stony. Where the brook had worn 
its way it was more so; and to attack required Caesar to 
cross the brook. The two armies were marshaled within 


IN LINE. 


668 


three hundred paces of each other. Nothing divided them 
but this slight depression in the ground. Scipio’s left 
leaned on the town, which was an advanced redoubt, as it 
were, affording it ample protection. His own and Juba’s 
legions were in the front, the Numidians in a second line in 



reserve, but in an extended thin formation. “At a distance 
you would have taken the main body for a simple line of 
legionaries doubled only on the wings.” On the right and 
left at equal distances Scipio placed elephants supported by 
light troops and auxiliary Numidians. The regular cavalry 
was on the right in one body, not being needed or available 
near Ucita. The Numidian and Gsetulian horse,—irregu¬ 
lars, “without bridles,” — sustained by a great body of light 
troops, formed a flying right wing one thousand paces from 


664 


NO ATTACK MADE. 


his right extending out towards the hills. Scipio’s inten¬ 
tion was to envelop Caesar’s left with all his cavalry and 
“throw it into confusion by their darts,” when the action 
should begin. 

In Caesar’s front line the Eighth and Ninth veteran legions 
were on the left, to-day the post of danger; the Thirteenth 
and Fourteenth, Twenty-sixth and Twenty-eighth, in the 
centre; the Twenty-ninth and Thirtieth on the right, leaning 
on the Ucita works. His second line was composed of the 
new levies, mixed with cohorts from the legions above 
named. His third line, composed of the third-line cohorts 
of the right legions, withdrawn for the purpose and replaced 
by some new cohorts, extended only from the centre of the 
line to the left, as the right was so strongly posted at the 
intrenchments opposite Ucita as to need no reserve. His 
right wing was thus in two, his left in three lines. All his 
cavalry stood on his left, opposite the enemy’s, mixed with 
light foot; and because he put no great reliance on these, 
the Fifth legion was placed in reserve in their rear. The 
archers were principally on the wings, but bodies of them 
stood in the front. 

The two armies thus drawn up remained in line all day, 
but three hundred paces apart, neither party willing to 
advance across the low ground, — a most unusual spectacle. 
It strikes one as curious, indeed, that Caesar, who was so 
prompt in his attack at Pharsalus, where he had but half 
Pompey’s force, and where excellent Roman legions under 
an able leader confronted him, should have been so slow at 
opening the battle here, when he was about on a par with 
his antagonists, a large part of whose troops were far from 
good either in quality or discipline. This is especially so as 
Pompey had recently beaten him at Dyrrachium, and in any 
event was far superior to Scipio in ability. Fighting a 


CAVALRY COMBAT. 


665 

battle is, with any commanding general, often a matter of 
temporary vigor or lack of it, and Caesar’s indecision on this 
occasion may have depended on his state of health. An 
inspection of the terrain shows that there was nothing in any 
respect as disadvantageous to Caesar as the hill at Pharsalus. 
And we seem to have all the details. 

The simple fact is that Caesar, in tactical attack, had far 
inferior initiative than Alexander, or than Hannibal, so 
long as the latter’s conditions gave him anything approaching 
an equality to the Homans. In almost all Caesar’s battles, 
unless forced on him, he was slow in attack. In strategic 
initiative, on the contrary, Caesar was admirable. It was 
one constant, never-ceasing push. 

At night, when Caesar was retiring to camp, the flying 
cavalry wing of the enemy moved out towards the works upon 
the hill. The heavy horse under Labienus remained opposite 
the legions. Seeing this, part of Caesar’s horse and light 
foot sallied out without orders to attack the Gaetulians, and 
advancing through a morass, probably made by the brook, 
but which does not to-day exist, were driven in with a loss 
of a number of men and many horses wounded. Scipio, 
rejoiced at this success, retired to camp. This check was 
compensated for next day, when a party of Caesar’s horse, 
on their way to Leptis for corn, killed or captured an hun¬ 
dred of the enemy’s troops who were straggling from camp. 

Both armies now busied themselves with advancing their 
lines and intrenching new positions opposite each other. 
Scipio sought to strengthen his holding on the hills back of 
Ucita. Caesar’s especial endeavor was to cut Scipio’s right 
off from the hills on his own left. He therefore “carried a 
ditch and rampart along the middle of the plain to prevent 
the incursions of the enemy.” This phrase has been trans¬ 
lated “quite across the plain,” but that cannot be explained 


666 


A NEAT STRATAGEM. 


by anything which the probabilities or later events show us 
to have been done. There is no evidence that a ditch and 
rampart were carried across the Ucita plain from east to 
west; nor was there reason for it. The passage probably 
means that opposite Ucita Caesar extended the head of his 



works in a long line north and south, — “along the middle of 
the plain.” Scipio sought to anticipate any attack by Caesar. 
The cavalry skirmished every day between the two parties. 

The inhabitants of Africa, then as now, were wont to keep 
their corn in little caches or underground vaults for safety in 
time of war. Caesar, who was in constant want of victual, 





NEATLY FOILED. 


667 


sent out a party of two legions and some cavalry one night, 
which within a radius of ten miles in the fruitful region south 
of Agar collected a large supply of corn from these hiding- 
places and returned to camp. Labienus, expecting that 
Caesar would again pursue the same road for the same pur¬ 
pose, laid an ambuscade for him on January 12 about seven 
miles from the plain where operations were being conducted. 
This was presumably in the vicinity of Tegea, where the 
plain narrows between two lines of hills (k). 

Caesar became aware of this stratagem through the medium 
of deserters. He waited a few days until Labienus’ men 
should become a trifle careless. Sending forward part of 
his cavalry, he followed with eight legions and the rest of the 
squadrons. The cavalry came unexpectedly upon Labienus’ 
outposts of light troops, which were taking their ease in their 
cover and paying small heed to the duty they were sent on, 
fell on them and broke them up with a loss of five hundred 
men. Labienus, near by, hurried up to their assistance 
with his own horse, and, by weight of numbers, had routed 
Caesar’s cavalry, when he suddenly ran against Caesar’s line 
of legions, which compelled him to beat a summary retreat 
to the west. His ambuscade had been a failure. Juba cru¬ 
cified all the Numidian runaways as an example. 

Caesar, despite all his efforts, was unable to collect the 
corn he needed to feed his men. He was reduced either to 
shift his ground or else to make an attack on Scipio in his 
defenses. On estimating the chances, Caesar deemed the 
risk of the assault greater than the possible loss of morale 
incident to a change of base and the abandonment of the 
position gained by so much exertion and sacrifice. Besides, 
he knew how easy it was to him to persuade his army that 
they retired with honor, and the labor had really been useful 
in hardening the legions. 


668 


LACK OF INITIATION. 


The whole matter is somewhat puzzling. Csesar must 
have long ago foreseen that his supplies would be precarious. 
He had gone to incredible exertions to create works from 
which he could fight a battle with Scipio to advantage. The 
army opposing him was by no means as good and scarcely 
larger than his own. He had pushed his manoeuvring at 
Ilerda; he had boldly attacked Pompey at Pharsalus, who 
had a superiority much more marked; here he declined the 
combat. It is unlike the Csesar we are apt to believe in; 
and yet not unlike the real Csesar. The best explanation 
lies in the probability that his intrenchments had been made 
in the hope that he could lure Scipio out into the open and 
there defeat him; that Scipio had erected excellent works 
and that Csesar did not care for an assault. We must 
remember, too, that Csesar did not have the same splendid 
body of men he had trained in the wars in Gaul and which 
he still commanded at Pharsalus, though relatively he was 
now better placed than then. The lack of initiative looks 
much like that of Napoleon in his later years. Was Csesar 
tiring of war? Or was war sapping Csesar’s energies? 

Leaving the garrisons at Leptis, Puspina and Acilla, 
which were all strongly fortified, Csesar ordered his fleet 
under Cispius and Aquila to blockade Hadrumetum and 
Thapsus and narrowly watch the coast to forestall attack on 
coming transports during his movements, set fire to his camp 
at Ucita, and started, January 14, before daylight, in 
column left in front and with baggage-train between his 
column and the sea, and marched westerly along the coast 
between the hills and the shore to Agar, a town near Leptis, 
on the southerly slope of the first line of small coast-hills. 
He was thus basing on Leptis rather than on Puspina. He 
camped in the plain before Agar (i). In the neighborhood 
he found a large supply of barley, oil, wine and figs, with 


LACK OF VICTUAL. 


669 

some wheat. Scipio did not attempt to disturb the retreat, 
or even send his horse in pursuit; but soon followed along 
the hills, and, reaching the vicinity, camped a few miles 
away and farther from the sea (1). His evident purpose was 
to shut Caesar out from getting corn in the interior. His 



force lay in three camps about six miles from Caesar’s on the 
heights which stood back of the town of Tegea (1 m n). The 
Numidian cavalry was posted on all advantageous heights, 
to head off foragers from Caesar’s camp. But, for all their 
care, Caesar was able to collect a fair supply of victual, by 
sending out large bodies on this duty. 

It is evident, not only from the Commentaries, but from 
the circumstances narrated, that Caesar was very close-pressed 
for rations; for, in order to fill his depleted magazines, he 
now undertook one of the most hazardous operations of all 
his campaigns. The town of Zeta (modern Bourdjine) in 
rear of the enemy was ten miles from Scipio’s camp, some 
seventeen from Caesar’s. Deeming it secure beyond a perad- 
venture, Scipio had made it a great magazine of corn and 
had sent two legions to those parts to forage and protect the 
corn collected. Of this fact Caesar had notice by a deserter. 




670 


A BOLD RAID. 


He made up liis mind to try a raid on Zeta. To accomplish 
his purpose he was forced to make a flank march past 
Scipio’s camps and to return by the same or an equally 
perilous road. Only famine staring him in the face, and 
the fact that supplies could not be got in sufficient quantity 
in the region to the south of Thapsus, explain the risk he 
took. He established his men in a new camp on a hill east 
of Agar (o) for greater security to the comparatively small 
number he was to leave behind in it, broke up January 17 at 
three o’clock A. M., with his entire cavalry force and a large 
body of foot, passed around Scipio’s camp unobserved, 
reached and took the town of Zeta out of hand, with a 
number of prominent Pompeians, loaded an enormous train, 
including twenty-two camels, with breadstuffs, and put a 
garrison under Oppius in the place, with instructions to shift 



for itself as best it might. Not content with this success, he 
moved on to attack the two foraging legions; but, on reach¬ 
ing their vicinity, Caesar found that Scipio had learned of 
his diversion, and had marched to their support with his 
whole army. He wisely desisted from attack and began to 
retire with his booty. 

Caesar was obliged to pass near by Scipio’s camp on the 




CAESAR HARASSED. 671 

way back to Ins own. Here a heavy force of Numidian horse 
and light troops under Labienus and Afranius had been 
placed by Scipio in ambush for him among the neighboring 
hills about modern Djemmal. Just after he had got beyond 
them they sallied out and attacked his rear. So far, Csesar 
had had extraordinarily good luck, but this diversion threat¬ 
ened trouble. He at once faced his cohorts towards the 
enemy, and, moving the baggage to their rear, he threw his 
cavalry out in their front, and prepared to defend his rear¬ 
ward march. No sooner did Caesar’s cavalry, sustained bv 
the legions, fall boldly upon the enemy than the troops of 
Labienus and Afranius turned and fled; but when Caesar 
resumed his march they renewed the attack. These Numid¬ 
ian s were wonderfully active and expert at their own method 
of fighting. They so effectually harassed Caesar in his 
effort to retire that he u found he had not gained a hundred 
paces in four hours.” Moreover, he lost many horses, which 
he could ill afford to spare. The enemy’s purpose was to 
force him to camp in that place, where there was no water; 
and Caesar’s men had had nothing to eat from their start at 
three a. M. till now, about three of the afternoon. Finally 
his cavalry grew so exhausted with its efforts that he was 
compelled to send it on ahead and make his rearguard of 
infantry, which could better impose upon the Numidians. 
The legionaries, though the ground was not much cut up, 
were really more fitted for rearguard than the tired horse¬ 
men. The baggage was hurried on ahead. Caesar was thus 
able to advance, though with extreme slowness. For, if only 
a handful of the legionaries faced about and flung their darts, 
thousands of the Numidian light troops or cavalry would fly; 
but so soon as the march was resumed, these warriors again 
approached and showered darts, stones and arrows upon the 
rear of column. Some of these worked their way around to 


672 


EXAGGERATED LOSSES. 


the flanks and van of Caesar’s column, and gave him the 
greatest trouble. Labienus and Afranius made an effort to 
inclose Caesar’s army by marching round his wings and 
through the hills to head him off, but unsuccessfully. Caesar 
preserved his formation, which may have been the square 
usual in such cases, in unbroken order. “Thus Caesar, at 
one time moving forward, at another halting, going on but 
slowly, reached the camp safe,” about seven in the evening, 
a total march of over thirty-six miles, with a loss of only ten 
men wounded. 

To judge from the description in the Commentaries one 
would have gauged the loss an hundred-fold this sum. It is 
not improbable that the number is erroneously given by the 
historian. Labienus, he says, had thoroughly tired out his 
troops and lost three hundred men, beside the wounded. 
The disparity in numbers is incompatible with the descrip¬ 
tion of the raid. Csesar was in a position to lose the larger 
number. 

The distance marched in sixteen hours seems incredible. 
Assuming that the capture of Zeta, the loading of the train 
and the diversion against Scipio’s two legions consumed but 
two hours, we have a large army, harassed by the enemy part 
of the way back, and delayed four hours by fighting, mak¬ 
ing a march of thirty-six miles in the remaining ten hours. 
There is probably exaggeration somewhere. Few bodies of 
foot can cover three and one half miles an hour except for a 
short stretch. Still, that the march was made from shortly 
before day to some evening hour is scarcely to be denied. 

This raid exhibits in marked contrast the character and 
ability of Scipio and Csesar. It is probable that Csesar 
would not have dared undertake such a movement against an 
opponent more his equal. Scipio distinctly showed want of 
power to seize an advantage. Csesar had passed over a range 


WAS IT A DEFEAT? 


673 

of hills to the plain of Zeta, and must return through the 
same path to regain camp. What more natural than for 
Scipio to draw up his forces on suitable slopes and, by dis¬ 
puting his passage, bring him to battle on disadvantageous 
terms? And during such an engagement, which Csesar 
would be forced to accept, Scipio had two legions at Zeta 
which could fall upon his rear. But instead of this simple 
plan, Scipio, apparently losing his head, marched off to the 
assistance of the two legions on such an eccentric line that he 
opened to Caesar the very road of retreat which he should 
have closed. Nor was Labienus any more skillful. He 
should have disputed Caesar’s passage of the hills by attack¬ 
ing his head of column and not his rear. Instead of so 
doing he allowed Caesar’s column to regain the road to camp, 
and contented himself with simply attacking his rearguard. 
It looks a trifle as if Caesar had really sustained something 
more of a defeat than the Commentaries are willing to 
acknowledge. But the defeat was not a fatal one. Caesar 
had a way of extricating himself from desperate straits. 

In justification of Caesar’s movement on Zeta it may be 
said that the character of the country is such as to afford 
more than one route for retreat. The whole surface of the 
land is covered with carriage and mule roads now, and pre¬ 
sumably was so then, when the population was larger and 
even more intelligent. He could have returned by way of 
modern Zermadina, Scipio being left at Zeta. He could 
have moved north along the Ucita plain to his old camp and 
thence to Agar, for on his left he would have Ruspina, 
strongly garrisoned by his own troops, as a refuge in case of 
danger. 

Csesar’s own luck and the paltry conduct of his foes had 
again saved him harmless. It is all the more strange that, 
with such contemptible opponents, this great captain, who 


674 NEW TACTICS. 

was daring enough to undertake expeditions which might 
compel him to do battle with all the chances against him, 
should have so long delayed forcing on his enemy a decisive 
engagement which might terminate the war. For he now 

had twelve legions, and the difficulties of subsisting them 

0 

were enough to make him above all desire a definite outlet 
to the matter. He indeed shortly undertook it in a way 
he had not before attempted. 

While Labienus was fighting Caesar on his retreat, 
Scipio, after returning from Zeta, had apparently drawn 
up before his camps, while Caesar was filing by the flank 
in his front laden with baggage. But on Caesar’s approach 
he withdrew. This lack of force is of a part with Scipio’s 
entire conduct. 

Caesar had run a grave danger, but at all events his 
legions had refilled their corn-bags. 

Caesar was obliged to instruct his men in new tactics to 
meet the new conditions thrust upon him. The enemy’s 
light troops were so nimble as seriously to annoy the heavy¬ 
armed legionaries in a mere skirmish; and he deemed it 
wise to bring some elephants from Italy to accustom the 
troops and horses to their sight, and drilled the men in the 
best method of attacking them. In Gaul, Caesar’s troops 
had met a frank, courageous enemy who came out and 
fought hand to hand on the field; here they had to resist the 
devices of a crafty foe who relied upon artifice, not courage. 
The Commentaries acknowledge that Caesar’s horse was no 
match for the enemy’s when sustained by light foot, and 
frankly confess that Caesar was not certain that his legion¬ 
aries were equal to the enemy’s in the open. This again 
seems inexplicable. We are wont to think that Caesar’s raw 
levies soon became seasoned; Hannibal’s did; and we have 
proof that Scipio’s troops were none of them well disciplined. 


GRAND REVIEW. 


675 


Caesar constantly marched his troops about the country, 
not only to drill and harden them, but in hope of compro¬ 
mising Scipio by some manoeuvre and of bringing him to 
battle against his will. He drew up, three days after the 
Zeta raid, near Scipio’s camp in the open plain south of 
Agar (p), but this general declined to come out and Caesar 
did not care to assault his works. As a rule Caesar was 
fortunate in securing the towns in the vicinity of which he 
was campaigning. Vacca sent to him for a garrison; but in 
this case Juba anticipated him, captured and razed the town. 

Too great fault should not be found with Scipio’s appar¬ 
ently inactive method. It was Fabian. Famine was doing 
the work of many a victory. But it was half indecision, 
half method, which governed Scipio’s movements. 

On the 22d day of January Caesar held a grand review of 
his army, which now numbered some forty thousand legion¬ 
aries, three thousand horse and some auxiliaries, and on the 
succeeding day, well satisfied with his legions, marched out 
to a distance of five miles from his camp and to within two 
miles of Scipio’s camp north of Tegea (q) and offered battle. 
But again Scipio declined it. Caesar saw that he was wast¬ 
ing his time in trying to lure Scipio into the open by merely 
offering battle, and as a last resort he planned a series of 
attacks on Scipio’s strong places and depots, such as Sar- 
sura, Tysdra and Thapsus, to provoke him to activity. 

Thapsus was on the coast southeast of Leptis, a large 
magazine of military stores and a highly important point for 
Scipio, which he had strongly garrisoned and in whose har¬ 
bor was a large number of vessels, at present blockaded by 
Caesar’s fleet. But to attack Thapsus was to play the great 
game for which Caesar was apparently not yet ready. He 
preferred to raid the smaller towns, not only as being an 
easier prey, but above all because he needed the corn with 


676 


RAIDS ON DEPOTS. 

which they were well supplied. It is altogether probable 
that at this moment Caesar’s legions were all but starving. 
He was on a tramp for victual. The strategy of the situa¬ 
tion must yield to the logistics. 

Caesar broke up from Agar January 23 and marched on 
Sarsura over the eastern slope of the hill below Tegea. To 
Sarsura he was followed by Labienus who harassed his rear. 
Caesar had on this occasion detailed three hundred men from 
each legion as rearguard. These do not, however, appear to 
have been able to hold Labienus in check, for this officer 
was able to cut out some of the train from the rear of col¬ 
umn — probably animals which were ready to load in case 
Caesar could capture Sarsura. In a rearguard engagement 
which ensued, the Numidians proved overanxious to secure 
booty and were severely punished by Caesar’s troops. They 
lost a number of men, and thereafter Labienus kept his 
distance, following along on Caesar’s right upon the hills. 
Arrived at Sarsura, Caesar stormed and took it under the very 
eyes of Scipio and Labienus, put the garrison to the sword, 
and found a goodly supply of corn, which he distributed to 
the soldiers or loaded. Scipio observed him from above, 
not offering to interfere. Thence Caesar marched next day 
to Tysdra, which he did not attempt to assault, the place 
having been very strongly fortified by Considius, a brave 
and stubborn officer who held it with his cohort of gladiators. 
There was no time, nor even engines, for a siege; and Caesar 
had already got a fairly good supply of victual. 

Caesar started back and camped over night at the stream 
which ran midway between Tysdra and Sarsura (r). Thence 
he made his way to his camp at Agar, January 26, probably 
by a circuit round the foot of the hills he had marched 
across. Scipio did the like. 


XLI. 


THAPSUS. FEBRUARY, 47 B. C. 

The rest of Caesar’s reinforcements having arrived, he was ready, if ever, to 
try conclusions with Scipio. After some strategic manoeuvring, Caesar marched 
on Thapsus, and sat down before it. Scipio and Juba followed, lest they should 
lose this valuable city. Caesar completed his lines. Scipio essayed to break 
through these on Caesar’s right, failing which, he tried the left, near the sea, 
and began to intrench a camp near his lines. Caesar drew up for attack, while 
Scipio was at work, and compelled the latter to do the like. The Caesarians 
were in high spirits ; not so the Pompeians. The former were eager to attack, 
seeing the indecision of the enemy. Caesar delayed. But the restless Tenth 
legion, on the right, gave a trumpet blast without orders, and this being 
repeated down the line, the whole army advanced on the Pompeians. These 
troops held their own some hours; but victory was finally won, and the ensuing 
slaughter was terrible. The entire army of Scipio was destroyed ; the leaders 
fled. Caesar had no difficulty in reducing Africa to his sway. The African 
campaign had been the direct result of Caesar’s going to Alexandria with an 
insufficient force and of the loss of time there encountered; and it was often 
characterized by a lack of decisiveness unlike Caesar. The victory of Thapsus, 
“ which Caesar prepared, but his men won,” rectified all his errors. 

About these days Thabena, a town on the seacoast at the 
confines of King Juba’s dominion, rose against its garrison, 
murdered it, and sent a deputation to Caesar asking for pro¬ 
tection, 44 as they had revolted from Juba’s rule and therefore 
deserved well of the Roman people.” Caesar detailed thither 
the tribune M. Crispus with a cohort, some archers, and a 
number of engines of war. 

The balance of the legionary soldiers who, by sickness, 
leaves of absence, or other causes had been detained in Sicily, 
arrived towards the end of January in one embarkation to 
the number of four thousand men, and with them four him- 


678 


CAESAR OFFERS BATTLE. 


dred horse and one thousand bowmen and slingers. Having 
all his forces in hand, Caesar had no further excuse for not 
forcing Scipio to a decisive battle. Before resorting to the 
siege of Thapsus, which he had long contemplated, but had 
been prevented from undertaking on account of the necessity 
of procuring corn in towns more easily taken, he made one 



more effort to bring Scipio out on the open, and on the last 
day of January moved from his camp to a plain — which 
the Commentaries say was eight miles from his own and four 
from Scipio’s, but the distances are actually less than six and 
two — not far from Tegea (y) and awaited the enemy. 

Scipio was not willing to take any chances. The town of 
Tegea lay below his camp. Its garrison of four hundred 
horse he drew up on the right and left of the town, and 
formed his legions on a hill somewhat lower than his camp 


SMALL INTERCHANGE. 


679 


and about one thousand paces from it, as a reserve, the 
cavalry on both flanks, but so placed as to be able to sustain 
the Tegean horse in their front. From this place Scipio 
would not budge, nor Caesar attack him in it. Finally, to 
tempt him out Caesar sent some squadrons, about four 
hundred men, supported as usual by light troops, to charge 
the cavalry at Tegea. To meet this partial attack, Labienus 
sent some of the cavalry of his second line around the right 
and left of this body to take it in reverse. Caesar ordered 
forward three hundred of the legionaries habituated to sustain 
the horse. Caesar’s men, not only greatly outnumbered but 
threatened in flank, began to give ground. Each side under¬ 
took to throw forward supports, and it looked for a short 
period as if the battle might become general. When Caesar’s 
line appeared to be all but overwhelmed, a further opportune 
reinforcement of foot carried the day. After a stout struggle 
Scipio’s horse was broken and pursued, with loss of many 
officers, three miles to the mountains. 

Caesar kept his legionaries in line all day; but the enemy’s 
foot, though the occasion appeared to be favorable to Scipio, 
he being on higher ground, could not be induced to come 
down to the plain to accept a general battle. Caesar’s efforts 
were all directed to trying to lure Scipio from his position. 
This, however, he could not accomplish, and as usual he was 
unwilling to attack equal numbers on ground above him. 
Though Fortune was wont to be on his side, he was mani¬ 
festly disinclined to tempt her too far. 

Caesar finally withdrew his men to camp, “without the loss 
of a man,” while “the enemy had many of his best officers 
either killed or wounded.” A corresponding loss in men is 
to be presumed. This statement shows that the historian of 
the African War was subject to the weakness, observable in 
most chroniclers of modern contemporary military events, of 


680 


MARCH TO THAPSUS. 


understating the losses of his own side and overestimating 
those of the enemy. When a combat is presented in con¬ 
siderable detail and severe fighting is reported, we must 
assume some loss in killed. In most cases the wounded are 
not taken into consideration. Except in the case of a 
massacre, there are rarely large losses on one side without 
some equivalent on the other. It must, however, be remem¬ 
bered that with his good defensive armor and his skill in the 
use of his shield, the Roman legionary could fight, sometimes 
for many hours, without a wound. So long as ranks were 
kept unbroken, he was comparatively safe. 

The siege of Thapsus now appeared to be the only means 
left of forcing Scipio into such activity as to give Caesar a 
chance of fighting on at least even terms. If anything would 
bring Scipio to battle, the danger of losing this town and port 
would do so. And, 
water being scarce 
near Scipio’s Tegean 
location, so that he 
could not sit down 
before him there, 

Caesar broke camp in 
the night of Febru¬ 
ary 3-4, “marched 
sixteen miles beyond 
to Thapsus,” 

— the distance is 
ten, — and 
seizing the elevations 

Thapsus and Vicinity. 

back of it, immedi¬ 
ately began to draw lines of contravallation about the city to 
invest it, as well as lines of circumvallation with redoubts in 
proper places to prevent succor from reaching it (A). 









SC IP 10 FOLLOWS CAESAR. 


681 


Thapsus is situated at that point in the coast where, after 
having run to the southeast from Hadrumetum, it turns 
suddenly south. It was an old Carthaginian city and very 
strong. The ruins found to-day on the site of the city proper 
cover nearly one hundred and fifty acres. It had triple 
walls, and its harbor, natural and artificial, was excellent. 
The town lay on low land, but hills up to one hundred feet 
in height ran to the west and to the south along the coast. 
Thapsus could be approached only from the south or west, 
on account of a large salt lake three miles inland and seven 
miles long. 

Caesar’s movement on Thapsus drove Scipio into action, 
“to avoid the disgrace of abandoning Virgilius and the Thap- 
sitani who had all along remained firm to his party.” After 
several councils of war in the Pompeian camp, it was deter¬ 
mined to follow Caesar along the line of the hills, and to 
avoid an attack unless on ground favorable to them. This 
was done, and the enemy intrenched eight miles south of 
Thapsus in two camps, one for Scipio and one for Juba (B). 

There was, as stated, west of the town of Thapsus a salt¬ 
water lake, — the modern Sebka di Moknine, — separated 
from the sea by a strip of dry land from one to two miles 
wide. Caesar had camped and thrown up his line around 
the entire town, but along this strip of land between the lake 
and the sea Scipio imagined that there was still access from 
his camps and that he could carry succor to the inhabitants. 
After renewed councils, it was determined to make a move 
in force up that way, —Juba remaining in his own camp to 
protect both. But Caesar with his usual foresight had anti¬ 
cipated this very manoeuvre, and had forestalled Scipio by 
the erection of a fort (C) in the centre of the strip of land 
and had placed a triple garrison in it which was ample to 
check the approach of an enemy as cautious as Scipio. 


682 


CAESAR BLOCKADES THAPSUS. 


Scipio broke camp, and marching right in front up the 
narrow strip in question with his hack to the sea, instead of 
being able to penetrate to Thapsus was astonished to run 
against Caesar’s redoubt. It is altogether probable that 
vigorous measures might have captured or masked the fort, 
but its presence so entirely brought Scipio out of counte¬ 
nance that he scarcely knew what course to adopt. He 
remained in situ , taking no action of importance during the 
entire day and night, but probably returned to his camp 
south of the lake. He now resolved to try the approach from 
the north, and early next morning he advanced round the 
lake to near Caesar’s camps. Here, had he acted with vigor, 
he might have cut Caesar off from Leptis and Ruspina, or by 
an attack on his works have added immensely to his task. 
But Scipio dallied, gave Caesar time to finish his intrench- 
ments, and undertook no diversion whatever. 

Caesar, in a day or two, got his army well intrenched and 
extended in a semicircle around the whole town from shore 
to shore. The enemy was definitely excluded from Thapsus. 
Scipio set about constructing two camps north of the lake 
(D), one for Juba and one for himself, having done which, 
he marched his troops to a point about fifteen hundred paces 
from the sea and an equal distance from Caesar’s lines, and 
there, on the 6th of February, he began to intrench still 
another camp (E). Just what his object may have been does 
not appear from the relation in the Commentaries, or from 
the topography. Scipio’s manoeuvres were apt to be indefi¬ 
nite. There were plenty of things to do, but Scipio was not 
given to vigor, and he was loath to approach Caesar except 
under cover of heavy works. 

Cfesar could not permit an intrenched camp to be placed 
in such dangerous proximity to his own lines, and determined 
to attack Scipio at once, though he would have preferred to 


SCIPIO MAKES A THREAT. 683 

defer a battle till lie had taken Thapsus. The time for 
attack was manifestly before Scipio had completed his new 
works. Leaving Asprenas, the proconsul, with two legions, 
to look after the trenches of Thapsus, Caesar drew out and 
marched upon Scipio with the rest of his forces. One half 
of the fleet he left before Thapsus, but ordered the other half 
to sail out beyond Scipio’s camp, make in near the shore, 
and, upon a proper signal, to begin a noisy demonstration 
in Scipio’s rear by shouting and getting ready to land men. 

Scipio was drawn up before the half-made intrenchments 
in three lines, the third of which only was at work; the ele¬ 
phants, sustained by light troops, were displayed before his 
right and left wings. The Numidian cavalry was on the left, 
the rest of the cavalry and light troops on the right. His 
left all but reached the coast. Caesar advanced likewise in 
three lines, with the Second and Tenth legions on the right, 
the Eighth and Ninth on the left, and five legions in the 
centre. His flanks opposite the elephants he covered each 
by five chosen cohorts of the Fifth legion aided by archers 
and slingers. His cavalry was mixed with light foot. He 
himself went on foot from legion to legion to encourage the 
veterans by reminding them of their past victories, and to 
stimulate the new levies by urging them to win equal glory. 
All perceived with glowing ardor that finally the battle was 
to come for which they had striven for so many weeks. 

Not so the enemy. Scipio’s men were seized with the 
trepidation of a surprise; they saw Caesar about to attack 
when their camp was but half finished. They had been 
weakened by being kept behind intrenchments. There 
seemed to be no head or order. Caesar’s men could see the 
lines moving in and out of place as if entirely unprepared 
for the deadly work at hand. His legionaries and officers 
begged for an instant order to advance, for they saw in this 



Battle of Thapsus. 
























THE MEN BREAK A WAY. 


685 


uncertainty a sure sign of victory. Caesar was anxious to 
be deliberate, for the elephants were strange and awful to the 
young troops, the Numidian cavalry was vast in number, and 
had bred all but disaster at Ruspina, and the light troops 
of the army were brave and nimble. While the captain was 
thus hesitating, the men acted; the attack was actually pre¬ 
cipitated by a trumpeter of the right wing, whom the soldiers 
of the Tenth legion compelled to give the signal before Caesar 
commanded it. This is one of the most extraordinary 
instances of slack discipline in all history. It reminds one 
of the charge on Mission Ridge, — though, indeed, at the 
latter place there was no actual breach of orders, but only 
an excess of spirit in carrying them out. 

The signal being repeated in the usual manner down the 
line, the cohorts rushed forward, and could not be restrained. 
Seeing this and taking advantage of his troops’ enthusiasm, 
Csesar gave “Good fortune” (. Felicitas ) as the battle-cry, 
“spurred on his horse’’and joined the fray. The archers 
and slingers and the cohorts on the right flank, set for this 
particular duty and now well-trained to encounter elephants, 
speedily overwhelmed these brutes with a shower of darts and 
stones, and drove them trumpeting back upon their own lines, 
where they trampled numberless men under foot, made their 
way to camp, closed up the entrances, and utterly demoral¬ 
ized the Mauretanian horse in the left wing, which fled 
incontinent. The lines of foot now clashed. That the Pom¬ 
peian legions despite their surprise fought well is demon¬ 
strated by the fact that they held their own some hours. It 
was sunset before Caesar’s legions could call the day their 
own. But after a gallant struggle, Scipio’s right wing par¬ 
took the growing demoralization; then followed the centre. 
In a short time thereafter the entire line was melting away 
towards the half-completed camp (E). The legionaries of 


686 


VICTORY. 


Caesar’s right and left wings soon wheeled around the ene¬ 
my’s flank and captured the intrenchments which there was 
scarcely an attempt to defend. The principal officers, fear¬ 
ful of their own fate if captured by Caesar, and appalled at 
this sign of disaster, without an effort to rally their men, 
themselves fled from the field. Perceiving this desertion by 
their chiefs, the whole army, seized with utmost panic, dis¬ 
solved into formless squads and made its way from the field 
as best it might. The struggle at the new camp was a short 
one. The soldiers of Scipio were cut down en masse; all 
who could still flee started towards the old camp north of the 
lake (D). 

The garrison of Thapsus had, meanwhile, made a sally 
along the shore, wading through the surf to aid their friends; 
but were beaten back by the camp-followers and non-combat¬ 
ants in the siege lines, which Caesar had left to attack Scipio. 

Caesar’s legionaries followed hard in pursuit. Scipio, 
Labienus, Afranius, and other generals had already got 
away; no sign of defense was made; their army was a mass 
of fugitives. The men endeavored to rally at the old camp, 
where they could still have shown a stout resistance, but 
there was no one to head them. Seeing none of their officers 
at this spot, they imagined that they had gone to Juba’s 
camp near by (J), and made their way thither to seek them. 
Finding this camp already in the hands of Caesar’s men, who 
had flanked them on their left, they at once fled to an adjoin¬ 
ing hill (H), intending to defend themselves. On the ap¬ 
proach of their pursuers they became panic-stricken, “cast 
down their arms, and saluted them in a military manner,” 
i. e., made the usual signal of surrender. 

But surrender availed naught. Caesar’s soldiers were too 
much wrought up to heed the signal. The Roman people 
were by nature cruel; in common with all men of their trade 


MASSACRE. 


687 


in ancient days, Caesar’s legionaries partook the national 
spirit and had long reproached him for clemency; they had 
been at war three long years; they now proposed to put an 
end to the matter, and broke quite beyond control. Caesar, 
though anxious to spare Roman blood, was unable to stem 
the tide. The legionaries, glutted with passion and blood, 
not only slaughtered the armed men, pursuing them in every 
direction and cutting them down wholesale, but in their 
frenzy they killed a number of Roman citizens in their own 
camp, against whom the cry was raised that they were the 
authors of the war, or secret adherents of Pompey’s cause. 
“This made several Roman knights and senators retire from 
the battle, lest the soldiers, who after so signal a victory 
assumed an unbounded license, should be induced by the 
hopes of impunity to wreck their fury on them likewise. In 
short, all Scipio’s soldiers, though they implored the protec¬ 
tion of Caesar, were, in the very sight of that general, and 
in spite of his entreaties to his men to spare them, without 
exception put to the sword.” 

This escape from control by his legionaries is the most 
serious criticism on their discipline which can exist. One 
can scarcely associate such laxity with cohorts which had been 
even weeks under Caesar. Plutarch says that several authors 
have claimed that Caesar was not in this battle at all, but 
was down with an attack of epilepsy. This scarcely accords 
with the facts elsewhere set down, or with the probabilities; 
but if anything lends countenance to it, it is the remarkable 
lack of hold upon his men shown by Caesar on this field, both 
at the inception and close of the engagement. Their conduct 
at Pharsalus stands out in marked contrast to it. 

At least ten thousand men were slain and sixty-four 
elephants were taken. Scipio’s whole force was annihilated. 
Caesar’s army, it is claimed in the Commentaries, lost not 


688 


FLIGHT OF LEADERS. 


over fifty killed and some wounded. Fancy a decisive 
battle in the nineteenth century won by an army of forty odd 
thousand men at such a paltry cost! 

The flight of the leaders, Scipio, Juba, Labienus, Afra- 
nius, Petreius and the others, availed them little. Most of 
them were unable to escape pursuing fate, whether by land or 
sea, and either fell that day or within a few weeks. Labienus 
made his way to Spain. Scipio reached his shipping, but 
was overtaken by bad weather, driven into Hippo, attacked 
by Sitius, and fell in the ensuing action. Some lesser chiefs 
reached Utica. 

As Thapsus did not surrender after this signal victory, 
though formally summoned to do so, with a display of the 
captured elephants, Caesar left the proconsul C. Rebellius 
with three legions to continue the siege, sent Cnaeus Domitius 
to invest Considius in Tysdra with two, and having been 
lavish in praises and rewards to his troops, — the Fifth legion 
was allowed to adopt an elephant as ensign, — he set out for 
Ucita and Hadrumetum, which he took February 10 and 
11* and where he found Scipio’s stores and much military 
treasure. Thence he marched on Utica, with Messala com¬ 
manding the cavalry in the van. He was anxious to capture 
Cato and a number of Scipio’s lieutenants who had fled for 
refuge to its walls. . 

Scipio’s cavalry escaped in a body from the battle as the 
foot could not, and started for Utica. On the way they were 
refused entrance to the town of Parada, but forced the place. 
In revenge for the refusal, they built a huge fire in the forum 
and into it cast the whole population bound hand and foot, 
with everything which they could not carry away as plunder. 
After this signal act of barbarity they marched to Utica, 
where they in like manner began to plunder and slaughter, 
and were only stopped by being bought off with money by 


CATO'S SUICIDE . 689 

Cato and Sylla Faustus. Cato endeavored to arouse the 
inhabitants to resist Caesar, but, unable to accomplish more 
than to gain permission from the city for all adherents of 
Pompey to leave for Spain, on February 12 he committed 
suicide. 

Cato was Caesar’s most able opponent. Had he not yielded 
the military command to Scipio, Caesar might not have put 
i so easy an end to the campaign. After his death, L. Caesar, 
his quaestor, determined to throw himself and the town on 
Caesar’s clemency. Sylla collected a body of men and retired 
into Juba’s territory. 

Messala, with Caesar’s cavalry-van, soon reached the city, 
and placed guards at the gates. Caesar followed close upon 
his heels. Reaching Utica February 16, he was easily pre¬ 
vailed on to pardon the rebels their lives, but he amerced 
them in a heavy money - penalty of two hundred thousand 
sestertia to be paid the republic for having, while Roman 
citizens, furnished Varus and Scipio with funds. 

King Juba and Petreius made their escape together, and 
hiding by day and traveling by night reached Zama, where 
were all Juba’s treasures and his family. His subjects 
refused him admittance and appealed against him to Caesar, 
— for Juba had threatened to consume himself, all his goods, 
and all the Zamians in one great conflagration should he 
return from this war other than victorious. On receiving 
this message Caesar himself set out towards Zama. On the 
way many of Juba’s officers and nearly all his cavalry came 
in and surrendered. Caesar’s pardon of all made them his 
firm adherents. Juba and Petreius killed each other. 
Reaching Zama March 6, Caesar confiscated all the king’s 
goods and those of Roman citizens who had borne arms 
against him and turned the kingdom into a province, leaving 
Crispus Sallustius as proconsul in command. 


G90 


COALITION BROKEN UP. 


Considius, meanwhile, had abandoned Tysdra. On the 
retreat his forces assassinated him, seized his treasure and 
dispersed. Virgilius at Thapsus surrendered to Caninius. 
Sitius defeated Sabura, and on his return to Caesar ran across 
Faustus and Afranius, who had escaped from Utica with 
the body of troops which tried to plunder the place, some 
fifteen hundred strong, surrounded and captured the entire 
force. The two chiefs were slain in a mutiny which occurred 
a day or two after. The services of Sitius were recognized 
by the gift of Cirta (Constantine) in which to settle his irreg¬ 
ular cohorts. 

Caesar confiscated and sold the estates of the rebels in all 
the towns which had opposed him; and fined Thapsus and 
Hadrumetum and their merchants fifty thousand and eighty 
thousand sestertia respectively. Other towns were fined in 
proportion. He then embarked, April 14, for Sardinia, 
where he went through the same form of amercement of his 
enemies, and thence sailed for Rome, which city he reached 
on May 25. He had been absent six months, of which four 
and a half in Africa. 

In Rome from June to November, Caesar celebrated four 
triumphs, for his victories over the Gauls, Pharnaces, Egypt 
and King Juba. No triumph, under the Roman constitution, 
could be had for victories in civil wars. During the days of 
the triumphs Caesar gave to the Roman people the most 
magnificent spectacles that had as yet been seen. Over four 
hundred lions and fifty elephants fought in the arena. The 
promised largesses were distributed to the soldiers, some 
nine hundred dollars to each old legionary, the centurions 
double, the tribunes and the chief of cavalry quadruple. 
Besides this, lands were distributed, though they had not 
been promised. For the next year, b. c. 45, Caesar was 
elected consul and was made dictator for ten years. But his 


A PERPLEXING WAR . 


691 


stay in Rome was short. Seven months after his return 
from Africa — b{ovember, 46 b. c. — he was called to Spain 
to suppress the relics of the Pompeian insurrection in that 
peninsula. 

The African war is perplexing to gauge. From one point 
of view it seems to have been a most difficult undertaking 
and to have taxed Caesar’s ability to the utmost. From 
another, when we note the low quality of the generals and 
the legions opposed to him and the unusually cautious man¬ 
ner in which he handled his problem, it does not appear to 
be a campaign as marked in excellence as others. That the 
African war was ever waged was due to Caesar’s being caught 
in unnecessary political and discreditable personal toils in 
Alexandria. This delay gave the Pompeian conspirators the 
better part of a year to hatch out their means of resistance, 
and enabled them to organize and carry through a campaign 
in Africa and still another in Spain. Both these campaigns 
could have been avoided if at once on Pompey’s death Caesar 
had turned against Cato and Scipio, his stoutest opponents; 
or if he had at the outset gone to Alexandria with a number 
of legions instead of less than one. We are not estimating 
an ordinary man. We are gauging the work of perhaps the 
greatest man the world has ever seen, of a soldier who has 
few peers. What would escape notice in the average gen¬ 
eral, forces itself on our attention in the case of Caesar. 

At the root of all this lies Caesar’s reprehensible habit of 
undertaking work with insufficient means. He moved to 
Greece with half his force, and was compelled to wage a 
defensive war for months. He sailed for Alexandria with 
but four thousand men, a reckless act which gave rise to a 
long and arduous struggle there. He moved into Pontus 
with a ridiculously insufficient force and was saved from 
disaster as by a miracle. He caiqe to Africa under circum- 


692 


CAESAR’S NEGLECT. 


stances which, without Caesar s own luck, must have resulted 
in his defeat. This more than foolhardy conduct brought in 
its train vastly greater complications than could have resulted 
from a careful opening of each campaign. If the months 
be counted, it will be seen that more than half of all Caesar’s 
campaigns were consumed in extricating himself from the 
results of his own mistakes. 

It was either unnecessary delay or uncalculating haste 
which made most of Caesar’s campaigns essential. At the 
same time we cannot forget that it was these campaigns 
which brought out his great qualities as a soldier, which have 
taught us so many lessons in the art of war. 

When Caesar woke up to the danger of the African im¬ 
broglio, his impatience to seize upon and carry through the 
matter led him to neglect the commonest precautions. He 
must have known, or at all events he could have ascertained, 
the numbers opposed to him in Africa. But apparently 
without consideration, just as he had before started from 
Brundisium against Pompey with half his force, he now set 
sail from Lilybaeum with but six legions and two thousand 
horse, on a weaker fleet than Scipio’s, at a season of the year 
when storms were common, and, most extraordinary of all, 
without a rendezvous if the transports should be separated, 
as was not only probable but actually occurred. It needed 
all Caesar’s luck to overcome such carelessness. It would 
have been a much more expeditious plan to wait till he got 
his forces together, till a season of better winds prevailed; 
he could then have crushed out the opposition with a blow. 
Most of the African campaign was taken up with manoeu¬ 
vring to avoid the natural results of Caesar’s numerical weak¬ 
ness, — Caesar’s, who controlled the vast resources of Borne, 
— or else in search of corn which he should have collected 
for shipment before he himself set sail. In this particular 


DARING AND CAUTION. 


693 


characteristic — lack of preparation — Csesar stands on a 
lower plane than any of his compeers. None of the other 
great captains was so unnecessarily reckless, ever tempted 
fortune so far; none ever had the fortune to be extricated 
from such dilemmas. 

There is so curious a mixture of daring and caution in 
Caesar that we are often tempted to believe that we do not 
understand the conditions under which he worked. The 
historian of the African War has an indefinite way of stating 
things which obliges us to complement much of his meaning 
by a study of the terrain. That the man who was bold 
enough to blockade Pompey at Dyrrachium with half his 
force, to attack Pompey uphill at Pharsalus with like odds 
against him, should be unwilling to attack Scipio under 
conditions far more favorable, is hard to explain. That the 
man who undertook and carried through the Zeta raid — the 
operation of a partisan corps by an entire army like that of 
Alexander at the Persian Gates — should have been unwill¬ 
ing to cross the valley at Ucita, or at least to attack Scipio 
when he had dug his way across, we can scarcely understand. 
Still the historian and the topography agree. We under¬ 
stand the conditions better than those under which Hannibal 
and Alexander worked. We are forced to ascribe Caesar’s 
hesitancy to mere mood. 

Caesar’s manoeuvring was always good. His reason for 
intrenching, instead of fighting, is harder to comprenend. 
Caesar was a fighter, in his way; not like Alexander, not like 
Frederick, but still an able and antagonistic tactician. But 
often, without reason, he appeared to be disinclined to fight, 
even when his men were in the very tone to command success. 
He was so clever at manoeuvring that he apparently desired 
for the mere art of the thing to manoeuvre his enemy into a 
bad position before he attacked him. His pausing at Thap- 


l 


694 


SHORT CAMPAIGN. 


sus lias led to the remark that, while he prepared for the 
battle, it was his men who won it. When Caesar was weak 
in numbers, his caution was justifiable; but his caution was 
often less" great with a handful than when his force was 
respectable. His opponent in Africa was far from being an 
able man; Scipio’s legions were less stanch than Caesar’s; 
yet hypercaution gives Caesar distinctly the appearance of 
having had more difficulty in mastering Scipio than in over¬ 
coming Pompey the Great. What difficulties he had were 
largely of his own creation. It is because he was Caesar that 
we wonder at his hesitation. 

This is one aspect of the case. On the other hand, 
Caesar’s activity, his intelligence, his skill and brilliant dash 
in the minor operations, his broad conceptions of the strategic 
necessities of the case, as well as the execution of all his 
plans, stamp him with the seal of genius. And if we con¬ 
sider the element of time, Caesar is unapproachable. In the 
Civil War, from his arrival on the field, the Italian campaign 
lasted but sixty days; the Ilerda campaign six weeks; the 
Epirotic seven months; the Alexandrian six; the Pontus 
campaign a bare week; the African a little over three 
months; the Spanish an equal time. When we note that 
in the Epirotic and Alexandrian wars it was Caesar’s over¬ 
hastiness which consumed the bulk of each period, this rec¬ 
ord, added to the splendid work in Gaul, in this sense stands 
unequaled in the history of great captains. 


XLII. 


SPAIN. DECEMBER, 46, TO AUGUST, 45 B. C. 

The Pompeians had taken root in Spain, in doing 1 -which Caesar’s lieutenants 
had aided them by mismanaging his affairs. Pompey’s sons, Cnaeus and Sextus, 
were in command of large forces there. Caesar, after triumphing in Rome, pro¬ 
ceeded to Spain. The first manoeuvring was near Corduha, with no marked 
advantage on either side, though Caesar suffered a defeat in a combat near the 
bridge over the Baetis. Caesar then moved away and attacked Attegua, and 
around this town there was a long interchange of hostilities, with frequent 
conflicts. Attegua finally surrendered. Ucubis was the next point of contest. 
Caesar, as usual, skirmished for an opening, which Pompey was clever enough 
not to give. But unsuccessful at all points, and having been worsted in a bat¬ 
tle of no great importance at Soricaria, Pompey finally determined to leave this 
part of Spain and retire to Carteia in the south. 

Spain was divided by the Romans into Tarraconensis, or 
Hispania Citerior and Ulterior, in the north, Baetiea in the 
south, Lusitania in the west. In this peninsula, while 
Caesar had been preparing the defeat of Pompey in Greece, 
Q. Cassius Longinus, who, as tribune of the people, had so 
ably served him in the early months of the Civil War, and 
whom Csesar had left in command, with the legions of Varro, 
after its conquest, had been acting with grave indiscretion. 
He had fallen into serious disfavor with the population, 
though he had kept the affections of the veterans in the army 
by exceptional largesses, — a course tending to the destruction 
of discipline. He had, for some time, by cruel extortions 
from the people, been raising moneys, which he squandered 
in needless equipments for his troops, and in supplying them 
with absurd extravagances. He had raised a fifth legion 
and three thousand horse, which he sumptuously paid and 


696 


CASSIUS. 


clad. Some time before the battle of Pharsalus, Cassius 
received orders from Caesar to march through Mauretania on 
Numidia, where Juba was still in Pompey’s favor, and was 
raising fresh troops tQ aid the cause. He was getting ready 
to march, for he lacked not vigor if there was work to do, 
when he was all but assassinated by some of the men he had 
injured. He was, however, rescued, and caused all the con¬ 
spirators to be tortured and put to death, except some few 
whom he allowed to purchase their lives for sums varying 



from ten thousand to fifty thousand sestertii each. After 
this experience he became more tyrannical than ever. A 
mutiny and revolt ensued, which threatened to place Spain 
in the hands of the Pompeian faction; for these atrocities 
by one of Caesar’s lieutenants had brought the adherents of 
Pompey again to the front. At the request of his Spanish 
friends, Caesar sent Trebonius, the conqueror of Massilia, to 






CNjEUS pompey. 


697 


displace Cassius. The latter, in sailing away from the 
province where he had earned so much hatred, was drowned 
in the Ebro. 

Young Cnaeus Pompey, after his fiasco in Mauretania, had 
sailed for the Balearic Isles, and finally reached and taken 
possession of Baetica in southern Spain, where he had been 
well received by the larger part of the people whom Caesar’s 
lieutenants had alienated, and had been saluted Imperator. 
He had driven Trebonius out of that part of the country. 
By seizing the wealth of many private citizens and by general 
rapacity and high-handed measures, he managed to collect a 
large army. After the defeat at Thapsus, many of the 
fugitives — his brother Sextus, Labienus and Varus among 
them — managed to make their way to young Pompey, with 
such small relics of the army as they had saved. By all these 
means a nucleus of parts of thirteen legions was collected and 
put under supreme command of Cnaeus, then a young man of 
twenty-four, by no means lacking in boldness or ability. 

In Baetica, which is a territory much cut up by hills and 
rivers, with excellent resources, and strong towns and 
positions, there was a promising chance for Pompey to drag 
out a war of defense for an almost indefinite time. This 
necessitated Caesar’s at once leaving Rome. He had im¬ 
agined the Civil War to be at an end, but he was rudely 
undeceived by the news from Spain, received during October 
and November, 46 B. c. He first dispatched Q. Fabius and 
Q. Pedius to Spain with troops, and Didius with a fleet. 
Didius beat Varus at sea and drove him into Carteia. Caesar 
left Rome early in December, 46. By what route he went 
is not known. Appian, Strabo and Eutropius assert that 
he reached his camp in Obulco (Porcuna) in twenty - seven 
days from the city. It is thought that the trip was by sea 
to Saguntum, which he reached in somewhat less than three 


698 


CJESAR'S RAPID JOURNEY. 


weeks, and thence to Obulco in a week more. One thing 
alone seems clear, that he reached Spain in less than a month 
after starting from Rome, certainly before he was expected, 



and in advance of his troops, 
to the rumor of his approach. 
On arrival, Cjesar learned 


He was on the ground prior 
by ambassadors from Corduba 





MARCH ON COR DUB A. 


699 


(Cordova) that the town was weakly defended by Sextus 
Pompey and might be captured out of hand. Pompey had 
sent out scouts to ascertain Caesar’s coming, but these had 
all been captured. Cnaeus Pompey was besieging Ulia 
(Montemayor, twenty miles south of Corduba), the last town 
which had held out against him in Baetica. To the relief 
of Ulia Caesar sent a force of eleven cohorts and a good body 
of horse under L. J. Paciecus, a man well known and 
acquainted with the province. Paciecus managed to enter 
the place during a storm which was accompanied by such 
darkness that the enemy was careless and readily deceived 
as to his presence and purpose. With this additional garri¬ 
son, Ulia could probably have held out in any event; and 
moreover, to draw Pompey from the siege, Caesar, about 
January 8, marched on Corduba, which he had some hope 
of capturing out of hand. He sent his cavalry on ahead, 
accompanied by a body of chosen heavy - armed foot, and 
adopted the stratagem of mounting a number of these behind 
the cavalrymen when they approached the city, so that their 
presence was not perceived by the enemy. The Cordubans 
thereupon sallied forth to attack what they supposed to be 
only horse intent on ravaging the country. The infantry, 
dismounting and forming, fell on the enemy with such effect 
that few returned to the town. But the victory obtained no 
result. 

The presence of Csesar near Corduba and the relief of Ulia, 
obliged Cnaeus to raise the siege when Ulia was on the point 
of surrender and to march to Corduba, which was important 
as being the capital of the province, and which his brother 
Sextus had sent him word he feared he could not hold against 
Caesar. It is very apparent that Cnaeus had illy prepared 
for opposing, as well as little anticipated, Caesar’s arrival. 

The description of the events which now took place is 


TOO 


OBSCURE HISTORY. 


given in the Commentaries in a manner very difficult to 
understand. These Commentaries, like the African War, 
were formerly ascribed to Hirtius Pansa, but it is certain 
that he did not write either; their author is unknown. One 
must decipher the matter as best one can. The bulk of the 
text is devoted to utterly trivial details, and the important 
movements are passed over with a word or altogether omitted. 
The topography is the only reliable guide so far as one can 



guess the localities or as they have been established by care¬ 
ful research and comparison of data. Few excavations have 
been made. It is necessary, sometimes, to do slight violence 
to the text in some one place in order to make the statements 
coincide with others equally positive. On the whole, how¬ 
ever, we may feel reasonably sure of our general ground; 
but the details are wanting and any narrative of the cam¬ 
paign somewhat lacks sequence. 

When, about January 10, Caesar reached the Bsetis (Gua- 
dalquiver), he found that the Pompeians held the only bridge 






INTRENCHED RACE. 701 

(A), and that the river was too deep to be forded. He 
accordingly built a number of piers for a bridge below the 
town (B) by sinking for foundations baskets of stones; and 
laying his roadway on these, crossed to the right bank in 
three successive divisions (C, D, E) and camped each in a 
suitable location strongly fortified. He then built a good 
bridgehead on the left bank (F). When Cmeus arrived 
from Ulia, he camped over against Caesar’s bridgehead, on 
the heights south of the town (G), hoping to get access to 
Corduba by the old bridge. 

Caesar began operations by an effort to cut Cnams off from 
the town and prevent his entering it. “He ran a line from 
the camp to the bridge ” (H) in such a manner as firmly to 
hold his bridgehead while threatening to cut Pompey off 
from easy access to the city and thus from his provisions. 
He might, perhaps, have thrown a force, by a night surprise, 
on the south end of the bridge and have quickly fortified it; 
but Caesar was always fond of the security of earthworks. 
He ran his lines along the river towards the bridge at the 
foot of the hills on which sat Pompey. 

Pompey’s plan was of course to obtain control of his end 
of the bridge, whose farther end was near a tower of the 
town, a fact which would make his access all the safer. It 
would have been a simple matter for his brother Sextus to 
fortify the bridge at its southern extremity, but he kept 
comfortably within the town walls. Perceiving Caesar’s 
works, Pompey began a line of his own from his camp to the 
bridge (I). So long as neither cared to fight for the bridge, 
it became a question of speed in building works. 

As a result of this intrenched race, a series of serious strug¬ 
gles occurred for the possession of the bridge. Skirmishes 
near by were of daily occurrence, in which neither side could 
boast the upper hand. But it is evident that finally, about 



Corduba to Munda. 





703 


CAESAR ATTACKS ATTEGUA. 

January 20, Cnaeus broke down Caesar’s defenses by an 
attack in force and fought his way to the bridge. The 
battle here was desperate. The legionaries fought hand to 
hand. Hundreds perished not only by the sword but by 
falling from the bridge into the river. “On either side were 
heaps of slain.” Despite stout fighting, it seems clear that 
Caesar was defeated. Cnaeus gained the bridge, and his 
entrance to Corduba. Caesar stayed on awhile, hoping to 
force Pompey to an open - field engagement, which might 
terminate the war; but finding that he could not bring him 
to battle on advantageous terms, he gave up the hope of 
capturing Corduba, and, as a long siege was not advisable, 
he drew off his forces. When Caesar left, Pompey strength¬ 
ened Corduba by many engines. 

Caesar rightly believed that he could make better headway 
by attacking Pompey’s minor strongholds to the south, and 
perhaps seize an opportunity for battle during the operations. 
Moreover, to get hold of some of these depots of provisions 
was the easiest way to ration his army. Southeast of Cor¬ 
duba lay Attegua (modern Teba), a town well fortified in a 
naturally strong and high position. This place he selected 
for a first attempt. On the 20tli of January he quietly drew 
in his forces, after lighting the usual evening fires in the 
camp to deceive the enemy, crossed the river by night and 
marched on Attegua. There were plenty of provisions in the 
place, and as usual Caesar lacked rations. The country was 
hilly and the town lay on a height a mile or so back from the 
river Salsum (modern Guadajoz), a narrow and not deep 
stream. Caesar reached the place next morning and at once 
laid siege to it; he camped on the hills to its west (A), con¬ 
structed strong lines about it with many redoubts to afford a 
shelter to the cavalry and infantry outposts, cast up a mound 
(B), brought up his vineae and engines and made ready to 



» 




POMPEY REACHES ATTEGUA. 


705 

storm. The watch-towers built on nearly every height by 
the old inhabitants as a means of security against the barba¬ 
rians came readily into play in Caesar’s work. 

Pompey, on ascertaining next morning that Caesar had 
decamped, at first entered Corduba amid much rejoicing. 
He felt that he had scored a point against the great soldier. 
Moreover, having possession of most of the towns, the 
winter season would work in his favor and not Caesar’s. 

Attegua, against which he guessed Caesar had marched, 
was strong and could hold out. But when he heard that the 
place was actually invested he followed Caesar up and reached 
Attegua a week later, before the siege operations had ad¬ 
vanced too far. By his sudden arrival on a foggy day he 
caught some stray parties of Caesar’s outpost horse and cut 
them to pieces. Not wishing to lose his communications 
with Corduba, he pitched his first camp on the hills to the 
west of Caesar (C), but still north of the river Salsum. 
Changing his mind next day, perhaps January 28, he set 
fire to this camp, crossed the Salsum, and took up a new 
camp (D) south of Attegua, and in view both of it and of 
Ucubis (modern Espejo), another of his strong places to the 
south. But though his presence near Attegua with thirteen 
legions gave Caesar and his troops much work, if not anxiety, 
Pompey could bring no assistance to the town, and in the 
outpost conflicts the Caesarians generally had the best of it. 

Pompey, to be sure, “had the emblems and standards of 
thirteen legions,” but none of these were full, nor were they 
of good material. Two were native, had been under Varro, 
had deserted to Caesar, had been given by him to Longinus 
and Trebonius, from whom they had revolted in favor of 
Cnaeus Pompey; one was recruited among the Roman col¬ 
onists in Spain; one had been in Africa with Afranius; the 
rest were mostly made up of fugitives from Pompey’s old 


i 


706 


NATURE OF THE COUNTRY. 


army, deserters and Spaniards. Tlius four of his legions 
may be said to have been veteran, the rest raw. He had 
some thousands of horse, and about twelve thousand auxil¬ 
iaries. Csesar had eight legions, and with later reinforce¬ 
ments eight thousand cavalry. His light troops were prob¬ 
ably of better quality and quite as many as those of Pompey. 
Each general had some fifty thousand men, not counting 
auxiliaries. The feelings of the old and weary legionaries 
were very bitter. The war promised not to lack atrocity. 

The nature of the country, which is mountainous, with the 
towns built on easily defended heights, was such that Pom¬ 
pey was able to camp in positions to make an easy and pro¬ 
tracted defense. Spain has always been noted for its defen¬ 
sive wars. The sharply accentuated country lends itself 
peculiarly to defense. Every small place remote from cities 
was built on an eminence, was fortified, and sentinels were 
kept constantly on the lookout. Whomever the native pop¬ 
ulation befriended had strong and able allies. 

Standing on any one of the numerous watch-towers of the 
country, one sees on every hand numberless round, woodless 
eminences, “like an immense city whose roofs are all cupo¬ 
las.” Nearly all these hills are fit for camping, and at every 
turn is a position easy to hold, difficult to capture. 

In order to strengthen his own position, keep a good out¬ 
look, and hold more territory, Csesar had taken possession of 
a suitable eminence — Castra Postumiana — some four miles 
from his main camp and fortified it (E). It was separated 
from his own camp by the river Salsum and was so placed as 
to be a threat to Pompey’s camp. This general harbored 
the idea that Csesar could not readily come to its relief in 
case he attacked it. It could be approached from his camp 
through the valleys without the troops being seen. He 
planned to fall upon this fort by night, as a means of creat- 


POMPEY RETIRES. 707 


mg a diversion in favor of Attegua, and, moving at mid¬ 
night of February 4, reached the place without the cohorts 
being discovered. But before it was too late the garrison 
took alarm, flew to arms, and rained such numberless mis¬ 
siles on the Pompeians from the walls that Pompey was much 
delayed in his operations. Caesar learned quickly of the 
attack, and with three legions hurried to the fort, already 
manfully defended by the garrison, where he inflicted a heavy 
loss on Pompey’s troops and drove them off. 


Caesar at this time received reinforcements, especially of 
cavalry. Pompey, who again appears to have feared that 
Caesar s position might enable him to move on Corduba and 
seize it out of hand, once more — on February 6 — set fire to 
his camp and made signs of retiring in the direction of that 
place, crossing the Carcliena and actually camping south of 
his first location (F). He had been much harassed by Cae¬ 
sar’s cavalry in bringing victual from Corduba, and he ap¬ 
pears to have retired the more readily to ration his men, for 
all his provisions were sent to him from the capital. Most of 
these convoys reached him, but Caesar’s cavalry on one occa¬ 
sion intercepted a train and pursued the guard back to the 
very walls of the city. 

Caesar pushed his works against Attegua. He daily added 
castella to his lines, and his terrace, surmounted by a tower, 
would shortly be able to fire upon the defenders of the city 
walls. To destroy these works the besieged made almost 
nightly sallies from Attegua, but these always resulted in 
their being driven back with loss. They employed every 
device to set fire to Caesar’s towers and engines. Pompey, 
who had not really left the vicinity, made sundry efforts to 
interfere with the siege, but to no serious effect. The 
besiegers proceeded with their operations, undermined and 
threw down a good part of the wall. 


708 


ROMAN CRUELTY. 


Pompey continued his activity. He seized a height on 
Caesar’s side of the river and erected a fort (G), hoping to 
place Caesar at a disadvantage, and in many skirmishes near 
the town showed himself to be an efficient and capable sol¬ 
dier. A select body of his infantry one day lay in ambush 
for some of Caesar’s horse and suddenly attacked them. 
These troopers dismounted to fight on foot, and, not being as 
good infantry as cavalry, were as a consequence driven in 
nearly to Caesar’s lines; but being here reinforced they ral¬ 
lied and pushed back the enemy with a loss of some hundred 
men. 

The garrison in the town was not only active but very 
obstinate and cruel. Caesar’s men were none the less so. 
The garrison consisted of Roman soldiers, and, mindful of 
the massacre of Thapsus, they dreaded any terms with Caesar 
lest he should not be able to control his men. The soldiers 

I 

murdered a great number of the citizens who were favorable 
to Caesar, throwing some headlong from the walls. Flaceus, 
the commander of the garrison, organized the defense with 
skill, and a vast number of darts and missiles and much 
inflammable stuff was thrown at all times from the ramparts 
upon Caesar’s works. 

One sally on February 15, at a time agreed upon with 
Pompey,—he being able occasionally by shooting darts or 
slinging bullets into the town to communicate with the garri¬ 
son, — was made with particular vigor. The garrison had 
for object to cut its way out to join the main force. After 
having thrown a large number of fire-pots and flaming arrows 
upon the besiegers’ lines at various places to create a diver¬ 
sion and uncertainty, they issued at midnight by the gate 
nearest Pompey’s camp, carrying fascines to fill up the ditch, 
and mural hooks and fire to destroy Caesar’s works and the 
barracks of the men, which latter were mostly built of reeds. 


ATTEGUA SURRENDERS. 709 

They were sly enough to carry with them a large supply of 
silver and fine apparel with the intention of scattering these 
valuables in places where they would divert Caesar’s men 
from their work of resistance by thoughts of plunder. Pom- 
pey was in the fort he had erected on the Attegua side of the 
river Salsum, and bore his part in the fray. He remained 
all night in line to protect the retreat of the Atteguans, 
should they cut their way out. The military enginery of the 
town proved very efficient. One of Caesar’s wooden towers 
was battered so severely as to give way above the third story, 
and in fact the besiegers fired that and an adjoining tower. 
But the gallantry of the besieged was of no avail. The cour¬ 
age of the men and Caesar’s good leadership sufficed to drive 
them back into their lines and to hold Pompey in check at 
the same time. 

The inhabitants now sent ambassadors to ascertain if 
Caesar’s clemency could be procured, and at the same time 
Pompey determined that he could do no more to afford the 
garrison relief. As a result, on February 19, the gates of 
the town were opened to his army. Caesar behaved with 
conspicuous generosity. 

When Cnaeus learned of the surrender of Attegua, he felt 
convinced that Caesar would advance on Ucubis. He moved 
his camp again up the river to a point northeast of the place, 
where he threw up works on all the hills around it which 
appeared to lend it strength. His weak conduct in not 
relieving Attegua had bred lack of confidence in him, and 
induced numberless desertions. These Pompey determined 
to punish. He selected a number of citizens of Ucubis sup¬ 
posed to be favorable to Caesar’s cause and put them to 
death. In all the towns and territories controlled by him 
similar cruelties were practiced. This was a short-sighted 
policy on his part, and materially helped Caesar’s cause. 


710 


BATTLE OF SORICARIA. 


After the capture of Attegua Caesar moved his camp up 
the river nearer to and opposite Pompey’s (K). He was 
puzzled how to proceed to draw Pompey into battle, which 
he sought as keenly as Pompey avoided it. Pompey, under 
the guidance of Labienus, was wisely avoiding open - field 
work and seeking to reduce Caesar by famine. The experi¬ 
ence of Africa and Greece was telling. 

Caesar within a few days (March 4) moved his camp 
somewhat nearer Pompey’s, but still on the other bank (L), 
and his men drew an intrenched line to the river (M). This 
work, the object of which is not apparent, gave rise, after a 
while, to some heavy outpost combats. 

On Caesar’s line was the town of Soricaria. Pompey had 
intrenched a depot at Aspavia, south of this place. The 
stores therein Caesar wished to divert to his own uses. He 
moved to Soricaria, crossed the Salsum, and established a 
camp (N) whose position resulted in cutting Pompey off from 
his communications with Aspavia. Pompey broke camp and 
endeavored to reach the place, but found Caesar athwart his 
path and intrenching his camp. Cnaeus, thereupon, deter¬ 
mined to offer battle, though on unequal terms to Caesar’s 
troops, as he sought the protection of the higher ground, in 
Caesar’s front (O). But Caesar was on the alert. He 
sharply advanced on Pompey’s cohorts, which were climbing 
the hill from the west, attacked them smartly, drove them 
from the heights and downward to the plain, occupied the 
upper ground himself, and, following down the slope, fell 
upon them as they were crossing the valley back to camp and 
defeated them with a loss of five hundred killed. 

On the next day, March G, Pompey, intending to retrieve 
himself, advanced on the same hill, anticipated Caesar in its 
possession, and sent his cavalry to attack Caesar’s men, still 
working at their camp. Caesar marched out and, drawing up 


POMPEY’S SUBTERFUGE. 


711 


on lower ground, invited Pompey to battle. This Pompey 
declined. After thus remaining some time, Caesar retired to 
camp. Pompey attacked his rear with his cavalry, which 
bred a very severe combat, in which Caesar’s light troops had 
to mix to extricate the squadrons. The battle went no 
farther. 

Soon after this action, Pompey retired to and held himself 
in Ucubis, and daily skirmishing was kept up between the 
armies, chiefly by the cavalry. 

Desertions from Pompey grew in number alarmingly. To 
arrest these Pompey resorted to perversion of facts by writing 
to the towns which still held to him that Caesar would not 
come down to the plain and fight, but stayed on the hills 
where he could not be attacked on anything like equal terms. 
Pompey was in his way energetic, and would have liked 
battle; but he was afraid of Caesar. He determined to move 
from town to town, encourage some and punish others, hoping 
to gain some advantage by drawing out the war. 



Homan Cuirass. 









XLIII. 


MUNDA. MARCH, 45 B. C. 

The Commentaries are very inexplicit on many of the facts of this campaign; 
they are made up of shreds and patches, which can be put together into one 
whole only by a knowledge of the topography. Caesar followed up Pompey, 
and heading him off from crossing the Singulis, forced him to retrace his steps. 
Following him to Munda, — which place cannot well he at modern Monda, as 
it is usually assumed, — Caesar attacked Pompey, and in a battle which came very 
close to being lost, by a happy accident cleverly utilized he eventually won a 
decisive victory. The entire Pompeian army was destroyed. It still took some 
five months for Caesar to finish the settlement of Spain. He then returned to 
Rome. 

About the 10th of March, Pompey, according to the 
Commentaries, which here become exceedingly sparse of 
details and unsatisfactory, broke camp and marched toward 
Hispalis, a place which, despite the name, cannot be modern 
Seville. Caesar destroyed the camp at Ucubis, took Ventis- 
ponte, and following Pompey, marched to Carruca, still 
seeking opportunity to bring him to battle. Pompey moved 
to Munda. Caesar followed and camped over against him. 
It is greatly to be regretted that the historian gives us no 
details of these manoeuvres. Caesar was evidently trying his 
best to drive Pompey into some position where he could have 
him at a disadvantage. And that he finally succeeded in 
so doing is evident from Pompey’s concluding to fight at 
Munda. But the reasons for the marches and counter¬ 
marches, as even these themselves, we have no means of pos¬ 
itively knowing. All that we are sure of is that Caesar 
finally succeeded in forcing Pompey into a position where the 


LOCATION OF MUNDA. 713 

latter saw that subterfuge and retreat would nd longer avail 
him; but that, in order to hold his allies to his cause, he 
must do battle for it. We are put to our inquiry from the 
topography and the probabilities. 

Let us see whether we can supply the gap left by the 
historian of the Spanish War and reconstruct these manoeu¬ 
vres. The interest of the campaign justifies a digression 
from our narrative. First we must disprove some of the 
theories already advanced as to the location of Munda. 

The entire Spanish campaign is involved in difficulties. 
As soon as we approach the battle of Munda, these difficulties 
multiply indefinitely. The question where Hannibal crossed 
the Alps is sufficiently puzzling, though it seems that the 
route of the Little St. Bernard may be considered as fairly 
established. In any event, there are but a few passes over 
which he could possibly have frayed a path. But within a 
radius of one hundred miles from Attegua and Ucubis there 
is scarcely a ruin-surmounted hill with a brook at its foot 
which has not laid claim to being the scene of Caesar’s great 
Spanish victory. And there are all but as many heights 
crowned by Roman ruins in Spain as in Italy. 

The location of the battle of Munda has been the source of 
hundreds of essays and books, some indeed crowned by the 
Spanish Academy; it has been the subject of many topo¬ 
graphical surveys and researches by the engineers of the 
Spanish army; it has been the cause of endless controversy. 
There is good reason to believe that the locality was not so 
far from that of the operations around Attegua and Ucubis 
as it is wont to be placed; certainly not so far as modern 
Monda, Osuna, or Ronda. There are dominant reasons for 
the belief that the battle was fought north of the Singulis 
(Xenil), rather than south of it. Let us glance at these. 

Caesar was constantly on the offensive, Pompey on the 


714 


PROS AND CONS. 


defensive. This was Caesar’s strategic habit, or, at least, it 
was his habit to actively push his enemy by operations of 
some nature until he could force him to battle under suitable 
conditions. With none of his enemies did he long dally on 
the side of defense. We may fairly presume that this rule 
of conduct obtained in the present case. As we learn from 
the Commentaries, after the battle of Soricaria, “since which 
the enemy had been under continual alarms,” and the suc¬ 
ceeding operations, Pompey decamped. Caesar followed, and 
“afterwards laid siege to Ventisponte, which surrendered; 
and, marching thence to Carruca, encamped over against 
Pompey, who had burned the city because the garrison re¬ 
fused to open the gates to him.” Thence “Caesar, still pur¬ 
suing his march, arrived in the plains of Munda, and pitched 
his camp opposite to that of Pompey.” 

Now, none of these places have been identified by excava¬ 
tions or otherwise, and it is well not to give much heed to a 
similarity of names. It is safer to rely on military proba¬ 
bilities and to weigh each little item and word in the very 
short and unsatisfactory accounts which have been preserved 
to us. 

There is an infinite number of arguments of more or less 
value, which can be framed to explain or sustain any given 
theory of the movements of the rival armies at this time. 
Let us keep in mind the leading statements concerning and 
characteristics of the campaign lest we go astray. These all 
point to the battlefield of Munda being not far from Cor- 
duba. 

After his lack of success in the late operations, Pompey 
would not unnaturally determine to retire towards the sea, 
so as to have the proximity of his fleet to lean upon. Caesar 
had a keen eye for the intentions of the enemy, and to have 
Pompey thus escape him would be the last thing he desired. 


NORTH OF SINGULIS. 


715 

It is altogether probable that he narrowly watched his adver¬ 
sary and sought so to manoeuvre as to head him off before 
he could cross the Singulis, which was a marked barrier 
between Pompey and the sea. Caesar based on Obulco, and 
could hope to succeed better if he penned Pompey in the 
triangle made by it with the rivers Singulis and Bsetis. 

It is, therefore, a fair assumption that, so soon as Pompey 
showed the intention of definitively retiring from the theatre 
so marked out, Caesar marched towards the river Singulis to 
head him off at the fords and compel him to do battle before 
he got away. 

Had the rival armies passed the Singulis, the historian 
would have been likely to mention the fact as he does the 
passage of the Baetis. He does not mention the passage of 
the Salsum, because the latter is easily forded in many 
places. The Singulis has few fords, and at that time had 
doubtless few bridges, and is more or less difficult to cross. 

Again: after the battle of Munda, the beaten Pompeians, 
we are told, took refuge in the cities of Munda and Corduba. 
Naturally enough in Munda, which they had at their back 
during the battle; but if we allow that Munda was far 
beyond the Singulis, and that Pompey was retiring from 
Corduba, while Caesar followed him, how could large num¬ 
bers of the Pompeians reach Corduba, through a country cut 
up by mountains and rivers and in possession of Caesar’s 
forces? Would they not rather have taken refuge in the 
towns nearer the battlefield, many, most of which, in fact, 
still held to Pompey’s cause? That a very considerable 
number did reach Corduba appears plainly from what is told 
us about the siege of the town following the battle. A few 
stray fugitives from battle have often been known to reach 
very out-of-the-way places even through the enemy’s lines, 
but not large bodies of men. 


716 


DISTANCE FROM CORDUBA. 


The text of the Spanish War is susceptible of meaning 
that some of these fugitives — among them Valerius — 
reached Corduba the night of the battle. This alone would 
prove Munda to be near Corduba. The text might also be 
held to imply that part of Caesar’s army marched from the 
battlefield to Corduba between the evening of the morrow 
of the battle and the next following noon, showing that but 
a short distance intervened. The text may be read to mean 
that Valerius escaped to Corduba, and that Cnseus took the 
road in the other direction, to Carteia (near modern Gibral¬ 
tar), one hundred and seventy miles from Corduba, — as if 
Munda was near Corduba and Carteia very far away. But 
the text should not be forced. Let us consider some other 
items. 

Cnseus Pompey, after the battle was lost, “attended by a 
few horse and foot, took the road to Carteia, where his fleet 
lay, and which was about one hundred and seventy miles 
distant from Corduba.” He arrived there exhausted, show¬ 
ing that he had made a long journey, as his taking but a 
small party implied that he had a difficult march to make, —- 
one much more tedious than the road from modern Monda 
to Carteia would be. Now, if the battlefield was not near 
Corduba, at least in the province of which Corduba was 
the capital, but far south of the Singulis, why should the 
historian give the distance of Carteia from Corduba , and 
not from some other well-known city nearer the battlefield? 

Again: as Pompey’s intention, unquestionably understood 
in the ranks of his army, was to make his way to Carteia, 
if he had passed the Singulis on his way thither, it seems 
certain that the fugitives would have sought to reach Carteia 
rather than distant Corduba. But except Cnseus, the histo¬ 
rian speaks of no soldiers reaching any places other than 
Munda and Corduba. 


NOT MONDA OR RONDA. 717 

The historian gives no details whatsoever of the march 
from Ucubis to Munda, except to say that Csesar went to 
Ventisponte and Carruca. Had the distance been great, 
would not he have said something about it, especially as to 
pass the Singulis with an army is quite an operation, and the 
country beyond is very mountainous? He does describe the 
country near Attegua, and when he comes to speak of Munda 
he says: u as we have observed before , this country is full of 
hills which run in a continued chain without any plains inter¬ 
vening,” as if Munda were still in the same section. 

Again: Corduba surrendered easily after the news of the 
battle had reached it, as if from panic arising upon the pres¬ 
ence of Ciesar’s army near by. Orsao (Osuna), on the con¬ 
trary, near which town many place Munda, stood a siege. 
May it not be assumed that it was too far off to be subject 
to immediate panic? 

As to modern Monda, neither the topography of the sec¬ 
tion, nor the narration of the Spanish War, can be held 
to justify making it the locality of the battle. Mommsen 
is clearly wrong in this. 

Honda or Honda la Yieja are still less available for both 
reasons. A few only have advocated these places. 

The vicinity of the Rosa Alta mountains has been sug¬ 
gested. This will not do, because had this been the theatre 
of the battle, the town of Orsao would certainly have been a 
refuge for the beaten army. Nor does the topography of any 
particular place there correspond to what we are told of the 
battlefield. 

Again: Many have claimed that Munda must be near 
Orsao, because the military engines used at Munda were 
brought to Orsao: “Fabius Maximus, whom he had left to 
continue the siege of Munda, conducted it with great zeal; 
so that the enemy, seeing themselves shut up on all sides, 


718 


NOT NEAR ORSAO. 


sallied out, but were repulsed with great loss. Our men 
seized this opportunity to get possession of the town, and 
took the rest prisoners, in number about fourteen thousand. 
Thence they retreated towards Orsao, a town exceedingly 
strong both by nature and art, and capable of resisting an 
enemy. Besides, there is not, within eight miles of the 
place, any spring but that which supplies the town, which 
was a decided advantage to the besieged. In addition to all 
this, the wood necessary for building towers and other 
machines had to be fetched from a distance of six miles. 
And Pompey, to render the siege more difficult, had cut 
down all the timber round the place, and collected it within 
the walls, which obliged our men to bring all the materials 
for carrying on the siege from Munda, the nearest town which 
they had subdued.” But the Roman military engines were 
not difficult to transport. Alexander always carried his 
engines with him, like our field artillery. The legionary 
onagra were carried. Within six miles of Orsao there was 
wood left for the large framework, so that to carry all the 
parts of the big engines from Munda to Orsao was optional, 
and the operative parts could be carried almost any distance 
with ease. Orsao is, moreover, not on the road from Cor- 
duba to Carteia, the line of Pompey’s retreat, but on that 
from Seville to Malaga, so that Munda can scarcely be 
assumed to have been near it. The Commentaries refer to 
Orsao as “the nearest town which they ( i . e., the besiegers 
of Munda) had subdued.” But this does not necessarily 
imply that Munda was in the vicinity of Orsao. These two 
towns appear to have been the stoutest in their resistance to 
Caesar. Had they been close to each other, it is probable 
that Caesar would have done more than leave the sieves of 
Munda and Orsao to the management of Fabius, lest the one 
town should interfere with the siege of the other. 


MILITARY PROBABILITIES. 719 

So much for the most important of the various places which 
lay claim to be the scene of this great battle. We can ad¬ 
duce only negative evidence at best to disprove their claims. 
The military probabilities furnish a stronger argument. 

There is noticeable a certain similarity in some of Caesar’s 
campaigns, showing a method of work, — a type, — which it 
may be allowable to appeal to as a guide when we can find 
no certainty in the narration left to us. For instance, in 
the Ilerda campaign, Caesar constantly kept Afranius and 
Petreius within certain bounds by manoeuvring. He did not 
permit them to get beyond his easy reach. In Africa, too, 
all his manoeuvres were within a comparatively small area. 
Without proof positive that the battle of Munda was fought 
south of the Singulis, may we not by analogy claim that it 
is more like Caesar to have kept his opponent within the 
boundary prescribed by the Baetis and the Singulis ? 

If Pompey crossed the Singulis and made for Carteia, and 
Caesar followed him and forced battle on him, how had he 
time to besiege Ventisponte on the way? For while he was 
doing so, Pompey would have certainly escaped him. Does 
it not seem more probable that Caesar had headed Pompey 
off from crossing the Singulis on the way to Carteia, and 
had thus gained time for the siege? Is it not much more 
according to a Caesarian model to imagine the great captain 
manoeuvring Pompey into a place where he must fight, than 
to consider him as conducting a stern chase? 

Such considerations as these make it altogether probable 
that the battle of Munda was fought north of the Singulis. 
The town of Montilla has been pointed out as a probable 
location. The topography is as satisfactory as we can ask, 
in view of the fact that the historian’s description is not very 
close; and the strategic features tally well with what we may 
imagine Caesar to have done. In order to construct a homo- 

O 


I 


720 


MUNDA PROBABLY MONTILLA. 


geneous whole out of the shrecls of historical statement, we 
are compelled to assume something. 

For the purpose, then, of planning a campaign which shall 
tally both with probability and with what we are told, let us 
assume that the three unidentified locations are: Ventis- 
ponte, modern Puente Vieja; Carruca, modern Puente 
Xenil; Munda, modern Montilla. The two former places are 
the only fords over the Xenil in this section, and have ruins 
of Roman bridges; the latter has a battlefield which chimes 
well with the narrative of the Spanish War. On his way 
towards Carteia after the battle of Soricaria, Pompey was 
heading for the bridges or fords of the Singulis. He chose 
Carruca for a crossing, but was stopped there by the garri¬ 
son. Caesar, meanwhile, moved on Ventisponte, took it, 
and moved against Pompey to Carruca. Thus cut off from 
his retreat towards Carteia, Pompey chose the only other 
alternative, turned in his tracks and headed by his left 
towards his old capital, Corduba. Caesar met this manoeuvre 
by moving by his right to cut him off from that city. 
Around modern Ecija are plains to which Caesar may have 
been hoping to drive him. Pompey had told his allied cities 
so frequently that Caesar would not fight when he offered him 
battle on equal terms, that he now felt compelled to make 
good his word. It is not impossible, too, that he saw no 
means of longer avoiding Caesar’s pursuit. In this way both 
armies reached Munda. 

Caesar had no special hope that Pompey would stand, but 
was surprised to see that his enemy had determined on 
battle. This was the thing he welcomed of all others. 

The assumption thus made bears the stamp of accuracy, 
for it accords closely with the historian’s relation, and still 
more closely with the military probabilities. No other does. 

It was on the 15th of March that Pompey camped under 


Battle of Munda, 





722 


THE BATTLEFIELD. 


the walls of Munda. Caesar arrived next day and camped 
to the eastward, on a brook, to-day the Carchena. Back of 
Pompey lay his own intrenched camp and the town of Munda 
as a retreat in case of disaster. He did not feel that his 
position was disadvantageous. 

The next day after Caesar’s arrival, March 17, as he was 
preparing for the route, — for he did not believe Pompey 
would fight, — he learned from spies that Pompey had been 
standing in battle array ever since midnight waiting for his 
approach. Caesar “at once ordered the standard to be 
raised” for battle. Pompey had so long alleged that Caesar 
preferred not to come to battle because his troops were raw 
levies that he had ended by half believing it; which idea, 
coupled to his present excellent tactical position, made him 
the more ready to chance matters on the result of a general 
engagement. 

The town of Munda lay on a hill sloping towards the east. 
Between the two camps lay an undulating plain about five 
miles in width, through which ran a small rivulet, the modern 
Cristobal. Caesar had had in mind some other plans for 
outmanoeuvring his opponent, but on hearing that Pompey 
had prepared for battle, he himself drew up in line and 
waited for the enemy to descend to the plain, as he believed 
he would do; for Pompey had some cavalry which on the 
plain could act to better advantage than on the slope. But 
Pompey kept close to the hill and near the town on which 
his legions backed. His position was exceptionally strong, 
and he did not propose to forfeit it. He had all his thirteen 
legions in line. The cavalry was on his wings with six thou¬ 
sand light infantry and six thousand auxiliaries. He had 
probably been able to make good his losses, and may have 
still numbered fifty thousand men. The slope on which the 
Pompeians lay was rugged, excellent to defend, bad to 


CAESAR PA USES. 


723 

attack. At its foot, on Caesar’s right, was low and marshy 
ground, fed by the brook. Caesar had eighty heavy armed 
cohorts and eight thousand horse, — in any event under forty 
thousand effective. His light troops may have been eight 
thousand more. 

As Pompey did not show any sign of advancing, Caesar, 
on his part, marched across the plain to a point opposite 
Pompey, as a means of luring him forward. When the 
legions had reached the low ground and the brook, beyond 
which the hill where Pompey was posted began to ascend, 
and before crossing the brook, Caesar halted the line and, 
calling together his officers, pointed out to them and to his 
troops the disadvantage under which they would attack if 
they did so now. As we have seen, Caesar never favored 
attacking positions, and was reluctant to undertake an assault 
here. He had caution in certain contingencies equal to Han¬ 
nibal’s: but, unlike Hannibal, he alternated hypercaution 
with the extremity of recklessness. 

“The army murmured greatly as if they had been kept 
back from a certain victory, when this was told them.” The 
men were in excellent spirits and demanded but a chance to 
fight. The order to advance was accordingly issued, and the 
line promptly moved forward as with the will of one man, 
and crossed the brook. The pause which had thus occurred 
in the advance of the Caesarians encouraged the enemy to 
believe that Caesar’s legions were hesitating from fear, and 
induced Pompey to order his line to move a short distance 
down the hill: but though they thereby yielded part of the 
strength of their position, the advantage still remained indis¬ 
putably with them. Nor did they advance far from the pro¬ 
tection of the walls of Munda, which was not exceeding a 
mile in their rear. Pompey proposed in any event to have 
this city as a harbor of refuge. 


724 


APPALLING OUTLOOK. 


Caesar’s Tenth legion was on the right; the Third and 
Fifth legions were on the left with the cavalry and the auxil¬ 
iaries drawn up beyond them. The other legions held the 
centre. The battle was engaged with extraordinary enthusi¬ 
asm. The shout on each side came from men determined 
and expecting to conquer, — men who proposed to give no 
quarter. Caesar’s legions charged up the hill with consum¬ 
mate gallantry. Pompey’s line met them at javelin-throw¬ 
ing distance by a storm of pila and a counter - charge. 
Caesar’s men were superior in discipline and went at their 
work with cheerful courage; Pompey’s troops fought with 
clenched teeth, in the belief that their only salvation de¬ 
pended on winning this battle. They remembered Thapsus. 

At the instant before the impact the shower of darts was 

so heavy from above that the young troops wavered, and 

there was serious danger of Caesar’s line being broken before 

* _ 

it had fairly engaged the enemy. Then came the charge 
down from the higher ground which struck like the blow of 
a ram. Its momentum fairly staggered Caesar’s line; the 
onset was checked. The two lines, like wrestlers, with a 
firm hold, swayed to and fro in fierce opposition. This 
lasted while the successive ranks and lines relieved each 
other and fought with lance and sword. But the position of 
Pompey’s men was much in their favor. They pressed 
Caesar’s cohorts hard. After many hours, of this close-locked 
fighting, Caesar’s line began to show serious signs of weari¬ 
ness; there were hints of that disintegration which appals 
the stoutest-hearted leader. Caesar was taken aback. So 
grave, indeed, was the danger at this instant, that Caesar 
afterwards stated that while he had often before fought for 
victory, this, his last battle, was the first occasion on which 
he ever fought for his life. He had forgotten the Sabis. 
But that wonderful magnetic energy of his was roused to its 


725 


CAESAR IN THE VAN. 

highest pitch by the imminence of disaster. Never, since 

the day when the Nervii all but annihilated his legions,_ 

save perhaps at Alesia, —had he been called upon to put out 
his every power, physical and moral, as now. He rushed 
through the ranks, shaming some, stimulating others, 
reproaching the backward, praising the brave, and rousing 
the courage of his men by every appeal. He fought, as at 
the river Sabis, like a common soldier, with sword and shield 
in the front rank before the ensigns. By his personal 
endeavors the men were kept at their work. 

There is no question that victory or defeat, for hours per¬ 
haps, hung by a hair. It was Caesar, and Caesar alone, who 
kept the cohorts from stampede. It has been alleged by some 
historians that at the most dangerous period of the battle Cae¬ 
sar, in despair, was about to take his own life. But this is 
so thoroughly unlike the man that we cannot accept it as true. 
Caesar was capable of falling at the head of his legions, but 
not by his own hand in battle, unless he was taken prisoner. 

Evening was approaching. The last man on both sides 
had been put in. Not a cohort of reserves was left. The 
battle was anybody’s. No one could predict the result. 
Caesar’s men had rallied, but they were fighting uphill, and 
Pompey’s men had been encouraged by holding their own so 
loner. The auxiliaries on both sides had fled. There was 
no chance for manoeuvring. It was a mere question of disci¬ 
pline and valor. An accident might break either line, and 
such a breach would be surely fatal. Caesar was still omni- 
j)resent. His efforts had never slackened. He clung to his 
ground like one possessed. He would not face defeat. He 
made a last appeal to his old favorite, the Tenth legion. 
“Are you not ashamed to deliver your general into the 
hands of boys?” he cried to his veterans. Stung to the 
quick by the taunts of their general, for whom they had 


726 


CHANCE DECIDES. 


wrested victory from desperate straits so many times before, 
these battle-scarred men now rose to their old standard of 
enthusiasm, and pressed the enemy hard. The rest of the 
line gained courage for redoubled effort. Pompey was com¬ 
pelled to draw a legion from his right to help sustain his 
left, which was battered by the heavy blows of the Tenth. 
Caesar’s cavalry of its own motion fell upon this depleted 
wing and created a distinct impression. The fighting “was 
hand to hand, foot to foot and shield to shield.” On whose 
banners was victory to perch? 

Finally chance decided the day. King Bogud with his 
Numidians, after the charge of the cavalry, made a circuit of 
the Pompeian right and marched upon their camp. Perceiv¬ 
ing this, Labienus, who commanded on this wing, detailed 
five cohorts to head him off. Catching sight of these troops 
moving to the rear, Caesar, who was in the thickest of the 
fray, though he comprehended the manoeuvre, seized on it as 
an omen and shouted to his men: “Look you, comrades, the 
enemy flees! ” The Pompeians at the same moment saw this 
rearward movement, and conceiving the idea that their line 
was somewhere broken, began to waver. This bred confusion 
in their ranks and enthusiasm in Caesar’s, —as small things 
will often do upon the battlefield. Here was Caesar’s oppor¬ 
tunity. Under his powerful influence, the line was roused 
to one more almost superhuman effort. It was all that was 
required; the effort prevailed; the Caesarians broke the 
Pompeian line and drove the enemy towards the town. 

The victory was won, but the battle was not yet ended. 
Caesar’s eight thousand cavalry, which had so far done small 
work, now put in its heartiest blows, and soon broke up the 
cohorts of the aristocrats. Great slaughter ensued; thirty 
thousand Pompeians were cut down, among them Labienus 
and y arus, and three thousand Homan knights. Caesar lost, 


FEARFUL MASSACRE. 727 

according to the Commentaries, but one thousand killed, and 
five hundred wounded. This last item is another of those 
curious discrepancies between killed and wounded which 
make it so difficult to gauge the Roman losses in comparison 
to those of modern times. In some battles it can, from their 
peculiar tactics, be understood how there might be less 
wounded than killed; but at Munda the reason does not so 
plainly appear. It may have been due to the hand-to-hand 

fighting, which gave a wounded man small chance of getting 
to the rear. 

Caesar took the eagles of the thirteen Pompeian legions, an 
immense number of standards, and seventeen higher officers. 
The victory was overwhelming; the massacre decided the 
war. Most fugitives from Pompey’s army made for Munda, 
which it became necessary to besiege. So heated were the 
passions of the Caesarians, that the dead bodies of the slain 
were used as ramparts, and their javelins as palisades, and 
on these their bucklers were hung as breastworks. The 
heads of many were stuck on pikes and placed along the in¬ 
vestment lines to strike terror into the besieged. 

At Pharsalus Caesar lost, according to the Commentaries, 
two hundred killed; at Tliapsus, fifty; at Munda one 
thousand. The enemy, on the contrary, practically lost their 
entire army in each of these engagements. While these 
figures may not be accurate, it remains true that in ancient 
battles the vanquished lost to an extent impossible to-day. 
Defeat always meant massacre, — except to a Caesar. There 
was no attempt to restrain the troops. To kill was one of 
the main purposes of an ancient battle; to-day, killing is an 
unfortunate incident of war, which is ended as soon as the 
army of the enemy is put as far as may be beyond usefulness 
for the campaign. Despite such fearful slaughter, the total 
losses of a campaign in ancient times were apt to be much 


728 


fate of the leaders. 


less than they are to-day, when constant deadly fighting, with 
daily loss on both sides, is going on. 

Cnaeus Pompey fled from the field towards his fleet at 
Carteia, “which was about one hundred and seventy miles 
distant from Corduba,” one hundred and forty-five from 
Munda; but, after some time, was overtaken and killed. 
Caesar left Munda invested by Fabius Maximus, and marched 
to Corduba. Sextus Pompey had decamped. Here Caesar 
was arrested some time by the gallant defense offered by the 
Thirteenth legion. We have no details whatever of the 
operations. But the adherents of Caesar within the walls set 
fire to the place. Caesar made his way in, and slew twenty- 
two thousand men, many of them runaways from the battle¬ 
field of Munda. This slaughter was uncalled for. It adds 
to the list of holocausts for which Caesar was responsible. 

The battle of Munda had by no means crushed out opposi¬ 
tion. Pompey’s adherents defended themselves to the last. 
Hispalis was the next city to be reduced. This occupied 
some time. Asta and Munda followed. Each was a task of 
some difficulty. Carteia had seized Cnaeus Pompey. One 
party in the town wanted to give him up; one to assist him. 
His adherents got the upper hand, and, laying hands on all 
his adversaries, remorselessly slaughtered them. Cnaeus 
escaped by sea, but Didius followed him up with Caesar’s 
fleet, and, after a series of romantic adventures and a brave 
fight for life, he was captured and killed. Didius’ success 
was, however, short-lived; he was shortly after caught in an 
ambuscade and his fleet destroyed by the Lusitanians. 

Fabius, after a long siege, took Munda, and later the city 
of Ursao fell to the Caesarian arms. But the stanch defense 
of the towns adhering to Pompey is best shown by the fact 
that it took Caesar or his lieutenants many months to accom¬ 
plish their reduction. 


THEIR QUALITY. 729 . 

The Spanish war was the last in which Caesar was engaged. 
Having reduced the whole of Spain, there was now no organ¬ 
ized opposition to his rule in any quarter of the world. He 
started for Rome the end of July. But his glory was short¬ 
lived. He was assassinated next Ides of March. 

The sons of Pompey had many conditions in their favor at 
the beginning of the Spanish campaign, but they did not use 
them to advantage. One of their chief errors was of a kind 
not unusual at that day; they devastated the land and robbed 
the population of a country already half Caesar’s. This con¬ 
duct incensed both their friends and foes, and enabled Caesar 
to tamper with Pompey’s adherents, who listened the more 
readily to him for having suffered at the hands of Pompey. 
Cnaeus, who was the ruling spirit, conceived his military 
projects in a manner far from perfect and carried them out 
in still worse form. When the execution of a plan of cam¬ 
paign brought either Cnaeus or Sextus into the presence of 
Caesar, he seemed to be still less capable of intelligent action. 
Few generals shine when they are opposed to men like Alex¬ 
ander, Hannibal or Caesar. Except Vercingetorix, scarcely 
one of Caesar’s opponents came out of the struggle with mili¬ 
tary reputation unscathed. Pompey had been a great man; 
but he was no longer such in Caesar’s front. 

Caesar never had to face such men as Marcellus, Nero and 
Scipio. Even in contrast with the greatest captain of anti¬ 
quity, perhaps of all time, these Romans earned an abiding 
fame. Caesar was never called on to oppose such generals; 
nor, indeed, such legions as were made up of the burgesses 
of the Second Punic War. 

Caesar encountered semi-barbaric tribes much as did Alex¬ 
ander, but not in as overwhelming numbers; he never en¬ 
countered civilized armies under conditions by any means 
as unequal as Hannibal. 


730 


REDUCING SPAIN. 


A marked distinction in ancient times between tlie great 
and the mediocre captain lay in the ability of the former to 
rescue himself from disaster if he happened to suffer defeat; 
to keep his men within the bounds of demoralization; to save 
them from a massacre. Alexander scarcely knew failure. 
Hannibal often looked defeat in the face, but never disaster, 
until Zama. Csesar always rescued himself from defeat. 
Disaster never overtook him. 

If, after the battle of Munda, Cnseus had not lost his head, 
he might have saved a portion of his army; have retired to 
one of half a dozen provinces or cities, and have raised troops 
to continue the struggle. He might not have been able to 
alter the outcome of the war, but he could have protracted 
it indefinitely, at this time a highly undesirable thing for 
Csesar, who was needed at Rome to allay serious political 
troubles, and could not well afford military difficulties. 
Neither Cnseus nor Sextus were in any sense worthy antago¬ 
nists of Csesar. The former must not be underrated. He 
had some good points, and, under better conditions, might 
have shown for more. Sextus must be gauged lower. They 
could not expect to equal Csesar; but they might have made 
his task a harder one. 

The fact that Csesar took from March to August after 
Munda to reduce Spain to complete subjection shows how 
strong a grasp the Pompeian element had got upon the 
peninsula, and proves that a good soldier, despite defeat, 
might well have held out an indefinite time. While it is 
true that Csesar’s luck generally pitted mediocre men against 
him during the Civil War, his genius was demonstrated as 
much in taking advantage of their shortcomings as it was in 
his so cutting out and doing his work as to reduce the length 
of his campaigns to such exceptionally short limits. 


XLIV. 


THE MAN AND SOLDIER. 

CAESAR was tall and slight, but strong and uniformly well. He was a good 
fencer and rider, and well up in athletic sports. His features were large hut 
refined. In his last years he showed his age and grew bald. His dress was 
always elegant. Cicero was his only superior as an orator; in ordinary con¬ 
verse he was unequaled. His power of work and endurance were wonderful. 
He is charged with many liaisons, hut they were the custom of the day. 
His domestic habits were simple, but he was extravagant in art. Some an¬ 
cient authors charge him with many vices ; he was, indeed, not perfect; but 
. the sum of all is a well-balanced character. He was a good friend and bore no 
malice to enemies. He had no bigotry; his intellectual equipment was splen¬ 
did. He did more cruel things than Alexander, but he was personally kind 
and generous. He had projected many great works in addition to those he had 
already performed when the end came. As a soldier, Caesar’s art was inborn. 
The ancients knew nothing beyond tactics and logistics. Strategy was not a 
recognized science. Caesar was his own pedagogue ; he learned from his own 
errors. The conception of the plan of the Civil War was on as high a plane 
as its execution; the rapidity of its campaigns has no equal; but it was marred 
by repeated instances of overhasty action barely pardonable in a tribune, inex¬ 
cusable in a great captain. A large part of the time consumed by his work 
was due to these mistakes. Caesar’s objectives were always well chosen; he 
invariably struck at the key-point. His manoeuvres and blockades were on a 
big scale. In adversity he was elastic; he never lost morale. His tactics 
was simple; such battle-tactics as that of Epaminondas, Alexander, Hanni¬ 
bal, we never see. His strategy was broad. Caesar’s opponents were not as a 
rule strong ; but he made good use of their mistakes. Pompey was able; he 
was never great, and Caesar’s morale overrode him. Caesar’s influence over his 
men was marked. In peace he allowed laxity; in war he demanded strict dis¬ 
cipline. With few exceptions his legions reflected his own splendid qualities. 

u CAESAR was born to do great things,” says Plutarch. 
First of all a statesman, arms were to Csesar a means of 
carrying out his political scheme, rather than statecraft an 


732 


CAESAR’S APPEARANCE. 


aid to his military policy. The portrait of this great mail 
has been painted by able hands and in many colors. It is 
only sought to add to this portrait some touches which per¬ 
tain to his military career. 

Csesar was tall and of slight but well-knit frame. Con¬ 
stant exercise and exposure had made him hardy; and his 
constitutional and nervous strength could not be overtaxed. 
Except that he had at times attacks of “the falling sickness,” 
no illness save quartan ague is recorded of him during a life 
of infinite toil. He was skillful as a fencer, and in many of 
his battles exhibited an ability to wield arms, coupled to a 
personal gallantry and magnetic power rarely shown by the 
captain. To his boldness in swimming he owed his life in 
Egypt. He was a fine horseman. As Alexander had his 
Bucephalus, so Csesar owned and rode in the Gallic War a 
much prized horse of his own raising who allowed no other 
man to mount him, and whose “divided hoof,” which, it is 
said, resembled a human foot, made him singular, if adding no 
value to his other qualities. That Csesar had great physical 
endurance is shown by the exceptional speed of his journeys. 
He often traveled day and night and worked on the road as 
if he had quietly sat in his tent. 

Refinement and strength rather than beauty of feature 
characterized Csesar’s face. His portrait busts show a strong 
intellectual development with an abundance of will-power; 
and in some of them there is a singularly sweet expression of 
the mouth; but this detracts naught from its force. In the 
last few years he showed in the deep-cut lines of his face the 
severe strain to which he had so long been subjected; and 
his carriage was not as erect nor his gait as elastic as that of 
many men of his age. In middle life, much to his regret, 
his hair grew thin; and as he never quite lost the instincts 
of the dandy, he combed his locks forward with noticeable 


HIS MANNER. 


733 


care, and to conceal his baldness was glad to wear upon his 
head the golden wreath of laurel voted him by the Senate. 
His eyes are variously spoken of as dark gray, or black and 
piercing. His face was pale when not bronzed by exposure; 
his dress had a touch of elegance all through life. He was a 
constant bather and never lost his liking for the niceties of 
the toilet. 

Caesar may not have possessed the grace of demeanor of 
Alexander; but he had the force of Hannibal, and a power 
of impressing himself on all who approached him in which 
neither the Macedonian nor the Carthaginian was his supe¬ 
rior. His simple directness, his aptness at saying the right 
word in season, his persuasiveness, his broad culture and 
immense resources of thought and language charmed every 
one who was cast with him, whether the barbaric king of 
Gaul or the queen of Roman society. As an orator he was 
confessedly second to no one but Cicero; his voice was high- 
pitched and his manner animated. In personal converse he 
was, perhaps, the first man of his day. His high-bred cour¬ 
tesy and an easy manner never forsook him. He was gifted 
with a remarkable memory and power of concentration; he 
often dictated to two or more secretaries at the same time; 


and we can conceive how such a memory, stored with all 
that Greek culture and extensive travel could bestow, and 
drawn on by eloquent lips, must have lent an attractiveness 
none could approach. He was versatile; without an effort he 
attained the highest excellence in all he undertook. 

Caesar has been blamed for his relations to women, 
habits were those of the day. Hannibal may be pr r Soy 

his fidelity to Imilcea; Alexander for his scrupr ^Jjspcct 
of Statira, the consort of fugitive Darius/ ^&p/ < -' sesar 1S 
scarcely blameworthy for being a man oi the world when 
what we call morality was not conside^d a virtue, and to be 


734 


HIS LIAISONS . 


continent or scrupulous was to be out of fashion. It is no 
doubt true that Caesar’s liaisons extended far and wide. He 
is charged with intrigues with the wives of many of his 
friends; but, whatever the truth, it seems clear that his 
friends and he did not quarrel. He was assuredly not gross 
in his amours; and his bravery in refusing to divorce his wife 
at Sulla’s nod, when other and then greater men did so, and 
in taking the consequences, scores a high mark in his favor. 
It is impossible to say how much of what has been charged 
against Caesar is due to the idle gossip of the Roman salons. 

Caesar’s domestic habits were not pretentious. When he 
was virtually king of Rome, when he had been called “the 
Divine ” by an obsequious Senate, he is said to have lived 
simply, though Plutarch speaks of the general splendor of his 
manner of life, and he was extravagant in the purchase of 
statues, pictures, gems, and other objects of art. He kept 
a generous table, of the best to be had, but without ostenta¬ 
tion. As custos morum he enforced the sumptuary laws with 
some severity. One of his tables was laid for his political 
friends, one for his military. He himself was moderate in 
food and drink, but enjoyed the mental friction of enlivening 
table-talk. That he had indulged in a youth of pleasure 
cannot be gainsaid; but that it left no trace on his body or 
mind is equally true. No vices had sapped his powers; Ins 
physical and mental structure rendered him proof against 


their effects. 

Caesar owed much to his mother, Aurelia; and he repaid 
\ v the same devotion which Frederick showed to “the 
\ * s other.” Aurelia lived under her son’s roof until her 

c*- v Sar ex ki^ e d. equal affection for his sister. 

*^ ie authorities vary greatly in their estimates of 

this man. is hharged by some with all the vices; he is 
credited by others wit^ a ]l the virtues; still others ascribe all 


WHAT SUETONIUS SAYS. 735 

vices and virtues to him. It has been the habit until of 
late years to look upon Caesar as “the monster,” which the 
many-headed in Rome once dubbed him. The pendulum has 
now swung back, and we are threatened with forgetfulness of 
what many Roman authors tell us. Among others, Suetonius 
informs us that Caesar exhibited great animosity as a judge; 
that he resorted to bribery; that he was hasty and violent; 
that he was suspected of ridding himself of an enemy by 
poison; that he lent money without interest in order to cater 
friendship; that he plundered Lusitania at the point of the 
sword and robbed temples in Gaul; that he was rapacious 
in character and extravagant in language; and that he 
incurred the suspicion of heading a conspiracy to murder 
his opponents in the Senate and resort to a coup d'etat . 
Other authors give us many similar items. There is no 
certain means of weighing these allegations. We must note 
them all and give them a proper place in our estimate of 
what Caesar was. But after so doing, the sum of all that is 
told us makes up a well-poised character, quite apart from 
Caesar’s gigantic intellect or moral force. 

From youth up Caesar avoided quarrels ; he had other 
means of settling disputes, and could either assert his view 
with reasonable insistence or persuade his opponent by his 
superior skill. When angry he was easily appeased. When 
worsted he bore no malice. 

Caesar’s friendships were sincere and durable, honest and 
above board. He was generous and kind. To sick Oppius 
he gave up his couch and slept bn the ground. With few 
exceptions his friends remained his friends. He had no 
room for suspicion in his broad affection. He would not 
believe that Labienus meant to desert him. When he did so, 
Caesar offered any friends of Pompey who might be in his 
service free conduct to join his opponent if they so chose. 


736 


I1IS REALISM. 


He clung to his friends, not from calculation hut affection; 
though he made use of them as he himself was useful to them. 
When he had pardoned an enemy, there was no further relic 
of ill-will. He took as much pride in restoring the statues 
of Sulla and Pompey as he had exhibited courage in repla¬ 
cing on the capitol-hill the trophies of Marius. 

Had he been nothing but a soldier, Caesar would still be 
the equal of the other great captains. Taking him as the 
statesman who built on the ruins of the Republic the founda¬ 
tions of the Empire, as the patron of learning who founded 
libraries in all the great towns, and filled Rome with men of 
science, culture and letters, as the legislator who drafted laws 
which still control the jurisdiction of the world, as the pro¬ 
found scholar who dictated the correction of the calendar, as 
the thinker, for the grasp of whose mind nothing was too 
intricate, nothing too broad, Caesar was, indeed, “the fore¬ 
most man in all this world.” 

Of the men of that generation, no one clung to fact as did 
Caesar. As Carlyle says of Napoleon, “the man had a cer¬ 
tain instinctive, ineradicable feeling for reality.” He was 
no idealist, yet he had an abundant fund of imagination, as 
every creative mind must have. He coolly dissected things, 
and could look at them as they actually were. From a given 
array of facts Caesar rarely failed to draw the correct conclu¬ 
sion. Traditions were of value to him for their influence on 
weaker minds. As pontifex maximus , he was neither bigoted 
nor over-liberal. The cult of the Roman gods had on his 
mind the proper influence, no more. It was of distinct value 
to the state; of no particular value to the indivdiual. 

In gifts of intellect and character Caesar was exceptional; 
his judgment was rarely at fault. He was of a reasonable 
turn of mind, and the harmony and consistency of his life 
were marked. In politics he was persuasive rather than dog- 


HIS HOLOCAUSTS. 


737 


matic, but lie bad a way of carrying his point. His intui¬ 
tions as well as his power of gauging men and of guessing 
their actions were keen. 

While allowing all this, it must not he assumed that Caesar 
was perfect in character. It is possible to make a glaring 
array of faults with which he may be charged. He was 
utterly unscrupulous as to the means he employed when he 
made up his mind to do a given thing, — a fact not palliated 
because it may be said to have been the fault of his age. 
He would allow nothing to stand in the way of the accom¬ 
plishment of his purpose. When he deemed the thing he 
aimed at worthy to be done, every means was proper. He 
borrowed immense sums of money without other means of 
payment than what he anticipated might be ground out of 
the government of a province. Personally of a generous, 
kindly habit, he is chargeable with holocausts before which 
the devastations of Alexander shrink to naught. It is said 
of him that he never murdered a Clitus or savagely mutilated 
a Batis, or burned a Persepolis; but he executed Acco with 
extreme if legal cruelty; he put to death the whole Venetan 
Senate for their patriotic resistance; he again and again vis¬ 
ited awful vengeance on the Eburones for the sins of Ambio- 
rix; he cut the hands off all the prisoners taken at Uxello- 
dunum, and in treacherous cold blood he massacred four 
hundred and thirty thousand defenseless men, women and 
children in the course of a short afternoon. The sum of his 
massacres in Gaul overruns a million souls, paying no heed 
to those who perished by a worse fate than the edge of the 
sword. Yet, though we view all these things in their proper 
light, we cannot withhold from Caesar’s personal character 
the meed of our respect and admiration. 

Up to middle life, Caesar was purely a statesman. He 
then had the fact brought home to him that he could no 




738 


HIS HONORS. 


longer win the success he sought unless he had at his command 
the military resources which his enemies boasted. Those 
who place Caesar on the plane of pure patriotism, who claim 

that the regeneration of Rome and Greece was his leading 

✓ 

object, must still allow that he sought it mainly by his own 
elevation. What he sought lie won. He was a born ruler, 
and he became a republican king. The honors and titles 
which were heaped upon him were lavish to absurdity. The 
heretofore military title of Imperator became a prefix to his 
name and was made hereditary in his family. He was styled 
Pater Patriae. He was saluted as Divus Julius. He was 
made consul for ten years. His statue was erected in every 
town and medals were struck in his honor. Chairs of gold 
and gilded chariots were presented to him. Triumphal 
arches arose in his honor, and a temple of Concord or Clem¬ 
ency. He was invested with tribunician honors which made 
it sacrilege to injure his sacred person or character. 

It is hard to say what part of all this proceeded from the 
gratitude of the Senate, what part was fulsome and empty 
adulation, what part the work of enemies who sought to sap 
the autocrat’s popularity with the people. It is hard to say 
how much Caesar enjoyed this worship, and how much he 
despised it. He declined some of the honors; he accepted 
others. He added his own to the seven statues of the kin^s 
of Rome; he appeared in public in the garb of the old kings 
of Alba. About all he did there was a certain ceremonial, 
despite his natural personal simplicity. Caesar was sole ruler 
and the Senate became a mere council. He assumed their 
political functions. A new patrician nobility was created. 
Augustus was no more Emperor than Caesar. 

It is probable that Caesar at heart cared little for much of 
all this tinsel; it is certain that he felt out of place and far 
from secure in the city. And yet he was covetous of honor; 


HIS PROJECTS . 


739 


he enjoyed the applause of the multitude. That he had a 
certain habit of simplicity is undeniable. He went about 
alone and unarmed, though well aware how numerous were 
his enemies. He refused the crown which was offered him, 
— perchance because he saw therein a snare. Had he lived 
he would no doubt have openly become what Augustus was, 
but he bided his time and the time never came. 

He had good cause to be satisfied with what he had accom¬ 
plished. Vast as his work had been, it had borne good 
fruit. Despite its fearful depopulation, Gaul was again 
flourishing and commerce and agriculture were on the in¬ 
crease. His changes in the laws were solid, — “the political 
life of nations has during two thousand years again and again 
reverted to the lines which Caesar drew.” As custos morum 
and in his other judicial characters, he punished severely but 
judiciously, and despite Suetonius we must believe impar¬ 
tially. It is certain that Rome was the better for his admin¬ 
istration, at least for the foundations which he laid. 

On Caesar’s final return to Rome, his physical strength, 
which had been upheld by nervous tension, sensibly declined; 
but his energy remained intact. He made vast projects for 
the future. He purposed to drain the Pontine marshes, to 
make a new channel for the Tiber, to improve the roads, to 
cut through the Isthmus of Corinth. He projected a cam¬ 
paign against the Parthians and was intending soon to start 
in order to secure this frontier of the state, as he had all the 
others — when the end came. 

At the risk of repeating what has already been said in run¬ 
ning comment, it is well to sum up the soldier. Caesar had 
the inborn qualities of the great captain. "When he received 
Gaul as his province he had had no training in the duties of 
a general officer except that gained in the Lusitanian cam¬ 
paign. There was no training for the larger operations of 


740 


HIS MILITARY ABILITY . 


war known to the ancients. The management of a campaign 
depended solely on the ability of the leader. The grasp of a 
military problem came purely from his personal equipment. 
To-day, instruction is given to students of war in its broader 
phases, and precept is enforced by the example of great com¬ 
manders. We hear of no such teaching among the ancients. 
Instruction there was, and perfect of its kind; but it went 
not beyond the tactical and logistic requirements of an army. 
Strategy was still unknown as a teachable science. It must 
not be assumed that to be an adept in the book-lore of strat¬ 
egy will make a great captain. Character counts for more 
than half. The personal equation is the one that tells. But 
character coupled to a well-trained intellect are essential to 
produce the greatest results. To-day only the highly-trained 
officer is efficient; it was less so in ancient days, but intellect 
then won as it does now and always will. 

Caesar was his own pedagogue in war. He taught himself 
his trade in Gaul. He accomplished this self-training 
dint of many errors. In the Civil War, Caesar committed 
fewer, and these were generally from overanxiety to get at 
his work. His operations, all things considered, were well- 
nigh faultless. 

We have already considered the strategic plan of the Gallic 
War and incidentally that of the Civil War. Let us reca¬ 
pitulate the latter. In this war Caesar wisely chose Italy, 
the centre point of the empire for which he was contending, 
as his first objective. This accords with his uniform habit 
of selecting for attack the most important point. He never 
adopted indirect means. His blows were always aimed at 
the key-point. In sixty days from crossing the Rubicon he 
had, by his directness and the moral ascendant which fol¬ 
lowed his vigorous initiative, acquired possession of the 
peninsula. 


HIS STRATEGY. 


741 


Once seated in Italy, Caesar found the enemy on three 
sides of him, — in Spain, Greece, Africa. He had gained a 
central position from which to operate. If he could hold 
himself in Rome, he could attack each of his enemy’s divi¬ 
sions in turn. To hold Rome and carry on an offensive, 
demanded two things, legions and speed. In the former, 
counting out essential detachments, he was weaker than his 
adversary; in the latter he proved himself far superior. 

We have assumed that Caesar’s better plan was at once to 
move on Greece, where Pompey stood with his main force. 
This was of a part with Caesar’s common habit of aiming 
directly at his enemy’s army. We are forced to guess at 
Caesar’s reasons for doing otherwise, —the Commentaries are 
not specific. They tell us that Pompey had command of the 
sea and that Caesar feared that it would consume much time 
to gather a fleet; that meanwhile not only would he be forced 
to inactivity, but that Pompey’s veteran legions might “con¬ 
firm Spain in his interest,” gather large levies, and, more 
dangerous still, invade Gaul from Spain, and arouse an 
enemy in his rear. Caesar knew Pompey and gauged his 
temperament correctly. He could more safely rely on Pom¬ 
pey’s keeping quiet in Epirus than on Pompey’s lieutenants 
doing the same in Iberia. This reasoning does not convince 
us; but action under it was crowned with success; it may, 
therefore, be deemed to have been sufficient. 

The Spanish campaign and the siege of Massilia, however 
rapid, took long enough to bring Caesar back to Italy at an 
inopportune season. But Caesar could never wait. Driven 
by exhaustless energy, he crossed the Adriatic to Epirus with 
half his army, because he had not transports for the whole. 
That he would have been wiser to march through Illyricum 
seems clear. It was his own province. From the Padus 
through Illyricum to Epirus was almost as short a march as 


742 


HIS ERRORS. 


to Brundisium, and the bulk of his army had rendezvoused 
on that river. Reaching Epirus with limited forces, Caesar 
with energy and unequaled good fortune held his ground 
until, after the lapse of five months, he was joined by Mark 
Antony. How Caesar would have fared with an abler oppo¬ 
nent in his front is a matter of conjecture. He owed his 
safety to Pompey’s laxness. Why Antony was not ordered 
to march by Illyricum when his presence was so essential in 
Epirus is explainable only in that Caesar and he both hoped 
from day to day that chance would afford him the opportunity 
to cross the Adriatic. 

The operation at Dyrrachium resulted in a marked defeat 
for Caesar, directly due to his undertaking an operation which 
could succeed only by virtue of a miracle or an accident. He 
was able to rescue himself from disaster because he was Caesar 
and had Pompey opposed to him. Having saved his army 
from this danger, he skillfully manoeuvred to join Domitius, 
which done, with an audacity worthy of a Frederick, he 
attacked and beat Pompey at Pharsalus. All this is so 
splendid, the errors are so completely swallowed up in the 
well-deserved success, that criticism is put to the blush. 

Upon this decisive victory followed Caesar’s overliasty and 
uncalculating pursuit of Pompey with a bare corporal’s 
guard to Alexandria; his political mistake in mixing himself 
up in petty Egyptian affairs when the world was still at 
stake; his being blockaded in Alexandria by a horde of 
barbarians, whom three of his old Gallic legions might have 
overwhelmed; his holding himself by pure stubbornness until 
released by Mithridates; his two months’ dalliance with 
Cleopatra while his enemies were daily gaining strength. 
Add to these delays the essential campaign in Pontus, and 
there was again a year consumed, during which the Pom¬ 
peian party had acquired control of Africa. However 


HIS OVERHASTINESS. 


743 


much we may admire the skill exhibited in the details of 
the Alexandrian campaign, as well as the courage to see it 
through to a successful issue, it is clear that Caesar for the 
moment lost sight of the broad plan of his mighty game 
which had the world for a theatre of operations. This error 
was the origin of the bitter struggle which it cost to reduce 
the Pompeians to terms in the succeeding years. 

Again, when Caesar was compelled to take up arms to bring 
Africa into subjection, his hyper-activity drove him to ship 
over to that continent at one of the worst seasons of the year, 
— and this without giving a rendezvous to his fleet; by which 
neglect the same untoward situation was brought about on 
the African coast which had happened a year before on the 
Epirotic. The man who held in his grasp the resources of 
the Roman state was reduced for months to a petty defen¬ 
sive scarcely befitting a legate, until he could gather forces 
sufficient to go over to the offensive; and during all this 
time he was in a danger which an able opponent might have 
rendered fatal. It was Caesar’s luck which placed Scipio in 
command instead of Cato. To this situation and the diffi¬ 
culty of procuring corn must be traced the narrowness of his 
movements. At the same time his danger showed up his 
fertility in resources in a wonderful measure. Having again 
recruited up his forces to a proper standard, we are led to 
look for an immediate and vigorous offensive. But we are 
disappointed. Though opposed by a less good army, and by 
trivial generals, Caesar hazarded nothing. For the moment 
all his audacity disappeared. He played the game which 
Hannibal was forced to play when he was facing thrice his 
numbers of superior troops under consummate leaders; and 
he appears to small advantage when contrasted with the Car¬ 
thaginian. But when the opportunity for which he had long 
manoeuvred had come, and Scipio had been brought to battle 


744 


A WAR OF CONQUEST. 


on advantageous terms, Caesar, or rather Caesar's army, made 
short work of him in the brilliant victory at Thapsus. 

Then came the Spanish campaign, to crush out the relics 
of the Pompeian party. The clever manoeuvres on the 
Baetis, followed by the hard-won battle of Munda and the 
ensuing sieges, again took more than half a year. We know 
less about these movements than we could wish. What we 
do know shows Caesar up in brilliant colors. 

It is clear that the Civil War might have been carried 
through in half the time it actually consumed had Caesar been 
more judicious. But he started with only a moiety of his 
army for Epirus at a bad season; he committed precisely the 
same error in opening the African war; the Alexandrian and 
Pontus campaigns came in between the other and more im¬ 
portant ones and prevented the prosecution of the latter in 
due season. These events had depended upon Caesar’s own 
volition. Had he marched to Epirus overland before the 
fall of 49, had he in the spring of 48 gone with a respectable 
force to Africa, this year would probably have seen the end 
of the Pompeian coalition. That despite these mistakes he 
was victorious in each campaign in so comparatively short a 
time he owes to his extraordinary ability, his simply astonish¬ 
ing good fortune, and the weakness of his opponents. It is, 
perhaps, hypercritical to suggest errors in a record which 
history can scarcely equal. And yet the errors are glaring; 
they are such as Hannibal was never guilty of; such as can¬ 
not be traced to Alexander. 

Speaking broadly, the Civil War was a war of conquest as 
much as the Gallic. Caesar was content with no less than 
sole control of Rome. In accomplishing this end his polit¬ 
ical and military management were, as always, admirable. 
He was constantly on the offensive. Except as the result of 
an overeager movement, he was never put on the defense. 


HIS METHOD. 


745 


His constant endeavor, as in the Gallic War, was to surprise 
his opponents before they were ready. It may be claimed 
as a valid reason why he did not march overland against 
Pompey, that the latter, being master of the sea, would have 
ascertained his movements and prepared for them. It may 
be claimed that it was to take the enemy unawares that Caesar 
moved on Pompey in Epirus in the winter season. It may 
be claimed that to surprise the aristocrats was the object of 
the winter movement on Africa. For as a rule Caesar was 
careful to put his troops into winter-quarters. But to allow 
these claims does not palliate the lack of preparation. 

Caesar’s scouting system was always good. In the Civil 
War he could more readily gather information of his enemy’s 
plans than in Gaul. He was in countries where he had many 
adherents, sometimes the bulk of the population, in his favor. 
Deserters were more frequent from the enemy. Pompey had 
similar advantages in a lesser degree. The tide of desertion 
was apt to set in Caesar’s favor. Caesar used his light cavalry 
for scouting purposes to better advantage and was generally 
more active in collecting information than his opponents. 

Though Caesar was always numerically the weaker, his 
troops were of a higher grade in discipline and movctla,. He 
had not many auxiliary troops. He felt that his legionaries 
were stronger without them. He kept enough foi an efficient 
skirmishing line, but did not care for the lioidcs of them 
which were usual at his day. 

In the Civil War Caesar kept his troops well concentrated. 
He rarely made detachments from his army except those 
necessary for foraging. In the first Spanish campaign he 
left three legions in Massilia and took six to Spain; four 
remained in Sicily, one in Sardinia, and the rest in Italy. 
With less than these he could not hold the territory he had 
already conquered. WTile Caesar concentrated his own, his 


HIS OBJECTIVES. 


746 

constant endeavor was to make his opponents divide their 
forces or to keep them from concentrating, so as to beat them 

in detail. 

His objectives were well chosen. They were generally the 
forces of his enemy. In 49 it was Brundisium, where Pom- 
pey was in force, seeking to leave Italy. Being the chief 
seaport, it had the advantage of protecting Rome if he drove 
Pompey across to Epirus. Later objectives were the passes 
of the Pyrenees, to open his route to Spain; Ilerda, where 
Afranius and Petreius lay in force; Dyrrachium, to rob Pom¬ 
pey of his base of supplies; Pharsalus, or in other words, the 
army of the enemy; Alexandria, to which place he thought 
Pompey had fled; the upper Delta, where Ptolemy was in 
force; Zela in Asia Minor, where he could strike Pharnaces 
without delay; Ruspina, as a secondary base near the enemy; 
Ucita and Thapsus, the enemy’s depots; Ulia, Corduba and 
Attegua, important cities held by the enemy in force; and 
Munda, where he could force a decisive battle upon Cnaeus; 
each and every objective he chose was a thrust at the heart 
of his adversary. Caesar never looked askance at his work. 
His look, thought and act went to the very centre. Veni, 
vidi , vici might well have been his motto, instead of being 
applied to one campaign. 

Caesar was frequently in distress for rations. In victual¬ 
ing he was less apt than Alexander, less careful than Han¬ 
nibal. Overanxiety to get into the field lay at the root of 
the evil; but, though often with difficulty and risk, Caesar 
always managed to keep his men in food. In offensive cam¬ 
paigns the enemy is apt to control the supplies. Caesar was 
fairly careful in victualing, but his movements were not 
wont to be controlled by the question of rations unless famine 
stood at the door. He was ready to take his chances of sub¬ 
sisting on the country or of capturing his enemy’s supplies. 


STRONG IN ADVERSITY. 747 

Not infrequently he made a mistake. On the whole he was 
a good provider. 

As in Gaul so in the Civil War, Caesar preferred combat 
in the open field; but he was at times compelled to sit down 
before fortified places and to waste time in besieging them. 
According to the custom of the time, he drew up near the 
enemy in the open in nearly all his battles. He had none of 
the sublime audacity of Frederick or Alexander; he was cau¬ 
tious not to be lured into an attack on intrencliments or diffi¬ 
cult positions; but he was not slow to accept equal battle. 

Caesar’s manoeuvring and blockades were on a large scale. 
The object of his manoeuvring was for battle, to compromise 
the enemy or to reach his magazines. In the Civil War this 
was more frequent than in Gaul; Caesar had gained self-con¬ 
fidence. The earliest example of able manoeuvring was at 
Ilerda. A good example was the operation at Zeta. 

In adversity Caesar was strong and elastic. He never 
weakened in morale; he was never disastrously defeated. 
After Dyrrachium he marched away rather like a victor than 
a badly beaten man. He showed no sign of loss of self-con¬ 
fidence; he cheered his legions by explaining away their de¬ 
feat ; he raised their courage by sundry small operations like 
the one at Gomphi, until they again felt that they could cope 
with the Pompeians even if outnumbered two to one. This 
ability to cope with adversity is more than any other a mark 
of Caesar’s genius. No one ever exhibited it as Hannibal 
did; but it was a distinct characteristic of Caesar. 

The tactics of Caesar in the Civil War was substantially 
the same as in Gaul, somewhat altered to conform to the fact 
that he had Roman soldiers in his front. His attacks were 
less summary than on the Gallic barbarians. At Ilerda the 
cohorts fought five hours with the spear before they took to 
the sword. 


748 


HIS TACTICS. 


In battle, flank movements were common. The general 
effort of each commander was to rupture the enemy’s line or 
break down one of its flanks. The tactics of Caesar was 
simple. There are few examples in his battles of splendid 
tactical formations like Epaminondas’ oblique order at Leuc- 
tra or Mantinaea, Alexander’s wedge at Arbela, or Hanni¬ 
bal’s withdrawing salient at Cannae. Caesar’s one instance 
of battlefield manoeuvring was at Ruspina. This was good, 
but not on an extensive scale. Why he did not profit by the 
tactical lessons of other captains is not clear. He did not 
appear to think the grand-tactics of battle available for his 
purposes. Nearly all his engagements were in simple parallel 
order, coupled with prudent forethought against unusual 
danger, as in the creation of a fourth line at Pharsalus. 
What one admires in other captains as original grand-tactical 
combinations are absent in the case of Caesar. The more 
usual combinations we do find. The orbis — or square — we 
saw used at Zeta with excellent effect. At Ilerda we saw 
Caesar march in order of battle a much longer distance than 
usual, showing exceptional steadiness in his formation and 
discipline. In marching by the flank in two or three lines, 
peculiar heed was given to the flank which was toward the 
enemy; it was so formed that it could readily come to a front 
against a sudden attack. 

Caesar’s ordinary formation was in three lines; but the 
accomplishment of the fourth line at Pharsalus is peculiarly 
noteworthy. Scarce another instance exists in which so great 
an effect has been produced by so small a body of men used 
at the right time in the right way. The Fifth legion at 
Ucita was a sort of fourth line; the same legion at Thapsus 
acted in a similar capacity against elephants; and we notice 
at Ucita that Caesar had two lines in his left and three in 
his right wing, or with the Fifth legion really four. It was a 


HIS CAVALRY. 749 

species of a strengthened left wing, though not for the usual 
purpose of such a reinforced wing. 

In formation for battle Caesar’s line of ten to twelve legions 
was generally divided into a centre and two wings, each of 
these under a legate. He had not enough legates to place 
one in command of each legion. One or other wing opened 
the battle. This duty was most frequently performed by the 
Tenth legion, whose post was wont to be on the right. Caesar 
was always with the opening wing and gave the signal. From 
this there sometimes arose a sort of oblique order, because the 
wing which opened the battle pressed forward faster than the 
rest of the lines, much in the same way as in Alexander’s 
battles; but this was not an oblique order in the same sense 
as the formations at Mantinaea or Leu then. 

The Romans were never able in the use of mounted men. 
Pompey’s cavalry at Pharsalus was massed in one heavy body 
on one wing and should have gained the victory; but it was 
badly organized and commanded. Caesar’s small corps was 
employed to better advantage. Caesar’s Gallic and German 
horse — of which at times he had large bodies — was, in its 
way, efficient. Occasionally as many as four thousand men 
rode in one column. There had been an improvement in the 
Roman cavalry since the Punic Wars, principally due to the 
employment for that arm of the natives of countries which 
made a specialty of cavalry. But on the whole, Caesar’s 
cavalry was defective. It did not act the legitimate part of 
cavalry. It was often mixed with foot. Nothing in Caesar’s 
battles even faintly approaches the magnificent use of cavalry 
by Alexander or Hannibal. 

A general must be gauged by his opponents. Pompey had 
long ranked as a great soldier; but he had ceased from war; 
he was resting on his laurels. He had never been noted for 
initiative, and the political intrigues of many years had un- 


750 


HIS GROWTH. 


fitted him for the field. Caesar had just emerged from an 
eight years’ war in perfect training. His political scheming 
had gone hand in hand with war and had not weakened his 
soldier’s habit. Add to each man’s equipment his own 
peculiar qualities and Caesar could scarcely help winning in 
the contest, if he had means at all equal to those of his ad¬ 
versary. There needs no proof of Caesar’s ability to cope 
with the difficulties which lay before him; and that Pompey 
looked quietly on at Caesar’s conquest of Spain is proof 
enough of the latter’s hebetude. Caesar had had the best 
training, actual war under, in this instance, the best master, 
— himself. His experience was bred of the errors he had 
made and intelligently profited by. Not that he now ceased 
to commit errors. Dyrrachium was a blunder of the first 
water. Caesar needed a back-set to teach him caution. He 
got it at Dyrrachium; he at once adopted a more rational 
scheme, and won. 

From the beginning Caesar grew in every department of 
the art of war. His ability in strategy, tactics, fortification, 
sieges, logistics, was more marked at the end of his career 
than at any other period. It is a question as to whether his 
aggressiveness did not decrease towards the end of his cam¬ 
paigns. It would have been strange had it not done so. To 
Caesar’s personality his soldiers owed all they knew and all 
they were. They sometimes lacked the spirit of discipline, 
but they were remarkable for toughness, force, adaptiveness, 
patience in every matter of difficulty and self-denial, endur¬ 
ance and courage in battle, attachment to and confidence in 
their general. Caesar’s legionaries were an equal honor to 
Caesar and to Rome. They were a standing reproach to 
Roman rottenness. Pompey’s men could not compare with 
them in any sense, and this was because Pompey had created 
his soldiers and Caesar had created his. 


HIS OPPONENTS. 751 

Pompey had never shown the highest order of ability, but 
it will not do to underrate him. He had at small outlay won 
his salute as Imperator; he had yet more easily come by his 
title of Magnus. Still some of Pompey’s work was excellent, 
when he actually set to work and good luck ran in his favor. 
In what has been said it has not been intended to convey the 
idea that Pompey was not still a good, perhaps a great sol¬ 
dier, though he fell short of being a marvelous one. It is 
in comparison only to Caesar that he pales. Had a lesser 
man opposed him, Pompey might have shown in higher 
degree the qualities he may fairly be credited with possessing. 
But Caesar overshadowed him to a degree which made him 
not only seem but be less than himself. He dwindled be¬ 
cause he met a moral force which bore him under. Caesar, 
on the contrary, was and always will be simply Caesar, — 
symbol of all that is greatest as a captain and a ruler. 

Scipio lacked both energy and ability in any marked de¬ 
gree. He was merely a military hack. Solely as Pompey’s 
father-in-law it was that he came by his command. 

Cato, who was really the superior of all the Pompeians, 
refused the supreme command in favor of Scipio, made no 
use of his unquestioned powers, and avoided disaster by com¬ 
mitting suicide. 

Labienus showed much energy, but his skill was weakened 
by hatred of Caesar. He was a fair sample of the excellent 
lieutenant, but poor captain. He had been a worthy and 
able soldier under Caesar; against Caesar he sank to a less 
than second-rate position. In every encounter with his 
ancient chief he lost his head. 

Both of the young Pompeys showed at first some promise. 
But when taxed, Sextus dropped back to a low grade of skill. 
Cnaeus exhibited more but not marked ability. Neither was 
a dangerous opponent. 


“SCENTED DANDIES” 


752 

The rest of the generals opposed to Caesar were distinctly 
of a low order. 

Caesar’s abilities stand out in singular contrast to all of 
these. Tried by the ability of his opponents, which is a 
tempting theme, but neither a fair test nor a fruitful subject, 
Caesar ranks lower than Alexander, vastly lower than Han¬ 
nibal. But as one of the marks of the great captain is to 
utilize the errors of opponents who lack high qualities, a 
thing which he always did, the soldier Caesar cannot be 
placed on a level other than theirs. His wonderful power of 
mind and will produced a marked influence on everything he 
touched. Every one relied on him, all looked to him as the 
centre of motion. As has been before said, the test of great¬ 
ness in a campaign may be applied by seeking the general 
who is the mainspring of the movement, the motive power 
which keeps the rest at work. This in all his campaigns 
was Caesar. It was not what his enemies did, but what 
Caesar did, which furnished the keynote of all that happened. 

Caesar was generous in rewards, praise and largesses to his 
soldiers. He was ever ready to distinguish the brave and 
thus incite others to imitate them. He had the rare capacity 
of winning his men's devotion to himself, both as a soldier 
and as a man; and this without losing his power or de¬ 
scending from the dignity of his position. He dressed 
and equipped his legions well, distinguished many by giving 
them weapons ornamented with gold and silver, took pride 
in seeing his men well-mounted and handsomely attired. 
Though his soldiers were dubbed “scented dandies,” they 
yet knew how to fight. In this they were like their leader. 
Beware of underrating dandies. Some of the stoutest hearts 
and clearest heads have lurked under a foppish dress. 

Csesar never lacked a pleasant word for his men, remem¬ 
bered the face of any one who had done a gallant deed, and 


HIS DISCIPLINE. 


753 


when not in the presence of the «nemy encouraged amuse¬ 
ments, in which he not infrequently personally joined. 
After the disaster to Sabinus and Cotta, Caesar allowed his 
beard and hair to grow and vowed he would not cut them 
till his soldiers had revenged their comrades’ death. This 
to us trivial act had its meaning to Caesar’s legionaries. 
Such things wrought up the feeling of his soldiers to a 
worship almost fanatical. 

However lax when danger was not near, in the vicinity of 
the enemy Caesar demanded discipline of the strictest. He 
required the most unheard-of exertions and sacrifices; he 
allowed no rest, day nor night; season or weather had no 
recognition. Every man must be ready at all times for duty. 
A willingness to do and suffer all this Caesar comprehended 
in the name soldier. It was his use of “citizens ” instead of 
“comrades” that broke up the mutiny of the Tenth legion. 
He was generous in overlooking smaller faults, but severe 
beyond measure in punishing larger ones. He was the more 
requiring of a man the higher he stood in office. His 
severest punishment was dismissal, as in the case of the 
tribunes and centurions of the Tenth legion when it came to 
Africa. In the Roman state this was political and social 
excommunication. Caesar’s officers were capable of more 
under his command than under any other conditions. Wit¬ 
ness Labienus in Gaul and Labienus afterwards. This was 
owing not only to his gigantic personality but to the fact 
that he was ready and able at all times to do thrice the 
work that any one else could do. No one in the army 
labored so hard as Caesar. All this makes it stranger that 
Caesar’s men more than once escaped from his control in a 
manner which showed a limit to their discipline. Of this 
Thapsus was the most noted example. The same may be 
said of their occasional demoralization, as at Dyrrachium. 


754 


THE PERSONAL FACTOR. 


Caesar’s career as a soldier shows to a marked degree how 
great in war is the factor of personal character. Caesar’s 
art was not a thing he had learned from or could impart to 
others. It was the product of his vast intellect and bore the 
seal of his splendid moral force. 



Ciesar as Pontifex Maximus. 
(Vatican Museum.) 










ALEXANDER, HANNIBAL, CjESAR. 


Alexander had the most beauty ; we think of him as the Homeric youth ; 
of Hannibal and Caesar as in sober maturity of years. In all his qualities, Caesar 
is the most splendid man of antiquity; as a soldier he equals the others. 
Alexander’s ambition and Caesar’s was coupled to self; Hannibal’s pure. 
Caesar the man was kindly ; Caesar the soldier ruthless. In capacity for work 
all were equal. Alexander’s will was fiery; Hannibal’s discreet; Caesar’s cal¬ 
culating. In battle Alexander was possessed of divine fury; Hannibal was 
cool but hold; Caesar had not their initiative. In influence over men Hannibal 
was supreme. Caesar was an orator; Alexander and Hannibal spoke simply 
and to the point. As statesmen, Alexander built on a mistaken foundation; 
Hannibal’s work was doomed to fail; Caesar’s is everlasting. For perform¬ 
ance with slender means and against great odds Hannibal stands the highest. 
Alexander had luck, but used it; Hannibal had no luck ; Fortune smiled on 
Caesar as on no other man. The strategy of each was the same. In extent of 
conquest Alexander was the most distinguished ; in speed, Caesar; in endur¬ 
ance, Hannibal. Alexander was the cavalry-leader ; in tactics Caesar was below 
the others ; in sieges, Hannibal. As men Alexander and Hannibal stir us with 
the touch of nature, as Caesar does not. Caesar evokes our admiration; Alex¬ 
ander and Hannibal our sympathy. 

In beauty of person and stateliness of presence the king of 
Macedon was more distinguished than the Carthaginian gen¬ 
eral or the Roman imperator. Few of the heroes of history 
appeal to us in the physical sense so distinctly as Alexander; 
and, adding youth to splendid achievement and royal bear¬ 
ing, the conqueror of the Great King stands out the most 
lustrous of mortals. In bodily strength and endurance Han¬ 
nibal was his equal; Caesar, while gifted with unsurpassed 
nervous force, and physically able, does not wear the Ho¬ 
meric garb with the right of Alexander. Nor had he the youth 


756 


THE GREATEST MAN IN ANTIQUITY. 


of warlike glory of the son of Hamilcar. When our thoughts 
call up Caesar or Hannibal, we are apt to see in our mind’s 
eye the mature man, superb in his power of intellect and 
character; Alexander stands before us clad in a blaze of 
divine strength and youthful fervor. All Alexander’s por¬ 
trait-busts are those of the hero who subdued the world and 
died before he passed his youth; those of Caesar and the sole 
authentic one of Hannibal show us the man of middle age, 
all the more powerful, perhaps, but less the demi-god than 
the son of Philip. 

If we take him as statesman, jurist, author, thinker, sol¬ 
dier, Caesar has no peer in antiquity. If we take him merely 
as the soldier, he stands beside the others. There are things 
which can be neither weighed nor measured. In intellectual 
activity and moral force these captains varied as their tem¬ 
peraments varied. In uprightness of purpose and purity of 
life neither Alexander nor Caesar in any sense approached 
Hannibal, — the unselfish, model patriot, whose ambition was 
solely for his country, whose appetites were always curbed, 
whose life was one long and earnest effort, whom pleasures 
could not seduce, nor position warp, nor flattery turn. 

Alexander was rash in temper and succumbed all too often 
to his love of wine. His ambition was a dream of personal 
greatness coupled to the hope of Hellenizing the world; and 
around this he cast the atmosphere of his all-pervading intel¬ 
lect, his boundless ability to conjure up mighty projects, his 
fabulous power of compassing the impossible. Caesar was 
by nature cool and calculating. He neither resisted nor 
succumbed to temptation. To him there was no temptation; 
what he craved he took. It was his boundless egotism which 
made him Caesar. His ambition was Rome; but Rome was 
not Rome without Caesar as its guiding star. With many of 
the noblest personal qualities, which he manifested at every 


POWER OF WORK. 


757 


turn, Caesar had not a glint of patriotism in its finest sense. 
All that he did or aspired to do was coupled to self. He 
could not serve Rome, as Hannibal sought to serve Carthage, 
though he himself was swallowed up. Generous and kindly 
by nature, he yet has to his charge holocausts which stop 
one’s heartbeats. Caesar, the conqueror, knew not Caesar, 
the man. If he felt a qualm at the treacherous butchery of 
nearly half a million souls in a few hours, no one ever knew 
it. Alexander was warm-hearted but hasty; generous at one 
moment, violent at another. Hannibal had that gentle fibre 
whose human kindness to fallen foemen overcame his hatred 
of their race. Caesar was gracious in his dealings with per¬ 
sons, ruthless to insensibility in his treatment of peoples. 

Intellect and moral force alone do not suffice to make a 
great man. Work is at the root of all that man has done or 
will ever do. In his capacity for work Alexander drew on 
a body and mind which never knew fatigue. If in any 
respect Alexander came near to being the demigod he loved 
to be thought, it was in his superhuman ability to labor. No 
professional athlete was his superior in arms or games; no 
philosopher had a clearer grasp of any new or knotty prob¬ 
lem; no soldier was ever so truly instinct with the gaudium 
certciminis as he; no one ever performed so much in so short 
a life. Hannibal, in his youth, was much like Alexander; 
but maturity early sat on Hannibal’s brow; eternal youth 
ever shone from Alexander’s visage. Caesar we only know 
in youth as the dandy who was noted for bold political acts; 
in manhood as the sublime orator, and as the statesman who 
overrode all with whom he came in contact; in middle age as 
the magnificent soldier, but the soldier whose boldness was 
not Alexander’s nor his caution Hannibal’s; in old age as 
the legislator, the governor, the creator of what to-day we 
look upon as the foundation of our civilization. 


758 


WILL-POWER AND COURAGE. 


The will-power of Alexander was that of a man who 
brooked not restraint; whose fiery purpose respected neither 
bosom friend nor ancient servitor; who would destroy even 
himself in seeking to compass his chosen end. Hannibal’s 
will never outran an inborn discretion which subordinated 
even Hannibal. We do not know what Alexander might 
have become at the age of Hannibal’s greatest power; we do 
know what Hannibal was at the age of Alexander’s greatest 
performance. Alexander did his brilliant work in the twen¬ 
ties, Hannibal in the thirties and forties. Caesar was well 
on in middle life before he wore the purple paludamentum. 
When he won his most splendid battle on the field of Phar- 
salus, he had by two years passed fifty; his best work fol¬ 
lowed this. His will-power was of a different kind. What 
he set out to do, he did, with the courage of Alexander, the 
persistency of Hannibal; but he could yield here a little, 
insist there a little, cajole, command, weave his way into 
opposition or tear its fabric into shreds, without for a mo¬ 
ment losing sight of his once conceived, never forgotten 
purpose. 

The courage of each was unsurpassed. So soon as battle 
was engaged, Alexander was possessed of a divine fury 
scarcely sobered by his divine intelligence. In the death 
struggle of legion and phalanx Hannibal never for a moment 
lost his quiet power of seeing and doing the proper thing; 
never failed to take advantage of the least error of his oppo¬ 
nent, nor to force the fighting at the critical moment. In 
the execution of his projects he was obstinately bold; delib¬ 
erate when doubtful, rapid at the instant when a blow would 
tell. Caesar s courage as a soldier lay rather in the power 
to push a strategic advantage than in the longing to meet 
and annihilate the enemy. Alexander and Hannibal, like 
Frederick, never counted numbers; unless forced into action, 


INFLUENCE OVER MEN. 759 

Caesar sought to get the chances on his side before he 
fought. 

Alexander’s influence over others as a man, was marked; 
as a king, was supreme. He would have been the chief of 
any assembly had he not been king; but his royal character 
added to his manly force. Hannibal had no equal in his 
power over men. He who could hold together a motley array 
of diverse tribes, with clashing instincts and aspirations, 
weld them into an army and, though outnumbered many 
times by superior troops, could with it keep his clutch on the 
throat of Rome for half a generation, has no peer. By just 
what method he did it we do not know; but the bare fact 
suffices. Caesar won his influence much as Napoleon did. 
His gigantic grasp, his fluent tongue, his plausible method, 
his suggestive mind, his appearance of reasonably yielding 
to those whom he desired to control, carried every point. He 
was truly Caesar Imperator, embodiment of all which should 
be czar and emperor, — which, alas, so rarely is. 

Caesar was by nature and training an orator. His style was 
direct, convincing; his manner animated; he held his audi¬ 
ence. Alexander and Hannibal were both intellectual and 
cultured; neither had studied rhetoric as an art; but each 
had the power of saying the right thing at the right moment 
and in such fashion as to sway his hearers and to compass 
his ends. None of these great men dealt in mere words. 
What they said proceeded from the glowing thoughts within. 
Who thinks clearly speaks clearly. None of these men 
spoke without due effect. Whoso listened was convinced, 
persuaded, or silenced. Alexander spoke as the master; 
Hannibal as the diplomat, with peace or war in either hand; 
Caesar, however powerful, never lost his plausibility. No 
man ever conjured right to his side, ever made the worse 
appear the better reason, more surely than he. 



760 


AS STATESMEN. 


That Alexander’s statesmanlike projects left a permanent 
trace of Hellenism on every country he overran is praise 
enough. Hannibal was sagacious and far-sighted. Had he 
not been endowed with the craft of a Talleyrand as well as 
the purity of a Washington, he could never have come so 
close to upheaving the foundations of the Roman republic. 
But as a statesman Caesar’s work was the more enduring, as 
it had the better basis. He built on what was left of the 
solid Roman character; his corner-stones were well laid; his 
superstructure lasted for generations; the inner meaning of 
his work has modified all human endeavors towards civiliza¬ 
tion from his own age to ours. Alexander wrought like a 
giant, but on a mistaken plan. Traces of his work still stand, 
like the pyramids of Gizeli. Hannibal’s work could not 
last; the Carthaginians were bound by the rule of progress 
to disappear from the world’s economy. Baal could not 
endure; no Punic structure but must perish. Caesar had a 
groundwork prepared for him by twenty generations of 
rational, honest thinkers, who builded even better than they 
knew. On this his perspicacity and wisdom erected what 
will ever be the pattern of growth in statecraft. That the 
Roman Empire did not last was due to other causes. The 
fabric wrought by Caesar the statesman can never perish. 

Apart from other work — as a soldier simply — no per¬ 
formance with slender means can equal Hannibal’s. Alex¬ 
ander started worse handicapped than Hannibal, but circum¬ 
stances favored him and, once he had attacked his problem, 
his material resources grew as he advanced into the bowels 
of the land. Hannibal’s resources dwindled from the first; 
he was forced to create everything he had. He made bricks 
without straw; he himself forged every weapon with which he 
slew a Roman. We shall never see such soldier’s art again. 
Caesar’s resources were ample. He could have drawn on 


FORTUNE. 


761 


more than he put to use. Vast as was the result of his 
achievements as a soldier, there is no part of his work which 
can be fairly compared to the record of Hannibal. To win 
is not the test of military skill. 

Alexander had a way of courting Fortune so that she 
always smiled on him. One's fancy readily ascribes her 
fidelity to his fascinating influence; in truth, it was that he 
never neglected a chance the fickle goddess offered. The 
smallest favor he on the instant put to use. He never called 
on Hercules until his own shoulder was at the wheel. How 
could Fortune be fickle with such an ardent wooer? To 
Hannibal the youth, Fortune was kind; on Hannibal, past 
his youth, she turned her back, and never again smiled. 
And yet this noble soldier wrought as persistently as if he 
had basked in her favors from morn to simset. No man ever 
tempted Fortune as did Caesar. He was successful beyond 
any in his devotion to women; he obtained before he asked. 

So with Fortune. She who forsook watchful Hannibal never 

# 

turned from reckless Caesar. Always at hand and kinder 
the more Caesar neglected what she requires in all others, she 
saved him a thousand times when his schemes deserved to 
come to naught. History furnishes no instance of a great 
man heins: so beholden to her whom he rarely sought to court. 
Foolhardiness which in others Fortune would leave to the 
punishment which ought to follow, in Caesar she would favor. 
He could not overtax her patience. And knowing that 
Caesar was happy in his conquests of women, we must allow 
that his greatest was the easy conquest of this wont-to-be 
hard-won goddess. 

Though Alexander was outnumbered as no one else, he 

fought only barbarians and semi - civilized armies; he 

attacked an effete monarchy without cohesion, a structure 

«/ 

already toppling. Caesar fought barbarians first and then 



762 


THE ART OF EACH. 


troops of his own kindred, though not so well equipped or 
commanded. The barbarians Caesar showed less aptness in 
handling than Alexander or Hannibal; in the Civil War he 
had stancher forces to oppose him than Alexander. Hanni¬ 
bal fought barbarians in Spain, and in Italy troops far bet¬ 
ter than his own, the stoutest then on foot, under leaders 
who had been taught by himself and who had assimilated his 
method. Marcellus and Nero and Scipio learned Hannibal’s 
lessons by heart as the Archduke Charles and Blucher and 
Wellington had mastered the art of Napoleon. Hannibal 
was overtaxed as no captain in the history of war has ever 
been and held his own a moment. The more we compare 
Hannibal with any other soldier, the brighter the effulgence 
of his genius. 

The art of each of these captains was based on a rare 
combination of intellect and moral force; and in the case of 
each the third element, opportunity, was not wanting. Each 
had a method; he saw distinctly the point at which he aimed, 
and he drove his shaft straight and unerringly into the target, 
— and through it. Each was careful of his base; each saw 
and sought the enemy’s weak spot; each kept his army well 
in hand. Alexander and Hannibal were better providers than 
Caesar, whose army, from his overanxiety to grapple with 
his problem, was often on the point of starvation. Alex¬ 
ander won by bold strokes, the brilliancy of which can be 
found on no other historic page. Hannibal won by a careful 
study of the when and where to strike; his blow when deliv¬ 
ered never failed to cripple the enemy. Caesar was less bold 
than Alexander; in a way he was more cautious than Han¬ 
nibal; but with his caution was mixed a precipitancy which 
should in many cases have wrecked his schemes. Alexan¬ 
der’s first glance told him where to strike, and the blow fell 
with lightning speed and force. Hannibal was deliberate; 


THE SPEED OF EACH. 


763 


he lured his enemy into a false position and annihilated him. 
Caesar, while never failing to grasp the whole, and to act on 
a method fully abreast of the problem, was so lax in many 
of the parts that to succeed required the intervention of a 
luck which often comes like a deus ex machina. Alexander 
would not steal a victory; Hannibal was the master of strat¬ 
agem; Caesar was by turns Quixotically bold and a very 
Fabius for lack of tactical enterprise. Yet finis coronat 
opus; Caesar won, and he stands beside Alexander and 
Hannibal. 

The element of speed in accomplishing a task is a test not 
to be overlooked. Caesar took eight years to conquer Gaul; 
Alexander in eight years had conquered a vast territory of 
neighboring barbarians, had ground Hellas under his heel, 
had restored to the ^Egean cities their independence, and had 
overrun Asia to the Jaxertes and India to the Hyphasis. In 
the Civil War, Caesar was second in extent and rapidity of 
conquest only to Alexander. Hannibal must be tried by 
another standard. In five years he subdued half of Spain, 
crossed the Alps to Italy and, though reaching the Po with 
but twenty-six thousand men, throttled the gigantic power 
of Pome, — a city which could levy three quarters of a mil¬ 
lion men. This record for speed against odds excels that of 
Alexander and Caesar. And when we take up the question 
of endurance, — the man who, forsaken by his own people 
and cast on his own sole resources, could hold Pome at bay 
and on the verge of dissolution for fifteen years has not, can¬ 
not have a peer. 

Alexander had no confidant but Hephaestion. Hannibal 
never had a confidant. Caesar had many friends to whom he 
confided his schemes in part; the whole he kept strictly to 
himself. C^sar trusted men so far as he could use them. 
But though on the surface plausible, frank and open as few 


764 


AS CAVALRY LEADERS. 


men ever are, no one knew Caesar’s ulterior purpose. What 
he aimed at as the result of all he did, no one divined. He 
was an adept at concealing his intentions under a veil of can¬ 
dor. It befits Alexander’s sunny character to have a Hephaes- 
tion; it befits Hannibal’s vast and trying task as well as his 
patient isolation that he should alone hold the key to his pur¬ 
pose. It befits Caesar’s versatility and self-reliance that he 
should use many friends to aid his kaleidoscopic plans. But 
under all a well-kept counsel added to his chances of success. 
Hannibal is said to have worn masks to conceal his person; 
Caesar’s face was always masked when it came to his inner 
motives. 

Alexander’s strategy was gigantic in conception; the the¬ 
atre of his campaigns was the world. Hannibal’s strategy 
differed from Alexander’s as the problems of each differed; 
but it was equally skillful and bold; in a certain sense keener 
if not so vast. Caesar’s strategic push was always noteworthy. 
His apprehension of the strategy of the Gallic problem was 
as fine as his judgment of what was required by the condi¬ 
tions which faced him as he stood on the bank of the Rubi¬ 
con. It could not be better. 

As a cavalry leader Alexander cannot be equaled. No 
one ever repeated charges with the same body of horse on the 
same place in the enemy’s line as he did at the Hydaspes. 
No one ever trained such squadrons; the “Companions” 
stand unrivaled in history. Next to him, but with a distinct 
interval, came Hannibal with his Numidians. Alexander’s 
Companions won with naked blade in hand; the Numidians 
by clever tactics. Caesar never knew the uses of cavalry in 
this sense. His Gallic and German horse were each excel¬ 
lent ; but they cannot be mentioned beside the others. 

Alexander s tactics was audacious and clean - cut. He 
thrust home on the instant, and blow succeeded blow until his 


THE GALLANTRY OF EACH. 


765 


enemy was a wreck. Hannibal studied liis tactical problem 
with deliberation; he thrust not till by skillful feints he had 
found the weak side of his adversary’s defense. But when 
he thrust, his blade never failed to find an opening. Cae¬ 
sar’s tactics was not strong. He had neither the audacity 
nor persistence of Alexander; he had none of the originality 
of Hannibal. His battles were not won because of his own 
perfect plan, but because of the weak behavior of the enemy. 
As a tactician Caesar is far below Alexander; still farther 
below Hannibal. Alexander was boldness personified; Han¬ 
nibal was careful in plan, strong in execution; Caesar was 
neither. When Caesar was forced to fight — as at the Sabis, 
or at Munda — he fought nobly; but he never fought as if 
he liked the task. Pharsalus is the only battle boldly planned 
and boldly carried through; and this was won by Pompey’s 
laxness as much as by Caesar’s courage and good judgment. 

In personal bearing, Alexander was, as he strove to be, 
an Achilles. Hannibal’s gallantry in youth is testified to 
by Livy, but we forget it; we look on him as the thought¬ 
ful soldier, running no unnecessary risks, calcidating his 
chances closely and then striking a blow marvelous for its 
effect. Caesar never appeals to us as the beau sabreur; he is 
the intellectual captain. In the few instances in which his 
personal conduct was called upon he was acting in self- 
defense. He never led his men, as Alexander did at the 
city of the Malli, from sheer exuberance of courage. Caesar 
won by brain tissue backed by strong moral force. He was 
not Homeric in his heroism. 

In the history of sieges, Tyre and Alesia stand side by 
side. Hannibal never did such work. Saguntum, though 
fine, is on a lower level. 

Alexander’s opponents were far below him in capacity; 
Caesar’s rank higher. Vercingetorix was able; Pompey had 


766 


AS MARCHERS. 


been great, but his powers had waned. Neither Alexander 
nor Caesar faced such men as Marcellus and Nero, Fabius 
and Scipio, or such troops as the burgess-legion. Tried by 
this standard Hannibal is the pattern of patterns. 

In marches Alexander holds the record for great distances; 
his pursuit of Darius is hard to equal. Hannibal is un¬ 
matched for craft and skillful eluding of the enemy. Some of 
Caesar’s marches are remarkable. The march from Gergovia 
to the iEduan army and back — fifty miles in twenty-four 
hours, with a force of fifteen thousand foot — is only equaled 
by the Spartan march to Marathon. Alexander’s passage 
of the Hindu-Koosh is like Hannibal’s crossing of the Alps. 
Caesar was never called on to do such work. Alexander 
was cautious on the march; Hannibal still more so. It was 
from Hannibal that the Romans learned to march an army. 
Caesar began by being careless; but surprises taught him 
caution; he ended by conducting his marches in the ablest 
manner. 

Alexander demanded of his men the severest exertions, 
without regard to season or circumstances, but took excellent 
care of them whether at work or rest. Hannibal was never 
out of bread, though living most of the time on the enemy’s 
country. On occasion, as in crossing the Alps or the Arnus 
marshes, he called on his men for labor untold. Caesar was 
not always a good provider; the African campaign was 
largely a tramp for victual. He was more apt to put his 
men in winter-quarters than Alexander or Hannibal. 

In exerting influence over his men, each of these captains 
exhibited the highest power. That each was the hardest 
worked man in the army was apparent to all; each could 
do every part of a soldier’s duty in a manner no man in his 
command could approach. Justice, generosity and high 
character made them the example all strove to imitate. 


THE ONE TOUCH OF NATURE. 767 

Each inculcated a spirit of emulation among his men; each 
rewarded gallantry and good service as they deserved. 

As simple man, Hannibal far outranks the others in his 
purity of life and his elevated patriotism. Alexander had 
two sides — the one lovable, admirable; the other lamentable 
in its want of self-control. Caesar the man lacks the one 
touch of nature. One can truthfully say a thousand admi¬ 
rable things of him. Quite apart from his greatness, — his 
reasonableness, his warm friendships, his generosity, the fine 
qualities of his mind, the many noble traits to which all 
testify, commend him to our admiration, to our regard. 
And yet there is to Caesar, as there is to Napoleon, an arti¬ 
ficiality which one never can forget. He wears an armor we 
cannot penetrate. We say much to praise him, but the 
epithets lack an inward meaning. Alexander, in his love for 
Hephaestion, in his violence to Clitus, was a man. Hanni¬ 
bal, in his hatred of Rome, in his self-immolation at the 
altar of Carthage, was a man. Gustavus, the Christian 
king, falling at the head of his squadrons at Liitzen, and 
Frederick, the monarch of iron, writing poor French verses 
as a relief from his defeat, are both full of human nature. 
Caesar and Napoleon impress us as characters in history. 
Each calls out a thrill of admiration; neither calls out a 
thrill of human sympathy. 

Tried solely by the standards of the soldier, these equal 
captains, if one may pronounce between them, stand: Hanni¬ 
bal the peerless; Alexander the Homeric; Caesar the unvan- 
quished. 

Taken in all his characters, Caesar is the greatest man in 
antiquity. 


XL VI. 


THE ART OF WAR OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE. 

Augustus formed from the relies of the legions of the civil wars a new 
standing army some three hundred thousand strong, which was distributed 
mostly on the frontiers. The Empire rested on the army; but Augustus’ 
method was good. The praetorian guard gradually increased, acquired great 
power and used it illy. Later on, when there was a good ruler there was a 
good army; under weak emperors, the army was bad. On the whole the 
material degenerated ; service was avoided, even by mayhem ; barbarians filled 
the ranks. The use of the sword decreased in favor of jactile weapons; engines 
were employed in line of battle; elephants and trained wild beasts were used. 
Intervals decreased so that the legion again became a phalanx. Tactics 
reached a high point, hut the soul of the army was not there. Baggage and 
non-combatants reached Oriental proportions. Pay and largesses were enor¬ 
mous. Camps were more strongly fortified. Fortification and sieges were 
expert. Theory was developed ; practice retrograded. Standing armies called 
out regular fleets. Declining soldierly spirit was supplemented by petty defen¬ 
sive means. There were many and able generals during the first five centuries 
of our era; but there was no growth in the art of war. 

From tlie history of the army of Julius Caesar we have seen 
that it was the genius of the captain and not the personal 
qualities of the rank and file which won his splendid victo¬ 
ries. When Caesar Augustus became sole ruler of Rome, 
military matters were not long in being put on a new footing. 
The ancient army of the republic had been a burgess-militia, 
and it is only necessary to recall the events of the Second 
Punic War to show that, rather than the ability of any one 
leader, it was the steadfastness of the Senate and army — 
for the army was the people — that saved Rome from anni¬ 
hilation by Hannibal. 

During the civil broils of Rome, professional soldiers and 


THE NEW ARMY. 


769 


mercenaries liad gradually crept in until they formed the 
bulk of the rank and file; and these had prepared the way 
for the standing army which was now to form a part of the 
equipment of the empire, in peace and war alike. 

Augustus went to work in a systematic way. From the 
forty-five legions and fifteen thousand cavalry remaining 
over from the civil wars, the slaves, freedmen and all of that 
ilk were discharged. Some one hundred and twenty thousand 
volunteers and veterans were settled in twenty-eight colonies 
on the lands in Italy donated to them. The remainder, mostly 
Roman citizens, were consolidated into twenty-five legions 
and a number of bodies of auxiliaries. These new legions 
and the cavalry attached to them were quartered in perma¬ 
nent camps, principally on the Rhine, Danube and Euphra¬ 
tes, to hold head against the inroads of foreign hordes. 
These troops were thus removed from the temptations of too 
great proximity of the capital or larger cities. Auxiliaries 
were raised in large numbers for service in their respective 
provinces. 

For the protection of Italy there were raised ten praetorian 
cohorts, of one thousand men each. This was the famous 
body-guard of the emperor. Three of these cohorts formed 
the garrison of Rome; the seven others those of the principal 
near-by cities. 

The sum total of all this standing force has been estimated 

at three hundred thousand men. 

The soldier’s oath had in early days been to the republic; 
from the time of Marius down it had been taken individually 
to the general who was raising legions to hold his province 
or to make war upon the neighboring nations; now that the 
emperor was the state, it ran: “In the name of the Emperor 
I swear unconditionally to obey him, never to leave the en¬ 
sign, nor spare my life for Emperor and State.” 


770 


A DEGENERATING ARMY. 


The term of service varied from twelve to twenty years, 
and every third year a careful levy was held to fill the service 
gaps. The excessive privileges which the soldiers had en¬ 
joyed during the civil wars and gradually claimed as a con¬ 
dition of military life, were restricted, and a special fund, 
under the emperor’s sole control, was created from which to 
pay, clothe and ration the troops. 

Thus was the power of the Roman emperor as firmly 
grounded on the army as the power of the republic had been 
grounded on the burgess-soldier; and while the exceptional 
personal qualities of Augustus made this reorganization a 
benefit to Rome, the army, under later and less worthy rulers, 
became a curse. The ten praetorian cohorts were all drawn 
in to Rome by his successor, and from thence on remained 
there, and by their corruption and tyranny grew to be the 
terror of the land. Nearly the entire first century of our era 
was made unquiet by the antagonism between people and 
army. 

During the second century, from Nerva to Marcus Aurelius, 
the army was held in better leash. But luxury and lax polit¬ 
ical morals had been doing their work in people and army 
alike. Both were degenerating. The citizens avoided mili¬ 
tary service to such a degree that the habit of self-mayhem 
became common. The succeeding period of threatened inva¬ 
sions by Germans and Parthians again obliged the emperors 
to resort to raising mercenaries, — and these among the bar¬ 
barians, a necessary but dangerous practice. 

The third century saw the power of Rome fallen practi¬ 
cally into the hands of the praetorian guards, who made and 
unmade emperors at will. Though their abuses were some¬ 
what reformed by Septimius Severus, the gulf between peo¬ 
ple and army had grown apace. The army was largely Ger¬ 
man, — the Roman Republic was fast drifting to its fall. 


CAVALRY AND ARTILLERY. 771 

The ancient arms and equipment of the legionary were not 
changed until the second century, though the use of the 
sword was steadily decreasing in favor of the spear. As 
the material of the arms-bearing class decreased, the latter 
weapon grew lighter. As the discipline and character of the 
rank and file waned, so whatever intervals between cohorts 
were still left decreased, and in the third century, under 
Caracalla and Alexander Severus, an organization like the 
Grecian phalanx was adopted, though but temporarily. The 
general tendency was to make all weapons lighter, for the 
man himself had ceased to be the well-trained, strong and 
able citizen of old. The legions were no longer expected to 
close with the foe, and the men carried additional jactile 
weapons, rather than those of hand-to-hand conflict. 

Cavalry was still as of old heavy, with man and horse in 
armor; or light, using only darts for weapons. 

Artillery began to accompany the legions. This it will be 
remembered was no new thing. Alexander in the prime of 
his power had employed field artillery; in their decline the 
Greeks had employed it in line of battle to protect their foot. 
The same thing now occurred with the Romans. At first 
this purported to be only for use on the walls of the perma¬ 
nent camps. But later, in the third century, the onager or 
smaller ballista was transported on a two-ox cart, and the 
liand-ballista on a one-horse wagon. Each was served by 
eleven men. They could cast stones and darts three to four 
hundred paces. They were placed in line of battle, between 
the legions, to save these from too sudden or close contact 
with the enemy. 

Elephants again appeared, and trained wild beasts and dogs 
were occasionally used against the enemy. These artificial 
aids exhibit the declining value of the legions. 

The strength of the legions grew to be somewhat greater, 


772 CHANGED LINE OF BATTLE . 

% 

at the normal from six to seven thousand men. Armies 
rarely numbered more than eight or ten legions. 

Flags replaced other ensigns, sometimes cut into dragon- 
shape ; and the bust or likeness of the emperor took the jdace 
of the eagle. To the old military horns was added a peculiar 
flute. 

A number of changes, owing largely to the new enemies 
encountered as well as the less good material of the legions, 
gradually took place. The third line of battle was given up 
so as to strengthen the first, and each line had five cohorts. 
The first cohort was doubled in number, was often as high as 
twelve hundred strong, and was composed of the best men. 
It was not infrequently divided into halves so as to be placed 
on the right and left of the first line, or the fifth cohort was 
made equally strong, so that a powerful body was on each 
extremity of the first line. The cohorts of the second line 
stood behind the intervals of the first so long as they existed, 
and these at a time not well settled appear to have been 
diminished by half. This was the Hadrian formation. The 
entire question of intervals and of the space occupied by the 
men is a puzzling one. Tribunes now commanded cohorts; 
legates legions; the praetorians were led by praetorian prae- 
fects, the army by imperial or consular legates. The staff- 
officers were quaestors and procurators. 

Trajan introduced still another system. The ten cohorts 
of the legion were placed in one line. The first had nine 
hundred and sixty chosen men in ten centuries and two 
hundred and forty cavalry. The others had four hundred 
and eighty men in six centuries. Arrian says the men stood 
in eight, Vegetius in six ranks. The front ranks were of the 
heavier and older legionaries; the rear ranks of the younger 
and lighter. Each man occupied three feet in width, and 
the ranks were six feet apart from back to breast. Light 


ORDER OF MARCH. 


778 


troops stood behind the legionaries. The cohorts stood in 
order from one to ten with very small, next to no, intervals, 
and these were filled by horizontal-fire engines. Behind the 
line were engines of high trajectory which could fire above 
the line. Behind the flanks were special troops, such as 
the praetorians, and cavalry and bowmen were on the flanks. 

This formation had its advantages against barbarian 
nations, such as the Dacians, Parthians and Germans. It 
suited either the offensive or defensive, any kind of ground, 
and could be used against cavalry or infantry. It had cer¬ 
tain features of the old class ordering of the legion. 
Hadrian and Trajan were specially apt at utilizing the 
legion thus formed. It seems to have been an attempt to 
reconcile the useful side of the class organization of old 
burgess times with the necessarily growing plialangial idea. 

Armies appear to have drilled, manoeuvred and marched 

much as of old. The tactics of the parade-ground often 

reached a high point. But that old instinct for war which 

enabled a Roman consul to raise his army of citizens and 

> 

leave Rome in one day was not present. 

The Hfollow square for marches, on open plains and 
against sudden attacks, remained common. It was a safe 
defensive formation. The wedge or hollow wedge was suc¬ 
cessfully put to use. An instance of this was seen at Tre- 
viri, 70 A. d. 

Josephus narrates how Vespasian and Titus disposed their 
armies. In the former’s march from Syria to Galilee in 67 
A. D., the column was as follows: the light troops (bowmen 
and slingers) sustained by a small body of heavy foot and 
some horsemen, in the van; following them the mechanics 
( fabri ) like our pioneers, to repair bridges and roads; then 
the officers’ baggage with cavalry, the emperor and staff, the 
military engines; then the bulk of the army, —the legions in 


774 


DEFENSIVE SCHEMES. 


a column of sixes; next the army-train. Last came the 
mercenaries, mixed with legionaries and cavalry to steady 
them. 

Up to the third century the Roman armies marched rap¬ 
idly ; the speed and distances then decreased markedly, owing 
in part to the less good material, in part to the greater 
amount of baggage and enginery. 

An army was marshaled for battle in much the same 
manner as a legion, and occasionally the position of the 
legions was determined by lot. When the army was in one 
line, the light troops and enginery opened the action. The 
heavy foot then advanced, and the light troops retired 
through them, — as there were no intervals, by the even- 
number men stepping for the moment behind the odd. The 
front ranks of legionaries closed and couched their spears, 
though these were, not formidable, and the rear ranks fired 
above their heads. The light troops and engines which were 
in the rear aided the front lines by their fire. The mounted 
archers moved from point to point and the cavalry operated 
on the wings. 

The farther the Roman army grew away from its old self- 
reliance the more it was sought to supplement this by en¬ 
ginery and defensive tactics of various useless sorts. The 
assault with naked weapon was now rarely seen. Distance 
weapons were preferred. Instead of the Roman soldier 
being more than a match for the barbarian so soon as he 
closed with his man, the reverse was now the case. The 
bulky German could laugh in earnest at the Roman legion¬ 
ary. Under able emperors this was not so apparent; but 
before the end of the third century the old-fashioned Roman 
organization, bravery and reliability had vanished, as had 
happened in Greece five hundred years before. 

In the same measure as the evidences of the ancient 


PAY AND LARGESSES. 


775 


Roman gallantry in war, there disappeared from the legions 
the sense of discipline, order and good conduct. Caesar 
Augustus had somewhat reestablished the old Roman mili¬ 
tary virtues; but it was only for a time. The pay of the 
troops rose as their value decreased, and largesses became 
enormous. Under Domitian the foot soldier is said to have 
received four gold pieces (about twelve dollars) a month, the 
centurion eight, the mounted man or praetorian twelve; and 
the deductions for arms, equipment and rations were given 
up. This seems excessive, in view of the value of gold. 
Allowances were increased to a luxurious extent and the 
trains and non-combatants correspondingly increased, until 
they reached Oriental proportions, and of the nimbleness of 
the Roman army there remained but a tradition. Occasion¬ 
ally a vigorous emperor or an energetic general improved 
these conditions, but only during his period of control. The 
tendency was downward. 

Augustus had brought back military gymnastics and drill; 
and under Vespasian, Titus and Antoninus these were 
encouraged; but in the third century they again disappeared. 
The drill-marches which Augustus compelled the legions to 
make three times a month, with baggage — sometimes 
doubled — and over all kinds of country, were forgotten; 
the army manoeuvres which were then conducted on as large 
a scale as to-day in Germany or France became onerous and 
were dropped; and the splendid public works, especially 
military roads, were no longer built. The troops mutinied 
against such labors. 

So far as military science and study were concerned, they 
were less practical and more pedantic. Though the empire 
produced numberless writers on military matters, there were 
none to approach Polybius or Caesar. They admirably wrote 
up details, but they failed to give the soul of the matter. 


776 


SKILLFUL FORTIFICATION. 


So far as the moral tone of the army was concerned, it 
could not be worse. If the ancient burgess-legion of the 
Second Punic War was the type of all that is excellent from 
a military standpoint, so it may be said that the army of the 
later empire represented all that was vicious. It was a 
monster whose work was to destroy the structure of the em¬ 
pire, even as its predecessor had been the creator of the 
power and greatness of Rome. The army may be said to 
have been held together solely by a system of fearful punish¬ 
ments and unreasoning rewards. 

Up to the era of Gratian, toward the end of the fourth 
century, the daily camp was still the rule and was made to 
conform to the ground with much skill, the ditch and wall 
being deeper and higher. The permanent camps were like 
regular fortresses, and enginery was much more abundant on 
the parapets. A system of such permanent camps was some¬ 
times constructed as a military frontier, like Hadrian’s wall 
* from the Tyne to the Solway, or Trajan’s wall from the Dan¬ 
ube to the Euxine. On the whole, while no works exceeded 
in ability Caesar’s wonderful defenses, fortification grew in 
skill as troops grew in worthlessness. Terraces and rams 
increased in size. Titus built four huge terraces opposite 
Jerusalem, and Vespasian had a ram which weighed one hun¬ 
dred tons and required fifteen hundred men to set it in 
motion and one hundred and fifty pairs of oxen or three hun¬ 
dred pairs of mules to transport it. Mines were cleverly 
designed and executed. The subterranean war at Jerusalem 
in 70 A. D. was remarkable. Double tortoises for assaulting 
walls and the use of inflammables in ballistics are to be 
noted. The number of engines accompanying an army was 
huge. Titus had, says Josephus, before Jerusalem, three 
hundred catapults and forty ballistas. This would be called 
a very large artillery force for an army of equal size to-day. 


REGULAR FLEETS. 


777 


In a certain sense, during this period, the art of war was 
not on the decline hut rather on the increase. The theoreti¬ 
cal was more highly developed, the practical simplicity was 
less. The ancient Roman habit of winning by hard knocks 
had given way to a system which protected the soldiers who 
were no longer ready to expose life and limb for the public 
weal. The gain in theoretical knowledge was but a cloak to 
cover the loss of the old military virtues. 

Standing armies soon called for regular fleets. Augustus 
had two, — at Ravenna and Misenum, — in the Adriatic and 
Tyrrhenian seas respectively. A third was later placed on 
the coast of Gaul. Flotillas were on the Rhine, Danube and 
other rivers. The type of vessel was Illyrian, and it had 
from one to five rows of oars. Many light boats for recon¬ 
noitring and scouting and dispatch-bearing were in use. The 
material of the fleets was of the worst. Slaves and criminals 
made up the crews. The tactics remained as of old, so far 
as it could be utilized. 

The changes in organization of the last two centuries of 
the Roman empire have no interest. They all tended to the 
same end, — to sustain a declining soldierly spirit by petty 
defensive inventions in tactics, ballistics and fortification. 
The old offensive tone of Rome had disappeared. The Ro¬ 
man soldier no longer felt that if he could but get at the 
enemy with sword and shield, he was more than a match for 
him. Everything tended to invite an attack by the enemy, 
and to an attempt to destroy him before he reached the line 
of battle. 

To recapitulate, chronologically, the changes by which the 
old quincuncial legion of brave burgesses became the one 
line phalanx of unsoldierly mercenaries: Marius, a century 
before the Christian era, changed the class-rating of citizen- 
soldiers to one of mere physical capacity, and began to intro- 


778 LEGION BECOMES PHALANX. 

cluce a lessening of the intervals. Caesar fully matured Ma¬ 
rius’ plan, deployed his men for battle so that the front line, 
and perhaps the second, had no intervals, and changed the 
cohort from a body in three lines, with light troops and cav¬ 
alry pertaining to it, into a body of heavy foot in one line 
eight or ten men deep. His legion was habitually set up in 
three lines. In the first century A. D. the ten legionary 
cohorts were set up in two lines, five in each, with whatever 
intervals there existed filled with ballistic machines. In the 
second and third centuries the cohorts were gradually mar¬ 
shaled in one line without intervals, and the spears were 
lengthened. In the fourth and fifth centuries the legion 
became absolutely a phalanx and a very poor one. As we 
remember, the courageous and enterprising Roman citizens 
of the early republic had adapted the old Dorian phalanx to 
their own ideas of a quincuncial form; the gradual decline of 
the imperial army had, by converse causes, brought it back, 
not to the phalanx of Miltiades, Epaminondas and Alexander, 
but to the phalanx of the degenerate Greece of the second 
century b. c. This was a noteworthy but a perfectly natural 
series of events. 

It must not be forgotten that, during the five first centuries 
of the Christian era, there were many able generals, both 
among the Romans and their barbarian opponents; and that 
there was a skillful adaptation of means to end. But there 
is nothing in the way of improvement to the art of war which 
claims our notice. The fact that Augustus, Arminius, 
Civilis the Batavian, Tiberius, Drusus, Germanicus, Vespa¬ 
sian, Titus, Trajan, Marcus Aurelius, Diocletian, Constan¬ 
tine, Julian, Theodosius, Stilicho, Aetius, Ricimer, Odoaker, 
Alaric, Attila, Belisarius commanded huge armies, con¬ 
ducted far-reaching campaigns, displayed military talents of 
a high order, does not concern us here. Many of the lesser 


NO GAIN IN ART. 


779 


lights of war at the inception of its story are of more con¬ 
sequence because in what they did we first discover some 
principle which had its bearing on subsequent events. It is 
not wars, but the art of war whose history we are tracing. 
And if in a subsequent volume we devote but a passing notice 
to the entire period from the fall of the Roman empire to 
the invention of gunpowder, we shall not interrupt the se¬ 
quence of events which have brought the art of war from its 
crude beginnings in the age of Cyrus to its wonderful devel¬ 
opment in our own nineteenth century. 



Triumphal Car. 









' 









































For armies of this size in a very stubbornly contested battle. 


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INDEX. 


A coo, 212, 225, 228. 

Achillas, 581, 580. 

Acilla, 044, 651. 

Acluatuea, 191,193 et seq.; retreat from, 
195 ; massacre near, 196, 219. 

Aduatuci, town of the, 122 ; surrenders, 
125, 211. 

^Edui, 58, 66, 82, 206, 231, 242, 248-9, 
257, 267-8, 269, 306. 

Afranius, 29, 435, 440 et seq.; defeats 
Caesar, 444; badly placed, 456; deter¬ 
mines to retire, 456; his route, 456-7 ; 
uncertain in plan, 465-6; surrenders, 
471 ; 620, 688, 690. 

Africa, 619. 

African campaign, 624 et seq. 

Agar, 668, 676. 

Agendicum, 235-6. 

Alesia, siege of, 283 et seq.; location of, 
284 ; defenses of, 285 ; forces at, 286 ; 
camps at, 288 ; cavalry fight at, 288 ; 
works at, 291 et seq.; first battle at, 
297 ; second battle at, 298 ; third bat¬ 
tle at, 300 et seq. 

Alexander, 251, 266,269, 312-3, 350, 386 ; 
compared to Caesar and Hannibal, 
755-67.. 

Alexandria, 578 ; siege of, 580. et seq.; 
destruction of library, 582; its topo¬ 
graphy, 584-5 ; operations in, 585 ; wa¬ 
ter diverted, 586; first naval battle, 
588 ; second naval battle, 591; battle at 
the mole, 593 ; third naval battle, 598. 

Allobroges, 66. 

Ambiorix, 190 et seq.; 193; attacks Sabi- 
nus’ camp, 194; ambushes Sabinus and 
Cotta, 196 ; treachery of, 197; march¬ 
es on Cicero, 197; besieges Cicero, 
199; 211, 212, 216 ; pursuit and escape 
of, 218 ; 224-5 ; 322. 

Andaematunum, 235. 

Antesignani, 8, 359 ; 445. 

Antoninus, 775. 

Antony, 312, 322, 329, 407, 413, 434, 486, 
503 ; sets sail, 504 ; lands, 504. 

Aquae Sextiae, battle of, 18 et seq.; 51. 

Aq uitania, campaign in, 143. 

Arausio, battle of, 16. 

Arehelaus, 22-4. 

Artluenna forest, 54, 217. 

Ariovistus, 49, 52, 82 et seq.; declines to 


meet Caesar, 85 ; asks confidence, 91; 
his alleged treachery, 91; outflanks 
Caesar, 92 ; declines battle, 94; escapes, 
97 ; army cut to pieces, 97. 

Aristocrats, 401, 576, 609, 620. 

Army, Caesar’s, 352 et seq. ; professional, 
353 ; maniples, 354-6 ; cohort, 354 ; 
strength, 355 ; legion, 355 ; space for 
men, 355 ; depth, 356 ; music, 357; 
baggage, 357; soldier’s pack, 357 ; 
light and heavy armed, 358 ; general 
staff, 359; antesignani, 359 ; pay, 360; 
offensive formation, 360; method of 
setting up legion, 361 ; defensive for¬ 
mation, 362 ; square, 363 ; fourth line, 
363 ; auxiliaries, 363 ; cavalry, 363 
et seq.. 370, 377; turma, 364; ala, 
365; orders of march, 365 et seq. ; ploy- 
ments and deployments, 368 ; march¬ 
es, 370 ; step, 370; formation of march, 
371 ; van- and rearguard, 372 ; train, 

373 ; battle-order, 373 ; retreat, 373 ; 
flank marches, 373 ; crossing rivers, 

374 ; bridges, 374; battles, 374-5 ; why 
it excelled, 376 ; independence of le¬ 
gions, .376; light troops, 378 ; centre 
and wings, 378 ; acts of a battle, 379; 
defensive battles, 380. 

Arretium, 413. 

Arsinoe, 583, 586. 

Art of war of Roman Empire, 768 et 
seq.; on increase, 777. 

Artillery accompanies legions, 771. 

Arverni, 82, 230, 234, 249, 252, 269, 306. 

Attegua, 703 et seq. 

Augustus, 769 et seq.. 775, 777. 

Aurelia, 38, 734. 

Avaricum, siege of, 239 et seq.; mound 
at, 245 : assault and capture of, 247. 

Axona, the camp on, 105; bridgehead 
on, 105; battlefield of, 107 ; battle 
of, 108 ; victory, 109. 

Balbus, 148. 

Ballistics, 12 et seq. 

Belgians, 54 ; how divided, 55; 99 ; ori¬ 
gin and forces, 103-4; retire from 
Axona 2 110. 

Bellovaci, 112, 310 et seq.; clever strata¬ 
gem of, 320 ; retire, 321. 

Bibraete, 74 et seq., 258. 


I 


! 





784 


INDEX. 


Bituriges, 231, 240, 244, 2G9, 312. 

Bogud, 039, 720. 

Boulougne, 100, 180. 

Bridge, Caesar’s, location of, 159 ; con¬ 
struction, 159 et seq. 

Britain, 104 et seq. ; its inhabitants, 100 ; 
second landing in, 182. 

Britons, oppose landing, 170 ; attack 
Seventh legion, 171 ; their chariots, 
172 ; sue for peace, 173; their war¬ 
fare, 184. 

Brundisium, Caesar and Pompey at, 423 
et seq. 

Brutus, D., 134 ; fine conduct in bat¬ 
tle against Veneti, 138 ; 435, 452, 477. 

Burgesses, 2 ; how classed, 3; avoid ser¬ 
vice, 4, 5. 

Caesar, birth, 37 ; his forbears, 38 ; moth¬ 
er, 38 ; his looks and habits, 38 ; as a 
gymnast, 38; as a dandy, 39; his 
bookishness, 39; as an orator, 39; 
general appearance, 40 ; priest of Ju¬ 
piter, 40 ; marries, 40 ; his quarrel with 
Sulla, 40; in Bithynia, 41; receives 
civic crown, 41; his prosecutions, 42 ; 
captured by pirates, 42 ; studies in 
Rhodes, 42 ; pontifex, tribune, quaes¬ 
tor, aedile, judex, 43; reckless in 
money matters, 43-4; in Lusitania, 
44 et seq. ; imperator, 40 ; his civil ad¬ 
ministration in Lusitania, 47; ambi¬ 
tion, 47 ; his triumph, 48 ; consul, 49 ; 
his new provinces, 49 ;_Jiis marriage, 
49 ; his provinces, 50; his method in 
Gaul, 53 ; anticipates 'war, 00 ; goes 
to Geneva, 02 ; tricks Helvetii, 02; 
his wall at Geneva, 03; places troops 
on Rhone, 00 ; destroys one third Hel¬ 
vetii, 09; bridges Arar, 70; follows 
Helvetii, 71; his caution, 71, 98, 107, 
055, 004; his rations, 72 ; his strata¬ 
gem against Helvetii, 72 ; at Bibracte, 
70-9; liis tactics, 79 ; his conduct at 
first battle, 80-1; desires war, 84 ; in¬ 
vites Ariovistus to meet him, 85; Ins 
legal authority, 85-0 ; moves on Ario¬ 
vistus, 80-91 ; his secret service, 87, 
243 ; reassures army, 89 ; cut off, 92 ; 
regains communications, 93 ; invites 
battle, 93 ; makes new camp, 93-5 ; 
forces battle, 95 ; his victory, 97 ; his 
ability against Ariovistus, 98 ; legions, 
101; his lieutenants, 101; moves 
against Belgians, 102 ; his objective, 
102 ; makes diversion, 104 ; his forces, 
104 ; relieves Bibrax, 100; intrenches, 
100 ; follows Belgians, 110 ; beaten at 
Noviodunum, 111 ; moves against Ner- 
vii, 113 ; his carelessness, 114; at bat¬ 
tle of Sabis, 110 et seq.; almost 
defeated, 11S-9 ; his victory, 121-2 ; 
attacks town of the Aduatuci, 123 et 
seq.; ability and mistakes, 125-7; in 
Illyricum, 131 ; determines to punish 
Veneti, 132; his reasons, 133; his le¬ 


gions, 134 ; his slow campaign against 
Veneti, 130; determines on battle, 
137 ; his cruelty to Veneti, 139 ; cam¬ 
paign against Morini, 148; moves on 
Usipetes, 152; his treachery to Usi- 
petes, 153; massacres Usipetes, 155; 
was he cruel ? 150; builds bridge 
across Rhine, 158; wisdom of the 
step, 158; his bridge, 159 et seq.; ac¬ 
complishes nothing, 103; moves to 
Britain, 104 et seq.; description of 
Britain, 105; lands near Dover, 108; 
his fleet damaged by storm, 170 ; res¬ 
cues Seventh legion, 172 ; returns to 
Gaul, 173 ; his invasion useless, 174 ; 
his carelessness, 175-0; builds new 
boats, 177-8 ; his legions, 180 ; lands, 
181 ; advances into Britain, 182 ; his 
fleet injured by storm, 183; repairs 
same, 183 ; advances inland, 183 ; wins 
victory, 185 ; forces Thames, 180 ; de¬ 
feats Britons, 187 ; retires, 188 ; re¬ 
crosses to Gaul, 188 ; had accomplished 
nothing, 189; spreads legions in win¬ 
ter-quarters, 190 ; fails to give rendez¬ 
vous, 193 ; marches to Cicero’s relief, 
202 ; his lack of preparation, 202 ; his 
march, 202 ; attacks Nervii, 203; de¬ 
feats Nervii, 204 ; raises new legions, 
210 ; his winter campaign, 212; calls 
congress, 212 ; moves against Menapii, 
213 ; again crosses Rhine, 210; sub¬ 
dues Eburones, 219; holds council, 

, 225; leaves no one in general com¬ 
mand, 228 ; hears of insurrection, 232 * 
reaches province, 232; secures prov¬ 
ince, 232 ; crosses Cebennse, 233 ; hur¬ 
ries to his legions, 235 ; captures Vel- 
launodunum and Genabum, 230-8; 
marches to Avaricum, 239; besieges 
Avaricum, 240 et seq. ; avoids ambush, 
244 ; captures Avaricum, 247 ; gives 
his men a rest, 248 ; forces Elaver, 
250-1; camps at Gergovia, 254 ; cap¬ 
tures Roche Blanche, 250; marches 
on /Eduau army, 257 ; and back, 259 ; 
disingenuous, 259 ; prepares assault, 
200 ; defeated, 201 et seq. ; his lack of 
energy, 200; retiresfrom Gergovia, 207; 
cut off from Labienus, 2(58 ; forces his 
way through, 209; joins Labienus, 270 ; 
his legions, 270 ; moves towards prov¬ 
ince, 277 ; defeats Vercingetorix, 281; 
follows him to Alesia, 282 ; reaches 
Alesia, 280 ; seizes hills around Ale¬ 
sia, 280 ; his works at Alesia, 291 et 
seq. ; his activity at Alesia, 301 et seq. ; 
ability at Alesia, 300; his fortune, 
308 ; seventh year in Gaul, 308-9; win¬ 
ter campaign, 311; dislikes them, 313 ; 
moves against Bellovaei, 315; his 
camp at Mt. St. Pierre, 310 ; his de¬ 
fenses at, 317-18 ; follows Bellovaei, 
319 ; defeats them, 322; marches to 
Uxellodunum, 330; begins siege of, 
330 ; captures Uxellodunum, 332 ; rd- 



INDEX. 


785 


sum^ of his Gallic campaign,^334-6 
hio fortune, 339 ; his general plan, '340 , 
his ambition, 340 ; his politics, 340 ; 
capacity, 340 ; cruelty, 341 ; his state¬ 
craft, 341 ; his strategy, 341 et seq. ; 
his legionaries, 344; his care of his 
men, 344-0 ; his scouting, 344 ; his 
ingenuity, 345; liis objective, 345; 
his base, 340 ; his method, 347 ; his 
secrecy, 348 ; his opponents, 348 ; his 
camp, 349 ; his battles ancl pursuit, 
350 ; his winter-quarters, _2p0-l ; his 
energy, 351 ; his army, 352 k seq.; a 
democrat, 405 ; quarrels with Pompey, 
400 ; at Ravenna, 400 ; location of his 
legions, 400 ; ultimatum to Rome, 407 ; 
crosses Rubicon, 407 ; his foolhardiness, 
407 ; his plan, 408 ; takes Ariminum, 
409 ; offers terms to Pompey, 409 ; his 
forces, 409 ; his lieutenants, 411 ; size 
of legions, 412 ; marches on Auxinium, 
413 ; gains recruits, 414 ; moves down 
Picenum, 415 ; marches to Corfinium, 
410 ; besieges Corfinium, 417 et seq.; 
offers terms to Pompey, 423 ; marches 
to Brundisium, 453 ; his operations at 
Brundisium, 423 et seq.; has gained 
all Italy, 420 ; changes plans, 427 ; or¬ 
ders fleet to be made, 427 ; his lieu¬ 
tenants occupy Sicily and Sardinia, 
428 ; determines to go to Spain, 431 ; 
what he should do, 431-2 ; in Rome, 
433 ; despoils treasury, 433 ; his forces 
in Spain, 437 ; his plan of raising mon¬ 
ey, 437 ; his activity, 441 ; offers bat¬ 
tle to Afranius, 441 ; camps in plain, 
442 ; tries to capture hill, 443 ; fails, 
444 ; drives back enemy, 445 et seq.; 
prevents enemy’s foraging, 448 ; his 
bridges swept away, 448 et seq.; con¬ 
voy cut off, 449 ; his want of victual, 
450 ; rescues convoy, 451 ; able to for¬ 
age, 454 ; makes artificial ford, 455 ; 
crosses ford and follows Afranius, 4G1 ; 
annoys Afranius severely, 4G2 ; cuts 
Afranius off from retreat, 465 ; refuses 
to attack, 4GG ; cuts Afranius off from 
water, 467 ; his soldiers fraternize with 
enemy, 4G8 ; pursues and harasses 
Afranius, 4G9 ; surrounds Afranius, 
470 ; his rapidity, 472 ; opens siege of 
Massilia, 47G ; subdues western Spain, 
482 ; goes to Massilia, 483 ; spares 
Massilia, 483 ; loses Africa, 484 et 
seq. ; consul, 487 ; orders troops to 
Brundisium, 487 ; forces, 487 ; at 
Brundisium, 488 ; has no fleet, 488 ; 
what he had accomplished, 492 ; saiLs 
for Epirus, 494 ; his fleet, 495 ; his 
position, 49G ; advances north, 498 ; 
blockades Pompey’s fleet, 501 ; offers 
terms to Pompey, 501 ; conference, 
502 ; attempts to cross, 504 ; moves 
towards Antony, 505 ; joins Antony, 
50G ; detaches forces to Greece, 508 ; 
his forces, 508; cuts Pompey off from 


'N 


Dyrrachium, 511; builds lines around 
Pompey, 51G ; his morale superior to 
Pompey’s, 518 ; Ninth legion engaged, 
519; cannot complete lines planned, 
521 ; his men on short rations, 522 ; 
his men healthy, 522; tries to take 
Dyrrachium, 523; his operations in 
Greece, 529 ; makes proposals to Pom¬ 
pey, 530 ; first desertions, 531; his left 
illy prepared, 533; his left broken, 
534 ; attacks again, 535 ; is defeated, 
53G-7 ; losses, 538 ; not disheartened 
by defeat, 541 ; punishes cowards, 
542; men anxious for battle, 542; 
starts for Apollonia, 542 ; outmarches 
Pompey, 543 ; his plans, 545; crosses 
to. Thessaly, 547; captures Gom- 
phi, 548 ; captures Metropolis, 549 ; 
camps near Pliarsalus, 550 ; his forces, 
552 ; determines to manoeuvre, 55G ; 
accepts battle, 557; draws up his 
forces, 560 ; his skillful dispositions, 
560 ; his men confident, 5G2 ; attacks, 
503; liis fourth line, 5G4 ; orders in 
third line, 5G5; his pursuit, 5G7; his 
losses, 568 • his audacity, 569 ; con¬ 
trasted with Pompey, 572 ; his faults, 
573; his strong qualities, 574-5; fol¬ 
lows Pompey to Egypt, 577 ; his trou¬ 
ble in Alexandria, 579 ; mixes in Egyp¬ 
tian affairs, 579 ; besieged in Alexan¬ 
dria, 582 ; in bad case, 584 ; sends for 
reinforcements, 584; digs wells, 587 ; 
receives reinforcements, 588 ; obliged 
to do battle, 589 ; defeated Alexandri¬ 
ans, 589 ; captures Pharos, 592; de¬ 
feated at the mole, 593; his losses, 
595 ; panic, 595 ; surrenders Ptolemy, 
597; relieved by Mithridates, 598; 
marches to meet him, 599; defeats 
Ptolemy, 602 ; captures Alexandria, 
602 ; starts for Pontus, 610 ; his forces, 
611; his insufficient preparation, 611; 
attacks Pharnaces at Zela, 612; de¬ 
feats him, 614 ; returns to Rome, 615 ; 
suppresses mutiny, 617 ; in Sicily, 622 ; 
his plans and forces, 622; sails for 
Africa, 622 ; gives no rendezvous, 623 ; 
his fleet dispersed, 623 ; in grave dan¬ 
ger, 626; returns to Ruspina, 627; 
fleet turns up, 628 ; his camp at Rus¬ 
pina, 629; his clever tactics at Rus¬ 
pina, 630-6 ; want of victual, 637; 
blockaded in Ruspina, 638-9 ; his dif¬ 
ficulties in Africa, 641; his defense, 
643; reinforced, 644 ; follows Scipio, 
647; wins initial fight, 650; demon¬ 
strates against Ucita, 650 ; fidelity of 
his legionaries, 651; avoids ambush, 
653 ; makes intrenched lines towards 
Ucita, 655; desertions to, 656 ; receives 
reinforcements, 658; rescues fleet, 660 ; 
draws up opposite Scipio, 663; intrench¬ 
es, 665; avoids stratagem, 667; in want 
of rations, 667 ; moves to Agar, 668 ; 
his raid on Zeta, 670 et seq .; his losses, 



786 


INDEX. 


672 ; his new tactics, 675; offers bat¬ 
tle, 675 ; raid on Tysdra, 675 et seq. ; 
offers battle at Tegea, 678 ; moves to 
Thapsus, 680; attacks ttcipio, 685; 
defeats him, 686; marches to Utica, 
690 ; triumphs in Rome, 691; his reck¬ 
lessness, 691-4; his lieutenants in 
Spain, 695 et seq. ; reaches Spain, 697 ; 
at Corduba, 700 ; besieges. Attegua, 
703 et seq. ; his forces, 706 ; his manoeu¬ 
vres at Attegua, 707 et seq. ; captures 
Attegua, 709; manoeuvres south of 
Attegua, 710; at Soricaria, 710; de¬ 
feats Pompey, 710; his operations 
about Munda, 712; similarity in his 
campaigns, 719; heads off Pompey, 
720 ; attacks at Munda, 723 ; his men 
anxious to fight, 724 ; his victory hard 
won, 726 ; his opponents, 728-30; ap¬ 
pearance and bodily strength, 732; 
demeanor, 733 ; socially, 733 ; his liai¬ 
sons, 734 ; domestic habits, 734 ; as 
estimated by old authors, 735; his 
friendships, 735; as a captain, 736 ; 
his realism, 736; his judgment, 736; 
not perfect, 737 ; his cruelty, 737 ; his 
honors, 738 ; his projects, 739 ; in Gaul, 
740 ; in civil war, 741 et seq. ; his over¬ 
hastiness, 742 ; his ability as a captain, 
745 et seq. ; his logistics, 74(5; as a 
fighter, 747-8; his tactics, 748-9; his 
cavalry, 749; his opponents, 750 et 
seq. ; as an army commander and dis¬ 
ciplinarian, 762 et seq. ; compared to 
Alexander and Hannibal, 755-67. 

Calendar, 500. 

Camps, important role played by, 526 ; 
under Empire, 776. 

Camps, Caesar’s, location, 381; pitching. 
382 ; defense of, 382-3 ; ditch and wall 
of, 383; time taken in making, 384; 
pickets, 385; watches, 385. 

Caninius, 322, 324 et seq., 326. 

Camulogenus, 270 et seq. 

Carnutes, 212, 228, 230, 237, 312, 326. 

Carrhae, battle of, 402 et seq. 

Carruca, 712, 720. 

Carvoeiro, 45. 

Cassivellaunus, 177 et seq. ; his killed, 
184 ; draws out the war, 185 ; defends 
the Thames, 186; his allies desert 
him, 186. 

Cativolcus, 193. 

Cato, 427, 620, 689, 751. 

Cavalry, raised from foreigners, 6 ; im¬ 
provement in, 7 ; position of, 10 ; Gal¬ 
lic, 57 ; Caesar’s in Gaul, 67 ; Caesar’s 
defeated, 153; Caesar’s unable to land 
in Britain, 170; Caesar takes to Brit¬ 
ain, 179; Vercingetorix’, 248; Caesar’s 
German, 276, 456 ; German, at Alesia, 
304; at Ilerda, 447 ; Caesar’s follows 
Afranius, 459; at Munda, 726; Cae¬ 
sar’s, 749 ; of Empire, 771. 

Celtica, how divided, 55. 

Celts, 54. 


Centurions, 16. 

Chaeronaea, battle of, 22 et seq. 

Cicero, 101, 197 et seq.; refuses to treat 
with Ambiorix, 197; his gallant de¬ 
fense, 204 ; 208 ; 212 ; at Aduatuca, 
220 ; Germans attack him, 222 ; poor 
defense, 223. 

Cingetorix, 179, 216. 

Classes for service, 2. 

Cleopatra, 579, 581, 603. 

Cohorts, Marius’, 8. 

Commius, 167, 170, 214, 296-7, 315, 318, 

322. 

Considius, 625, 644, 651, 688, 690. 

Convictolatavis, 258. 

Corduba, 699. 

Correus, 314, 321-2. 

Cotta, 101, 168, 173, 193 et seq., 208, 
226. 

Crassus, M., 44, 48, 101, 131, 143 ; sub¬ 
dues Aquitania, 144 et seq.; his bat¬ 
tle, 145-6; 212, 214, 400 ; in Syria and 
Partheia, 402; at Canine, 403; de¬ 
feated, killed, 404. 

Discipline, in transition state, 10. 

Divitiacus, 52, 82, 90, 104, 112. 

Domitian, 775. 

Domitius, Ahenobarbus, 27, 406, 416, 
434, 452, 568. 

Domitius, Cal., 508, 544, 547, 604 et seq., 
608. 

Dover, 168. 

Drappes, 326. 

Dumnorix, 64 et seq., 71, 179-80. 

Dyrraehium, description of, 513 ; opera¬ 
tions about, 515 et seq.; siege of, 515 
et seq.; theatre of, 517; novelty of 
blockade, 522; condition of rival 
troops, 522 ; Caesar tries to capture, 
523; operations on the left, 532-3; 
Caesar defeated at, 534 et seq. 

Eburones, 193, 210 et seq., 217 et seq.; 
punished, 221, 322-3. 

Egypt, 580. 

Elaver, passage of, 251. 

Elephants, 7, 771. 

Engines, 7. 

Epirus, 497. 

Eporedorix, 257, 267-8, 296. 

Eunostos, 590. 

Euphanor, 591, 597. 

Fabius, 101, 200, 212,214, 322, 324 et seq., 
326, 433, 435, 439 et seq., 728. 

Fieldworks, 23. 

Fleet, increased, 13; how manned, 13; 
how managed, 14 et seq.; battles of, 
15 et seq. 

Ford, Caesar’s artificial, 455 et seq. 

Fortifications, improved, 11, 12. 

Galba, his Alpine campaign, 129 et seq.; 
134, 167. 

Ganymedj 586. 



INDEX . 


Gaul, how acquired and divided, 51, 53; 
turbulent, 52; climate, topography, 
population, feudalism, 54. 

Gauls, 51 et seq.; their appearance and 
habits, 56; as soldiers, 57; general 
assembly, 82; inconstant, 130, 143; 
rising of, 192, 232 ; conspiracy of, 228 ; 
destroy their towns, 240; their forti¬ 
fications, 245 ; gallantry of, 246 ; raise 
army for relief of Alesia, 296; new 
idea of war, 310; subjugated, 334. 

Genabum, 230, 236. 

Geneva, 60; wall at, 62 et seq. 

Gergobina, 236-7. 

Gergovia, 230, 249, 252 et seq.; its natu¬ 
ral defenses, 255 ; works, 255 et seq.; 
assault on, 259; fails, 265 et seq. 

Gomphi, 548. 

Gymnastics, 10. 

Hadrumetum, 623, 688. 

Haliacmon, operations on, 509. 

Hannibal, 251, 266, 313; compared to 
Alexander and Caesar, 755-67. 

Harbors, 14. 

Helvetii, 50 et seq.; want to emigrate, 
58; choice of routes, 59; rendezvous, 
60; send ambassadors, 62; try to 
force exit, 64 ; get into Gaul, 66 ; their 
slow march, 66 ; cross Arar, 69 ; send 
ambassadors, 70; rearguard fighting, 
71; escape Caesar's ambuscade, 74; 
attack Csesar, 76; are defeated, 77-8 ; 
surrender, 80: number of, 80; sent 
back to their home, 80-1. 

Herennius, 28 et seq. 

Hirtuleius, 28 et seq. 

Hispalis, 712. 

Igurium, 413. 

Ilerda, 436 ; operations near, 438 et seq.; 
terrain, assault of, 458; operations 
south of, 460 et seq. 

Illyricum, 178, 610. 

Indutiomarus, 179, 206. 

Intervals, decreasing, 7 et seq.; in Cae- 
sar’s legion, 9 ; under Empire, 734. 

Juba, 484 et seq., 619, 639, 652, 657, 677, 
688, 689. 

Killed and wounded, 528. 

Labienus, T., 65, 98, 101, 133, 167, 180, 
183, 201, 204 ; defeats Indutiomarus, 
207 ; 213; attacked by Treviri, 214; 
defeats them, 215 ; 219, 249, 268-9; 
his campaign against Lutetia, 270 et 
seq.; advances on Lutetia, 272 ; bears 
defeat at Gergovia, 272; attacks Ca- 
mulogenus, 273; defeats him and re¬ 
tires, 274; joins Csesar, 275 ; 303-4, 
306, 323, 332, 414, 551, 558, 620, 629 et 
seq., 637, 642, 648-9; his ambush, 652 
et seq.; his stratagem, 666; 670-3, 676, 
688, 697, 726, 751„ 


Legates, 10. 

Legion, early Homan, 1; Caesar’s, 2, 
4 ; of Second Punic War, 2, 3 ; Mari¬ 
us’^ changes in, 7 et seq.; numbers of, 
7; intervals in Caesar’s, 9; strength 
of, 276-7 ; degenerate under Empire, 
768 et seq.; sti*ength of, under Empire, 
771; changes in, under Empire, 772 ; 
tactics of, 773. 

Legionary, armament of, 4; belong to 
general, 11; cleverness of Csesar’s, 
185 ; energy of Csesar’s, 242. 

Lentulus, 406, 413. 

Leptis, 626, 627, 642. 

Liger, the fleet built in, 131. 

Losses in battle, 447. 

Lucterius, 326 et seq. 

Lucullus, in the East, 32 et seq.; his 
work and ability, 33-6. 

Lusitania, campaign in, 44 et seq. 

Lutetia, 212. 

Mamurra, 148. 

Marches, 258, 672, 774. 

Marius, C., 4; gives all free-born citi¬ 
zens right to serve, 5 ; his changes in 
army, 6; his marches, 9, 12; as a 
soldier, 16; sent to Gaul, 17; barba¬ 
rians attack camp on Rhone, 18 ; fol¬ 
lows and attacks them, 18; victori¬ 
ous, 19, 20. 

Massilia, 51, 434; naval battle at, 452; 
description of, 474 et seq.; siege of, 
475 et seq.; second naval fight, 477 ; 
sally from, 478 ; works at, 479; Ro¬ 
man works burn. 480. 

Matrona, shipbuilding in, 179. 

Menapii, 147, 168, 211, 213. 

Mercenaries, 6, 1(5, 768 et seq. 

Metellus, in Spain, 27 et seq. 

Metropolis, 549. 

Militia, disappears, 16. 

Mines, 12. 

Mithridates, 22, 32 et seq., 41. 

Mons Herminium, 44 et seq. 

Morini, 147 ; attack Roman party, 173. 

Mounds, 12. 

Munda, 712 et seq.; battle of, 713 et seq.; 
location of, 713 et seq.; near Corduba, 
714 et seq.; arguments as to locality, 
713 et seq.; probably near Montilla, 
712, 720; battlefield of. 721; descrip¬ 
tion of, 722 et seq.; forces at, 722; 
their position, 722 ; Cfesar attacks at, 
723 ; narrowly wins victory, 726 ; mas¬ 
sacre and losses at, 726. 

Mutiny, 11; of Ninth legion, 487 ; of-the 
legions near Rome, 616. 

Napoleon, 207, 269, 340, 350. 

Nervii, the, 113 et seq. : their ambuscade, 
114; their splendid attack, 114 ; 193-8, 
211 . 

Nicopolis, 606 ; battle of, 607. 

Nile, battle of the, 599 et seq. 

Noviodunum, 110, 238, 268. 



788 


INDEX. 


Oath, personal to general, G ; under Em¬ 
pire, 769. 

Obulco, 697, 715. 

Octodorus valley, campaign, 129. 

Orchomenus, battle of, 24. 

Orgetorix, 58. 

Panic at Dyrrachium, 538-40. 

Parada, 688. 

Pas de l’Ecluse, 59, 66. 

Pay, of soldier doubled, 10 ; 761. 

Petreius, 485, 440 et seq ., 620, 688-9. 

Phalanx, Hannibal’s, 2. 

Pharnaces, 604, 608, 612-14. 

Pharos, 582, 592. 

Pharsalus, battle of, 553 et seq.; topo¬ 
graphy of, 553-4 ; rival forces at, 558 ; 
their position, 558 ; plan of, 559 ; field 
of, 561 ; Caesar’s attack, 563; failure 
of Pompey’s cavalry, 564 ; victory and 
pursuit, 565 et seq.; losses, 568. 

Pharsalus plain, 555. 

Plancus, 101, 192. 

Pompey Cnaeus, 620, 639, 697; defeats 
Caesar at Corduba, 703; follows Cae¬ 
sar to Attegua, 705; his forces, 706 ; 
defeated at Soricaria, 710; starts for 
Carteia, 716; cut off from retreat, 
moves back on Corduba, 720; flees, 
728; his death, 728-9 ; 730, 741. 

Pompey the Great, his ability and char¬ 
acter, 24 et seq. ; in Pisenum, 26 ; im- 
perator, 27 ; in Sicily and Africa, 27 ; 
saluted magnus, 27 ; in Spain, 28 ; de¬ 
feated by Sertorius, 29 ; his work in 
Spain, 30 ; subdues pirates, 31 et seq. ; 
supplants Lueullus, 34 ; follows Mith- 
riclates, 34 et seq. ; how his success 
was won, 35-6, 48 ; governing Rome, 
400 ; dictator, 401; an aristocrat, 405 ; 
his forces, 412; abandons Rome, 414; 
his plans, 415 ; goes to Luceria, 415 ; 
determines to leave Italy, 419his 
procrastination, 420 ; at Brundisium, 
422 ; sends part of army to Epirus, 
422 ; escapes from Brundisium, 426 ; 
his legions in Spain, 428 ; his strate¬ 
gic plan, 428; his lack of force, 
429; his Spanish legion, 436; his 
forces in Spain, 436-7; inactivity, 
473; his general plan thwarted, 483; 
captures two of Cesar’s legions in II- 
lyricum, 486 ; his forces, 489; fleet, 
490; inert, 491; his drill camp, 491; 
what he had accomplished, 492 ; hur¬ 
ries to the coast, 498; saves Dyrra- 
ehium, 499; what he should have 
done, 499; moves against Antony, 
505 ; his plan, 507 ; camps near Cssar, 
512; plans not to fight, 514; makes 
inner line, 516 ; his skill, 518 ; supe¬ 
rior position, 518; defeats Ninth le¬ 
gion, 520 ; his lack of water, 522 ; at¬ 
tacks Caesar’s lines, 524 ; beaten back, 
325-6; sends horse to Dyrrachium, 
530; desertions to, 531; attacks Cae¬ 


sar’s left, 531 et seq.; gains foothold 
on Caesar’s left, 534; defeats Caesar 
badly, 538 ; elated at his victory, 541; 
follows Caesar, 544; starts to join 
Scipio, 545 ; in Larissa, 550 ; advances 
to Pharsalus, 552; his forces, 552; 
will not attack Caesar, 555 ; offers bat¬ 
tle, 557 ; his plan of battle, 557 ; awaits 
attack, 562; his cavalry fails, 564; 
flees from the field, 566 ; his camp, 
566; his losses, 568 ; his flight, 569; 
his death, 570; his character, 571; 
contrasted with Caesar, 571, 751. 

Pompey, Sextus, 620, 697, 702, 729, 730, 
741. _ 

Praetorian cohorts, 769-70. 

Province, the, 52, 232, 275. 

Ptolemy,.579, 581, 597, 598-9, 601. 

Pulfio, 199. 

Quincunx, 3, 9. 

Quinquireme, 14. 

Remi, 103, 206, 225, 313. 

Rewards and punishments, 10, 11. 

Roscius, 101. 

Ruspina, 627 ; camp at, 629 ; battle at, 
629 ; camp at, 636. 

Rutilius, P., 5. 

Sabinus, 101, 134, 139 et seq.; his clever 
defeat of Unelli, 140-1; 167, 173, 193 
et seq., 208. 

Sabura, 485, 690. 

Samarobriva, 152 ; council at, 189, 191. 

Sarsura, 676. 

Sathonay, 68. 

Scaeva, 528. 

Scipio, 434, 507, 545, 620; his forces, 
621; his plan, 621; joins Labienus, 
637; blockades Caesar in Ruspina, 
638 ; his proper policy, 642; drawn 
up before Ruspina, 647; moves on 
Caesar, 648; attacks Caesar’s fatigue 
parties, 657; offers battle, 662; in¬ 
trenches, 665; attacks Caesar on re¬ 
treat, 671 ; his laxness, 673; declines 
battle, 675 ; follows Caesar to Thapsus, 
681; manoeuvres in front of Thapsus, 
682-3; camps, 683 ; defeated, 687 ; 
massacre of his army, 688, 751. 

Seribonius, 406. 

Senones, 212. 

Sequana, fleet building on, 178, 270. 

Sequani, 58, 64, 82. 

Sertorius, Q., in Spain, 27 et seq .; assas¬ 
sinated, 31. 

Servius Tullius, 2. 

Ships, kinds of, 13; officers of, 14. 

Sieges, improved, 12 ; antiquity of, 386 ; 
walls to be attacked, 386-7 ; towers, 
387, 393 ; mounds, 388; circumvalla- 
tion and contravallation, 388; ter¬ 
races, enormous size of, 390; rams, 
390, 394; vines, 391 ; mantelets, 391; 
musculi, 391; telenon, 396 ; engines, 





INDEX. 


789 


A 


397; breaches, 398; steps of a siege, 
398; 776. 

Signaling, 230. 

Singulis, 715 et seq. 

Sitius, 639, 688, 690. 

Slope, importance of, in battle, 527. 
Soricaria, battle of, 710-11. 

Spain, 695 et seq., 698. 

Square, 9. 

Suevi, 18, 150, 157, 162, 217. 

Sulla, 12, 16; as a general, 21 ; at Ath¬ 
ens, 21; at Chseromea, 22 ; his ability, 
24; 27. 

Sulpicius, 168. 

Tegea, 678. 

Teutones and Cimbri, 16-20. 

Tliapsus, 675, 677 et seq., 681 ; battle of, 
684 et seq.; 690. 

Thessaly, plain of, 548. 

Tigranes, 32 et seq. 

Tigranocerta, 33. 

Time, division of Roman, 385. 

Titus, 773. 

Trebonius, 101, 185, 200, 212, 219, 236, 
313, 319, 433, 475 et seq., 696. 

Tribunes, 10. 

Triumvirate, 48, 400 ; end of, 405. 
Triumvirs, at Luca, 401. 

Tysdra, 645, 676, 688, 690. 

Ubii, 151, 157, 162, 217. 

Ucita, 645-6, 659 et seq., 688. 

Ucubis, 712. 

Ulia, 699. 

Usipetes and Tenchtheri, 151 et seq.; 
send ambassadors, 152; their mas¬ 
sacre, 155 ; its location, 155. 

Utica, 688. 


Uxellodunum, 326 et seq.; position, 327 ; 
siege of, 327 et seq.; defense of, 330 
et seq.; capture of, 332. 

Varenus, 199. 

Varro, 435, 481. 

Varus, 406, 413, 661, 726. 

Vellaunodunum, 236. 

Veneti, seize ambassadors, 131; their 
country, 132 ; their trade with Brit¬ 
ain, 133; their towns, 135; their ship, 
135-6 ; battle against, 138 ; their boats 
and tactics, 138-9 ; their defeat, 139. 

Ventisponte, 712 et seq., 720. 

Vercassivellaunus, 296. 

Vercingetorix, 227 et seq. ; his character, 
230; his recruiting, 231; his ability, 
231; opens campaign, 231 ; moves on 
Caesar, 234 ; moves back, 236 ; follows 
Caesar, 238 ; his new plan, 239 ; camps 
near Avaricum, 240 ; lays ambush for 
Caesar, 243; his difficulties, 244; de¬ 
fends Elaver, 250; at Gergovia, 255 
et seq. ; rouses zEdui, 258; attacks 
camp, 258; raises new troops, 275 ; 
faces Caesar, 278 ; is defeated, 280; 
retires to Alesia, 282; sends away 
cavalry, 290 ; at Alesia, 293 et seq. ; 
surrenders, 305 ; his ability, 309, 729. 

Veromandui, 116. 

Vesontio, 87 ; panic at, 88, 98, 101, 277. 

Viridomarus, 257, 267-8, 296. 

Volusenus, 166-7. 

Winter-quarters, 98, 126, 149, 174, 191, 
205, 225, 306, 333. 

Zela, 33 ; battle of, 612 et seq. 

Zeta, 669. 


/ 



LIST OF DATES 


B. C. 

Marius begins the Army Changes. 110 

Battle of Aquae Sextiae. 102 

Battle of Vercellae. 101 

Birth of Caesar. 100 

Battle of Chaeronaea. 8G 

Battle of Orchomenus. 85 ] 

Caesar made priest of Jupiter. 84 ; 

Pompey in Picenum. 83 

Pompey in Sicily and Africa. 82 

Caesar in Bithynia . 81 

Caesar in Cilicia. 78 

Pompey in Spain. 77 

Lucullus in the East. 74-GC 

Battle of Tigranocerta. 69 

Pompey subdues the Pirates. G7 

Caesar Quaestor in Spain. 67 

Pompey in the East. 66-61 j 

Battle on tlieLycus. 66 

Caesar iEdile. 65 

Caesar Judex Quaestionis. 64 

First Triumvirate. GO 

Caesar Consul. 59 j 

Helvetian Campaign. 58 } 

Operations at Geneva.March, 58 | 

Battles of the Arar and Bibracte.... June, 58 
Campaign against Ariovistus..Aug.-Sept. 58 

Battle of the Axona.Spring, 57 

Battle of the Sabis.Aug. 57 

Galba’s Campaign in Alps.Winter, 57-56 

Veneti seize hostages.Winter, 57-56 

Campaign against Veneti 

Spring and Summer, 56 

Sabinus in Normandy.Spring, 56 

Crassus’ Campaign in Aquitania. Summer, 56 

Meeting of Triumvirs at Luca. 56 

Battle against Veneti.Fall, 56 

Campaign against Morini and Menapii 

Late Fall, 56 

Usipetes and Tenchtheri invade Gaul 

Spring, 55 

Caesar moves against them.April, 55 

Massacre of Usipetes and Tenchtheri. June, 55 
Caesar builds bridge and crosses Rhine 

Mid. June, 55 

First Expedition to Britain... Aug., Sept. 55 

Expedition against Treviri.June, 54 

Second Crossing to Britain.July 20, 54 

Recrossing to Continent.End Aug. 54 

Ambiorix attacks Sabinus and Cotta. .Nov. 54 

Ambiorix attacks Cicero.Nov. 54 

Battle against Ambiorix.Nov. 54 

Indutiomarus attacks Labienus. Winter, 54-53 
Campaign against Nervian Allies. .March, 53 

The Treviri attack Labienus.March, 53 

Caesar again crosses Rhine.Spring, 53 

Campaign against Ambiorix 

Summer and Fall, 53 

Germans attack Aduatuca.Fall, 53 

Battle of Carrliae. 53 

Vercingetorix opens Campaign 

Late Winter, 53-52 


Caesar joins his legions-Late Winter, 53-52 

Noviodunum, Avaricum... .Early Spring, 52 
March to, Siege of and Retreat from Ger- 

govia.Spring, 52 

Breach between Caesar and Pompey. 52 

Pompey Consul with dictatorial powers .. 52 

Labienus’ Campaign against Parisii. Spring, 52 

Caesar joins Labienus.Late Spring, 52 

Battle of Vingeanne.Early Summer, 52 

Siege of Alesia.Summer and Fall, 52 

Battle of Alesia.Fall, 52 

Campaign against Bellovacian Allies 

Jan. to April, 51 

Battle against Bellovaci.April, 51 

Siege of Uxellodunum.Spring, 51 

Caesar inspects Gaul.Summer, 51 

Breach widened between Caesar and Pom¬ 


pey . 51-50 

Caesar declared Public Enemy. 50 

Tribunes flee from Rome*.Dec. 12, 50 

Passing of Rubicon.Dec. 17, 50 

Antony takes Aretium.Dec. 20, 50 

Consuls leave Rome*.Dec. 23, 50 

Pompey at Lavinium.Dec. 30, 50 

Caesar at Ancona*.Jan. 5, 49 

Auximum taken.Jan. 8, 49 

Asculum taken.Jan. 11, 49 

Camp at Corfinium*.Jan. 18, 49 

Corfinium taken*.Jan. 24, 49 

Pompey arrives at Brundisium*.. Jan. 28, 49 

Caesar arrives at Brundisium*-Feb. 9, 49 

Pompey leaves Brundisium.Feb. 17, 49 

Caesar arrives at Capua*.Feb. 25, 49 

Caesar arrives at Rome.Mar. 2, 49 

Caesar leaves for Gaul*.Mar. 9, 49 

Cato abandons Sicily*.Mar. 25, 49 

Siege of Massilia opened*.Apr. 4, 49 

Fabius camps at Ilerda.Apr. 20, 49 

Caesar leaves Massilia.May 6, 49 

Caesar reaches Ilerda*.May 23, 49 

Combat at Ilerda.May 27, 49 

Naval Battle at Massilia.May 28, 49 

Inundations begin in Spain.May 29, 49 

Bridge built at San Llorens. .. June 10-11, 49 

Work begun on canal.June 17, 49 

Afranius marches towards Iberus. June 25, 49 
Caesar cuts Afranius from Iberus. June 27, 49 
Second naval battle of Massilia.. .June 30, 49 

Afranius capitulates.July 2, 49 

Curio defeated at Bagradas.July 20, 49 

Caesar arrives at Corduba.Aug. 5, 49 

Caesar arrives at Gades.Aug. 15, 49 

Caesar leaves Gades.Aug. 23, 49 

Caesar arrives at Tarraco.Aug. 28, 49 

Surrender of Massilia.Sept. 6, 49 

Caesar arrives at Massilia.Sept. 21, 49 

Caesar arrives at Placentia.Oct. 11, 49 

Caesar arrives at Rome.Oct. 28, 49 

Caesar arrives at Brundisium.Nov. 17, 49 

Caesar sails from Brundisium*. ..Nov. 28, 49 

Caesar arrives at Dyrrachium .... Nov. 30, 49 

Caesar arrives at Apollonia.Dec. 1, 49 




































































































































































































































